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THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES

TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT CENTURY;

DRAWN UP FROM

59968

BRUCKER'S

HISTORIA CRITICA PHILOSOPHIÆ.

BY

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OPINIONUM COMMENTA DELET DIES, NATURÆ JUDICIA CONFIRMAT.

CIC.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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PREFACE.

IN a country, which has ſo long held a diſtinguiſhed place in the Republic of Letters as Great Britain, it is ſurpriſing that ſo ſmall a ſhare of attention ſhould hitherto have been paid to the ſubject of this work. While the events of civil hiſtory have been related in every poſſible variety of method and language, and have been made the frequent ſubject of philoſophical diſcuſſion, a ſeries of facts, leſs adapted, indeed, to impreſs the imagination, but by no means leſs inſtructive, has been almoſt entirely overlooked. A Britiſh ſtudent, who, in his ſearch after truth, ſhould be deſirous of taking a general ſurvey of the riſe and progreſs of opinions on the more important ſubjects of ſpeculation, and by a fair compariſon of different ſyſtems to draw legitimate concluſions for himſelf, would ſeek in vain for the neceſſary information in any Engliſh work. The only treatiſe, which might ſeem to promiſe him much aſſiſtance on this ſubject, is *Stanley's Hiſtory of Philoſophy*: but, to ſay nothing of the uncouth and

obſcure ſtyle in which this work is written, he would find upon examination, that the author's plan extended little further than to the hiſtory of the Grecian ſects of philoſophy; and that, in executing it, he has rather performed the office of an induſtrious compiler, than that of a judicious critic.

When, a few years ago, I firſt conſulted Brucker's Hiſtory of Philoſophy [1], it was merely in hopes of obtaining, from ſo extenſive and elaborate a work, further ſatisfaction than I had hitherto been able to gain reſpecting the opinions of the antients; and the only uſe I then propoſed to make of the book was, to borrow from it ſome aſſiſtance in drawing up a Courſe of Lectures to young men on the purſuit of knowledge. But upon a careful peruſal of this hiſtory, I found it a vaſt magazine of important facts, collected with indefatigable induſtry, digeſted with admirable perſpicuity of method, and written with every appearance of candour and impartiality. I regretted that ſo valuable a fund of information ſhould be acceſſible only to thoſe, who had learning, leiſure, and perſeverance ſufficient, to read in Latin ſix cloſely printed quarto volumes, containing on the average about a thouſand pages each. I thought I could not render my countrymen better ſervice, than

[1] Edit. ſec. Lipſiæ, 1767.

by

by taking upon myſelf to become, in this inſtance, their reader; and determined to undertake the taſk of communicating to them, in their vernacular tongue, the SUBSTANCE of this great, and, as it appeared to me, valuable work.

The taſk was not without difficulties. Having neither leiſure, nor in many caſes opportunity, to compare the hiſtory with the numerous authorities to which it refers, I was obliged, for the moſt part, to give my author implicit credit for fidelity and accuracy. This, however, I thought myſelf juſtified in doing, partly becauſe, wherever I have conſulted the originals, I have found the quotations and references ſufficiently correct; but chiefly, on account of the high reputation which the author has obtained upon the continent. I have, nevertheleſs, thought it right to give his references, as far as my plan would permit, that they may be conſulted by ſuch readers as may wiſh to compare them with the work. In the ſelection of materials, I had no reſource, but to rely upon my own judgment. The only rule I have followed has been, to chuſe ſuch particulars as were moſt likely to be generally intereſting. Thoſe who are inclined to enter into more minute inquiries, will of courſe conſult the original authors; and for their convenience, a general liſt of references

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is given at the cloſe of each chapter, or ſection. In regard to language, I have found it wholly impracticable to follow my author. His ſtyle is ſo exceedingly verboſe, that it would have been impoſſible to have made theſe volumes a tranſlation of ſelect parts, without omitting others equally important, and without at the ſame time rendering the work tedious to an Engliſh reader. Inſtead of *tranſlating* the original, I have, therefore, endeavoured to give a faithful *repreſentation* of its general meaning and ſpirit. To expreſs theſe with perſpicuity and preciſion has been, as far as reſpects ſtyle, my utmoſt aim.

Of the author's Abridgment of his great work, publiſhed, in a large octavo volume, under the title of *Inſtitutiones Hiſtoriæ Philoſophicæ Uſui Academicæ Juventutes adornatæ*, I have made as much uſe, as was conſiſtent with the different views with which that abſtract and this hiſtory were drawn up. The former appears to have been written almoſt entirely for the ſake of academic ſtudents, and rather to aſſiſt their recollection in ſtudying the ſubject, than to ſuperſede the uſe of the larger hiſtory. The latter is deſigned to give thoſe, who may not have leiſure or opportunity to peruſe the original, an idea of its contents, ſufficiently com-

Lipſiæ, 1756.

plete to anſwer every purpoſe of intereſting or uſeful information. If it be aſked, whether the trouble of drawing up this hiſtory from the larger work might not have been ſpared by tranſlating the author's own abridgment;* my anſwer is, that ſuch a tranſlation would only have furniſhed the Engliſh reader with a dry ſketch of leading incidents and opinions; whereas, in this work it is intended, not only to communicate information by a detail of facts, but to enliven the detail by anecdotes and reflections of various kinds. Few perſons, I apprehend, would prefer the bare *outline* of a portrait, though ſketched in full ſize by the hand of a maſter, to a *miniature picture*, which, at the ſame time that it ſufficiently preſerves the likeneſs, copies in ſome meaſure the expreſſion and colouring of the original.

For any occaſional miſtakes which the learned reader may detect in the courſe of this hiſtory, I have no other apology to make, than that I have endeavoured to render it as correct as I was able. With regard to the errors which may be charged upon my author, I am inclined to ſpeak with leſs diffidence. His work bears throughout ſuch evident marks of diligent attention, cool judgment, and freedom from prejudice, as juſtly to entitle even his opinions to no ſmall degree of reſpect; but as far as concerns facts, perhaps no hiſtorian ever

ever had a better claim to confidence. No candid reader will, without the moſt careful enquiry, pronounce that ſtatement of facts erroneous, which was the reſult of a courſe of inveſtigation, in which the life of an induſtrious ſtudent was principally occupied for the long term of FIFTY YEARS*.

The uſes which may be made of the hiſtory of philoſophy are ſo fully enumerated in the author's PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, as to leave me little to add upon the ſubject. I muſt not, however, omit to mention certain applications of this branch of knowledge, which, from cauſes into which it is of little conſequence to enquire, Brucker has either barely hinted at, or wholly overlooked.

Experience is univerſally acknowledged to be the beſt preceptor. The hiſtory of philoſophy is a regiſter of experiments to aſcertain the ſtrength of the human underſtanding. As far as they have been ſucceſsful, they at once ſerve to guide and to encourage our future reſearches. And even thoſe which have been unſucceſsful may perhaps prove of equal uſe in preventing the repetition of unprofitable labours. To infer from the diverſity of opinions on metaphyſical

ſubjects, which, after ages of diſputation, has ſubſiſted, and ſtill continues, among philoſophers, that the whole field of metaphyſics ought to be abandoned as barren ground, would be a raſh and precipitate concluſion. But the dialectic combatants of the Grecian, Alexandrian, Arabian, and Chriſtian ſchools, have lived to little purpoſe, if they have not convinced the world, that by far the greater part of their ingenuity and induſtry was employed, either upon *mere words*, or upon *nugæ difficiles*, which have never yielded, and are never likely to yield, any ſubſtantial benefit to mankind.

With reſpect to thoſe more important enquiries, which have been always interwoven with ſcholaſtic logomachies, ſuch as concern, for example, the origin of things, the nature of the Supreme Being, the diſtinct exiſtence and duration of the human ſoul, the foundation of morals, and other ſimilar ſubjects, although the different ſyſtems, which are embraced with equal confidence by dogmatiſts of every ſect, ought not to be pleaded as an argument for abandoning the ſearch after truth, as altogether a hopeleſs purſuit, they ought, unqueſtionably, to teach every inquirer caution and diffidence, and every diſputant candour and moderation. Perhaps, too, men's reſearches into theſe ſubjects, have

now been carried to ſuch extent, and every argument upon them has been ſo thoroughly diſcuſſed, that it may be poſſible to determine, with ſufficient preciſion, *how far* it is poſſible for the human faculties to proceed in the inveſtigation of truth, and *why* it can proceed no further. Poſſibly the time may not be far diſtant, when an end will be put to fruitleſs controverſy, by diſtinctly aſcertaining the limits of the human underſtanding. If this deſirable point be ever attained, it is obvious that one of the means of accompliſhing it muſt be, an accurate attention to the manner in which different ſects in philoſophy and religion have, from time to time, ariſen, and to the various cauſes of diverſity of opinion.

But, among the advantages which may be expected, from a compariſon of the hiſtory of philoſophy with the preſent ſtate of opinions, one of the principal is, that it will lead to the full diſcovery of the origin of many notions and practices, which have no other ſupport than their antiquity, and conſequently to much important reformation and improvement. The doctrines, the forms, and even the technical language of our public ſchools, may be eaſily traced back to the Scholaſtic age, and through this to the antient Grecian ſects, particularly to the Peripatetic ſchool. It is im-

poſſible that the preſent ſtate of knowledge ſhould be fairly compared with antient wiſdom, without diſcovering the abſolute neceſſity of enlarging the field of education beyond the utmoſt limits preſcribed by our moſt enlightened anceſtors. From the ſame compariſon, ſimilar effects may be confidently expected, with reſpect to religious tenets and inſtitutions. When it is clearly underſtood (as from the preſent free diſcuſſion of theſe ſubjects it is likely ſoon to be) that many of the doctrines commonly received as of divine authority, originated in the Pagan ſchools, and were thence tranſplanted *at a very early period*, into the Chriſtian church; more particularly, when it is generally known (and it is impoſſible it can be long concealed even from the loweſt claſſes of the people) that the fundamental doctrine of the UNITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE has undergone corruptions, from which no eſtabliſhed church in Chriſtendom has ever yet been purged; it cannot fail to become an object of general attention, to produce ſuch a reform in religion, as ſhall free its public inſtitutions from the incumbrance of Scholaſtic ſubtleties, and to render religion itſelf more intereſting and efficacious, by making its forms more ſimple and intelligible.

It has not been without the hope of contributing, in ſome degree, towards the abolition of antient errors, and the extenſion of uſeful knowledge, that I have drawn up this hiſtory of philoſophy.

W E.

Norwich, June 1791.

AN

EPITOME

OF THE

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

IN THREE PERIODS.

PERIOD THE FIRST,

From the Earlieſt Times, to the Decline of the Roman Republic; which comprehends,

I. BARBARIC PHILOSOPHY, including that of all antient Nations, among whom the Greek Language was not ſpoken.

1. EASTERN NATIONS.

(1.) HEBREWS, comprehending the poſterity of Abraham to the Time of the Babyloniſh Captivity; after their return from which they were called Jews. Among their wiſe men, the moſt celebrated names are MOSES, Solomon, and Daniel. Their wiſdom, derived from divine revelation, is not to be confounded with philoſophical and ſpeculative ſcience.

(2.) CHALDEANS, the author of whoſe philoſophy was Zoroaſter. Belus was another celebrated teacher of wiſdom among the Aſſyrians; but both his age and hiſtory are uncertain. Later than theſe lived Beroſus, who firſt taught the Chaldean learning to the Greeks.

(3.) PERSIANS,

(3.) PERSIANS, among whom Zardhuſt, alſo called Zoroaſter, was the founder of wiſdom: he wrote a ſacred book called Zend. Among the Perſian Magi were Hyſtaſpes and Hoſtanes.

(4.) INDIANS, whoſe wiſe men were called Gymnoſophiſts and Brachmans. Among theſe were Buddas, Dandamis, and Calanus.

(5.) ARABIANS, among whom the Zabii, a ſect of philoſophers, and Lokman, an elegant writer of fables, are memorable.

(6.) PHENICIANS, to whom is aſcribed the invention of letters. Moſchus, Cadmus, and Sanchoniathon, are among their celebrated men.

2. SOUTHERN NATIONS.

(1.) EGYPTIANS, the founder of whoſe wiſdom was Theut, or Thoth, whom the Greeks call Hermes, and the Latins Mercury. After him aroſe a ſecond Hermes, called alſo Triſmegiſtus, to whom various books and inventions are aſcribed.

(2.) ETHIOPIANS, whoſe wiſdom ſeems to have been borrowed from the Egyptians. Atlas was one of their firſt aſtronomers.

3. WESTERN NATIONS.

(1.) CELTS, whoſe philoſophers were called Druids. Under the general name of the Celtic nations were comprehended the Gauls, Britons, Germans, and Cambrians.

(2.) ETRURIANS and ROMANS: among the former flouriſhed Tages, the inventor of augury: among the latter, Numa is improperly ſtyled a philoſopher.

4. NORTHERN NATIONS.

Theſe include the Northern Scythians (diſtinct from the Celtic Scythians) Thracians, Getæ, &c. Among whom Abaris, Anacharſis, Toxaris, and Zamolxis, obtained the praiſe of wiſdom.

II. GRECIAN

II. GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY; which was,

First, FABULOUS, as taught by Prometheus, Linus, Orpheus, Muſæus, Eumolpus, Melampus, Amphion, Heſiod, Epimenides, and Homer.

Secondly, POLITICAL, chiefly adapted to the formation and improvement of ſtates, and the civilization of ſociety. Among the authors of this philoſophy were the legiſlators Zeleucus, Triptolemus, Draco, Solon, and Lycurgus; the Seven Wiſe Men of Greece, Thales, Chilo, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, and Periander; and the fabuliſt, Eſop.

Thirdly, SECTARIAN, which owes its birth to Thales and Pythagoras, and was divided into two leading ſchools, the Ionic and Italic.

Of the IONIC SCHOOL were

1. THE IONIC SECT *proper*, whoſe founder Thales had, as his ſucceſſors, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Diogenes Apolloniates, and Archelaus.

2. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL, founded by SOCRATES, the principal of whoſe diſciples were Xenophon, Æſchines, Simon, Cebes, Ariſtippus, Phædo, Euclid, Plato, Antiſthenes, Critus, and Alcibiades.

3. THE CYRENAIC SECT, of which ARISTIPPUS was the author: his followers were, his daughter Arete, Hegeſias, Anicerris, Theodorus, and Bion.

4. THE MEGARIC, or ERISTIC SECT, formed by EUCLID of Megara; to whom ſucceeded Eubulides, Diodorus, and Stilpo, famous for their logical ſubtlety.

5. THE ELIAC, or ERETRIAC SCHOOL, raiſed by PHÆDO of Elis, who, though he cloſely adhered to the doctrine of Socrates, gave name to his ſchool. His ſucceſſors were Pliſtanus, and Menedemus: the latter of whom, being a native of Eretria, transferred the ſchool and name to his own country.

6. THE ACADEMIC SECT, of which PLATO was the founder. After his death, many of his diſciples deviating from his doctrine, the ſchool was divided into

(1.) *The Old Academy*, which ſtrictly retained his tenets, and in which the chair of Plato was ſucceſſively filled by SPEUSIPPUS, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, and Crantor.

(2.) *The*

(2.) *The Middle Academy*, founded by ARCESILAUS, and continued by Lacydes, Evander, and Egeſinus.

(3.) *The New Academy*, of which CARNEADES was the author: he was ſucceeded by Clitomachus, Philo of Lariſſa, Charmidas, and Antiochus of Aſcalon, the laſt preceptor of the Platonic ſchool in Greece.

7. THE PERIPATETIC SECT, founded by ARISTOTLE, whoſe ſucceſſors in the Lyceum were Theophraſtus, Strato, Lycon, Ariſto, Critolaus, and Diodorus. Among the Peripatetics, beſides thoſe who occupied the chair, were alſo Dicæarchus, Eudemus, and Demetrius Phalereus.

8. THE CYNIC SECT, of which the author was ANTISTHENES, whom Diogenes, Oneſicritus, Crates, Metrocles, Menippus, and Menedemus, ſucceeded. In the liſt of Cynic philoſophers muſt alſo be reckoned Hipparchia, the wife of Crates.

9. THE STOIC SECT, of which ZENO was the founder. His ſucceſſors in the porch were Perſæus, Ariſto of Chios, Herillus, Sphærus, Cleanthes, Chryſippus, Zeno of Tarſus, Diogenes the Babylonian, Antipater, Panætius, and Poſidonius.

Of the ITALIC SCHOOL were

1. THE ITALIC SECT, *proper*: it was founded by PYTHAGORAS, a diſciple of Pherecydes. The followers of Pythagoras were Ariſtæus, Mneſarchus, Alcmæon, Ecphantus, Hippo, Empedocles, Epicharmus, Ocellus, Timæus, Archytas, Hippaſus, Philolaus, and Eudoxus.

2. THE ELEATIC SECT, of which XENOPHANES was the author: his ſucceſſors, Parmenides, Meliſſus, Zeno, belonged to the *metaphyſical* claſs of this ſect; Leucippus, Democritus, Protagoras, Diagoras, and Anaxarchus, to the *phyſical*.

3. THE HERACLITEAN SECT, which was founded by HERACLITUS, and ſoon afterwards expired: Zeno and Hippocrates philoſophiſed after the manner of Heraclitus, and other philoſophers borrowed freely from his ſyſtem.

4. THE EPICUREAN SECT, a branch of the Eleatic, had EPICURUS for its author; among whoſe followers were Metrodorus, Polyænus, Hermachus, Polyſtratus, Baſilides, and Protarchus.

5. THE PYRRHONIC, or SCEPTIC SECT, the parent of which was PYRRHO: his doctrine was taught by Timon, the Phliaſian; and after ſome interval was continued by Ptolemy a Cyrenean, and at Alexandria by Æneſidemus.

The

The GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY at length paſſed from Greece and Italy,

1. INTO ASIA. Alexander, in his Aſiatic expedition, was attended by many philoſophers, particularly Calliſthenes and Anaxarchus; ſeveral of whom he ſent to hold conference with the wiſe men of the Eaſt, particularly the Perſian Magi and the Indian Brachmans. The conſequence was, that by means of the mythological caſt of the Oriental theology, the Grecian and Oriental dogmas were blended together; and hence aroſe a new kind of doctrine in the Eaſt.

2. INTO EGYPT. After Alexander had conquered Egypt, he permitted the people, whom he collected from different countries in Alexandria, to profeſs their reſpective religious and philoſophical tenets; whence theſe gradually became incorporated with thoſe of the Greeks. This coalition was afterwards greatly promoted by the encouragement which was given to learned men and philoſophers of all nations and ſects to ſettle at Alexandria. From this time, the names of almoſt all the Greek ſects were heard in Egypt; but that which was chiefly prevalent was the Platonic. The remains of the Italian ſchool of Pythagoras alſo fled into Egypt, and their inſtitutions ſuited the taſte of that ſuperſtitious nation. Thus an alliance gradually took place between the Egyptian, Platonic, and Pythagorean ſyſtems; and from this heterogeneous combination both philoſophy and theology aſſumed a new form in Egypt. When, under Ptolemy Phyſcon, the philoſophers were for a time driven from Egypt into Aſia, upon their return the Oriental philoſophy was added to the maſs, and the confuſion of opinions was completed in the *Eclectic ſect*.

PERIOD THE SECOND,

From the Decline of the Roman Republic to the Revival of Letters, which comprehends,

First, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ROMANS; concerning which may be conſidered its State,

I. Before the Eſtabliſhment of the Monarchy; when it may be remarked, that the Grecian philoſophy was not received without great difficulty. For when Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus were ſent to Rome on an embaſſy from the Athenians, and the Roman youths of diſtinction flocked together to hear the philoſophers, it was thought neceſſary, after giving them an honourable diſmiſſion, to paſs a decree of the ſenate, that no philoſophers ſhould reſide at Rome. When the ſame young men, however, were ſoon afterwards ſent to Athens in a military capacity, they viſited the ſchools of the philoſophers, and became acquainted with their doctrines. This was firſt done by Scipio Africanus, Lelius, and Furius, whoſe example was ſoon followed by many others. Lucullus, who was inſtructed in philoſophy by Antiochus the Aſcalonite, erected a magnificent library at his houſe, which he opened for the uſe of the learned, and hereby enticed philoſophers of all ſects to ſettle at Rome. Sylla, after the ſiege of Athens, firſt brought to light the writings of Ariſtotle and Theophraſtus, and conveyed them to Rome. From the times of Lucullus and Sylla commences the epocha of the flouriſhing ſtate of philoſophy in Rome, during which there was ſcarcely any Grecian ſect which had not its patrons and followers among the Romans. This was the caſe particularly with reſpect to

1. The Pythagoric Sect, to which Ennius, Cato the Cenſor, and Nigidius Figulus were adherents; after whom the Pythagoric diſcipline ſoon diſappeared.
2. The Academic, *Old, Middle, and New:* the Old having among its followers Lucullus, Brutus, Varro, and Piſo; the Middle being eſpouſed by Cicero; and the New by Philo.
3. The Stoic Sect, to which, beſides many other illuſtrious Romans, Balbus and Cato of Utica were addicted.

4. The

4. THE PERIPATETIC SECT; for, after the writings of Ariſtotle had been copied by Tyrannio, and commented upon by Andronicus the Rhodian, a Peripatetic philoſopher, this ſect alſo engaged much attention in Rome. Cato, Craſſus, and Piſo, received inſtructions from philoſophers of this ſect; and Cicero committed the charge of his ſon to Cratippus, a teacher of the Peripatetic philoſophy at Athens.
5. THE EPICUREAN SECT, which was patronized by Torquatus, Velleius, Trebatius, Panſa, Atticus, Caſſius, and others.
6. THE SCEPTIC SECT, which was indeed thought to be extinct in the time of Cicero, but was not without ſecret friends among the profeſſed Academics, and was publicly revived at Alexandria by Æneſidemus.

II. FROM THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROMAN MONARCHY, when, though Roman liberty expired, the ſtudy of philoſophy was not neglected. For with the poets, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Lucan, Manilius, and Perſius, and the hiſtorians, Livy, Tacitus, and Strabo, whoſe writings are enriched with many ſentiments borrowed from the ſchools of philoſophy, we find many profeſſed philoſophers:

1. PYTHAGORIC: for though the ſect of the Pythagoreans ſoon failed, and, ſtrictly ſpeaking, was never afterwards revived, there were ſome philoſophers who adopted Pythagoric dogmas, and followed the Pythagoric diſcipline; among whom were Nigidius, Anaxilaus, Sextius, Sotion, Moderatus, Nicomachus, and, above all the reſt, Apollonius Tyanæus.
2. PLATONIC: to which claſs belonged Thraſyllus, Theon, Alcinous, Favorinus, Taurus, Apuleius, Atticus, Numenius, Maximus Tyrius, Plutarch, and Galen.
3. ECLECTIC, or LATER PLATONISTS; a body of philoſophers, who raiſed a new edifice of opinions from materials collected from various philoſophical and religious ſects, not excepting the Chriſtian. The ſeeds of this ſect were ſown in Egypt by POTAMO, an Alexandrian philoſopher. It roſe to full growth under AMMONIUS SACCA. Among his diſciples were Longinus, Herennius, Origen, and Plotinus. Under PLOTINUS this ſect became ſo flouriſhing, that he may be conſidered as a ſecond father of the Alexandrian Eclectic ſchool. The ſect was ſupported in Egypt and Aſia by

Amelius, Porphyry, Maximus, Jamblichus, Ædeſius, Euſtathius, Chryſanthius, and Hierocles; and afterwards at Athens by Plutarch the ſon of Neſtorius, Syrian, Proclus, Marinus, Iſidore, and Damaſcius.

4. Peripatetic; who may be divided into two claſſes: The *firſt, Pure*, which from Andronicus to the time of Nero, preſerved the peculiar characters of the ſect, and kept it diſtinct from all others. To this claſs belonged, Soſigenes, Nicolaus Damaſcenus, Xenarchus, Athenæus, and Alexander Ægeus. The *ſecond, Mixed*, which owed its origin to Ammonius the Peripatetic, who mixed Platonic and Stoic dogmas with thoſe of his own ſect. His example was followed by Eudemus, Alexander Damaſcenus, Themiſtius, Olympiodorus, Simplicius, and others. Notwithſtanding the attempts which were made by Alexander Aphrodiſeus, Anatolius, and ſome others, to reſtore the purity of the Ariſtotelian doctrine, it remained in a corrupt ſtate, till, in the ſeventh century, it paſſed over to the Arabian and Chriſtian ſchools.

5. Cynic: of whom the moſt memorable names are Muſonius, Demetrius, Demonax, Creſcens, Peregrinus, and Saluſtius.

6. Stoic: who flouriſhed with peculiar diſtinction under the patronage of ſeveral of the emperors. The moſt celebrated Stoics of this period are Athenodorus, Cornutus, Muſonius Rufus, Chæremon, Seneca, Dio of Pruſa, Euphrates, Epictetus, and Sextus of Chæronea.

7. Epicurean: among whom Pliny, Lucian, and Diogenes Laertius are to be reckoned: ſome add Celſus, but without ſufficient reaſon.

8. Sceptic: of whom the principal are Æneſidemus and Sextus Empiricus.

Secondly, THE ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

This philoſophy, which ſprung up a little before the Chriſtian æra, from the remains of the Zoroaſtrean doctrine, had many followers in various parts of Aſia. Of theſe not a few paſſed over into Egypt, and contaminated not only the Pagan, but the Chriſtian and Jewiſh ſchools; producing among the Jews the Cabbaliſtic myſteries, and among the Chriſtians the Gnoſtic hereſies. The Oriental philoſophy, which firſt appeared in Chaldea and Perſia, and was afterwards diſſeminated through other countries, bears ſo near a reſemblance

ſemblance to that of Zoroaſter, that it may be reaſonably referred to this origin.

Thirdly, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS, after their Return from the Babyloniſh Captivity: concerning which is to be conſidered,

I. THE JEWISH PHILOSOPHY FROM THE END OF THE CAPTIVITY TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM; during which period the things chiefly to be noted are,

1. That the Samaritans embraced a mixed ſyſtem of religion, partly Jewiſh and partly Pagan, and received from the Oriental ſchools certain doctrines concerning emanations from the divine nature; whence aroſe the hereſy of Simon Magus.

2. That, by the help of allegory, an Egyptian colony of Jews incorporated Pagan philoſophy, chiefly the Platonic mixed with Oriental dogmas, with the myſtical interpretation of their ſacred law; and that among the firſt of theſe corruptors of Jewiſh wiſdom are to be ranked Philo and Ariſtobulus.

3. That the Cabbala, or myſtical interpretation of the law, was brought over from Egypt to Paleſtine by Simeon Shetach; and that after this there were learned men in Judea who ſtudied Pagan philoſophy, of which Joſephus the hiſtorian is an example.

4. That the principal ſects of the Jews were the Sadducees, the Karæites, the Phariſees, the Eſſenes, and the Therapeutæ, whoſe origin, however, is uncertain: Of their learned men ſome of the moſt eminent were, Jeſus the ſon of Sirach, Philo, Hillel, and Shammai.

II. THE JEWISH PHILOSOPHY FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM TO MODERN TIMES: during which period the principal objects of attention are,

1. The learned men, who having eſcaped the general deſtruction, erected ſchools at Jamnia, Tiberias, Bittera, Lydda, &c. The moſt celebrated doctors of the law at that time were, Eliezer, Johannan, Jehudah Hakkadoſh, and

and Akibha, the compilers of the Talmud. In Babylon, were the Jewiſh ſchools of Sorana, Naharda, and Pumbeditha; among the more celebrated preceptors of whom were the rabbis Aſhe and Joſe, the compilers of the later Talmud, called the Babylonian.

2. The traditionary myſtical wiſdom, called the CABBALA, which after the deſtruction of the Jewiſh ſtate was ſtudied and taught with great induſtry. The moſt famous Cabbaliſts were Akibha, the author of the book *Jezirah*, and Simeon Jochaides, who wrote the book *Sohar*. A diſciple of the former was Simeon ben Jochai, after whom, till the tenth century, we meet with few traces of the Cabbaliſtic philoſophy, and Saadias Gaon is the only diſtinguiſhed name. The Jews, at this time grievouſly perſecuted by the Saracens, fled from the Eaſt into Europe, and many of them ſettled in Spain.

3. The revival of Talmudical, Cabbaliſtic, and Pagan learning among the Jews in Spain, by whom the writings of Ariſtotle were tranſlated from Arabic verſions into Hebrew. The moſt eminent Jew of this age was Maimonides.

III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SARACENS OR ARABIANS.

Before the publication of the ISLAMITIC LAW by MAHOMET, philoſophy had little or no exiſtence among the Arabians. At the beginning of the Abbaſidean dynaſty, in the eighth century, the light of ſcience began to dawn; and under Al-Mamon, in the ninth century, learning of every kind, and eſpecially philoſophy, flouriſhed. Meſue Damaſcenus opened a ſchool at Bagdat, and taught philoſophy in the Syriac tongue. His diſciple Honain alſo promoted the ſtudy of philoſophy, which was greatly facilitated by the Chriſtian libraries which came into the poſſeſſion of the Saracens. The works of Galen and Ariſtotle were tranſlated into Arabic. Public ſchools were inſtituted, and long flouriſhed, at Bagdat, Baſſora, and Bochara. Nor was philoſophy at this time confined to the countries of the eaſt; with the Saracenic empire, it extended to the weſtern world. Numerous ſchools were founded, in which profeſſors of philoſophy were appointed. During the period of Arabian learning, the moſt eminent philoſophers were, Raſi, Eſſereph, Thophail, Averroës, Al Aſhari, Alkendi, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Avenzoar, Avenpace, Al Gazel, Abulfarabi, &c.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIANS.

I. From the Birth of CHRIST to the Seventh Century.

The Fathers of the Chriſtian church, who were diſtinguiſhed by philoſophical learning were, in the *ſecond century*, Juſtin Martyr, Theophilus, Athenagoras, Irenæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Pantænus, and Hermias, who all favoured the Platoniſm which then prevailed; Tatian, who went over to the Gnoſtics; and Tertullian, who, though well ſkilled in antient philoſophy, rejected it altogether:—in the *third century*, Origen, who mixed the Eclectic philoſophy of Alexandria with the Chriſtian doctrine:—in the *fourth century*, Arnobius, Lactantius, Euſebius, Didymus, Auguſtine, Chalcidius:—in the *fifth century*, Syneſius, and Pſeudo-Dionyſius, in the Eaſt; and in the Weſt, Claudius Mammertus and Boëthius, who, after Origen, leaned towards the Eclectic ſect, while Boëthius favoured the Peripatetic:—in the *ſixth century*, Æneas Gaza, and Zecharias Scholaſticus, who were inclined to the Eclectic philoſophy; to whom may be added Philoponus, who, though attached to the ſame ſyſtem, turned his attention chiefly to the interpretation of Ariſtotle.

II. From the Seventh Century to the Revival of Letters; during which come under conſideration,

1. *The philoſophy of the* Greek *or* Oriental *Chriſtians from the ſeventh century to the taking of Conſtantinople*; where the following things are chiefly to be remarked: Alexandrian Platoniſm expired among the Pagans in the ſeventh century; and its remains were only found among the Chriſtians, and chiefly among the monks. Out of the monaſteries, the Ariſtotelian philoſophy began to revive, through the labours of John of Damaſcus, who called in this philoſophy to the aid of theology. He may not improperly be conſidered as the harbinger of the Scholaſtic philoſophy. After his time barbariſm prevailed, till *in the ninth century*, under the emperors Michael and Barda, learning was in ſome degree revived. The moſt celebrated names, at this period, in the Eaſt, were, Pſellus the Elder, Leo the Philoſopher, Photius, Nicetas, Nicephorus, Pachymerus, and Lapitha, all Peripatetics; and Pſellus the Younger, an admirer of the Alexandrian philoſophy.

2. *The philoſophy of the* WESTERN *Chriſtians from the ſeventh century to the twelfth:* during which period flouriſhed, in the *ſeventh* century, Boethius and Iſidore;—in the *eighth*, Bede, Theodore Cilix, Alcuin, &c.;—in the *ninth*, Rabanus, Erigena, Eginhard, Adelard, Grimbald, &c.;—in the *tenth*, Bridferd, Dunſtan, Remigius, Nanno, Gerbert, &c.;—in the *eleventh*, Fulbert, Berengar, Lanfranc, Anſelm, Hermannus, &c. and Roſcelin, from whom aroſe the memorable controverſy between the Nominaliſts and Realiſts. The wiſdom of this period was almoſt wholly waſted in dialectic ſubtleties.

3. THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY, which was a confuſed maſs of notions compounded of Arabian and Ariſtotelian philoſophy and polemic theology. Lanfranc, Roſcelin, and others, have been called the fathers of this philoſophy.

From the beginning of the *twelfth* century to the middle of the *thirteenth*, the more celebrated SCHOLASTICS were, Abelard, Lombard, Porretan, Comeſtor, John of Saliſbury, and Pulleyn; between the middle of the thirteenth century and the year 1330, flouriſhed Albert, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Roger Bacon, Ægidius, Duns Scotus; to theſe ſucceeded, before the revival of letters, Durand, Occam, Suiſſet, and Weſſel.

The Scholaſtics were divided into various ſects, ſuch as Albertiſts, Thomiſts, Scotiſts, Occamiſts; but thoſe of the Nominaliſts and Realiſts are moſt celebrated.

PERIOD

PERIOD THE THIRD,

From the Revival of Letters to the Beginning of the preſent Century; in which we find,

I. ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE AND CORRECT THE SECTARIAN PHILOSOPHY. Theſe we owe to the reſtoration of learning, and particularly to the revival of the ſtudy of the Greek language.

1. After Raymund Lully, in the *thirteenth* century, had in vain pretended to improve philoſophy by his inventive art; in the *fourteenth* and *fifteenth* centuries, many learned men aroſe, who, either by reviving a taſte for claſſical ſtudies, or by tranſlating and commenting upon the writings of the antient philoſophers, or by ſatirizing the Scholaſtic philoſophy and its profeſſors, prepared the way for the reformation of philoſophy. Among theſe, ſome of the more celebrated names are Chryſoloras, Paleologus, Dante, Petrarch, Boccace, Aretin, Politian, Philelphus, Valla, Agricola, and Argyropulus.

2. The revival of learning, accompanied with the reformation of religion, produced a general inclination to reſtore the antient honours of philoſophy. Eraſmus, Vives, Nizolius, and others, expoſed to ridicule the falſe philoſophy of the Scholaſtics; Luther, Melancthon, Faber, Agricola, Camerarius, and others, contributed in various ways to the correction of philoſophy in general.

3. Learned men aroſe, who formed the deſign of reviving the antient Grecian ſects, and arranged themſelves, reſpectively, under the ſtandards of the antient maſters. Particularly,

(1.) THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY, mixed with the Pythagorean, was revived by Pletho, Beſſario, and Ficinus: Picus added the *Cabbaliſtic* doctrine; and his footſteps were followed by Reuchlin, Venetus, Agrippa, and More; while Patricius, Gale, Cudworth, Burnet, and others, rejecting the Cabbaliſtic dreams, endeavoured to reſtore Alexandrian Platoniſm.

(2.) THE ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY was taught, either *mixed* with the Scholaſtic, by Lobkowitz, Ricciolus, Honoratus Faber, and others; or *pure*, by Gaza, Trapezuntius, Scholarius, Pomponatius, Niphus, Cremoninus, Melancthon, Simon, Schegkius, Sherbius, Taurellus, Sonerus, Conringius, and many more.

(3.) THE PARMENIDEAN PHILOSOPHY was reſtored by Teleſius, who, meeting with much oppoſition, was ably defended by Campanella.

(4.) THE IONIC PHILOSOPHY had a new advocate in Berigard; who however acknowledged that, both the Ionic and the Peripatetic ſyſtem were defective, and was hence inclined to ſcepticiſm.

(5.) THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY found an able patron in Lipſius, who was cloſely followed by Scioppius and Gataker.

(6.) THE EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY, after an unſucceſsful attempt by Magnenus, was revived by Gaſſendi, who was followed by Bernier, and Charleton.

II. ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE NEW METHODS OF PHILOSOPHISING, made by

1. MODERN SCEPTICS; of whom the moſt celebrated are Sanchez, Hernhaym, Vayer, Huet, and Bayle.

2. SCRIPTURAL PHILOSOPHERS, who, deſpairing of being able to arrive at truth by the light of reaſon, had recourſe to the ſcriptures, particularly to the Moſaic coſmogony, and endeavoured upon this foundation to raiſe a new ſtructure of philoſophy. Theſe are, chiefly, Alſted, Dickinſon, Burnet, Whiſton, Comenius, and Bayer.

3. THEOSOPHISTS, who boaſt that they derive their hidden wiſdom, not from the exerciſe of the underſtanding in inquiries after truth, but from immediate divine illumination. To this claſs of philoſophers are to be referred, Paracelſus and his diſciples, Fludd, Boehmen, Helmont, Poiret, and, according to ſome, the Roſicruſians.

4. PROFESSED ENEMIES OF PHILOSOPHY; of whom the principal are, beſides the Sceptics and Theoſophiſts, Pomponatius, Cremoninus, and Daniel Hoffman.

III. ATTEMPTS

III. ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE PHILOSOPHY IN THE TRUE ECLECTIC METHOD; not ſuch as was followed by the Alexandrian philoſophers, but that which conſiſts in rejecting prejudices of every kind, ſubjecting the opinions of former philoſophers to the ſtrict ſcrutiny of reaſon, and admitting no concluſions but ſuch as may be clearly deduced from principles founded in the nature of things, and diſcovered by experience. Among modern Eclectic philoſophers are,

1. THOSE WHO HAVE ENDEAVOURED TO IMPROVE PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL; of whom the principal are Bruno, Cardan, Bacon, Campanella, Hobbes, Des Cartes, Leibnitz, Thomas, and Wolfe.

2. THOSE WHO HAVE ENDEAVOURED TO IMPROVE PARTICULAR BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY: as,

(1.) *Logic and Metaphyſics*; ſuch as, Peter Ramus, Arnold, Spinoza and his followers, Mallebranche, Tſchernhauſen, Locke.

(2.) *Morals and Juriſprudence*; as Montaigne, Charron, Scultet, Boden, Machiavel, Grotius, Selden, Puffendorf.

(3.) *Natural Philoſophy*; as Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, Galileo, Gilbert, Boyle, Newton.

ERRATA, Vol. I.

P. 49. l. 2. read *theology.* P. 15. l. 13. for *he* read *he.* P. 221. l. 17. for *purſuits* read *purſuit.* P. 256, Note, l. 3. for *not* read *nor.* P. 389. l. 13. for *diſtance* read *diſtances.* P. 487. l. 15. for *appear* read *appears.*

HISTORY

A BIOGRAPHICAL CHART OF THE PRINCIPAL PERS



CHART OF THE PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THIS WORK.



HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

IN an undertaking ſo extenſive as the enſuing, it is neceſſary, that the general object be at firſt clearly aſcertained, and that the limits of the deſign be accurately defined. As this work is intended to be a hiſtory, not of literature or ſcience in general, but of Philoſophy, the reader ſhould be previouſly informed, in what ſenſe the author underſtands the term; eſpecially, as there are few words to which a greater variety of ſignifications has been annexed.

What is now called Philoſophy, was, in the infancy of human ſociety, denominated Wiſdom; and indeed every ingenious diſcovery, and uſeful art, was then honoured with this appellation. The title of Wiſe Men was, at that time, frequently conferred upon perſons who had little claim to ſuch a diſtinction: and ſuperſtition very early beſtowed it upon thoſe who were entruſted with the direction of religious concerns; although it cannot be doubted, that they had often no other right to ſuch pre-eminence, than that which was founded upon ingenious impoſture. Men of ſuperior underſtanding, at length detecting the fallacy of theſe pretenſions, were induced to aſſert their own right of free inquiry, and proſecuted their reſearches after truth, if not with the ſucceſs which

[a] Ariſtot. Ethic. ad Nicom. l. vi. c. 7.

[b] Strabo. l. xv. p. 501. Diog. Laert. l. i. § 1, 2.

they expected, at leaſt with that liberal ſpirit which gave them a juſt claim to the title of Wiſe Men. The wiſdom, which they in this manner acquired, many of them applied to purpoſes highly beneficial to mankind: whence the term Wiſdom came, by degrees, to denote both the ſcientific ſtudy, and the practical application of ſuch truths, as were adapted to promote the happineſs of human life.

In proceſs of time, when a race of ſelf-created preceptors aroſe in Greece, who aſſumed the name of Sophiſts or Wiſe Men, their arrogant pretenſions gave great offence to ſuch as were capable of diſtinguiſhing between real and counterfeit wiſdom, and led them to adopt an appellation more ſuitable to the character of men, who modeſtly profeſſed themſelves to be in the purſuit, rather than in the poſſeſſion of truth and wiſdom, namely, that of Philoſophers.

Cicero aſcribes the invention of this term to Pythagoras, and thus relates the occaſion upon which it was introduced.—Every one knows, that among the Greeks there were ſeven eminent men, who have ſince been univerſally denominated the Seven Wiſe Men of Greece; that, at a ſtill earlier period, Lycurgus, and, even in the heroic ages, Ulyſſes and Neſtor, were called wiſe men; and, in ſhort, that this appellation has, from the moſt antient times, been given to thoſe who have devoted themſelves to the contemplation of nature. This title continued in common uſe till the time of Pythagoras. It happened, whilſt this great man was at Phlius, that Leon, the chief of the Phliaſians, was exceedingly charmed with the ingenuity and eloquence with which he diſcourſed upon various topics, and aſked him, in what art he principally excelled: to which Pythagoras replied, that he did not profeſs himſelf maſter of any art, but that he was a PHILOSOPHER. Leon, ſtruck with the novelty of the term, aſked Pythagoras, who were philoſophers, and wherein they differed from other men. Pythagoras replied, that, as in the public games, whilſt ſome are contending for glory, and others are buying and ſelling in purſuit of gain, there is always a third claſs, who attend merely as ſpectators; ſo, in human life, amidſt the various characters of men there is a ſelect number, who, deſpiſing all other purſuits, aſſiduouſly

aſſiduouſly apply themſelves to the ſtudy of nature, and the ſearch after wiſdom: theſe, added Pythagoras, are the perſons whom I call philoſophers [a].

This appellation, thus aſſumed merely through modeſty, to intimate that even they who have made the greateſt advances in knowledge, are rather to be conſidered as Lovers of Wiſdom than as Wiſe Men, ſoon loſt its original meaning, and was borne with as much haughtineſs and vanity, as if it had implied an excluſive right to the poſſeſſion of wiſdom. "Some there are," ſays Quintilian, "who, deſpiſing the occupation of an orator, have employed themſelves in preſcribing rules for the conduct of life: theſe have inſolently aſſumed to themſelves the title of the Sole Profeſſors of Wiſdom [b]."

At a later period the ſignification of the term Philoſophy was extended ſo far, as to include not only all ſpeculative ſcience, but alſo ſkill in municipal law, the knowledge of medicine, the art of criticiſm, and the whole circle of polite literature. The term was even transferred to theology; the Chriſtian religion was called ſacred philoſophy; and eccleſiaſtical doctors, and monks, were ſtiled philoſophers.

This brief account of the changes which this term has undergone, in its meaning and uſe, may ſerve to ſhew the neceſſity of fixing, with ſome degree of preciſion, the ſenſe in which we underſtand the word, before we attempt to trace the riſe and progreſs of Philoſophy.

Philoſophy may be defined, that Love of Wiſdom, which incites to the purſuit of important and uſeful ſcience. Philoſophy diſcovers and teaches thoſe principles by means of which happineſs may be acquired, preſerved, and increaſed; wiſdom applies theſe principles to the benefit of individuals, and of ſociety. "Knowledge which is applicable to no uſeful purpoſe cannot deſerve the name of Wiſdom:"

"Qui ipſi ſibi ſapiens prodeſſe nequit, nequicquam ſapit [c]."

The ſources of that knowledge of truth which leads to the poſſeſ-

[a] Cic. Tuſcul. Diſp. l. v. c. 3. Quintil. Procem. Inſtit.
[c] Ennius ap. Cic. Epiſt. Fam. l. vii. ep. 6.

ſion of happineſs are two, reaſon and revelation. To inſtruct men in thoſe truths which God hath communicated to mankind by revelation, is the province of theology. To teach them ſuch truths, connected with their happineſs, as are capable of being diſcovered by the powers of reaſon, is the province of philoſophy. Theſe two provinces are perfectly diſtinct, and ought to be kept ſeparate, except where the one may occaſionally ſerve to caſt light upon the other.

The leading offices of philoſophy may be eaſily deduced from the general idea of its object. For if the end to be attained be the permanent enjoyment of real good, it muſt unqueſtionably be the buſineſs of philoſophy, to inveſtigate the nature of good, and the means by which it may be acquired, and ſo to form and improve the whole man, that he may arrive at the complete poſſeſſion of true felicity. Conſequently, the buſineſs of philoſophy will be, to cultivate the underſtanding, and point out the manner in which it may beſt perform its operations; to correct and meliorate the will and affections, by diſcovering what objects are deſirable, comparing their reſpective claims, and ſhewing how they may be rendered moſt productive of happineſs; to inquire into the cauſes of natural appearances, and hence arrive at the knowledge of the Firſt Cauſe, under thoſe characters and relations which are moſt intereſting to mankind; to conduct men to ſuch an acquaintance with the properties of natural bodies, and their reciprocal actions, as ſhall enable them to apply the objects around them to their own convenience; and finally, to aſſiſt them in inveſtigating the principles of ſocial virtue, and to provide them with ſuch rules of conduct, as ariſe from mutual convenience and intereſt, from the natural ſentiments of juſtice and humanity, and from the voluntary engagements of civil ſociety. Dialectics, phyſics, natural religion, ethics, and policy, are thus comprehended under the general term, philoſophy. How far this diſtribution agrees with the arrangements adopted by the antients, and comprehends their ſeveral objects of philoſophical diſcuſſion, will appear in the ſequel.

From this explanation of the ſenſe in which we underſtand the term

term philoſophy, the reader will eaſily perceive, what is to be expected from the preſent undertaking. A hiſtory of philoſophy, is a hiſtory of doctrines, and of men. As a hiſtory of doctrines, it lays open the origin of opinions, the changes which they have undergone, the diſtinct characters of different ſyſtems, and the leading points in which they agree or differ: it is therefore, in fact, a hiſtory of the human underſtanding. As a hiſtory of men, it relates the principal incidents in the lives of the more eminent philoſophers; remarks, particularly, thoſe circumſtances in their character or ſituation which may be ſuppoſed to have influenced their opinions; takes notice of their followers and their opponents, and deſcribes the origin, progreſs, and decline of their reſpective ſects.

In this manner we have undertaken to trace the hiſtory of philoſophy, and philoſophers, from the earlieſt records to the preſent time. The undertaking, we are ſenſible, is attended with many difficulties, and requires much induſtry and impartiality. That we might proceed, in the execution of ſo extenſive and arduous a deſign, with ſome probability of ſucceſs, we have found it neceſſary to preſcribe to ourſelves certain rules and cautions, which we have invariably endeavoured to follow.

Wherever original authors were to be obtained, we have carefully examined them. In peruſing theſe, we have conſidered, whether they deliver their own opinions, or merely relate the opinions of others; attending all along to the general phraſeology, and particularly to the technical terms, made uſe of by the ſect which they founded, or to which they belonged. We have, in the firſt place, endeavoured to diſcover the general principles on which each ſyſtem is built; and then, to trace out the particular concluſions which have been deduced from theſe; always preferring that interpretation of any doubtful paſſage, which beſt agrees with the fundamental principles and the ſpirit of the ſyſtem. We have carefully remarked thoſe perſonal circumſtances, reſpecting any philoſopher, which might ſerve to throw light upon his opinions; ſuch, for example, as his country, his family, his education, his natural temper, his habits of life, his patrons, friends, or enemies. In thoſe caſes, in which the founder

founder of a ſect has either left no writings behind him, or his works are loſt, we have preferred the authority of his immediate followers, or of ſuch as lived neareſt his time, to the teſtimony of later writers. Well aware of the unpardonable liberties which have been taken, in impoſing ſpurious books upon the world under the ſanction of the moſt venerable names of antiquity, we have been conſtantly upon our guard againſt this kind of deception, and have rejected, without heſitation, ſuch writings as bear the evident marks of impoſture *. In comparing the proofs of queſtionable facts, we have endeavoured to weigh them fairly in the ſcale of probability; aſſerting or denying nothing with greater confidence than the nature of the evidence adduced will juſtify, and always ſuſpending our judgment where we are uncertain, and, where means of information are wanting, confeſſing our ignorance. We have been particularly careful not to aſcribe modern ideas and opinions to the antients, nor to torture their expreſſions into a meaning which probably never entered into their thoughts, in order to accommodate them to a modern hypotheſis or ſyſtem. Where we have found any doctrine imperfectly explained, or have met with any philoſopher, who appears to have been himſelf defective in perſpicuity of conception, or who, by making uſe of vague and indeterminate language, leaves his reader in uncertainty; we have rather choſen to let the veil of obſcurity remain upon his ſyſtem, than to ſubſtitute our own ideas in the room of the writer's, from the hope of making that clear, which the author himſelf has left obſcure. In fine, we have not neglected to make uſe of every collateral aid, which chronology, eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, or general literature could afford.

By obſerving theſe rules and precautions, we truſt we have been enabled, in ſome meaſure, to riſe ſuperior to the difficulties of our undertaking. After all, however, we cannot but exceedingly regret, that our ſources of information are ſo defective, and the materials which they ſupply ſo imperfect. A circumſtance which the reader will eaſily account for, when, beſides the unavoidable injuries of

* Vid. Fabricii Bibl. Græc. vol. xiv. p. 131.

time,

time, he recollects, how many famous libraries of antient manuſcripts have been deſtroyed by military plunder, or by the ſtill more barbarous hand of religious bigotry. It is well known, that the celebrated collection which had been made by the Egyptian Ptolemies was conſumed, through the ignorance and raſhneſs of Julius Cæſar's ſoldiers; that the public library which had been formed at Rome, in the palace of the Cæſars, and was carefully preſerved in a temple dedicated to Apollo, was deſtroyed by lightning; that Pope Gregory iſſued a general order for burning all the Heathen writings which remained at Rome [a]; that when Alexandria was taken by Omar, the Saracen Caliph, its immenſe library, which had been accumulating for ſeveral centuries, in a place diſtinguiſhed for the ſtudy of philoſophy, was conſigned to the flames, and furniſhed fuel for heating the baths of the city for the ſpace of ſix months [b]; and that Al-Mamon, an Arabian, whoſe name is celebrated for the protection which he afforded to learning and learned men, in order to give greater value to the tranſlations which were at that time made, under his patronage, from the Greek tongue, deſtroyed the original manuſcripts as ſoon as the Arabic or Latin verſion was finiſhed [c].

The uſes, to which an impartial and accurate inquiry into the riſe and progreſs of philoſophy may be applied, and the advantages, which are to be expected from it, are numerous and important.

The hiſtory of philoſophy is, as we have ſaid, the hiſtory of the human underſtanding, clearly ſhewing the extent of its capacity, the cauſes of its perverſion, and the means by which it may be recalled from its unprofitable wanderings, and ſucceſsfully employed in ſubſerviency to the happineſs of mankind. Whilſt it traces the origin and growth of uſeful knowledge, it alſo diſcovers the manner in which errors have ariſen and been propagated, and expoſes the injury which they have done to ſcience, literature, and religion. It exhibits great and exalted minds as forſaking the path of truth, and adopting

[a] Sariſberienſis Policrat. l. ii. p. 123. [b] Abulphar. Hiſt. Dynaſt. p. 114.
[c] Leo Africanus de Viris Illuſtr. Arab. c. 1. apud Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. xiii. p. 260. Conf. Schelhornii Amœnit. t. vii. p. 75.

opinions

opinions at once the moſt abſurd and the moſt pernicious: a repreſentation, which cannot fail to ſhew the folly of placing an implicit confidence in the judgment of celebrated men, or of admitting any ſyſtem as true, before it has undergone an accurate examination. Nor is there any hazard, as ſome ſuppoſe, leſt ſuch a freedom from the ſhackles of authority ſhould produce a contempt of truly wiſe and learned men, and cheriſh the humour of conceit and vanity. For, an acquaintance with the miſtakes and failures of men, who have unſucceſsfully employed great ingenuity and induſtry in the purſuit of truth, ſuggeſts a uſeful leſſon of modeſty and diffidence in our own enquiries, and of candour towards the miſtakes of others. A clear detection of error, and of the ſources whence it has ſprung, furniſhes facts to prove, that opinions which have no other foundation than weak miſconception, a blind reſpect for authority or antiquity, or a ſelfiſh attention to intereſt, may be embraced by multitudes as true; and that, on the other hand, truths, which have been long rejected as idle paradoxes or pernicious principles, may, at length, lift up their heads, and triumph over prejudice; whence will naturally ariſe enlargement of mind, and a manly freedom of thinking.

The hiſtory of philoſophy may alſo be uſeful, as a faithful regiſter of diſcoveries in the world of ſcience, and as a ſkilful guide towards unknown regions, whither future adventurers may with advantage direct their courſe. It may ſerve to prevent the farther waſte of precious time in ſpeculations, which experience has ſhewn to lie beyond the reach of the human faculties, and to give that prudent direction to philoſophical induſtry, without which the boundaries of knowledge can never be enlarged. By ſhewing how far ſcience has been hitherto ſucceſsfully proſecuted, and in what inſtances it has been treated injudiciouſly, inaccurately explained, or imperfectly explored, it inſtructs men, what is to be avoided, and what yet remains to be done, in the purſuit of knowledge; puts them upon their guard againſt the repetition of attempts, which have already, in many inſtances, proved fruitleſs; enables them to diſtinguiſh new doctrines or diſcoveries from things already known and taught, and to ſtrip off the plumes

plumes from impoſing plagiaries; and aſſiſts them in the choice of a proper field of inquiry, and in the regulation of their future ſpeculations.

An acquaintance with the hiſtory of philoſophy, moreover, includes the knowledge of the general ſources of ſcience, of the names and characters of valuable authors, the ſubjects of their works, and the aſſiſtance which may be expected from them in ſcientific reſearches. The hiſtory of philoſophy is, in this view, an important branch of the hiſtory of univerſal erudition, ſerving to introduce the young inquirer to an acquaintance with thoſe ſilent preceptors, from whoſe inſtructions he may expect the daily increaſe of his intellectual ſtores.

In ſeveral diſtinct branches of ſcience, the hiſtory of philoſophy may afford much aſſiſtance. In theology, it may be of great uſe, in diſcovering the origin of natural religion, and tracing the courſe of its ſtream, even when united with the foul current of gentile idolatry; in confirming the credit of ſacred hiſtory by external teſtimony; in aſcertaining the limits between the province of reaſon, and that of revelation, and in reflecting light upon many paſſages in the ſacred writings. In eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, it enables us to account for the early introduction of metaphyſical ſubtleties into the Chriſtian ſyſtem, as well as the conſequent corruption of the ſimplicity of its doctrine, and to explain the origin of many obſcure tenets and idle fictions, which have, at different periods, gained admiſſion into the church of Chriſt. In juriſprudence, it aſſiſts us in diſcovering the foundation of municipal law, by ſhewing, that in every age of the world the principles of natural juſtice have been known, and that they have been admitted into every philoſophical ſyſtem, and received by every nation of the earth. It is particularly uſeful in the ſtudy of the Civil Law, many of the ideas and terms of which are borrowed from the Stoic philoſophy. It might eaſily be ſhewn, in like manner, that the hiſtory of philoſophy caſts light upon mathematics, medicine, and other ſciences; but, in a matter ſo exceedingly obvious, a farther detail would be ſuperfluous.

To theſe benefits, which may be expected to accrue from a hiſtory

of opinions, may be added others, of great importance, ariſing from the hiſtory of philoſophers and ſects. Beſides the biographical entertainment and inſtruction which ſuch memoirs may afford, they muſt contain much uſeful information peculiar to this branch of learning. To obſerve by what means they who have been engaged in the purſuit and propagation of knowledge have accompliſhed their deſign; what obſtacles they have overcome; in what inſtances, and from what cauſes, they have been impoſed upon by the ſemblance of truth, and have embraced the ſhadow for the ſubſtance; into what miſtakes they have fallen through prejudice, precipitation, or vanity; what inconveniences they have ſuffered from their miſconceptions and errors, and what advantages they have derived from their wiſdom, with other circumſtances of a ſimilar nature, cannot fail to ſuggeſt hints and reflections, which may be of great uſe in the proſecution of ſcience.

Having ſaid thus much to explain the nature of our deſign, the rules which we have preſcribed to ourſelves in the execution, and the advantages which are to be expected from a work of this kind, we have nothing further to add, in the way of introduction, than to give our readers a general view of our plan.

The whole hiſtory of philoſophy we divide into Three Periods. The *firſt* period traces its riſe and progreſs from the earlieſt times to the eſtabliſhment of the Roman empire. The *ſecond* period repreſents its ſtate among the Heathens, whilſt it flouriſhed under the Emperors, which brings the hiſtory down to the ſixth century; and among the Jews, Saracens, and Chriſtians, from the commencement of the Chriſtian æra to the time of the Revival of Letters. The *third* period relates the attempts which have ſince been made for the reformation and improvement of philoſophy, and deſcribes the various forms which it has aſſumed from the revival of letters to the preſent century. Thus the whole hiſtory of philoſophy is conveniently divided into *antient*, *middle*, and *modern*. In order to aſſiſt the memory, the utmoſt care has been taken, to give each of theſe periods its diſtinct characters of time and place.

The Firſt Period includes the Barbaric and the Grecian philoſophy: the former comprehending all thoſe nations, which, before

the time when the Grecian philoſophy paſſed over to the Romans, did not make uſe of the Greek language; the latter, all thoſe countries in which that language was ſpoken.

We ſhall find, in treating of the Barbaric philoſophy, that, as might be expected in the infancy of the world, it was ſimple in its nature and office, and was taught, without any laboured efforts of reaſoning, merely by tradition. As knowledge advanced, philoſophy aſſumed a more manly tone, and put on the habit of ſcience; till, at length, it appeared with great dignity among the Greeks, the freedom of whoſe ſpirit and manners led them to lay open the myſteries of wiſdom, and to make uſe of their own faculties in inveſtigating new truths, and framing new ſyſtems.

Our ſurvey of the ſtate of philoſophy among the barbaric nations, takes its riſe, with reſpect to time, from the firſt records of hiſtory; and follows, with reſpect to place, the natural order of Eaſt, South, Weſt, and North; an order which was followed by the antients, who divided the inhabitants of the world into four parts, calling the inhabitants of the eaſt, Indians; thoſe of the ſouth, Ethiopians; thoſe of the weſt, Celts; and thoſe of the north, Scythians[a]. Among the eaſtern nations, our deſign will lead us to treat diſtinctly concerning the Hebrews, the Chaldeans, the Perſians, the Arabians or Sabeans, the Phenicians, and the Indians: our account of the ſouthern barbaric nations will include the people of Egypt and Lybia: in the weſt, we ſhall take notice of the Celts or Gauls, the Germans, the Britons, and the antient Romans: and in the north, we ſhall treat of the Scythians, Thracians, and other neighbouring nations.

The philoſophy of Greece we ſhall find to have a double character. In its infancy, and in its juvenile ſtate, we ſhall ſee it, like the barbaric philoſophy, rather ſimple than artificial, rather empiric than theoretical, expreſſed in fable, and in moral and political maxims or rules of prudence. Afterwards, we ſhall find the Greek philoſophy, improved by the ingenuity of many eminent men, becoming ſyſtematic, and branching out into a great number of ſects,

[a] Pompon. Mela de Situ Orbis, l. ii. c. 1. Strabonis Geogr. l. ii.

of which a particular account will be given in this part of our work. To preſerve this period entire, we have ſubjoined an account of the fate of the Grecian philoſophy in Egypt and in Aſia.

The Second Period, from the beginning of the Roman Empire to the Revival of Letters, will open before us a field of philoſophical hiſtory, not leſs ſpacious than the former. It will exhibit the ſtate of philoſophy during the courſe of twelve hundred years, among the Romans, the Orientaliſts, the Jews, the Saracens, and the Chriſtians. With reſpect to the Romans, philoſophy having met with much oppoſition when it was firſt introduced among them by the Greeks, did not obtain a firm footing till towards the cloſe of the Republic. Under the Cæſars, philoſophy almoſt entirely deſerted Athens, its native ſeat, and took up its reſidence in Rome, where almoſt every Grecian ſect flouriſhed; till at length, that which had been formed in the Alexandrian ſchool, by combination from the reſt, called the Eclectic, became predominant. Among the Aſiatics, a new kind of philoſophy ſprung up, formed upon the doctrine, real or ſuppoſed, of the antient Zoroaſtrian and Greek mythology. The nation of the Jews, after their return from their Babyloniſh captivity, though they chiefly devoted themſelves to the ſtudy of their own law, were not ſtrangers to the gentile philoſophy, eſpecially thoſe of them who reſided in Egypt; and in a ſubſequent period, in which the Ariſtotelian philoſophy was predominant, they ranked themſelves among the Peripatetics. The Arabians, who, under the name of Saracens, in the ſeventh century, diſturbed the Eaſtern empire, although at firſt exceedingly averſe to inquiry (Mahomet, their leader, having prudently denied the privilege of private judgment to the people whom he had deſtined to ſlavery) became at laſt ſo much devoted to philoſophy, according to the Peripatetic ſect, that, during a long period of general darkneſs and confuſion, they were almoſt the only nation who afforded her an aſylum. Among the firſt Chriſtians, who were induſtriouſly employed in diſſeminating the divine doctrine of their maſter, the ſubtleties of gentile philoſophy obtained little credit. But, very ſoon after the riſe of Chriſtianity, many perſons who had been educated in the ſchools of the philoſophers becoming converts to the Chriſtian faith,

faith, the doctrines of the Grecian ſects, and eſpecially of Platoniſm, were interwoven with the ſimple truths of pure religion. As the Eclectic philoſophy ſpread, Heathen and Chriſtian doctrines were ſtill more intimately blended, till, at laſt, both were almoſt entirely loſt in the thick clouds of ignorance and barbariſm which covered the earth; except that the Ariſtotelian philoſophy had a few followers among the Greeks, and Platonic Chriſtianity was cheriſhed in the cloiſters of monks. About the beginning of the eleventh century, a new kind of philoſophy ſprung up, called the Scholaſtic, which, while it profeſſed to follow the doctrine of Ariſtotle, corrupted every principle of ſound reaſoning, and hindered, inſtead of aſſiſting, men in their inquiries after truth. At length, learning beginning to revive, and to be diſſeminated by the Greeks, who after the taking of Conſtantinople were diſperſed through Europe, a happy opportunity was afforded for reſtoring philoſophy to its antient honours.

This reſurrection of literature and ſcience is the commencement of the Third Period of our hiſtory. In this part of our courſe we ſhall ſee the ſucceſsful efforts of philoſophy, to riſe above the unwholeſome atmoſphere of tyranny, ſuperſtition, and bigotry, into the pure regions of freedom and truth; we ſhall find the ſeveral antient ſects reviving, new and better methods of philoſophiſing diſcovered, the chains of authority in ſome meaſure ſhaken off, and farther advances made in true philoſophy, within the courſe of a ſingle century, than had before been made in a thouſand years.

To the general hiſtory of theſe Three Periods of philoſophy will be added, by way of Appendix, a brief ſketch of the progreſs and preſent ſtate of philoſophy in the Indies, and among the Chineſe.

BOOK I

OF BARBARIC PHILOSOPHY.

CHAP. I.

OF BARBARIC PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.

THE term Barbarian was applied by the Greeks *, to all thoſe nations who ſpoke a language different from their own. We ſhall adopt the obvious diviſion which ariſes from this ſignification of the term; and, in treating of the FIRST PERIOD of the hiſtory of philoſophy, *from the earlieſt records of the world to the beginning of the Roman Empire*, we ſhall firſt inquire into the ſtate of philoſophy, during that period, among barbaric nations, and then trace its riſe and progreſs in the ſtates of Greece.

It has long been a ſubject of diſpute, whether philoſophy firſt appeared among the Barbarians, or among the Greeks. The inhabitants of Greece, who were very early remarkable for literary and philoſophical vanity, and ſoon learned to make uſe of an artificial method of philoſophiſing, were unwilling to allow that philoſophy had any exiſtence in other countries, except where it had been borrowed from them. They could not perſuade themſelves, that the

* Ovid. Triſt. l. v. el. 10. v. 37.

mere

mere communication of precepts of wiſdom in the ſimple form of tradition, and in languages harſh and diſſonant compared with their own, could deſerve to be called philoſophiſing. On the other hand, the barbaric nations, in their turn, treated the Greeks as Barbarians, and looked upon them as children in philoſophy. Plato, in his Timæus, introduces a Barbarian as inſtructing the wiſe Solon, and ſaying, "You Greeks are always children; there is not an old man "among you: you have no ſuch thing as grey-headed wiſdom." They were the more confirmed in this perſuaſion, when they underſtood, that the moſt learned men, and the moſt antient philoſophers among the Greeks, had either been Barbarians by birth, or inſtructed by Barbarians[a]; that Pythagoras, for example, was a Tuſcan, Antiſthenes a Phrygian, Orpheus a Thracian, Thales a Phœnician; and that Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and others, had derived their knowledge from Chaldean and Egyptian prieſts.

Many of the Chriſtian fathers eſpouſed, in this diſpute, the cauſe of the Barbarians, and maintained, with great vehemence, and with all the learning they could command, that the Barbaric philoſophy was the fountain of all the wiſdom which had appeared among the Greeks, except ſo far as they had been indebted, in the way of tradition, to divine revelation.

In this queſtion, as it frequently happens in controverſy, from a want of diſtinct ideas and an accurate uſe of terms, many things foreign to the argument were advanced. If the meaning of the term Philoſophy had been correctly ſettled; if the infant ſtate of knowledge had been diſtinguiſhed from its more advanced age, and eſpecially, if due attention had been paid to the eſſential difference between communicating doctrines by mere authority, and inveſtigating the principles, relations, and cauſes of things by diligent ſtudy, the whole diſpute would ſoon have been found to be nothing more than a logomachy.

For no one would aſſert, that the barbaric nations were wholly inattentive to wiſdom, or ſtrangers to every kind of knowledge,

[a] Clemen. Alex. Stromata, l. i. p. 302, 303.

human

human or divine. On the other ſide, it cannot be queſtioned, that they became poſſeſſed of knowledge rather by ſimple reflection than by ſcientific inveſtigation, and that they tranſmitted it to poſterity rather by tradition than by demonſtration. Whereas the Greeks, as ſoon as they began to be civilized, diſcovered a general propenſity to inquiry, and made uſe of ſcientific rules and methods of reaſoning. Hence it is eaſy to perceive, that though the improvement of philoſophy is to be aſcribed to the Greeks, its origin is to be ſought for [a] among the barbaric nations.

[a] Tatian. in proem. Clem. Al. Strom. l. i. p. 302. Origen adv. Celſum, l. i. p. 5. Ed. Hoeſhel.

Conſult alſo, upon the ſubject of this chapter, Beauſobre Hiſt. du Manicheiſme, p. ii. l. i. c. 2. Scaliger. Exerc. li. contra Cardan. p. 188. Bos Animadv. ad Script. c. ii. p. 12. Heuman. Act. Phil. v. ii. p. 204. Heurnii Ant. Phil. Barb. Ed. Lugd. Bat. 1600.

CHAP. II.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANTIENT HEBREWS.

AMONG the barbaric nations (uſing the term Barbaric in the ſenſe before explained) the moſt antient people, concerning whom any authentic records remain, are the Hebrews. We ſhall inquire into the ſtate of philoſophy among this people, from the earlieſt period of their hiſtory to the time of their return from their Babyloniſh captivity; after which, the Jewiſh philoſophy will be more properly conſidered in connection with the Grecian.

From the praiſes which are beſtowed, in the Jewiſh hiſtory, upon ſome of their more illuſtrious anceſtors, patriarchs, prophets, and princes, ſome have been induced to place them upon a level, in reſpect of ſpeculative wiſdom, with the philoſophers of Greece, and even with thoſe of modern times. But that this is a miſconception, muſt be evident to every one who recollects the ſtate of ſcience, and of general civilization, at that early period.

A better or more certain judgment concerning the wiſdom of the antient Hebrews cannot be formed, than from the monuments which they themſelves, or their deſcendants, have left in the ſacred Scriptures. Much greater credit, particularly in this inſtance, is due to domeſtic than to foreign teſtimony. For the Jewiſh hiſtorians had their information, concerning the antient ſtate of their nation, from records preſerved with the utmoſt care by their anceſtors; whereas other writers, in ſpeaking of a people who had little intercourſe with their neighbours, for want of a better guide than vague report, muſt neceſſarily have given a precipitate, and often an erroneous judgment.

We learn from the Scriptures, that among the antient Hebrews there were many eminent men, who made uſe of the clear light of divine truth, with which they were favoured by heaven, as their guide

guide in the conduct of life. In practical and moral wiſdom it cannot be doubted, that they held a place of high diſtinction. Their wiſdom, however, muſt not be confounded with philoſophy, in the ſtrict acceptation of the term. Bleſſed with a divine Revelation, they have tranſmitted to poſterity rays of ſacred truth, which have been ſpread through the world; and they have hence obtained an immortal name in an order of higher dignity than that of philoſophers. Under the direction of genuine principles of religion, they purſued the plain path of ſimple virtue, without being led aſtray by vain curioſity into fruitleſs ſpeculations. In the firſt ages of their hiſtory, their patriarchs were ſhepherds, who, by their domeſtic virtues, obtained great authority over the people among whom they lived, and ſeem to have had no other object of ambition, than that of providing for the ſafety and proſperity of their families. Joſeph, the ſon of Jacob, and after him Moſes, David, Solomon, Ezra, and other eminent men, were occupied in affairs of legiſlation and government, and, by the wiſdom with which they conducted them, acquired high renown. Others, who were diſtinguiſhed by the name of prophets, were employed in declaring to the people the will of God, in managing the affairs of religion, and in training up diſciples for theſe ſacred ſervices. Among the Hebrews we are therefore to look for prudent ſtateſmen, upright judges, and prieſts learned in the law, but not for philoſophers, in the limited ſenſe in which we underſtand the term. Much pains has indeed been taken, both by Jewiſh and Chriſtian writers, to affix this character to ſeveral illuſtrious names in the antient Hebrew nation, particularly Moſes, Solomon, and Daniel; but it will not be difficult to prove, that this has been attempted without ſufficient reaſon.

Upon the authority of Philo [a] and other Jewiſh writers, it is aſſerted by Clemens Alexandrinus [b], Juſtin Martyr [c], Origen [d], and other Chriſtian fathers, that Moſes reached the ſummit of human learning, and he is repreſented as having been a perfect maſter of aſtronomy, geometry, muſic, medicine, occult philoſophy, and, in ſhort, of the

[a] De Vita Moſis, p. 604. De Mundi opificio, p. 2. [b] Strom. l. i. p. 343.
[c] Queſt. 25. ad Orthod. [d] Adverſ. Celſum, l. i. p. 14.

whole circle of the arts and ſciences which were at that time known. And this opinion, like many others, has been received without much examination in later times. The principal arguments by which it has been ſupported are, that St. Stephen ſpeaks of him [a] as having been "learned in all the wiſdom of the Egyptians;" that a general tradition to this purpoſe has prevailed among the Jews from the moſt antient times; that in reducing Aaron's golden calf to powder [b], he ſhowed great chemical ſkill; that his account of the creation diſcovers an extenſive acquaintance with nature; and that his laws abound with moral wiſdom. To this it has been added, that Moſes, during the forty days in which he was upon the mount with God, beſides the written code, received alſo an oral or traditionary law, ſince called the *Cabbala*, and that he taught this concealed doctrine to perſons ſelected out of all the tribes of Iſrael, by whom they were tranſmitted to poſterity. Some have even aſſerted that he wrote books, now loſt, from which Pythagoras and Plato drew a great part of their doctrine: the authority of Euſebius has often been quoted in ſupport of this aſſertion, in a paſſage [c] where he mentions, on the credit of Jewiſh tradition, ſeveral theological and philoſophical tenets of Moſes, and amongſt the reſt, his opinion concerning the immortality of the ſoul.

With reſpect to the evidence from teſtimony on this ſubject, it is eaſy to ſee that it may all be traced up to Philo, who will have little credit with thoſe who remark, how exactly he has adapted his account of the opinions of Moſes to the philoſophy of the times in which he lived, and how egregiouſly he miſtakes, in ſuppoſing learned men to have come from Greece, at a period when Greece was in a ſtate of barbariſm. The judgment of Clemens Alexandrinus, and other Chriſtian fathers, upon this queſtion, is of little weight; for they were induced to accommodate their idea of the wiſdom of Moſes to the model of the Greek philoſophy, by an opinion, which they took up without examination from the Jews, that all the genuine wiſdom which was found among the Heathens, had paſſed over to them

[a] Acts vii. 22. [b] Exod. xxxii. 20. Deut. ix. 21.
[c] Demon. Evang. l. iii. c. 2.

from

from the Hebrews, and was originally derived from divine revelation. Little ſtreſs is to be laid upon the account given of Moſes by St. Stephen, ſince the learning which he aſcribes to him was only that of the Egyptians at the time when he flouriſhed, which, as we ſhall afterwards ſee, was confined within very narrow limits. The ſkill which Moſes diſcovered in the affair of Aaron's golden calf was probably not chemical, as many have ſuppoſed, but merely mechanical; for nothing farther can with certainty be inferred from the ſcripture account of this tranſaction, than that Moſes ordered the calf, which had been made an object of idolatry, to be cut into ſmall pieces, and thrown into an adjoining river, whence the Iſraelites were, at that time, ſupplied with water; probably, that, as often as they ſhould fetch water from this ſtream, they might be reminded of their offence. In delivering laws and inſtitutions to the Jews, Moſes is to be conſidered, not as a philoſopher, but in the higher character of miniſter and repreſentative of Jehovah, by whoſe immediate authority their nation was governed. As to the traditionary law, which the Jewiſh writers ſuppoſe to have been the ground of their Cabbala, if it were not a mere invention of later times, it muſt have been given by divine revelation, and can furniſh no argument in defence of the philoſophy of Moſes. Much leſs can any argument, for this purpoſe, be derived from writings which are confeſſedly loſt, and which have not been proved to have ever exiſted.

SOLOMON, in the Jewiſh ſcriptures, has the firſt place aſſigned him among the wiſe men of the Eaſt. But the later Jewiſh writers, not ſatisfied with this general encomium, have advanced the moſt extravagant aſſertions concerning his wiſdom. They have not ſcrupled to ſay, that Ariſtotle pillaged his doctrine from the writings of Solomon. A bold aſſertion of this kind might have been endured from a people, whoſe vanity has always been equal to their ignorance; but that learned men of later times ſhould adopt ſo abſurd an opinion, is truly wonderful. Yet an Engliſh writer, of no mean name in the republic of letters*, has maintained, that Ariſtotle and

* Gale Phil. gener. § 8.

Theophraſtus learned natural hiſtory; Hippocrates, medicine; the Stoics, ethics; and Pythagoras and Plato the ſymbolical philoſophy, from Solomon. Others have ſuppoſed him to have known the uſe of the mariner's compaſs [a], and to have been acquainted with the doctrine of the circulation of the blood [b], and with other anatomical diſcoveries. And Pineda, a Jeſuit [c], has gone ſo far as to aſcribe to Solomon the perfect knowledge of every modern as well as antient ſcience. Upon all this it is ſufficient to remark, that had Solomon been thus wonderfully enlightened, it muſt have been by divine revelation and not by philoſophy; and that the wiſdom which is attributed to him in ſcripture [d] was not ſpeculative ſcience, but that practical wiſdom which was neceſſary to qualify him for the offices of government.

Daniel takes the next place among the wiſe men of Iſrael. From the particulars related concerning him in the book which bears his name, ſome have concluded, that he was an eminent teacher of the Chaldean philoſophy, and a great maſter of all the wiſdom of the Eaſt. It has even been ſaid, that he was acquainted with the whole circle of Ariſtotelian learning [e]. All this, however, is founded upon mere conjecture: for we have no certain information concerning this prophet except from his own writings; and theſe only relate, in general terms, that he was well furniſhed with that kind of wiſdom, which ſerved to obtain him influence, and procure him eſteem and confidence, in the court of Babylon, and that, beſides this, he was endowed with miraculous powers from heaven.

In the hiſtory of the Jews, frequent mention is made of their prophets; and a great part of the Jewiſh Scriptures conſiſts of prophecies: but theſe prophets appear in no other light than as good men ſupernaturally illuminated, for the purpoſes of inſtructing and admoniſhing the Jewiſh people, and predicting the great events which were to befal them. We are alſo informed, that there were,

[a] Fuller's Sacred Miſcell. b. iv. ch. 19.
[b] Corn. Bontekoe de Vit. hum. p. ii. § 10. Witſii Miſcell. Sac. t. ii. ex. 13. § 24.
[c] De Rebus Solom. Mogunt. 1613. [d] 1 Kings iii. 9—11. iv. 29.
[e] Horn. Hiſt. Phil. l. v. c. 20. Huet. Dem. Ev. Pr. iv. p. 278.

among

among the Hebrews, ſchools, in which the prophets preſided, and gave inſtructions to their diſciples; but we are not to imagine that theſe ſchools were colleges of philoſophers, or, as ſome have done[a], to apply our modern idea of academical life to theſe inſtitutions. As the prophets were employed in delivering the will of God to the people, and in inculcating upon them the principles, and inſpiring them with the ſentiments of religion, by means of ſacred hymns accompanied with muſic, ſo it was, doubtleſs, the buſineſs of the ſchools to train up young men, who were devoted to the prieſthood, for the ſame offices. The account, which the ſacred writings give of the ſchools of the prophets in Kirjath-jearim and Ramoth-Gilead[b], is far from conveying any idea of a philoſophical ſeat of learning. We do not mean to aſſert, that the antient Hebrews were deſtitute of learning[c]; we only maintain, that it was of a very different kind from that philoſophy which we meet with in later ages. Their learned men were chiefly occupied in explaining the Moſaic law, and in inculcating principles of religion, and precepts of morality, drawn from the pure fountain of divine revelation. The ſacred Odes or Pſalms of David afford an excellent ſpecimen of Hebrew learning. They every where breathe the ſpirit of ſublime piety, but diſcover no traces of abſtract philoſophy.

We ſhall conclude our view of the ſtate of philoſophy among the Hebrews in the words of an eminent Engliſh writer: "It is well known that the Hebrews never excelled in mathematical or philoſophical learning, or liberal arts, nor were ever diſtinguiſhed by any ingenious diſcoveries. Whence Appollonius paſſes this ſevere judgment upon them, that they are to be ranked among the moſt ſtupid barbarians, and are perhaps the only people who have never produced any ſingle invention. Their antient inſtitutions, called Schools of the Prophets, were not ſo much intended for the purpoſe of inſtruction in the circle of the ſciences, after the manner of modern ſchools, as for that of training up youth for

[a] Altingii Hiſt. Ebr. Acad. p. 281.
[b] 1 Sam. x. 5. xix. 18. 2 Kings ii. 3—5. [c] 1 Kings iv. 11.

diſcharging

diſcharging the prophetic and prieſtly functions. No nation or country, upon the face of the earth, has abounded ſo much with prophets and inſpired men: one might almoſt imagine, that ſome divine virtue reſided even in the ſoil and climate of Judæa[a]. *

[a] T. Burnetii Archæologia. Phil. l. i. c. 7. Joſeph. contr. Apion, l. ii.

* Videnda. Albert. Fabricii Cod. Vet. T. Buddæi Hiſt. Phil. Hebr. Spencer. de Legibus Hebr. Dickinſon. Phyſ. Vet. c. xx. Altingii Hiſt. Acad. Heb. Witſius de Prophetis. Hornii Hiſt. Phil. l. v. Galæi Phil. Gent. l. i. Maii Diſſ. de Phil. Job. Reeman. Ant. Lit. Ægypt. l. i. Baumgarten's notes on Ant. Univ. Hiſtory, v. i. note 327.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHALDEANS.

AMONG the Eaſtern nations, the moſt antient people, next to the Hebrews, who appear to have been acquainted with philoſophy (uſing the term in its more relaxed ſenſe) are the Chaldeans. For, although the Egyptians have claimed the honour of being the more antient nation, and contended that the Chaldeans were an Egyptian colony, and conſequently derived all their learning from Egypt, there is reaſon to believe [a], that the kingdom of Babylon, of which Chaldea was a part, flouriſhed before the Egyptian monarchy: whence it is probable, that, with reſpect to knowledge, the Egyptians were rather indebted to the Chaldeans, than the Chaldeans to the Egyptians. There is little room, however, to doubt, that Chaldea had, from the moſt remote times, its own preceptors, and was not indebted for its wiſdom [b] to any other country.

There were, it muſt be owned, amongſt the Chaldeans themſelves, fabulous accounts of the antiquity of their learning. When Alexander became poſſeſſed of Babylon, Ariſtotle, who was deſirous of making the Aſiatic expedition ſubſervient to philoſophy, requeſted Calliſthenes to inform himſelf concerning the origin of ſcience in Chaldea; for, at that time, the Chaldeans boaſted that their anceſtors had continued their aſtronomical obſervations through a period of 470,000 years [c]. Calliſthenes, through the intereſt of Alexander, examined into the grounds of this report, and found that the Chaldean obſervations reached no farther backward than 1903 years. If this term be ſubtracted from 4383, the year of the Julian

[a] Pompon. Mela de Situ Orbis, l. i. c. 9. p. 21. ed. Gron. Plin. N. Hiſt. l. v. c. 9.
[b] Conf. Diodor. Sicul. l. ii.
[c] Porphyr. apud Simplic. Comment. in Ariſtot. de Cœlo, l. ii. Cicero de Divin. l. i.

period in which Babylon was taken, these observations will appear to have commenced in the year of the Julian period 2480, or 2234 years before the Christian æra. And even these are not mentioned by Ptolemy, who takes notice of nō Chaldean observations prior to the Nobonassserian æra, which commenced in the 3967th of the Julian period, or before Christ 747 years. Nevertheless, the great antiquity of the Chaldean learning cannot be disputed. Aristotle *, on the credit of the most antient records, speaks of the Chaldean Magi as prior to the Egyptian priests, who, it is well known, cultivated learning before the time of Moses.

The history of the Chaldean or Babylonian philosophy is, from its great antiquity, necessarily involved in much uncertainty. The only remaining records, which can cast any light upon the subject, we owe, not to the Chaldeans themselves, but to other nations, chiefly the Greeks, whose genius was not adapted to the oriental learning, and whose vanity frequently led them into misrepresentations in their accounts of barbaric nations. Add to this, that, in consequence of the symbolical mode of instruction made use of by the Chaldeans, their doctrines have been transmitted to posterity under a veil of obscurity, which it is now become extremely difficult to remove. The difficulty was greatly increased by a race of philosophers, who, about the beginning of the Christian æra, in order to obtain credit for certain wild and extravagant doctrines of their own, passed them upon the world as the antient wisdom of the Chaldeans and Persians, in spurious books, which they ascribed to Zoroaster, or some other Eastern philosopher. Thus, the fictions of these impostors became confounded with the genuine dogmas of the antient Eastern nations. And the industry of modern critics has done little towards removing these difficulties: for either they have not attended to the causes of uncertainty which have been enumerated; or they have suffered themselves to be imposed upon by forged writings; or they have given credit to the fallacious pretensions of the Arabian writers, who have boasted, that they had, in their language, the exclusive possession of many valuable treasures of antient learning. All that can be

* Apud Laert. l. i. §. 8.

related, with any tolerable degree of probability, concerning the Chaldean philoſophy, may be comprized within a ſmall compaſs.

The Chaldean philoſophers were the prieſts of the Babylonian nation, who inſtructed the people in the principles of religion, interpreted its laws, and conducted its ceremonies. They ſuſtained the ſame character with the Perſian Magi, afterwards to be noticed, and are often confounded with them by the Greek hiſtorians. Like the prieſts in moſt other antient nations, they employed religion in ſubſerviency to the ruling powers, and made uſe of impoſture to ſerve the purpoſes of civil policy. This is confirmed by the general teſtimony of antient hiſtory, and by the expreſs authority of the hiſtorian Diodorus Siculus, who relates [a], that they pretended to predict future events by divination, to explain prodigies, and interpret dreams, and to avert evils, or confer benefits, by means of augury and incantations. They retained, for many ages, a principal place among diviners. In the reign of Marcus Antoninus, when the emperor and his army, who were periſhing with thirſt, were ſuddenly relieved by a ſhower, the prodigy was aſcribed to the power and ſkill of the Chaldean ſoothſayers [b]. No wonder that, as long as theſe Chaldean prieſts could perform ſuch marvels, they retained their conſequence in the courts of princes.

The principal inſtrument, which theſe impoſtors employed in ſupport of ſuperſtition, was aſtrology. The Chaldeans were probably the firſt people who made regular obſervations upon the heavenly bodies [c]. This kind of knowledge was in ſuch high eſtimation among them, that a diſtinct order of men was appointed for this purpoſe, and ſupported at the public expence [d]; whence the appellation of Chaldean afterwards became ſynonimous with that of aſtronomer. But all their obſervations were applied to the ſingle purpoſe of eſtabliſhing the credit of judicial aſtrology; and they employed their pretended ſkill in this art, in calculating nativities, foretelling

[a] L. ii. p. 81. Compare Dan. ii. 1, &c. Ecclus. xliv. 3. Vid. Juſt. Mart. Cohort. ad Gent. p. 12.

[b] Lamprid. in Heliogab. c. 9. Claudian. in vi. Conſul. Honor.

[c] Cic. de Divin. l. i. Strabo, l. xv. [d] Arrian. Exp. l. vii. c. 16.

the weather, predicting good and bad fortune[a], and other practices usual with impostors of this class. Teaching the vulgar that all human affairs are influenced by the stars, and professing to be acquainted with the nature and laws of this influence, and consequently to possess a power of prying into futurity, they encouraged much idle superstition, and many fraudulent practices. Hence other professors of these mischievous arts were afterwards called Chaldeans, and the arts themselves were called Babylonian arts. Among the Romans, these impostors were so troublesome, that it was found necessary, during the time of the Republic, to issue an edict[b], requiring the Chaldeans, or mathematicians (for they were commonly known by this latter appellation) to depart from Rome and Italy within ten days; and afterwards, under the Emperors, these soothsayers were put under the most severe interdiction.

Still farther to lay open the true character of the Chaldean philosophy, it must be remarked, that it consisted, not in a free and diligent examination of the nature of things, but in the bare transmission of certain settled opinions from father to son. Diodorus Siculus (who herein shews how little he himself was entitled to the character of a philosopher) commends the Chaldeans for having taken up their opinions upon the authority of their ancestors, and says "that, in this respect, they acted much more wisely than the Greeks, who, addicting themselves to disputation, were ever ready to embrace new opinions, and thus obliged their disciples to wander through their whole lives in perpetual uncertainty[c]." Whether the Grecian method of proceeding, or the Chaldean, was most likely to lead to the discovery of truth, it can require no extraordinary sagacity to discover. But, for the purpose for which the Chaldean philosophy appears to have been chiefly instituted, no mode of philosophising could have been better chosen. Their mysteries were to be revealed only to a select few, and to be studiously concealed from the

[a] Sextus Empir. adv. Math. l. v. § 2. Aulus Gellius, l. xiv. c. 1. Strabo. l. c.
[b] Valer. Maxim. l. i. c. 3. Diod. Sic. l. xvii. p. 622. Sueton. in Tiber.
[c] L. ii. p. 81.

multitude,

multitude, that a veil of ſanctity might be caſt over their doctrine, which would, by this means, be the more eaſily employed in the ſupport of civil and religious tyranny.

Another circumſtance, which greatly contributed to produce the ſame effect, was the care which was taken by the Chaldean prieſts to prevent the ſpread of religious and philoſophical knowledge among the people. Inſtead of teaching their doctrine promiſcuouſly to all who were diſpoſed to receive it, after the manner of the Greeks, they confined it to a certain tribe and diſtrict. Inſtead of communicating important truths to the people in intelligible language, they gave forth their dogmas under the veil of ſymbols; hereby always reſerving to themſelves a power of varying the popular ſyſtem, according to the exigencies of the times, or the pleaſure of the ruling powers, without danger of detection. The implicit credit, which, by theſe artifices, the Chaldean prieſts obtained among the people is particularly remarked by Juvenal [a]:

> Chaldæis ſed major erit fiducia: quicquid
> Dixerit aſtrologus, credent a fonte relatum
> Ammonis, quoniam Delphis oracula ceſſant,
> Et genus humanum damnat caligo futuri. [b]

From this account of the Chaldeans, it is eaſy to perceive, what title they had to the appellation of wiſe men. No one, who has a juſt idea of the nature and uſe of philoſophy, can heſitate in diſmiſſing them, from the rank of philoſophers, to their proper ſtation among impoſtors. Whatever ſhare of knowledge they poſſeſſed, it is evident that they applied it to the purpoſes of ſuperſtition. Little

[a] Sat. vi. 552.

[b] More credit, yet, is to Chaldeans given;
What they foretell is deem'd the voice of heaven:
Their anſwers as from Hammon's altar come;
Since now the Delphian oracles are dumb,
And mankind, ignorant of future fate,
Believes what fond aſtrologers relate. DRYDEN.

regard

regard is, therefore, due to the encomiums which ſome antient writers, particularly Philo [a], have paſſed upon this race of ſages; and ſtill leſs to the general admiration, which, at a very early period, they obtained in the Eaſt; for it is eaſy to perceive, that this was the natural effect of the ſucceſsful practice of the arts of impoſture among an ignorant and credulous people.

> Omnia enim ſtolidi magis admirantur amantque
> Inverſis quæ ſub verbis latitantia cernunt. [b]

It is not, however, to be inferred, from what [c] is known of the manner in which philoſophy was taught and propagated by the Chaldeans, that there was among them no variety of opinions. We learn, from the authority of Strabo [d], and Pliny [e], which is confirmed by the teſtimony of the Jewiſh prophets [f], that there were, in Aſſyria and Chaldea, different ſchools or ſects. But the accounts which we have of theſe ſects are ſo general and imperfect, that they will ſcarcely authorize us to do more than give it as a probable opinion, that they differed from each other chiefly in the mode of practiſing the arts of divination and aſtrology; and that their knowledge of nature extended little farther, than to the diſcovery of the ſuppoſed magical uſes of certain natural bodies, particularly minerals and herbs [g]. Whatever were the tenets, or the inſtitutions of each ſect, they were implicity tranſmitted from father to ſon; and it was ſeldom known, that the followers of one ſect revolted to another.

It is univerſally acknowledged by the antients, that ZOROASTER was the founder of the Chaldean philoſophy. But learned induſtry has in vain attempted to draw aſide the veil of obſcurity, which covers this celebrated name. "The accounts which have been

[a] De Nominum Mutat. Op. p. 1046.

[b] Whate'er the myſtic phraſe hides from their ſight,
The crowd of fools admire, with fond delight.

[c] Lucretius, l. i. v. 642. [d] L. xvi. p. 509. [e] Hiſt. Nat. l. vi. c. 26.
[f] Dan. i. 20. ii. 2, 27. iv. 4. [g] Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xxxvii. c. 10.

given

given of him," ſays Fabricius[a], "are ſo confuſed and contradictory, that it would be a taſk of much greater labour than profit to compare them." The uncertainty which neceſſarily ariſes from the remote antiquity of the Chaldean hiſtory has been greatly increaſed, in part by the abſurd attempts of the Greek writers to trace a reſemblance between their own learning and religion, and that of the Eaſtern nations, and in part from the vanity of the Perſians and Arabians, who have pretended to derive their religion from the Chaldean Zoroaſter, and have ſupported the pretence by many extravagant fictions. No greater uncertainty, however, attends the hiſtory of Zoroaſter, than has attended that of other antient heroes and wiſe men, who were the firſt authors of civilization, or inventors of arts and ſciences; with reſpect to whom it is now ſcarcely poſſible, to ſeparate the real incidents of their lives from the fables with which they are involved.

For this uncertainty ſeveral cauſes may be aſſigned. Theſe renowned benefactors of mankind lived at a period, in which ignorance and barbariſm univerſally prevailed. To raiſe men from this ſavage ſtate to rational and civilized life; to form them into communities; to afford them the protection of laws and government; and to furniſh them with the conveniences and benefits ariſing from arts and ſciences, were the important objects of their labours. The ignorant and ſuperſtitious multitude, from a ſenſe of obligation to ſuch benefactors, have readily admitted the claims which, for the ſake of eſtabliſhing their authority, they have made to ſupernatural powers; and, after their death, have delivered their names and actions to poſterity, ſurrounded with all the fictitious luſtre of imaginary divinity. Nor have there been wanting artful men, who have accommodated this ſuperſtitious humour in the multitude to their own benefit, or that of the ſtate, by inventing many fables concerning theſe illuſtrious men, and by paſſing their own opinions or writings upon the world under the ſanction of their names. The uncertainty has been farther increaſed, by the contention which has ariſen among different nations concerning their deſcent, each claiming

[a] Bibl. Græc. vol. i. p. 246, 247.

them

them as their own, and advancing every thing, whether true or falſe, which could ſerve to ſupport the claim. From theſe cauſes, it has become impoſſible to diſtinguiſh truth from fiction, in reports which have flowed down to the preſent time through ſo long a channel of impoſture. Many examples will occur in the courſe of this work, which will ſerve to illuſtrate theſe remarks, but none more ſtriking than that of Zoroaſter.

Concerning Zoroaſter, it is wholly uncertain, whence the name is derived, or to how many eminent men it belonged. Some have maintained, that there was but one Zoroaſter, and that he was a Perſian [a]. Others have ſaid that there were ſix eminent founders of philoſophy of this name. Ham the ſon of Noah, Moſes, Oſiris, Mithras, and others, both gods and men, have by different writers been aſſerted to have been the ſame with Zoroaſter [b]. Many different opinions have alſo been advanced, concerning the time in which he flouriſhed. Ariſtotle and Pliny [c] fix his date at ſo remote a period as 6000 years before the death of Plato; Hermippus ſays, that he lived 5000 years before the Trojan war: idle tales, which are, doubtleſs, to be claſſed with the report of the Chaldeans, concerning the antiquity of their aſtronomical obſervations. According to Laertius [d], he flouriſhed 600 years before the Trojan war; according to Suidas [e], 500. If, in the midſt of ſo much uncertainty, any thing can be advanced with the appearance of probability, it ſeems to be this; that there was a Zoroaſter, a Perſo-Median, who flouriſhed about the time of Darius Hyſtaſpes, and that beſides him there was another Zoroaſter, who lived in a much more remote period among the Babylonians, and taught them aſtronomy. The Greek and Arabian writers are agreed concerning the exiſtence of the Perſian Zoroaſter: and the antients unanimouſly aſcribe to a philoſopher, whom they call Zoroaſter, the origin of the Chaldean aſtronomy, which is certainly of much earlier date than the time of

[a] Hyde de Rel. Perſ. c. 24. p. 308. Prideaux's Connection, vol. i. p. 318.

[b] Vid. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. i. p. 243, 246. Huet. Dem. Evang. pr. 4. c. 5. Kircher. Œdip. Egypt. p. 216.

[c] Plin. Hiſt. N. l. xxx. c. 1. [d] Lib. i. § 2. [e] In Voc. Zoroaſt.

Hyſtaſpes:

Hyſtaſpes: it ſeems, therefore, neceſſary to ſuppoſe a Chaldean Zoroaſter diſtinct from the Perſian. Concerning this Zoroaſter, however, nothing more is known, than that he flouriſhed towards the beginning of the Babyloniſh empire, and was the father of the Chaldean aſtrology and magic [a].

The magic which Zoroaſter invented was probably nothing more than the performance of certain religious ceremonies, by means of which good dæmons were ſuppoſed to be prevailed upon to communicate ſupernatural properties and powers to herbs, ſtones, and other natural bodies, or to afford aſſiſtance, in other miraculous ways, to thoſe who invoked them [b]. In war, it was ſuppoſed that, by the help of magic, the forces of an enemy might be routed, or an army ſtruck with a general panic, as is ſaid to have happened to Ninus in his war with the Bactrians [c]. In this art the kings of Chaldea and Perſia were inſtructed, as one of the moſt uſeful inſtruments of government, among a people, whoſe ignorance and credulity rendered them proper ſubjects of impoſture. For "barbarous nations are naturally prone to ſuperſtition; and a weak, illiterate, and fickle multitude, when they are once brought under its dominion, will be more obedient to their prieſts than to their civil or military leaders [d]." The Chaldean magic was then a very different thing from a knowledge of the real properties of bodies; and, though ſome acquaintance with the motions of the heavenly bodies was neceſſary for aſtrological calculations, it cannot be inferred, either from their magical or aſtrological arts, that the Chaldeans were eminent maſters in any branch of natural ſcience. All the writings, which have been aſcribed to the Chaldean Zoroaſter, are unqueſtionably ſpurious.

Among the Chaldean philoſophers, we muſt not omit to mention Belus and Beroſus.

Of BELUS nothing farther is known, than that he promoted the ſtudy of aſtronomy among the Aſſyrians; probably with no other

[a] Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. vii. c. 16. xi. 42. xxx. 1. Juſtin, l. i. c. 2. Recognitiones Clementis, l. iv. c. 27.

[b] Platon. Alcib. i. Ficin in Argument. Cratyli. Bayle Zoroaſt.

[c] Diod. Sic. l. ii. c. 6. [d] Plutarch in Sertorio.

view, than to encourage that faith in aſtrological predictions, which he knew how to apply to political purpoſes. It is related [a], that Semiramis erected a lofty tower to his memory, which the Chaldeans afterwards made uſe of as an aſtronomical obſervatory. After his death, Belus was honoured with a place among the divinities, and this was, probably, the origin of the fables which are found concerning him in the Grecian mythology.

The hiſtory of Berosus is of later date, and is better known. He lived before Manetho, who wrote concerning the affairs of Chaldea under Ptolemy Philadelphus; he probably flouriſhed about the time of Alexander [b]. He was a Babylonian, a prieſt of Belus. Going into Aſia Minor, he ſettled in the iſland of Cos, where he opened a ſchool for teaching the Chaldean aſtrology, and obtained ſuch reputation by his predictions [c], that his ſtatue was erected at Athens. He publiſhed a hiſtory of the Chaldeans, which contained many memorials of antient times; but this work, except a few fragments preſerved by other writers [d], is loſt. An impudent Monk, Annius, of Viterbo in Tuſcany, who employed himſelf in forging books which he aſcribed to the antients, obtruded upon the world a fictitious hiſtory of the Chaldeans, under the name of Beroſus, which obtained greater credit among the learned than might have been expected.

Notwithſtanding the obſcurity with which antiquity has covered the Chaldean philoſophy, it has been highly extolled, not only by the Orientaliſts and Greeks, but by Jewiſh and Chriſtian writers. But, if we have recourſe only to ſuch authorities as are unqueſtionably genuine, we ſhall find little, in this branch of the Barbaric philoſophy, deſerving of notice. The following brief detail includes the moſt intereſting particulars, which are known, concerning the tenets, and the magical and aſtrological arts, of the antient Chaldeans.

It appears, not only from the teſtimony of Diodorus [e], but from

[a] Diod. Sic. l. ii. p. 69. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. vi. c. 26.
[b] Tatianus Adv. Græc. c. 58. p. 171. Ed. Par. Syncelli Chronicon, p. 14, 28, 40.
[c] Vitruvius, l. ix. c. 4. [d] Fabricius Bibl. Gr. vol. xiv. p. 175. [e] Loc. cit.

other

other antient authorities collected by Euſebius [a], that the Chaldeans believed in God, the Lord and Parent of all, by whoſe providence the world is governed. And indeed, without this it is impoſſible to conceive, how their religious rites ſhould ever have ariſen: for the immediate object of theſe rites was a ſuppoſed race of ſpiritual beings or dæmons, whoſe exiſtence could not have been imagined, without firſt conceiving the idea of a Supreme Being, the ſource of all intelligence. Accordingly we find in fact, that not only the Chaldeans, but the Egyptians, and the whole Heathen world, from the moſt remote times, believed in a Supreme Deity, the fountain of all the divinities which they ſuppoſed to preſide over the ſeveral parts of the material world. This was the true origin of all religious worſhip, however idolatrous, not excepting even that which conſiſted in paying divine honours to the memory of dead men. Beſides the Supreme Being, the Chaldeans ſuppoſed ſpiritual beings to exiſt, of ſeveral orders; gods, dæmons, heroes. Theſe they probably divided into ſubordinate claſſes, as their practice of theurgy, or magic, required. The antient Eaſtern nations in general, and among the reſt the Chaldeans, admitted the exiſtence of certain evil ſpirits, clothed in a vehicle of groſſer matter; and in ſubduing or counteracting theſe, they placed a great part of the efficacy of their religious incantations [b].

Theſe doctrines were the myſteries of the Chaldean religion, communicated, as was uſual among the antients, only to the initiated. Their popular religion conſiſted in the worſhip of the ſun, moon, planets, and ſtars, as divinities [c], after the general practice of the Eaſt [d].

The religious ſyſtem of the Chaldeans gave riſe to two arts, for which they have long been celebrated, magic and aſtrology.

The magic of the Chaldeans, as appears from what has already been related, is not to be confounded with witchcraft, or a ſuppoſed intercourſe with evil ſpirits: it conſiſted in the performance of cer-

[a] Prep. Evan. l. iv. c. 5. [b] Plutarch. de Defectu Orac.
[c] Job, xxxi. 27. Diod. Sic. loc. cit. Herod. l. i. c. 181.
[d] Selden de Diis Syriis, Prol. c. 3.

tain religious ceremonies or incantations, which were ſuppoſed, through the interpoſition of good dæmons, to produce ſupernatural effects. Their aſtrology was wholly founded upon this chimerical principle, that the ſtars have an influence, either beneficial or malignant, upon the affairs of men, which may be diſcovered, and made the certain ground of prediction, in particular caſes: the whole art conſiſted in applying aſtronomical obſervations to this fanciful purpoſe, and, by this means, impoſing upon the credulity of the vulgar. Referring the reader, for farther information concerning this viſionary and pernicious art, to thoſe writers who have treated upon it more at large [a], we ſhall only add, upon this ſubject, the ſenſible reflection of Horace [b]:

Tu ne quæſieris (ſcire nefas) quem mihi, quem tibi
Finem Dii dederint, Leuconoë, neu Babylonios
Tentaris numeros: Ut melius, quidquid erit, pati! [c]

Whilſt the Chaldeans buſied themſelves in theſe and other arts of divination, true ſcience was very little indebted to their labours. We have ſcarcely any remains of their aſtronomical obſervations and opinions. As to the latter, the loſs is not much to be regretted, if we may judge from the following ſpecimens. According to Plutarch, and Vitruvius, who quote Beroſus, it was their opinion, that an eclipſe of the moon happened, when that part of its body which is deſtitute of fire is turned toward the earth [d]. From the ſame authority Seneca [e] gives it as a notion of the Chaldeans, that when all the

[a] Sextus Empir. Adv. Math. l. v. p. 339. Diod. Sic. l. ii. p. 83. Manilius, l. ii. ver. 456. Jamblich. de Myſter. § 8. c. 4. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. v. ii. p. 494. Voſſius de Theolog. Gent. l. ii. c. 47. [b] L. i. Od. xi. 1.

[c] Aſk not—'tis impious to inquire—what date
The limit of your life is fix'd by fate:
Nor vainly Babylonian numbers try;
But wiſely wait your lot, to live or die.

[d] Plut. de Placit. Phil. l. ii. c. 29. Comp. Euſeb. Prep. l. xv. c. 51. Vitruv. l. ix. c. 4. [e] Quæſt. Nat. l. iii. c. 29.

planets

planets ſhall meet in Cancer, the world will be conſumed by fire, and that when they ſhall meet in Capricorn, it will be deſtroyed by an inundation. They thought the form of the earth to be that of a boat [a].

The ſum of the Chaldaic Coſmogony, as it is given by Beroſus in his *Babylonica*, preſerved by Syncellus [b], diveſted of allegory, is, that in the beginning all things conſiſted of darkneſs and water; that Belus, or a divine power, dividing this humid maſs, formed the world; and that the human mind is an emanation from the divine nature *.

[a] Diod. Sic. loc. cit. [b] Chronic. p. 28.

* Vidend. Tribbechovius de Phil. Mor. inter Barbaros, c. 4. Perizon. in Orig. Bab. Rhodigin. Antiq. Lect. 16. Voſs. de Scient. Math. c. xxx. § 5. De Theol. Gent. l. ii. c. 47. Werenfels de Logomach. Erudit. c. vi. Buddæi Hiſt. Eccl. Per. v. ii. ſect. 5. Patricius de Zoroaſt. Urſinus de Zor. &c. ed. Norimb. 1661. Hottinger. Hiſt. Or. p. 365. Herbelot. Bibl. Or. Voc. Zor. Kircher Oedip. Ægypt. p. 216. Jonſius de Script. Hiſt. Phil. l. ii. Schrœerus in Imp. Bab. Herbert Relig. Gent. Pet. Fred. Arpe de Taliſmanibus. Anc. Univ. Hiſtory. vol. iv. Diſſ. on Zoroaſter. Prideaux Connection, b. iv. Shuckford's Harmony, b. viii. Weidler. Hiſt. Aſtron. Naudæi Apol. pro Viris magnis Magiæ ſuſpectis, c. viii. Burnet. Archæol. Phil. l. i. c. iv.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSIANS.

CONCERNING the philoſophy of the Perſians, which comes next under our conſideration, it is difficult to form a ſatisfactory judgment: for, we have no information upon this ſubject, but from the Greeks and Arabians; and the accounts we receive from both are liable to material objections. The Greeks had, indeed, ſufficient opportunities for becoming acquainted with the affairs, the religion, and the tenets of this people: but their inveterate enmity againſt the Perſians, rendered them incapable of giving a fair repreſentation of what they ſaw or heard; and their partiality to their own inſtitutions led them to ſpeak contemptuouſly of thoſe of all barbarous nations. As to the Arabians, notwithſtanding the credit which has been given them by ſeveral writers of diſtinguiſhed erudition, particularly by Pococke, Prideaux, Beauſobre, and Hyde, it muſt be confeſſed that difficulties, of ſtill greater magnitude, embarraſs their teſtimony. Not to urge, that the Arabian writers were little qualified, either by natural temper or by education, for the arduous taſk of examining queſtions, which time had involved in the deepeſt obſcurity; it is moſt evident, that the ſhameful practice, which, after the time of Mahomet, prevailed amongſt the Arabians, of ſupporting their new religion at the expence of truth, and making uſe of every kind of falſehood, particularly that of impoſing upon the world ſuppoſititious writings, in order to reconcile Jews and Chriſtians to their ſyſtem, renders their evidence, in all doubtful caſes, exceedingly liable to ſuſpicion. That this charge againſt the Arabian writers is not without foundation, will fully appear in the ſequel, and cannot indeed be queſtioned by thoſe who have read their works without prejudice, and obſerved what abſurd fables they have endeavoured to paſs upon the world, under the ſanction of ancient names, for genuine hiſtory.

It muſt not, therefore, be thought ſurpriſing, if, even from ſuch eminent modern writers as thoſe above mentioned, we receive, with ſome degree of heſitation, accounts of the antient Perſians which are given wholly upon the credit of the Arabians, and preſume to queſtion, whether, in reporting theſe accounts, ſufficient attention has been paid to the nature of hiſtorical evidence. We perceive much occaſion for this kind of ſuſpicion, in the writings of the learned Hyde, whoſe fondneſs for oriental learning ſeems to have led him to magnify ſlight conjectures and doubtful traditions into certain facts, and to have prevented him from making a judicious uſe of the immenſe maſs of materials with which his erudition furniſhed him[a]. Having laid it down to ourſelves as an invariable rule, not to admit any authority till we have carefully examined its foundation, we muſt be allowed not to give credit to modern reports, unleſs we find them ſupported by more ſolid evidence than that of the Arabians, and confirmed either by the concurrent teſtimony of the Greek writers, or by circumſtances of probability derived from ſome other quarter. This is the only way in which we can poſſibly lay before our readers an impartial hiſtory of philoſophy.

Philoſophy was introduced, or rather revived and corrected, among the Perſians, by ZARDUSHT, whom the Greek writers call ZOROASTER. The different accounts given of Zoroaſter by the Greeks, and by the Arabians and Perſians, can only be reconciled by ſuppoſing, as we have done, that the Chaldean and the Perſian Zoroaſter were different perſons, and that the latter lived at a much later period than the former. From comparing theſe accounts[b], it

[a] Com. Bayle's Dict. Zoroaſter. Works of the learned, 1701, p. 405. Moſheim's Eccl. Hiſt. S. i. p. ii. c. 1. § 2. Not. ad Cudworth, c. iv. § 16. n. 28. Baumgarten Notes on Ant. Univ. Hiſt. vol. iv. n. 75. Montfaucon Antiq. t. ii. p. ii. l. iv. c. 6. Fabricii Bibliogr. Ant. p. 31. A. Tierre in Monum. Vet. Antii. Renaudot, the author of *Anciennes Relations des Indes et de la Chine*, cenſures Hyde, for having preferred the teſtimony of one obſcure and enigmatical author, who wrote only 120 years before his time, to the authority of all antiquity.

[b] Vid. Agathias, l. ii. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 304. Huet. Dem. Ev. Prep. Pr. iv. c. 5. Abulfeda apud Pococke Spec. Hiſt. Arab. p. 146. Hyde Rel. vet. Perſ. p. 293. Suidas in Zor.

is

is probable that the latter was of Perſian extraction, and was born in Media. What the Arabian writers report concerning his having been early inſtructed by the Jews, ſeems to be a fiction invented to obtain credit, among the Jews and Chriſtians, to the doctrine which they profeſſed to have received from him. It is not, however, improbable, that he might have learned ſome things from the Iſraelites reſiding in Babylon, which might be of uſe to him in executing his deſign of correcting the doctrine of the Perſian Magi, though it may not be eaſy to ſpecify the particulars.

Several miracles are aſcribed to Zoroaſter, ſuch as an artful impoſtor would naturally attempt, and would not perhaps find it difficult to perform. It is ſaid, particularly, that he ſuffered melted metal to be poured upon his boſom, and held fire in his hand, without ſuffering any injury[a]. Having by theſe and other artifices eſtabliſhed his credit, it is related that he undertook the revival and improvement of the religion of the antient Magi, which had long before this time prevailed in Media and Perſia, but which, in conſequence of the maſſacre of the Magi (who after the death of Cambyſes had uſurped the government) had been interrupted, and almoſt entirely ſupplanted, by the worſhip of the ſtars, to which the Perſians, with their king Darius, were addicted. Much is alſo ſaid by the Arabian writers, concerning the learning which Zoroaſter acquired from the Indian Brachmans; concerning the influence which he obtained with Darius, and the ſucceſs with which he propagated his ſyſtem; and laſtly, concerning his aſſaſſination, by Argaſpis, king of the Eaſtern Scythia, at the ſiege of Bactria[b]. But the ſilence of the Greeks, who were at this time well acquainted with the affairs of Perſia, and after Alexander's conqueſts muſt have become poſſeſſed of many Perſian records, is a circumſtance which caſts a cloud of ſuſpicion over theſe relations. Thus much, however, may be admitted as probable; that there was in Perſia, in the time of Darius Hyſtaſpes, a reformer, who, aſſuming the antient name of Zoroaſter, brought back

[a] Hyde p. 311. Prid. Conn. p. 214.

[b] Hyde, c. 24. p. 313. Prideaux. p. 221. Bayle, Zor. Pococke Specim. Hiſt. Arab. p. 146, &c.

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the Perſians from the worſhip of the ſtars, to their antient worſhip of fire, with ſome innovations both in doctrine and ceremonies. Perhaps too it may be added, that he was acquainted with aſtronomy, with the medical art, and with other branches of learning, as far as they were at that time advanced in the Eaſt. Both the reality and the ſucceſs of this attempt are confirmed by the teſtimony of Lucian, who relates, that in his time the antient religion of the Magi flouriſhed among the Perſians, the Parthians, the Bactrians, the Choraſmians, the Sacans, the Medes, and other barbarous nations[a]. And the reports of modern travellers give farther credit to this relation[b]; for we learn from them, that there is ſtill, in the province of Carmania, a ſect, who adhere to the doctrines of Zoroaſter, and worſhip fire according to the inſtitutions of the antient Magi.

To Zarduſht, or the Perſian Zoroaſter, many writings are aſcribed. One of theſe, called the *Zend*, is ſaid to be ſtill remaining among the followers of Zoroaſter, and is eſteemed of ſacred authority. It is written in the Perſian language, and conſiſts of two parts, one of which contains their forms of devotion and order of ceremonies; the other, the precepts of religion and morality. A portion of this book, or of a compendium of it, called the *Sadder*, is read to the people, on every ſacred day, by their prieſts[c]. There is, however, much reaſon to queſtion, whether this book be of ſuch antient date as the time of Zoroaſter[d]: probably, it was written about the time when many Jews and Chriſtians reſided among the Perſians, that is, about the fourth or fifth century. Many other works in aſtrology, phyſics, theology, &c. have been attributed to Zoroaſter, but they are all loſt, and it is probable that moſt of them were forged to ſerve the purpoſes of impoſture.

Fragments of a work, entitled *The Oracles* of Zoroaſter, are ſtill extant. A ſmall collection of theſe fragments, conſiſting of only ſixty verſes, was publiſhed[e] by Pletho. Patricius afterwards made a much

[a] In Longæv. Op. tom. ii. p. 818. [b] See Prideaux Connect. vol. i. p. 231.
[c] See a Latin verſion of the Sadder, in Hyde Rel. Perſ. p. 431, &c.
[d] Fabric. Bibl. Gr. vol. i. p. 246. [e] Paris, An. 1538, 1589. Amſt. 1689.

larger collection, containing 323 verſes, with the commentaries of the Platonic philoſophers [a]. Several other editions of theſe verſes have been publiſhed, and much pains has been taken by various writers to explain them. Stanley has ſubjoined to his account of *The Lives of Philoſophers* a correct tranſlation of them. They are quoted, with the higheſt reſpect, by philoſophers of the Alexandrian ſchool, as genuine remains of Chaldean wiſdom. But they abound ſo much in the ideas and language peculiar to that ſchool, that it is probable they were written by ſome Platoniſt, about the beginning of the ſecond century; a period when nothing was more common than to attempt to ſupport the falling credit of gentile philoſophy, by ſpurious writings [b] *.

Beſides Zoroaſter, we have few eminent names remaining, among the antient Perſian philoſophers. The prince Hyſtaſpes has been ranked in this claſs; and it is related [c], that he ordered his ſon Darius to inſcribe upon his tomb the title of Maſter of the Magi. It is probable, that, after the uſual manner of kings in antient times, he united in himſelf the two characters of high prieſt and ſovereign prince.

[a] Publiſhed at the end of his *Nova Philoſophia de Univerſis.* Ferrar. 1591. Venet. 1593.

[b] Compare Stanley, p. 1176. Fabric. Bib. Gr. vol. i. p. 247, 249. Moſheim. Not. ad Cudworth, p. 340. n. 54. Hyde, p. 386. Burnetii Archæologia, p. 28.

[c] Ammianus Marcell. l. xxiii. c. 6.

* Hyde, Prideaux, and others, mention ancient books of Zoroaſter, which are at this day extant among the Gheuri and other profeſſors of the Zoroaſtrian ſuperſtition, and made uſe of in their ſacred worſhip, copies from which have been brought over to England and France. A catalogue of theſe and other Perſian MSS. lodged in the library of the King of France, was publiſhed by M. Anquetil du Perron, in his travels, and is copied in the *Journal de Savans* for July, 1762. But theſe books, written partly in the Zendic or ſacred, and partly in the vulgar Perſian language, are, for the moſt part, a narrative of miracles and revelations, by which Zoroaſter is ſaid to have eſtabliſhed his religion, or a collection of precepts for religious ceremonies. Some of them indeed treat of fundamental doctrines of theology, taught among the worſhippers of fire: but it is probable, from the tenets contained in theſe books, many of which ſeem to have been borrowed from the Jews and Mahometans, from the entire ſilence of Greek authors who wrote after the time of Alexander concerning theſe books, and from other conſiderations, that they were written at a later period, for the purpoſe of appeaſing the reſentment of their Mahometan perſecutors.

Hoſtanes

Hoſtanes is alſo mentioned by Euſebius[a] as an eminent Perſian philoſopher, who borrowed his learning from the Egyptians: but it is, not without reaſon, ſuſpected by Scaliger and Bochart, that the paſſage is ſurreptitious, and was inſerted by Panodorus, a monk, in order to give the ſanction of antiquity to the art of alchymy.

Though our information concerning the hiſtory of philoſophy among the Perſians, in the ages prior to the time of Zoroaſter, is very imperfect, it is certain, from the united teſtimony of the Greeks and Arabians, that long before that time the Magi exiſted as a body, and were the official guardians of religion and learning. The religion which they taught, conſiſted in the worſhip of the ſun or fire; a practice which prevailed among the Aſſyrians, Chaldeans, and many other eaſtern nations[b]. The name under which the Perſians worſhipped the ſun, or rather the inviſible Deity, whom they ſuppoſed to be, in a peculiar manner, reſident in this luminary, was Mithras. Both Herodotus[c] and Strabo[d] relate, that the Perſians worſhipped none of the gods but the ſun: and it appears, from comparing the inſcriptions on ſeveral antient Perſian monuments yet remaining, that Mithras was the name of this divinity. Among theſe are the following[e]: *Deo Soli invicto Mithræ*; and, *Omnipotenti deo Mithræ*. The hiſtorians juſt cited add, that the Perſians ſacrificed horſes to the ſun; a circumſtance to which Ovid alludes when he ſays[f]:

> Placat equo Perſis radiis Hyperiona cinctum,
> Ne detur celeri victima tarda Deo[g].

It may be conjectured, that, in a more remote period, ſome emi-

[a] Chron. l. i. p. 43.
[b] Voſſius de Theol. Gent. l. ii. c. 2. Selden de Diis Syriis. paſſ. Herbert de Rel. Gent. c. 4. [c] L. i. c. 131. [d] L. xv.
[e] Spanhemius ad Jul. Cæſ. p. 144. Van Dale, Diſſ. ix. ad ant. Marm. p. 16.
[f] Faſtor, l. i. v. 383.

[g] The horſe, renown'd for ſpeed, the Perſians ſlay,
A welcome victim to the God of day.

nent hero, or public benefactor, whoſe name was MITHRAS, had after his death been deified: for, in certain ancient Perſian monuments, Mithras is repreſented as a mighty hunter, armed with a ſword, having a *tiara* on his head, and riding a bull [a]. Perhaps the Perſians might conceive the ſoul of this hero to be reſident in the ſun, and might afterwards transfer their worſhip to the ſun itſelf, under the name of Mithras. But, whatever be thought of this conjecture, it can ſcarely be doubted, that the ſun, under this name, was an object of worſhip among the Perſians.

It has been diſputed, whether the Perſians worſhipped the ſun as immediately the ſupreme divinity, or conſidered him as the viſible repreſentation of a higher inviſible power. The paſſages above referred to have been urged in proof of the former opinion: in ſupport of the latter, are adduced the teſtimonies of Herodotus [b] and Xenophon [c], who ſay, that the Perſians looked upon lightnings as the enſigns of the ſupreme divinity; and of Strabo [d], who relates, that they called the whole circuit of the heavens, God. The true ſolution of this difficulty probably is, that the vulgar paid their worſhip immediately to the ſun, as the viſible fountain of light and heat, whilſt the more enlightened, conceiving of the Deity as the ſoul of the world, diffuſed through the whole circuit of the univerſe, imagined the ſun to be the chief ſeat of this divine principle, and paid homage to that luminary, as the repreſentative of the inviſible power. Whilſt the multitude were contented with a ſenſible object of devotion, the Magi, and thoſe whom they inſtructed in the myſteries of religion, conſidered the ſun and fire merely as viſible ſymbols of the animating principle of the univerſe.

Beſides Mithras, the Perſians worſhipped, under oppoſite characters, OROMASDES and ARIMANIUS, the former as the author of all good, the latter as the author of all evil. Perhaps theſe divinities were originally, like Mithras, merely human beings; the one, a good prince, who had diſtinguiſhed himſelf by rendering important ſervices, military or civil, to his countrymen; the other, a tyrant, who

[a] Van Dale Marm. ant. Diſſ. i. [b] L. i. c. 131.
[c] Cyrop. l. i. p. 65. [d] Lib. xv.

had

had been the cauſe of grievous public calamities [a]. Arimanius was not called by the Perſians a god, but an evil dæmon, and they always wrote his name with the letters inverted [b]. This rude and vulgar ſuperſtition, which had no other object than individual men, was afterwards corrected and improved by philoſophy, till it was changed into the worſhip of two ſpiritual beings, the one the author of good, the other of evil. The ſyſtem which ſuppoſes two ſuch principles in nature, ſeems to have been held by the Perſian Magi before the time of Zoroaſter; but how far they ſuppoſed them dependent upon the ſupreme divinity, does not appear. Zoroaſter, however, certainly taught the doctrine of their inferiority to the firſt parent of all things [c], and introduced many alterations into the religious ſyſtem and ceremonies of the Magi, which are intimately connected with the hiſtory of philoſophy.

The ſacred fire, which the Perſians had hitherto worſhipped upon altars erected in the open air, Zoroaſter appointed to be incloſed in temples, the care of which was committed to an order of MAGI, or prieſts [d]. Theſe Magi were divided into three claſſes. The firſt conſiſted of the inferior prieſts, who conducted the ordinary ceremonies of religion; the ſecond preſided over the ſacred fire; the third was the *Archimagus*, or high-prieſt, who poſſeſſed ſupreme authority over the whole order. They had three kinds of temples; firſt, common oratories, in which the people performed their devotions, and where the ſacred fire was kept only in lamps; next, public temples, with altars, on which the fire was kept continually burning, where the higher order of the Magi directed the public devotions, and the people aſſembled, to perform magical incantations, hear interpretations of dreams, and practice other ſuperſtitions [e]; and laſtly, the grand ſeat of the Archimagus, which was viſited by the people at certain ſeaſons with peculiar ſolemnity, and to which it was deemed an indiſpenſible duty for every one to repair, at leaſt once in

[a] Leibnitz Theodicèe, p. ii. § 138. Moſheim. ad Cudworth, p. 328.
[b] Hyde, l. c. [c] Plutarch, l. c. [d] Hyde, c. 28, 29, 30.
[e] Cic. de Divin. lib. i. c. 4. Ælian. l. ii. c. 17. Valerius Max. l. i. c. 6. Strabo, l. xvi. Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. xxiv. c. 6.

his

his life. This principal temple was erected by Zoroaſter, in the city of Balch, and remained till the ſeventh century, when, the followers of Zoroaſter being driven by the Mahometans into Carmania, another building of the ſame kind was raiſed, to which thoſe who ſtill adhered to the antient Perſian religion reſorted. They were divided into ſeveral ſects; but this diviſion probably rather reſpected the mode of conducting the offices of religion, than religious tenets. The kings of Perſia were not allowed to take poſſeſſion of their government, till they had been inſtructed in the myſteries of religion, and enrolled among the Magi[a]. No images, or ſtatues, were permitted in the Perſian worſhip. Hence, when Xerxes found idols in the Grecian temples, he, by the advice of the Magi, ſet them on fire, ſaying, that the gods, to whom all things are open, are not to be confined within the walls of a temple.

The account which Diogenes Laertius[b] gives of the Perſian Magi is this: "They are employed in worſhipping the gods by prayers and ſacrifices, as if their worſhip alone would be accepted; they teach their doctrine concerning the nature and origin of the gods, whom they think to be fire, earth, and water; they reject the uſe of pictures and images, and reprobate the opinion, that the gods are male and female; they diſcourſe to the people concerning juſtice; they think it impious to conſume dead bodies with fire[c]; they allow of marriage between mother and ſon; they practiſe divination and prophecy, pretending that the gods appear to them; they forbid the uſe of ornaments in dreſs; they clothe themſelves in a white robe; they make uſe of the ground as their bed, of herbs, cheeſe, and bread for food, and of a reed for their ſtaff." And Strabo relates[d], that there were in Cappadocia a great number of Magi, who were called *Pyrethi*, or worſhippers of fire, and many temples of the Perſian gods, in the midſt of which were altars, attended by prieſts, who daily renewed the ſacred fire, accompanying the ceremony with muſic.

The religious ſyſtem of the Magi was materially improved by

[a] Hyde, p. 126. Pocock, ib. p. 146.
[b] L. i. § 6—9.
[c] Conf. Dioſcorid. Anthol. l. iii. c. 4.
[d] Lib. xv.

Zoroaſter. Plutarch, ſpeaking of his doctrine, ſays[a]; "Some maintain, that, neither is the world governed by blind chance without intelligence, nor is there one mind alone at the head of the univerſe; but, ſince good and evil are blended, and nature produces nothing unmixed, we are to conceive, not that there is one ſtore-keeper, who, after the manner of an hoſt, diſpenſes adulterated liquors to his gueſts, but that there are in nature two oppoſite powers, counteracting each others operations, the one accompliſhing good deſigns, the other evil. To the better power Zoroaſter gave the name of Oromaſdes; to the worſe that of Arimanius; and affirmed, that, of ſenſible objects, the former moſt reſembled light, the latter darkneſs. He alſo taught, that Mithras was a divinity who acted as moderator between them, whence he was called by the Perſians, the Mediator." After relating ſeveral fabulous tales concerning the conteſts between the good and evil dæmon, Plutarch, ſtill reciting the doctrines of Zoroaſter, proceeds: "The fated time is approaching, in which Arimanius himſelf ſhall be utterly deſtroyed; in which the ſurface of the earth ſhall become a perfect plain, and all men ſhall ſpeak one language, and live happily together in one ſociety." He adds, on the authority of Theopompus, "It is the opinion of the Magi, that each of theſe gods ſhall ſubdue and be ſubdued by turns for ſix thouſand years, but that, at laſt, the evil principle ſhall periſh, and men ſhall live in happineſs, neither needing food, nor yielding a ſhadow; the God who directs theſe things taking his repoſe for a time, which, though it may ſeem long to man, is but ſhort." Diogenes Laertius[b], after Hecateus, gives it as the doctrine of Zoroaſter, that the gods (meaning, doubtleſs, thoſe of whom he laſt ſpeaks, Oromaſdes and Arimanius) were derived beings.

Shariſtan, an Arabian writer, gives the following account of the doctrine of Zerduſht, or Zoroaſter[c]. "Zerduſht affirmed light and darkneſs, Yezdan and Ahreman, to be two contrary principles, which were the origin of every thing ſubſiſting in the world; the forms of nature being produced from the combination of theſe principles:

[a] Iſis et Oſiris, tom. ii, p. 155. [b] Loc. cit. [c] Apud Hyde, p. 299.

but

but maintained, that the exiſtence of darkneſs is not to be referred to the one ſupreme Deity, who is without companion or equal, but muſt be conſidered as the unavoidable conſequence of his determination to create the world, in which light can no more ſubſiſt without darkneſs, than a viſible body can exiſt without its ſhadow.[a] To theſe accounts we may add that of the Neſtorian Biſhop, Theodorus Mopſueſtenus, who, in his book concerning the Magian religion of the Perſians, ſays[a], that according to their doctrine, Zarva, or the chief of all the gods, produced Hormiſda and Satana[b].

If theſe authorities be carefully compared, it will appear probable, that Zoroaſter, adopting the principle commonly held by the antients, that from nothing nothing can be produced, conceived light, or thoſe ſpiritual ſubſtances which partake of the active nature of fire and darkneſs, or the impenetrable, opaque, and paſſive maſs of matter, to be emanations from one eternal ſource; that, to the derived ſubſtances he gave the names, already applied by the Magi to the cauſes of good and evil, Oromaſdes and Arimanius; and that the firſt fountain of being, or the ſupreme divinity, he called Mithras. Theſe active and paſſive principles he conceived to be perpetually at variance; the former tending to produce good, the latter evil; but that, through the MEDIATION or intervention of the ſupreme being, the conteſt would at laſt terminate in favour of the good principle. According to Zoroaſter, various orders of ſpiritual beings, gods or dæmons, have proceeded from the deity, which are more or leſs perfect, as they are at a greater or leſs diſtance, in the courſe of emanation, from the eternal fountain of intelligence; among which, the human ſoul is a particle of divine light, which will return to its ſource, and partake of its immortality; and matter is the laſt or moſt diſtant emanation from the firſt ſource of being, which, on account of its diſtance from the fountain of light, becomes opaque and inert, and whilſt it remains in this ſtate is the cauſe of evil; but, being gradually refined, it will at length return to the fountain whence

[a] Apud Photium, Cod. 81.

[b] Compare Pococke, p. 147. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. xiv. p. 137.

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it flowed. This doctrine of emanation afterwards produced many fanciful opinions in theology *.

* Vidend. Moſheim de Cauſis ſuppoſ. Libr. Huet. Dem. Ev. Prop. iv. c. 5. Buddæi Eccl. Hiſt. tom. ii. Kircher Œdip. Æg. tom. ii. p. ii. Mopſueſtenus de Mag. Perſ. apud Photium. Solini Polyh. c. 55. Rhodigin. Ant. Lect. xiii. Selden de Diis Syr. Proleg. et Synt. ii. c. 8. Van Dale, Diſſ. i. ix. ad Ant. Marm. Montfaucon Diar. Ital. c. 14. Fabric. Bibl. Ant. c. viii. k. Fab. Bib. Gr. vol. xiv. p. 137. J. Firmic. de Error. p. 414. Voſſ. de Orig. Idol. l. ii. c. 9. Beauſobre de Manich. tom. i. Anc. Univ. Hiſt. vol. iv. & notes. Bayer Hiſt. Regni Bactr. Leibnizii Theodicée, præf.

CHAP. V.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INDIANS.

FROM whatever quarter India, the country which, as adjacent to Perſia, next comes under our notice, received its wiſdom, there can be no doubt that its wiſe men very early obtained a high degree of reputation. We find that it was viſited, for the purpoſe of acquiring knowledge, by Pythagoras, Anaxarchus, Pyrrho, and others, who afterwards became eminent philoſophers in Greece.

It is not, however, eaſy to collect ſatisfactory information concerning the antient philoſophical hiſtory of theſe remote countries. Modern travellers, either from the want of an accurate acquaintance with the language of the country, and a ready acceſs to the interior regions, or from the changes which have happened in the tenets and cuſtoms of theſe nations ſince they have been under the dominion of the Moguls, or on account of the poetical and allegorical dreſs in which the hiſtory of India is clothed, or laſtly, through the

ſuſpicion of fraud which hangs upon their ſacred books, have been able to furniſh little aſſiſtance to thoſe who are deſirous of ſearching into the antiquities of India. Our chief reliance, in this part of our work, muſt be upon the antients, and particularly thoſe who wrote after the time when Alexander extended his conqueſts into this country. At that time, much information was gained concerning the religion, the tenets, and the manners of the Indians, which was afterwards committed to writing, and is preſerved in the geography of the accurate Strabo, in the works of Plutarch and Arrian, and afterwards in thoſe of Porphyry, Philoſtratus, and others. But even theſe writers muſt be read, upon this ſubject, with ſome degree of diſtruſt; for their accounts are given wholly upon the reports of unknown perſons, who themſelves viſited only the exterior parts of the country; and they are written under the ſtrong bias of a diſpoſition to judge of the Oriental philoſophy by comparing it with the Grecian.

In the moſt antient times, we find among the Indians a race of wiſe men, who are ſometimes called Gymnoſophiſts, from their cuſtom of appearing with the greater part of the body naked, and ſometimes Brachmans: but this latter is properly the name of only one claſs of theſe philoſophers, who were divided into ſeveral ſects[a].

The Brachmans were all of one tribe. From the time of their birth they were put under guardians, and, as they grew up, had a ſucceſſion of inſtructors. They were in a ſtate of pupillage till thirty-ſix years of age; after which they were allowed to live more at large, to wear fine linen and gold rings, to live upon the fleſh of animals not employed in labour, and to marry as many wives as they pleaſed. Others ſubmitted, through their whole lives, to a ſtricter diſcipline, and paſſed their days upon the banks of the Ganges, with no other food than fruits, herbs, and milk. The Samanæans were a ſociety, formed of thoſe who voluntarily devoted themſelves to the ſtudy of divine wiſdom. They gave up all private property, and

[a] Strabo, l. xv. p. 822. Conf. Schmidii Diſſ. de Gymnoſ. & Bayle. Porphyr. de Abſt. l. iv. § 17. Laert. l. i. § 1. Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. vii. c. 2.

committed their children to the care of the ſtate, and their wives to the protection of their relations. They were ſupported at the public expence, and ſpent their time in contemplation, in converſation on divine ſubjects, or in acts of religion. A wonderful circumſtance is related concerning theſe philoſophers; that frequently, without any apparent reaſon from ill-health or misfortunes, they formed a reſolution to quit the world, and, when they had communicated their intention to their friends, immediately, without any expreſſions of regret on the one ſide, or of apprehenſion on the other, threw themſelves into a fire which they had themſelves prepared for the occaſion. There was another ſect, called the Hylobians, who lived entirely in foreſts, upon leaves and wild fruits, wore no other clothing than the bark of trees, and practiſed the ſevereſt abſtinence of every kind[a].

From this account of the Indian Gymnoſophiſts, it is eaſy to perceive, that they were more diſtinguiſhed by ſeverity of manners than by the cultivation of ſcience, and that they more reſembled modern monks than antient philoſophers. Some of them, indeed, allowed themſelves a greater latitude of manners than others; but their general characters were, rigid abſtinence, indolence, and the pride of independence. Of their high ſpirit Strabo relates the following example. When Oneſicritus was commiſſioned by Alexander to invite a body of theſe philoſophers to viſit him, they refuſed to go, ſaying that, if Alexander had any buſineſs with the Brachmans, he might come to them.

The rigours which have been, and are to this day, practiſed among the Indians, are ſuch as could not be credited but upon the beſt authority. Pliny relates[b], that ſome have ſtood with their eyes ſteadfaſtly fixed upon the ſun from morning to night; and that others have remained, in one painful poſture, upon the burning ſands, for whole days: ſtories which are confirmed by the reports of modern travellers[c] concerning the voluntary ſeverities, and even tortures,

[a] Megaſthenes ap. Strabon. l. c. Pococke's Travels.
[b] Hiſt. Nat. l. vii. c. 2.
[c] Bernier's Travels, vol. ii. p. 127. Kempfer's Hiſt. of Japan, vol. i. p. 30.

which are commonly practiſed upon themſelves by the Indian Bramins.

Such examples of abſtinence and hardy endurance could not fail to make a ſtrong impreſſion upon the minds of the multitude, and to give the Gymnoſophiſts great influence, in an age of ignorance and ſuperſtition. In order to preſerve and increaſe their power, they made uſe of two expedients. The firſt was, the keeping among themſelves the whole buſineſs of foretelling future events. "The wiſe men alone," ſays Arrian [a], "were ſkilled in the arts of divination, or permitted to practiſe them. They only predicted the changes of the ſeaſons, or public calamities, thinking it a degradation of themſelves, or their art, to employ it upon trifling occaſions." They, doubtleſs, made uſe of this precaution, in order to render themſelves the more neceſſary to the ruling powers, who would eaſily perceive the value of ſuch an inſtrument of ſuperſtition. The other expedient, by means of which they maintained their authority, was, the appropriating to themſelves the regulation of religious concerns. To eſtabliſh their reputation for ſanctity, they ſpent the greater part both of the day and the night in performing acts of worſhip, which were chiefly addreſſed to the ſun [b]. By theſe means, they made themſelves of conſequence to the ruling powers, and became objects of veneration to the people; ſo that they could eaſily gain acceſs wherever they pleaſed, and obtain whatever they wiſhed [c]. Many tales are related concerning theſe Gymnoſophiſts, which are too ſtrongly marked with the characters of fiction to merit a place in the hiſtory of philoſophy [d].

Among the few Indian philoſophers, whoſe names have been preſerved to the preſent times, the moſt celebrated is Buddas. Little is known concerning him, more than that he was a religious impoſtor, who, by pretending to a divine original and miraculous birth, obtained credit and authority whilſt he lived, and, after his

[a] In Indicis & Exped. Alex. l. vii. [b] Porphyr. l. c. et Philoſtrat. l. iii. c. 13.
[c] Strabo, l. c.
[d] Apuleii Floridi l. ii. Alex. ab Alex. l. v. c. 21. Hieron. contra Jovinian. § 22. Clem. Alex. Strom. p. 305.

death,

death, was honoured with divine worſhip. St. Jerom relates, that he boaſted of having been brought forth from the ſide of a virgin [a]. This impoſtor is probably the ſame who is at preſent honoured in Siam, China, and Japan, under the names of Somonacodom, Xeko, and Fohi.

Among thoſe Brachmans, who are mentioned with reſpect by the Greek writers who treat of the time when Alexander viſited India, are Dandamis and Calanus [b]. Dandamis is celebrated for the boldneſs with which he cenſured the intemperance and licentiouſneſs of Alexander and his army, in a conference which he held with Oneſecritus. Calanus, when he ſaw Alexander's meſſengers clothed with fine linen garments, and elegantly adorned, laughed at their effeminacy, and requeſted them, if they wiſhed to hold any conference with the Brachmans, to lay aſide their ornaments, and, like them, recline naked upon the rocks. It is alſo related, that when he found the infirmities of age coming upon him, he devoted himſelf to voluntary death, and aſcending the funeral pile, ſaid [c], "Happy hour of departure from life, in which, as it happened to Hercules, after the mortal body is burned, the ſoul ſhall go forth into light!" The doctrines of the antient Indians, as far as they are at preſent known, may be arranged under three claſſes, Divine, Natural, and Moral.

The ſum of their doctrine concerning Divine Subjects is as follows:

God is light, not ſuch as is ſeen, like the ſun or fire, but intelligence and reaſon [d]; that principle, through whoſe agency the myſteries of knowledge are underſtood by the wiſe. He never produced evil, but light, and life, and ſouls, of which he is the ſole Lord. The former and governor of the univerſe pervades it, and is inveſted with it, as with a garment: he is immortal, and ſees all things; the ſtars, the moon, and the ſun, are his eyes. He is beneficent, and preſerves, directs, and provides for all. The human mind is of celeſtial origin, and has a near relation to God. When it de-

[a] Contra Jovin. l. c. [b] Strabo, l. c. Arrian, l. c.
[c] Cic. de Divin. c. 23. Val. Max. l. i. c. 8. [d] Λογος.

parts

parts from the body, it returns to its parent, who expects to receive back the ſouls which he has ſent forth. Beſides the ſupreme divinity, inferior deities, proceeding from him, are to be worſhipped, but not with the ſacrifice of harmleſs animals, nor in temples, and upon altars adorned with gold and gems, but with eyes lifted up towards heaven, and with minds free from criminal paſſions[a].

The notions, which the antient Indians ſeem to have had of God, approach ſo near to the tenets of the Perſian Zoroaſter on this ſubject, that it is very probable, that his doctrine paſſed over to India, and was, in part at leaſt, received among them. In ſpeaking of the univerſe as the garment of God, their idea ſeems to have been, that the intellectual principle, which animates all things, is contained within the ſphere of the univerſe. They conceived God to be the ſoul of the world, a rational and intellectual light, whence all good is produced, and the chief ſeat of whoſe divinity is the ſun. Their notion of divine providence, deduced from that of the ſoul of the world, probably extended no farther, than that this principle is neceſſarily the firſt ſpring of all motion, life, and enjoyment; and fell far ſhort of that wiſe, and gracious voluntary ſuperintendance, which is the Chriſtian idea of providence. The human ſoul they repreſented as of divine original, becauſe, with all the other Eaſtern nations, they conceived it to be a particle, or an emanation, of that intellectual fire, by which they believed the univerſe to be animated. Their doctrine of the return of the ſoul to God, which ſome have confounded with the Chriſtian doctrine of the reſurrection, ſeems to have meant nothing more, than that the ſoul, after being diſengaged from the groſſer material body, would be re-united to the fountain of all being, the ſoul of the world. It is an opinion ſtill found among the Indians, and probably of very antient date, that there is in nature a periodical reſtitution of all things; when, after the return of all derived beings to their ſource, they are again ſent forth, and the whole courſe of things is renewed. Inferior divinities were, doubtleſs, worſhipped among them as emanations from the firſt ſpring of life.

[a] Pſeudo-Origenis Philoſophum, c. 24. Palladius de Gent. Ind. p. 22, 31, 158. Clement. Alex. Stromat. l. iii. p. 451.

Some of the doctrines of the Greeks concerning Nature, are ſaid to have been derived from the Indians *: but there is little reaſon to doubt, that theſe accounts are the mere fictions of Grecian ingenuity and vanity. Natural ſcience was probably no farther advanced among them, than merely to furniſh them with inſtruments of impoſture, in the arts of aſtrology and divination.

Many extravagant aſſertions have been advanced concerning their Moral ſyſtem. It has been ſaid, that the fables of Pilpay, which have been tranſlated from the Indian tongue into the Perſian, and have paſſed from theſe into European languages, were written by an antient Indian philoſopher, 2000 years before Chriſt. But the work contains many internal proofs, that it was written at a much later period: probably it was the production of ſome ingenious Perſian, who, to give it the greater credit, paſſed it upon the world as a relic of the antient Indian philoſophy. All that can be certainly known concerning the morality of the Indians, muſt be inferred from the manners of the Brachmans; whence we may conclude, that it chiefly conſiſted in voluntary acts of abſtinence and mortification, and in a contempt of death *.

* Megaſthenes apud Strabon. l. xv. Philoſtr. l. iii. c. 34.

* Videnda. Palladius de Gent. Ind. et Brachm. Ambros. de Mor. Brachm. Biſſe on the Brachmans, Lond. 1665. Burnet. Arch. c. iii. Heurn. Ant. Ph. Barb. l. ii. Horn. Hiſt. Ph. l. ii. Schmidii Diſſ. de Gymnoſoph. Rhodog. Lect. xiii. Maffæus de Rebus Ind. l. i. Beauſob. de Man. tom. i. Thomaſius de Manetis Dogmata. Hiſt. Sap. tom. i. Herbolet. Bibl. Or. p. 118, 206, 456. Starckii Specimen Sap. Ind. Vet. Berol. 1697. Anc. Univ. Hiſt. vol. iv. ix.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARABIANS.

ALTHOUGH the Greek writers have been entirely silent concerning the philosophy of the antient Arabians, and even the Saracens themselves have confessed, that before the rise of Mahometanism, their country was in a low state of civilization, yet some modern writers have taken much pains to maintain, that Arabia was very early distinguished by wisdom. In support of this opinion it has been said, that Pythagoras acquired a great part of his knowledge from the Arabians; that Moses fled out of Egypt into this country, and carried with him the wisdom of the Egyptians; that the queen of the East, who visited Solomon, was of Sabea, a region in Arabia; and that the wise men, who visited Jesus, were from this country[a]. But, the whole story concerning Pythagoras's journey to Arabia, is, as we shall afterwards see, extremely uncertain; and if it were not, nothing more could be fairly inferred from this circumstance, than that he learned from the Arabians the arts of divination, with which it is not improbable that, like the rest of the Eastern nations, they were well acquainted: and with respect to the remaining arguments, if they be allowed their utmost force, they will give the Arabians a very small share of the credit arising from the antient philosophy of the East.

It has been said[b], that there was in Arabia, at a very remote period, a sect of philosophers called the Zabians. But of this sect no mention is made by Greek or Roman writers. We owe all our information concerning them to the Arabians, from whom Maimonides[c], the Jew, borrowed his account. The probable truth con-

[a] Ludewig. Diss. de Phil. Turc. Hal. 1691. Porphyr. Vit. Pyth. § 2. Grot. in Matt. ii.

[b] Hyde Rel. Pers. c. 3. Pococke Hist. East, B. i. c. 8. Spencer de Legibus Heb. l. ii. c. 1. [c] Moreh Nebh. p. iii. c. 29.

cerning them is, that they were a mixed body of Gentiles and Jews, who, to give the ſanction of antiquity to their inſtitutions, pretended to derive them from Sabi the ſon of Seth. Their religion conſiſted in the worſhip of the ſun, the ſtars, and planets, and reſembled the antient Chaldean ſuperſtition; which is not at all ſurpriſing, conſidering how extenſively the Chaldean tenets were ſpread through the Eaſt. Their ſyſtem of opinions was an heterogeneous maſs, which muſt have been the produce of a period much later than that of which we are now treating [a].

The ſum of our knowledge of the antient Arabians, as far as reſpects our ſubject, is, that they were not unacquainted with aſtronomy, and that they were famous for their ingenuity in ſolving ænigmatical queſtions, and for their ſkill in the arts of divination [a]. Like the neighbouring Chaldeans and Perſians, they ſeem to have had their wiſe men, by whom their knowledge, ſuch as they had, was taught, and their religious ceremonies and ſuperſtitious arts were practiſed. Pliny [b] mentions the Arabian Magi, and ſpeaks of Hippocus, an Arabian, as belonging to this order.

It can ſcarcely be ſuppoſed, that the Arabians, who cultivated poetry, were unacquainted with moral wiſdom. But none of their moral writings are remaining, unleſs we allow the fables of Lokmann (tranſlated from Arabic into Latin by Erpenius [c]) to be of as antient date as ſome have conceived. It is however wholly uncertain, at what period the ſuppoſed author of theſe fables lived; and the work ſeems rather to be a collection of antient fables, than the production of any one writer. From the ſimilarity of many of theſe fables to thoſe of Æſop, ſome have inferred that Lokmann and Æſop were only different names for the ſame perſon. But it is more likely, that the compiler of theſe fables had ſeen thoſe of Æſop, and choſe to inſert ſome of them in his collection. Whoever was the writer, the fables afford no inelegant ſpecimen of the moral doctrine

[a] Abulfarius Dynaſt. ix. p. 184. Porphyr. Vet. Pyth. § 2. Pococke, p. 147.
[b] Hiſt. Nat. l. xxx. c. 1.
[c] Lugd. Bat. 1615, 1656. Vid. Fabr. Bibl. Gr. vol. i. p. 400.

of the Arabians; better adapted, however, to popular inſtruction than to the improvement of philoſophy, which the Arabians do not appear to have cultivated, till the period when their government paſſed into the family of the Abbaſidæ *.

* Vidend. Urſinus de Zor. Sect. vol. i. Horn. Hiſt. Ph. l. v. P. de Ludewig Diſſ. de Hiſt. Ph. ap. Turcas. Hal. 1691. Bochart. Geog. Sac. p. i. l. ii. c. 27. Le Moyne Var. Sac. p. 685. Spencer de Leg. Heb. l. ii. c. i. Hottinger Hiſt. Or. p. 165. Stoll. Hiſt. Ph. Mor. § 9. Chardin Voy. de Perſ. p. iii. p. 227.

CHAP VII.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PHENICIANS.

AMONG the Aſiatic nations who come under the general denomination of barbaric, in the ſenſe before explained, the Phenicians are the only people, whoſe philoſophical hiſtory ſtill remains to be conſidered.

The commercial celebrity of this people, has induced ſome writers to allow them great credit for wiſdom. It has been maintained, that their philoſophers taught ſounder principles of natural ſcience, than thoſe of any other eaſtern nation. Situated as they were upon the borders of the Mediterranean; obliged, by the narrow limits of their territory, frequently to ſend forth colonies into diſtant regions; and led, by their mercantile connections, into an extenſive acquaintance with foreigners, they enjoyed, it has been ſaid, peculiar advantages, for diſperſing abroad their native ſtock of knowledge, and for poſſeſſing themſelves, in return, of the learning and wiſdom of other countries. A nation of merchants would, it is urged, carry on a traffic,

traffic, not only in the natural productions of the earth and in manufactures, but in arts and ſciences.

But the experience of modern times, in which navigation and commerce are ſo much more extenſively purſued than formerly, is by no means favourable to theſe hypothetical concluſions. Mariners and merchants have ſeldom leiſure to attend to the improvement of ſcience. There can, indeed, be little reaſon to doubt that the Phenicians were acquainted with thoſe arts, which, at that time, admitted of an eaſy application to the purpoſes of gain. As far as they found a knowledge of the celeſtial *phænomena* to be uſeful in navigation, they were aſtronomers: and as far as experience taught them the utility of numbers in mercantile affairs, they were mathematicians [a]. But it is not likely, that they ſhould have much leiſure, or inclination, for proſecuting ſcientific reſearches beyond the line of practical application; and ſuch a degree of knowledge as their commerce would require, could hardly entitle them to the appellation of philoſophers. Among the antient Phenicians, we, however, meet with ſome individuals, who, on account of the inventions which have been aſcribed to them, claim attention.

MOSCHUS, or Mochus, the moſt antient name remaining on the liſt of Phenician philoſophers, was a native of Sidon. If we are to credit Jamblichus [b], he lived before the time of Pythagoras. After Poſidonius, many writers [c] aſcribe to him a ſyſtem of philoſophy, which afterwards roſe into great celebrity under the Grecian philoſophers, Leuſippus and Epicurus, called the Atomic. It is urged in defence of this opinion, that the Monads of Pythagoras were the ſame with the Atoms of Moſchus, with which Pythagoras became acquainted during his reſidence in Phenicia; and that from Pythagoras this doctrine paſſed to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and afterwards to Leuſippus and Epicurus [d].

[a] Lucian in Toxari. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. v. c. 12. Porphyr. Vit. Pyth. § 6. p. 9. Strabo, l. xvi. p. 158.

[b] Vita Pythag. c. 3. § 14.

[c] Strabo, l. xvi. p. 718. Sext. Empiric. adv. Phyſ. l. i. p. 621. Laert. l. viii. § 140. Cudworth Int. Syſt. c. i. § 9.

[d] Stobæi Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 13. Ariſt. Metaph. l. xiii. c. 6.

To this it may be replied, that the ſingle evidence of Poſidonius, the Stoic, who lived ſo many ages after the time of Moſchus, to whom Cicero allows little credit, and of whoſe authority even Strabo and Sextus Empiricus, who refer to him, intimate ſome ſuſpicion, is too feeble to ſupport the whole weight of this opinion. But the circumſtance, which moſt of all invalidates it, is, that the method of philoſophiſing by hypotheſis or ſyſtem, which was followed by the Greek philoſophers, was inconſiſtent with the genius and character of the barbaric philoſophy, which conſiſted in ſimple aſſertion, and relied entirely upon traditional authority [a]. The argument drawn from the hiſtory and doctrine of Pythagoras will afterwards be fully refuted, when it is ſhown, that this part of the hiſtory of Pythagoras has been involved in obſcurity by the later Platoniſts, and that neither the doctrine of Monads, nor any of thoſe ſyſtems which are ſaid to have been derived from Moſchus, are the ſame with the atomic doctrine of Epicurus. We therefore conclude, that, whatever credit the corpuſcular ſyſtem may derive from other ſources, it has no claim to be conſidered as the antient doctrine of the Phenicians.

Cadmus, ſo celebrated in Grecian hiſtory, was a native of Sidon, who, on the ſettlement of a Phenician colony at Thebes, formed the Greek alphabet on the foundation of the Phenician [b]. But, though this fact ſeems to be well aſcertained, it affords little ground for ranking Cadmus in the claſs of philoſophers: for the characters which he introduced into Greece, were not the invention of his own ingenuity; but were merely conveyed by him from Phenicia (where, as well as in other Eaſtern countries, they had long been in uſe) and accommodated to the Greek language. What has been advanced by ſome modern writers, to prove that Cadmus inſtituted ſchools of philoſophy at Thebes, being grounded merely on conjecture, can deſerve no attention.

The only remnants of antiquity, which treat of the philoſophy of the Phenicians, are ſundry fragments of the Coſmogony of Sancho-

[a] Burnet. Archæol. Phil. c. vi.

[b] Bochart, p. i. l. iv. c. 34. Montfaucon Palæogr. l. i. c. 23. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. v. i. p. 147.

niathon,

niathon, preſerved by Euſebius and Theodoret. Euſebius[a], on the authority of Porphyry, ſpeaks of Sanchoniathon as an accurate and faithful hiſtorian, who wrote of the affairs of Phenicia before the Trojan war, about the time of Semiramis; and adds, that his work, which was tranſlated by Philo-Byblius from the Phenician into the Greek language, contains many things, relating to the hiſtory of the Jews, which deſerve great credit, both becauſe they agree with the Jewiſh writers, and becauſe Sanchoniathon received theſe particulars from Hierombalus, a prieſt of the god Jao. Theodoret[b], on the ſame authority, confirms Euſebius's account of the hiſtorical ability and fidelity of Sanchoniathon, and ſays, that he applied himſelf diligently to the examination of antient records, and particularly took pains to collect authentic materials for the hiſtory of Taaut or Thoth, called by the Greeks, Hermes, and by the Romans, Mercury.

Upon theſe authorities, or rather upon the mere teſtimony of Porphyry, many learned men have concluded, that the genuine writings of Sanchoniathon were tranſlated by Philo-Byblius, and that Sanchoniathon derived a great part of his information from the books of Moſes; nay, ſome have ſuppoſed that Thoth was only another name for Moſes[c]. But, the inconſiſtencies, chiefly chronological, which the learned have detected in theſe accounts, and eſpecially the ſilence of the antients concerning this hiſtorian, who, if he had deſerved the character given him by Porphyry, could not have been entirely over-looked, create a juſt ground of ſuſpicion, either againſt Porphyry or Philo-Byblius. It ſeems moſt probable, that Philo-Byblius fabricated the work from the antient coſmogonies, pretending to have tranſlated it from the Phenician, in order to provide the Gentiles with an account of the origin of the world, which might be ſet in oppoſition to that of Moſes. Euſebius and Theodoret, indeed, who, like the reſt of the fathers, were too credulous in matters of this kind, and after them ſome eminent modern

[a] Prep. Evang. l. i. c. 9.
[b] De Curand. Græc. Affect. Serm. ii.
[c] Bocharti Geog. S. p. ii. l. ii. c. 17. Huet. Ev. Prep. l. iv. p. 50 and 70.

writers,

writers [a], have imagined, that they have diſcovered a reſemblance between Sanchoniathon's account of the formation of the world and that of Moſes. But, an accurate examination of the doctrine of Sanchoniathon, as it appears in the fragment preſerved by Euſebius, will convince the unprejudiced reader, that the Phenician philoſophy, if indeed it be Phenician, is directly oppoſite to the Moſaic. Sanchoniathon teaches, that, from the neceſſary energy of an eternal principle, active but without intelligence, upon an eternal paſſive chaotic maſs, or *Mot*, aroſe the viſible world. A doctrine, of which there are ſome appearances in the antient coſmogonies, and which was not without its patrons among the Greeks. It is therefore not unreaſonable to conjecture, that the work was forged in oppoſition to the Jewiſh coſmogony, and that this was the circumſtance which rendered it ſo acceptable to Porphyry.

But, though little credit ſeems due to the fragments of Sanchoniathon, of which, as well as of their author, nothing is known but from Porphyry or Suidas; it will be readily allowed, that the Phenicians, like the other Eaſtern nations, philoſophiſed in the barbaric manner concerning the origin of the world. Strabo mentions ſeveral Phenician philoſophers; but they flouriſhed, after the Greeks had introduced their ſyſtematic mode of philoſophiſing; a period, which muſt not be confounded with the age of barbaric philoſophy *.

[a] Grotius de Verit. Chr. Rel. l. i. § 16. Huet. l. c. Compare Cumberland's Coſmogony of Sanchoniathon. Introd. to Ant. Univ. Hiſtory.

* Videnda. Bochart. Geog. Sac. p. ii. l. i. c. 2. l. iv. c. 34. Bayer de Phæn. Stud. et Invent. Diſſ. Jen. 1709. Scheffer de Phil. Ital. c. v. Moſheim ad Cudw. c. i. § 6—10. Le Clerc Bibl. Choiſée, tom. i. p. 75. Burnet. Arch. c. vi. Fabr. Bibl. Gr. v. i. p. 147. Montfaucon. Paleogr. Gr. l. i. c. 23. Urſin. de Zor. Triſmeg. et Sanchoniathone. Ex. 3. Van. Dale ap. Diſſ. ſuper Ariſtea. Dodwell's Two Letters on Sanchon. Voſſ. Hiſt. Gr. l. i. c. 1. Simon Bib. Crit. tom. i. c. 9. Stillingfleet's Orig. Sac. l. i. c. 2. Shuckford's Harm. v. ii. p. 12. Banier Mythol. l. iii. c. 1.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EGYPTIANS.

HAVING taken a ſurvey of the ſtate of barbaric philoſophy in the Eaſtern nations, the firſt country which calls for our notice, as we paſs Southward, is Egypt; a country, which has claimed the honour of being the firſt ſeat of learning, and the fountain, whence the ſtreams of philoſophy flowed to Chaldea, and other Aſiatic nations, till it reached the remoteſt borders of India. Though there ſeems to be no ſufficient ground for admitting theſe high pretenſions, Egypt is unqueſtionably to be ranked among the moſt antient civilized countries, and was very early famous for wiſdom. Many eminent philoſophers among the Greeks, ſuch as Orpheus, Thales, Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato, viſited Egypt in ſearch of knowledge; and the illuſtrious legiſlator of the Hebrews was "learned in all the wiſdom of the Egyptians."

Nevertheleſs, it muſt be owned, that the hiſtory of Egyptian learning and philoſophy, after all the pains which have been taken to elucidate the ſubject, ſtill remains involved in thick clouds of uncertainty. The cauſes of this uncertainty it is eaſier to enumerate, than to overcome. To mention them may, however, be of uſe, in enabling us to judge how far we may expect ſatisfaction, and where it will be neceſſary, for want of ſufficient information, to ſuſpend our judgment.

The hiſtory of the Egyptian philoſophy looks backwards, beyond the period in which men firſt began to commit the great tranſactions of ſociety to writing, into the infant ſtate of the world, when arts and ſciences, as far as they were known, were only taught by oral inſtruction, concerning which nothing remains, but obſcure fables, and doubtful conjectures. From the numerous natural and politi-

cal changes, which, in a long ſucceſſion of ages, have taken place in Egypt, its cuſtoms and tenets have undergone various alterations and corruptions; whence it has happened, that authors who have written of the philoſophy of Egypt at different periods, not adverting to theſe changes, have given different, and even contradictory relations. Knowledge was communicated, by the Egyptian prieſts, under the concealment of ſymbolical characters or hieroglyphics, the key of which was at firſt intruſted only to the initiated, and has ſince been irrecoverably loſt: a circumſtance which has afforded ſubſequent theoriſts an opportunity of accommodating their repreſentations of the doctrines of the Egyptians to their own ſyſtem. Even at the time when Egyptian wiſdom firſt flouriſhed, different dogmas were taught in the different ſchools at Thebes, Memphis, and other places; which has occaſioned great diverſity in the accounts given of the Egyptians by Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch. At a later period, when Alexandria became the common reſort of learned men from every part of the world, the combination of their opinions with thoſe of the native Egyptians gave philoſophy and religion a form till then unknown. The ſtate of opinions in Egypt was at all times ſubject to alteration, from the dependance of the prieſts, who were the chief depoſitories of knowledge, upon the civil power, and their conſequent inclination to ſuit the doctrines of religion to the taſte of the reigning prince, and to accommodate them to the purpoſes of policy; a deſign, which might eaſily be effected by means of hieroglyphical characters. Farther difficulties ariſe from the vanity of the Greek writers, our chief authorities on this ſubject, who have every where confounded the gods of the Egyptians, and their theogony, with their own mythology, and, upon the ground of the ſlighteſt reſemblances, have concluded Oſiris to be Jupiter, Typhon to be Pluto, and other Egyptian and Grecian gods to be the ſame divinities under different names; hereby involving the mythological hiſtory of both countries in endleſs confuſion. Nor muſt we expect much aſſiſtance, in clearing our way through this thorny path, from modern interpreters of Egyptian learning: for we find them perpetually wandering in the mazes

of

of conjecture, and amuſing themſelves, and their readers, with unſatisfactory and inconſiſtent explanations of Egyptian myſteries. Of this we have a memorable example in the fanciful conjectures which have been offered, concerning the Iſiac Marble, one of the remains of Egyptian hieroglyphics, which was found by a common workman, and preſented to Vincent Duke of Mantua, in the year 1630. In this tablet Kircher diſcovered ſundry religious myſteries favourable to Chriſtianity, and Pignonus found precepts of moral and political wiſdom; another critic was of opinion, that it was a Runic calendar; while a fourth attempted to perſuade the learned world, that theſe characters deſcribed the properties and uſe of the magnet, and of the mariner's compaſs. What aſſiſtance can the cautious inquirer expect from remains of antiquity, which afford ſuch ample ſcope for the exerciſe of imagination? Laſtly, it is a circumſtance which greatly embarraſſes every attempt to trace out the antient philoſophy of Egypt, that we have few remains of antient writings, which treat directly upon this ſubject. Of Cheremon, Manetho, and other Egyptian writers, we have only a few fragments, preſerved in other authors: their works probably periſhed in the deſtruction, ſo fatal to literature, of the Alexandrian Library. The book *de Hieroglyphicis*, under the name of *Horus Apollo*, is ſpurious [a].

In the midſt of ſuch numerous cauſes of uncertainty, it will not be thought ſurpriſing that it is only in our power to lay before our readers the following particulars, as a probable ſtate of facts reſpecting the antient Egyptian philoſophy.

THEUT or THOTH, called by the Phenicians Taaut, by the Greeks Hermes, and by the Romans Mercury, is generally ſpoken of, by antient writers, as the firſt author of the Egyptian learning; but little is known concerning him. Cicero mentions [b] five Mercuries, three of whom were Greeks; the fourth, the ſon of Nilus, whom the Egyptians thought it unlawful to name; and the fifth, him whom the Phaneatæ worſhipped, who is ſaid to have ſlain Argus, and by that means to have poſſeſſed himſelf of the government of Egypt.

[a] Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 88. [b] De Nat. Deor. l. iii.

The Egyptians called him Thoth, and named the firſt month of the year after him. In this account Cicero confounds the Egyptian with the Arcadian Mercury[a]. Thoth, according to Diodorus Siculus[b], was chief miniſter to Oſiris, and aſſiſted him by his counſel; the hiſtorian adds, that he improved language, invented letters, inſtituted religious rites, and taught aſtronomy, muſic, and other arts. Other writers alſo aſſert, that he invented letters[c]: and the aſſertion may be credited, if by letters we underſtand ſymbolical characters, whence alphabetical letters were afterwards formed.

> Nondum flumineas Memphis contexere biblos
> Noverat, et ſaxis tantum volucreſque feræque
> Sculptaque ſervabant magicas animalia linguas[d].

The Egyptian Mercury or Thoth, was probably ſome man of ſuperior genius, who, before the age of Moſes (for among the Egyptians knowledge was in his time conſiderably advanced), had invented uſeful arts, and taught the firſt rudiments of ſcience; and who cauſed his inſtructions to be engraved in emblematical figures[e] upon tables or columns of ſtone, which he diſperſed over the country, for the purpoſe of enlightening the ignorant multitude. One of the principal uſes, to which theſe ſymbolical inſcriptions was applied, doubtleſs was, to teach the doctrines of religion, and maxims of political and moral wiſdom. Some writers have, fancifully enough, conjectured this Thoth, or Mercury, to have been the ſame with Adam, or Enoch, or Joſeph. Others have, with more plauſibility, maintained, that he was the Jewiſh legiſlator; but the circumſtances

[a] Marſhami Chron. Sec. 1. p. 35. [b] L. i.
[c] Ælian. Hiſt. l. xiv. c. 34. Plin. Hiſt. N. l. vii. c. 36.
[d] Lucan, l. iii. v. 222.

> Then Memphis, ere the reedy leaf was known,
> Engrav'd her precepts and her arts on ſtone;
> While animals in various order plac'd,
> The learned hieroglyphic column grac'd. Rowe.

[e] Herodot. l. ii. c. 37. Diodor. l. i.

of reſemblance between Thoth and Moſes, were ſuch as might eaſily be ſuppoſed to have occured between any other eminent founders of ſtates[a].

Beſides this Hermes or Mercury, there was another, who, at a later period, was equally celebrated. Manetho diſtinguiſhes him from the firſt, and ſays of him[b], that from engraved tables of ſtone, which had been buried in the earth, he tranſlated the ſacred characters written by the firſt Mercury, and wrote the explanation in books, which were depoſited in the Egyptian temples. He calls him the ſon of Agathodæmon, and adds, that to him are aſcribed the reſtoration of the wiſdom taught by the firſt Mercury, and the revival of geometry, arithmetic, and the arts, among the Egyptians. He was alſo called TRISMEGISTUS. The written monuments of the firſt Hermes having been loſt or neglected, in certain civil revolutions or natural calamities, the ſecond Hermes recovered[c] them, and made uſe of them as means of eſtabliſhing his authority. By an ingenious interpretation of the ſymbols inſcribed upon the antient columns, he impreſſed the ſacred ſanction of antiquity upon his own inſtitutions: and, to perpetuate their influence upon the minds of the people, he committed the columns, with his own interpretations, to the care of the prieſthood. Hence he obtained a high degree of reſpect among the people, and was long revered as the reſtorer of learning. From the tables of the firſt Hermes, he is ſaid to have written, as commentaries and explanations, an incredible number of books. It has been aſſerted, that he was the author of more than twenty thouſand volumes which treated of univerſal principles, of the nature and orders of celeſtial beings, of aſtrology, medicine, and other topics[d]. But many of the ſubjects, on which theſe writings are ſaid to have treated, were unknown in the early period of the Egyptian philoſophy. There can be little doubt, therefore, that

[a] Huet. Dem. Evang. Pr. iv. c. 4. Heumanni Acta Phil. t. ii. p. 687.

[b] Ap. Syncellum, p. 40.

[c] Herodot. l. ii. c. 82. Marſham. Chron. p. 241. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 242.

[d] Jamblichus de Myſt. Ægypt. § viii. c. 1, 2. Julius Firmicus, l. ii. Mathes. Fabricii Bibl. Gr. v. i. p. 76.

they were the forgeries of a later age, when it became one of the common artifices of impoſture to give the ſanction of antiquity to fiction [a].

From theſe firſt authors of Egyptian wiſdom, all learning was tranſmitted to poſterity by means of the prieſthood, a ſacred order probably inſtituted by the ſecond Hermes. The Egyptian prieſts had the reputation of extraordinary ſanctity, and were even ſuppoſed to participate of divinity. Hence they obtained great ſway over the people, and poſſeſſed no ſmall ſhare of influence in civil affairs. At ſeveral fixed hours of the day, they celebrated the praiſes of the gods in hymns: the reſt of their time they employed in mathematical ſtudies, in aſtronomical obſervations, or in other ſcientific purſuits. They obſerved a great degree of gravity in their dreſs and external deportment. They were exceedingly attentive to perſonal cleanlineſs; and, for this purpoſe, they made uſe of frequent ablutions, and of circumciſion. They held it unlawful to eat fiſh or beans. This latter ſuperſtition was adopted by the Pythagoreans [b].

Theſe prieſts concealed the myſteries of religion and philoſophy from the vulgar by means of written characters, which none but the initiated could underſtand. Theſe were of two kinds, hieroglyphical, and alphabetical. The former, were thoſe ſymbolical cha-

[a] Jablonſki, the author of *Pantheon Ægyptiorum*, is of opinion, that the firſt Hermes, or Thoth, was not a man, but the ſacerdotal divinity, from whom the prieſts were ſuppoſed to have derived all their wiſdom and authority, and who preſided over the στηλαι or columns, on which the antient learning of the country was inſcribed. This divinity, who as the god of the columns was called Thoth, he maintains to have been the ſame with Phthas (called by the Greeks Vulcan) that is, the ſupreme Deity *. But it ſeems more conſonant to the general voice of antiquity to ſuppoſe, that the firſt inventor of the inſcriptions upon the columns was conceived to have been inſpired by ſome divinity; and that afterwards, upon the recovery of the ſacred columns, the ſecond Hermes, who undertook to explain them, pretended to derive his deſcent from Thoth, and to partake of that divine inſpiration, which had dictated the antient wiſdom inſcribed upon theſe pillars.

[b] Herod. l. ii. c. 37. Strabo, l. xvii. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. iii. p. 303. vi. p. 633. Vid. Jablonſki Pantheon Ægyptiacum, Proleg. c. 3.

* Pantheon Æg. l. v. c. 5.

racters,

racters, which were inſcribed by the firſt Hermes on pillars or tables of ſtone, and which were afterwards copied and interpreted by the prieſts. The latter was the method of writing invented, or adopted, for the ſake of explaining the hieroglyphic records, but made uſe of only by the prieſts, and for religious purpoſes. Hence theſe characters were called Sacerdotal, or Sacred. Beſides theſe, there was a third kind of character in common uſe among the people, called the Epiſtolary[a].

Many attempts have been made to explain the hieroglyphic mode of writing, from the few ſpecimens, and the imperfect accounts, which remain from antiquity. But it would be ſurpriſing, if the ſagacity of modern criticiſm were able to decypher characters, which do not appear to have been always perfectly underſtood by the Egyptian prieſts themſelves, and which were, if not at their firſt introduction, certainly in their ſubſequent application, made uſe of for the purpoſe of concealment[b]. The ſacerdotal writings were depoſited in the inmoſt receſſes of temples: none but prieſts of the higher orders were commonly permitted to examine them: no ſtranger could obtain a ſight of them, without an expreſs order from the king, or without ſubmitting to ſeveral troubleſome ceremonies, particularly that of circumciſion[c]. Pythagoras ſeems to have been the only man, who ever choſe to gratify his curioſity on theſe hard conditions.

From this regular ſyſtem of concealment, it may reaſonably be inferred, that the Egyptian theology and philoſophy were chiefly contrived to preſerve and increaſe the authority of the prieſthood, and to aid the deſigns of government[d]. At the ſame time, it is very evident, that we can have little hope, at this diſtant period, of being able to draw aſide the veil, which has ſo long concealed the Egyptian myſteries. What kind of claim the Egyptians had to the character of philoſophers, will, however, in

[a] Clem. Alex. Stromat. l. v. p. 555. Porphyr. Vit. Pythag. p. 15. Shaw's Travels, v. ii. c. 5. [b] Origen contra Celſum, l. i. p. 11.
[c] Jamblich, l. c. [d] Jablonſk. Panth. Æg. tom. ii. p. 183, 253. Orig. adv. Celſ. l. i. p. 11. Clem. Alex. Strom. p. 533.

part

part appear, if we proceed to inquire into the ſtate of knowledge among them, reſpecting particular ſciences and arts.

Geometry, whether invented by the Egyptians or not (a queſtion, which it is not our province particularly to examine) was certainly known among them[a]. But, to ſuppoſe that they were acquainted with the higher and more abſtruſe parts of this ſcience, is a miſtake. The neceſſity they were under, of annually ſettling the boundaries of their lands, which were broken up by the overflowing of the Nile, taught them the art of menſuration; but we have no proof, that they poſſeſſed more mathematical knowledge than this art required. The elementary diſcoveries, which were made by Pythagoras and Thales after their return from Egypt, ſufficiently prove, that this ſcience muſt have been in a very imperfect ſtate in that country, at the time when they viſited it for the purpoſe of acquiring knowledge. It may therefore be certainly concluded, that we are indebted to Greece, and not to Egypt, for the advanced ſtate in which the mathematical ſciences have been tranſmitted from antient to modern times.

The caſe was nearly ſimilar with reſpect to aſtronomy. Some writers have made the Egyptians, and others the Babylonians, the original authors of this ſcience. But it is probable, that the firſt elements of aſtronomy were diſcovered by different nations, whoſe habits of life led them to the frequent obſervation of the heavens. Thus Cicero ſays[b], "The Egyptians and Babylonians, dwelling in open plains, where nothing intercepted the view of the heavenly bodies, devoted themſelves to the ſtudy of aſtronomy." If, however, the honour of inventing this ſcience be given to the Egyptians, it muſt be allowed, that their knowledge of the ſubject was neither ſufficiently extenſive, nor profound, to entitle them to the character of aſtronomical philoſophers. They obſerved the riſing and ſetting of the ſtars, the order of the ſigns in the Zodiac, and the aſpects of the planets; but it was merely to enable them to practice aſtrological arts: they remarked the equinoctial and ſolſtitial points; but it

[a] Voſſius de Scientiis Math. c. xiii. p. 48. Burnet. Archæol. c. viii. D. Laert. l. i. § 11. [b] De Divinat. l. i.

was

was only to aſcertain the length of the year: they noticed the varieties of weather, and imagined them connected with the appearance or ſituation of the heavenly bodies; but they had no other object in view, than to regulate the labours of the huſbandman. It was in the Pythagorean ſchool, that Eudoxus firſt applied mathematical principles to the explanation of the celeſtial motions: and it was Thales, a Grecian, who firſt predicted an eclipſe[a].

The invention of Muſic is alſo aſcribed to the Egyptians: but this can only relate to the firſt elements of melody; for the proportion of harmonic ſounds was diſcovered, as we ſhall afterwards learn, by Pythagoras.

The orgin of the Medical Art was referred by the Egyptians to their demigods. It is chiefly on this account, that the names of Iſis, and her ſon Horus, or Apollo, are ſo highly celebrated among the Egyptian divinities. Whence Ovid ſpeaking of Apollo ſays [b],

> Inventum medicina meum eſt, opiferque per orbem
> Dicor, et herbarum ſubjecta potentia nobis [c].

The name of Eſculapius, or Serapis [d], has alſo, for the ſame reaſon, a diſtinguiſhed place in the Egyptian mythology. But the hiſtory of theſe inventors of medicine is too obſcure to afford any other concluſion, than this ſimple fact, that there were, in the moſt remote period of the Egyptian hiſtory, celebrated men, who devoted themſelves to the benevolent office of healing diſeaſes, and who were afterwards, by their grateful, but ignorant and ſuperſtitious countrymen, ranked among the gods. Homer indeed ſpeaks of Egypt as fertile in drugs [e]:

[a] Plin. l. ii. c. 13. Cic. Div. l. i. [b] Metam. l. i. v. 521.

[c] Med'cine is mine, what herbs and ſimples grow
In fields and foreſts, all their powers I know;
And am the great phyſician call'd below. DRYDEN.

[d] Tacit. Hiſt. l. iv. c. 84. Apuleius, l. x. [e] Odyſſ. l. iv. v. 229.

—Tu

—— Τῇ πλεῖστα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα
Φάρμακα ——[a]

But the particulars which are preſerved reſpecting the Egyptian method of practice, will ſcarcely permit us to rank the Egyptian phyſicians among philoſophers. Herodotus relates[b], that, in his time, there were diſtinct phyſicians for different diſeaſes, which they claſſed according to their ſeat in the human body. From Diodorus Siculus we learn[c], that inſtead of preſcribing medicines according to the judgment and experience of the practitioner, every phyſician was obliged to follow a written code; and if, in adhering to this, he proved unſucceſsful, he was free from blame; but, if he ventured to depart from the preſcribed forms, though the patient recovered, the phyſician was to loſe his life. In adminiſtering medicines, they called in the aid of magical incantations, and pretended that ſupernatural virtues were, by means of theſe, communicated to certain plants[d]. In ſhort, from every circumſtance which is known concerning medical practice among the Egyptians, it appears, that it was entirely empirical, and that it was artfully connected with ſuperſtition, to ſerve the purpoſes of prieſtcraft.

The art of alchymy has been ſaid to have been known by the antient Egyptians; and, from the founder of the Egyptian philoſophy, it has been called the Hermetic art. But we find no certain account of any attempt to effect the tranſmutation of metals, earlier than the time of Conſtantine.

In the fictitious ſciences of aſtrology and magic[e], there can be no doubt that the Egyptians were adepts. Their prieſts were not negligent in cultivating arts, which would give them ſuch an irreſiſtible ſway over an ignorant and ſuperſtitious populace. Diodorus Siculus relates[f], that the Chaldeans learned theſe arts from the

[a] —— Where prolific Nile
With various ſimples clothes the fatten'd ſoil. Pope.

[b] L. ii. [c] L. i. c. 28. [d] Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xxx. c. 2.
[e] Ib. c. i. [f] Lib. i. p. 51.

Egyptians,

Egyptians, which he could not have aſſerted, had there not been at leaſt a general tradition that they were practiſed, from the earlieſt times, in Egypt. One of the moſt antient ſects of the Magi, as the Moſaic hiſtory informs us[a], was among the Egyptians. Theſe Magi made uſe of ſmall images, of various forms, with which they pretended to perform many wonders, and particularly to cure diſeaſes[b]. The image of Harpocrates, an aſtronomical divinity, who ſeems to have perſonified the return of the ſun at the winter-ſolſtice, and who was repreſented in the form of a young infant, was hung from the neck, or worn in a ring upon the finger, as an amulet[c].

Before we attempt to approach the myſteries of the Egyptian theology, or philoſophy (for, in ſpeaking of antient times, theſe cannot be ſeparated) we muſt remark, that it was of two kinds; the one exoteric, addreſſed to the vulgar; the other eſoteric, confined to a ſelect number of the prieſts, and to thoſe who poſſeſſed, or were to poſſeſs, the regal power[d]. The myſterious nature of their concealed doctrine was ſymbolically expreſſed by images of ſphinxes placed at the entrance of their temples. It muſt alſo be recollected, that in different cities of Egpyt, and in different colleges of prieſts, different tenets prevailed. Of this Juvenal furniſhes an example, in his account of a quarrel between the inhabitants of Tentyra and Ombri, two neighbouring diſtricts in Egypt, concerning the crocodile; the Tentyriteans being accuſtomed to worſhip this formidable animal, and the Ombrians to kill it wherever they found it[e].

——— Summus utrinque
Inde furor vulgo, quod numina vicinorum
Odit uterque locus, quem ſolus credat habendos
Eſſe Deos, quos ipſe colit[f].

[a] Exod. iv. [b] Pet. Arpe de Taliſm. p. 7. Gaulmin de Vit. Moſis, l. i. c. 11.
[c] Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xxxiii. c. 2. Jablonſki Panth. Egypt. p. i. c. 6.
[d] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 566. Plutarch de Iſid. et Oſir. [e] Sat. xv. v. 34.

[f] ——— Hence ruthleſs rancour ſprings;
Each hates his neighbour's gods, and each believes
The power alone divine which he adores.

That theſe diſputes were not confined to the popular ſuperſtitions, appears from the different and contradictory accounts, which were given by the Egyptian prieſts themſelves [a], of the origin and hiſtory of their divinities.

The exoteric religion of the Egyptians is univerſally known to have conſiſted in the groſſeſt and moſt irrational ſuperſtitions. It could only be on account of the ſtrictneſs with which the populace adhered to theſe, that Herodotus ſpeaks of them as the moſt religious of men [b]. Beſides gods, heroes, and eminent men, they worſhipped various kinds of animals and plants. Their ſuperſtitious character is thus ridiculed by Juvenal [c].

Quis neſcit, Voluſi Bythinice, qualia demens
Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat
Pars hæc; illa pavet ſaturam ſerpentibus Ibin.
Effigies ſacri nitet aurea Cercopitheci,
Dimidio magicæ reſonant ubi Memnone chordæ,
Atque vetus Thebe centum jacet obruta portis.
Illic cæruleos, hic piſcem fluminis, illic
Oppida tota canem venerantur, nemo Dianam;
Porrum et cepe nefas violare, ac frangere morſu.
O ſanctas gentes, quibus hæc naſcuntur in hortis
Numina*!

[a] Herodot. l. ii. c. 42. Plutarch de Iſ. et Oſ. [b] L. ii. c. 37. [c] Sat. xv. v. 1, &c.

Who knows not, that there's nothing vile or odd,
Which brainſick Egypt turns not to a god?
Some of her fools the crocodile adore,
The ibis cramm'd with ſnakes as many more.
A long tail'd ape, the ſuppliants moſt admire
Where a half Memnon tunes his magic lyre;
Where Thebes, once for her hundred gates renown'd,
An awful heap of ruins ſtrews the ground:
Whole towns, in one place, river fiſh revere,
To ſea-fiſh ſome as piouſly adhere:
In ſome a dog's high deity is ſeen;
Not none mind Diana, tho' of dogs the queen:
Nay vegetables here take rank divine;
On leaks and onions 'tis profane to dine.
Oh holy nations! where the gardens bear
A crop of gods through all the live-long year! Owen.

At

At Rome, the Egyptian ſuperſtitions were thought ſo pernicious, that under the conſulſhip of Piſo and Gabinius, the public worſhip of their gods was prohibited [a]; and in the reign of Tiberius the obſervance of Egyptian rites was ſuppreſſed, and thoſe who were infected with this ſuperſtition were required to burn their ſacred veſtments, and other articles employed in their ceremonies [b]. The moſt probable account of the origin of the Egyptian ſuperſtitions is, that thoſe natural bodies, which were at firſt introduced into their religious rites merely as emblems, or ſymbols, of inviſible divinities, became themſelves, in proceſs of time, objects of worſhip.

Concerning the eſoteric, or philoſophical doctrine of the Egyptians, it ſeems evident, in the firſt place, that they conceived matter to be the firſt principle of things, and that before the regular forms of nature aroſe, an eternal chaos had exiſted, which contained, in a ſtate of darkneſs and confuſion, all the materials of future beings. This Chaos, which was alſo called Night, was, in the moſt antient times, worſhipped as one of the ſuperior divinities. Ariſtotle ſpeaks of Chaos and Night as one and the ſame, and as the firſt principle, from which, in the antient coſmogonies, all things are derived [c]. It is probable, that the Egyptians worſhipped the material principle, Chaos, or Night, under the name of Athor; a word, which, in the Coptic language ſignifies *night* [d]. This divinity the Grecian mythologiſts, after their uſual manner, confounded with Venus. Heſychius refers to a temple in Egypt dedicated to the nocturnal Venus: Ἀφροδίτης σκοτίας ἱερον [e]. And Herodotus relates [f], that in the city of *Atarbechis* was a temple ſacred to Venus: whence it may be inferred, that long before the time of Herodotus, Athor, or the Egyptian Venus, denoting the material principle, was an object of worſhip. Of this divinity the ſymbol, which, after their uſual manner, the Egyptians placed in her temple, was a cow [g]. That the paſſive principle in nature was thus admitted to a primary place

[a] Tertull. Apol. c. 6. [b] Sueton. Tib. Plut. If. & Oſir.
[c] Metaphyſ. l. xii. c. 6. [d] Jablonſk. Panth. Egypt. l. [illegible] §. 7.
[e] In verb. σκοτία. [f] L. ii. c. 41.
[g] Ælian. de Anim. l. xi. c. 27. Jabl. ib. § 15. Strabo, l. xvii. p. 552.

in the philoſophy and theology of the Egyptians is confirmed by Diogenes Laertius, who ſays, that the Egyptians taught, that matter is the firſt principle, and that from this the four elements are ſeparated, and certain animals produced [a].

Beſides the material principle, it ſeems capable of ſatisfactory proof, that the Egyptians admitted an active principle, or intelligent power, eternally united with the chaotic maſs, by whoſe energy the elements were ſeparated, and bodies were formed, and who continually preſides over the univerſe, and is the efficient cauſe of all effects. For this we have not only the authority of Plutarch [b], who may be ſuſpected of having exhibited the Egyptian philoſophy in a Grecian dreſs, but the united teſtimony of many writers, who give ſuch accounts of the Egyptian gods, *Phthas* or Vulcan, and *Cneph* or Agathodæmon, as render it probable that theſe were only different names expreſſing different attributes of the ſupreme divinity. "The Egyptians," ſays Euſebius [c], "call the maker of the univerſe by the name of Cneph, and relate, that he ſent forth an egg from his mouth; which in their ſymbolical language denotes that he produced the univerſe." Diodorus Siculus [d] ſpeaks of the Egyptian Vulcan as the firſt king among the gods, and Manetho [e] aſcribes to him unlimited duration, and perpetual ſplendor. The name itſelf, Phthas, in the Coptic language, denotes one by whom events are ordained. When the Egyptians meant to repreſent the ruler of the world as good, they called him by the appellation Cneph; a word which denotes a good genius. They repreſented him under the ſymbol of a ſerpent. Upon a temple dedicated to Neitha, at Sais, the chief town in Lower Egypt, was this inſcription, "I am whatever is, or has been, or will be, and no mortal has hitherto drawn aſide my veil; my offſpring is the ſun." Both Plutarch and Proclus mention this inſcription, though with ſome difference of language [f]: and it is ſo conſonant to the mythological ſpirit of the Egyptians, that,

[a] Procem. § 10. [b] Iſis and Oſiris. [c] L. iii. c. 11.
[d] L. i. [e] Apud Syncellum, p. 51.
[f] Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l. i. c. 10. l. iii. c. 11. Plut. Amat. Lamprid. c. 28.
[g] Plut. Iſ. et Oſir. Procl. in Tim. p. 30.

notwith-

notwithſtanding the ſilence of more antient writers who treat of their theology, its authenticity may be eaſily admitted. If this be allowed, and if, at the ſame time, it be granted (as the learned Jablonſki maintains [a]) that Neitha and Phthas were only different names for the ſame divinity, this inſcription will be a ſtrong confirmation of the opinion, that the Egyptians acknowledged the exiſtence of an active intelligence, the cauſe of all things, whoſe nature is incomprehenſible. On the whole, notwithſtanding what has been advanced in ſupport of the contrary opinion by Porphyry [b] and others, it appears highly probable that the antient Egyptians acknowledged an active as well as a paſſive principle in nature, and, as Plutarch aſſerts, worſhipped τῷ πρώτῳ Θεῷ, the ſupreme Deity.

The doctrine of an ethereal intelligence pervading and animating the material world, appears, among the Egyptians, to have been from the earlieſt time accompanied with a belief in inferior divinities. Conceiving emanations from the divinity to be reſident in various parts of nature, when they ſaw life, motion, and enjoyment communicated to the inhabitants of the earth from the ſun, and, as they ſuppoſed, from other heavenly bodies, they aſcribed theſe effects to the influence of certain divinities, derived from the firſt deity, which they ſuppoſed to inhabit theſe bodies. Hence aroſe their worſhip of the ſun, under the names of Oſiris, Ammon, and Horus; of the moon, under thoſe of Iſis, Bubaſtis, and Buto; of the Cabiri, or planets; of Sothis, or the Dog-ſtar; and of other celeſtial divinities [c]. The Cabiri were called by the Egyptian prieſts ſons of Phthas, or Vulcan, that is of the Supreme Being [d]. When the Egyptians worſhipped the divinity under the notion of an offended ſovereign, they called him Tithrambo, that is, according to the Greeks, Hecate: and the evil principle, from which they conceived themſelves liable to misfortune, they deprecated as an object of terror, under the name of Typhon [e].

From the ſame ſource it may be eaſily conceived that, among the

[a] Pantheon Egypt. [b] Vid. Jambl. Myſt. Eg. Proem. Ed. Galæi.
[c] Jablonſk. l. ii. c. 1, 2, 4. l. iii. c. 1, 2, 3, 4. Prolog. c. i. § 26.
[d] Herod. l. iii. c. 37. [e] Jabl. l. i. c. 5. l. v. c. 2.

Egyptians

Egyptians as well as in other nations, would arise the worship of deified men. When they saw their illustrious heroes, or legislators, protecting their country by their prowess, or improving human life by useful inventions and institutions, they concluded that a large portion of that divinity, which animates all things, resided in them, and supposed that after their death, the good dæmon that animated them passed into the society of the divinities. In this manner it may be conceived that the worship of heroes would spring up together with that of the heavenly bodies. But whether the former did in fact prevail among the Egyptians, is a question which has been much disputed, and which, after all that has been advanced upon it, still remains undecided [a].

The opinion of the Egyptians concerning the human soul is very differently represented by different writers. It is indeed universally agreed, that they believed it to be immortal. Herodotus asserts, though perhaps without sufficient ground, that they were the first people who taught this doctrine [b]: and Diodorus Siculus relates [c], that the Egyptians, instead of lamenting the death of good men, rejoiced in their felicity, conceiving that, in the invisible world, they would live for ever among the pious. To the same purport is the account which he gives of the custom of bringing the characters of the deceased under a public trial, and offering up prayers to the gods on behalf of those who were adjudged to have lived virtuously, that they might be admitted into the society of good men. But it has been a subject of debate, into what place, according to the Egyptian doctrine, the souls of men passed after death. Plutarch speaks [d] of the Amenthes of the Egyptians, corresponding to the Hades of the Greeks, a subterraneous region, to which the souls of dead men were conveyed. With this agrees the account given by Diodorus Siculus of the funeral customs of the Egyptians. It is also confirmed by a fact, related by Porphyry [e], upon the authority of Euphantus, that the Egyptians, at their funerals, offered up this

[a] See on this question, Euseb. Pr. [illegible] l. i. c. 9. Diod. Sic. l. i. c. 8. Univ. Hist. [illegible] Shuckford, [illegible] p. 208. Jablonski Proleg. c. 2.
[illegible] c. 123. [b] L. ii. c. 123. [d] Isis & Osiris.
[illegible] De Abstinentia, l. iv. § 10.

prayer, in the name of the deceaſed: "Thou ſun, who ruleſt all things, and ye other powers, who give life to man, receive me, and grant me an abode among the immortal gods." Herodotus, on the contrary, gives it as the opinion of the Egyptians[a], that, when the body decays, the ſoul paſſes into ſome other animal, which is then born; and that after it has made the circuit of beaſts, birds, and fiſhes, through a period of three thouſand years, it again becomes an inhabitant of a human body. Diogenes Laertius, after Hecateus, relates[b], that according to the tenets of the Egyptians, the ſoul after death continues to live, and paſſes into other bodies.

Theſe different notions concerning the ſtate of the ſoul after death were probably held by different colleges of prieſts, ſome of whom were advocates for the doctrine of tranſmigration, while others held, that the ſouls of good men, after wandering for a time among the ſtars, were permitted to return to the ſociety of the gods. Or, the ſeeming inconſiſtency of theſe opinions may be reconciled by means of a conjecture, which naturally ariſes from the doctrine, that God is the ſoul of the world, from which all things came, and to which they will return. According to this doctrine it may be conceived, that all ſouls, being portions of the univerſal mind, muſt return to the divinity; but that ſince different minds, by their union with the body, are ſtained with different degrees of impurity, it becomes neceſſary, that, before their return, they ſhould paſs through different degrees of purgation, which might be ſuppoſed to be accompliſhed by means of ſucceſſive tranſmigrations. According to this ſyſtem, bad men would undergo this *metempſychoſis* for a longer, good men for a ſhorter period; and the Amenthes, or Hades, may be conceived to have been the region, in which departed ſouls, immediately after death, received their reſpective deſignations.

As the Egyptians held that the world was produced from chaos by the energy of an intelligent principle, ſo they conceived, that there is in nature a continual tendency towards diſſolution. In Plato's Timæus, an Egyptian prieſt is introduced, deſcribing the deſtruction of the world, and aſſerting that it will be effected by means of water

[a] L. ii. c. 123. [b] L. i. § 10.

and

and fire. They conceived that the universe undergoes a periodical conflagration, after which all things are restored to their original form, to pass again through a similar succession of changes [a].

Of preceptive doctrine the Egyptians had two kinds, the one sacred, the other vulgar. The former, which respected the ceremonies of religion, and the duties of the priests, was doubtless written in the sacred books of Hermes, but was too carefully concealed to pass down to posterity. The latter consisted of maxims and rules of virtue, prudence, or policy. Diodorus Siculus relates many particulars concerning the laws, customs, and manners of the Egyptians, whence it appears that superstition mingled with, and corrupted their notions of morals. It is in vain to look for accurate principles of ethics among an ignorant and superstitious people. And that the antient Egyptians merited this character, is sufficiently evident from this single circumstance, that they suffered themselves to be deceived by impostors, particularly by the professors of the fanciful art of astrology; concerning whom Sextus Empiricus justly remarks [b], that they have done much mischief in the world, by enslaving men to superstition, which will not suffer them to follow the dictates of right reason *.

[a] Diod. S. l. i. c. 1. Laert. l. i. § 10. Orig. contra Cels. l. v. p. 252. Macrob. Sat. l. ii. c. 6. [b] Adv. Math. l. v.

* Videtur. Jablonski Pantheon Ægyptiorum, passim. Herm. Conringius de Hermet. Ægypt. Wilde Ægyptiaca. Moshe'm. Not. ad Cudworth. c. iv. Voss. de Hist. Gr. l. ii. 3. Gyrald. Hist. Deor. l. ix. Natal. Comes Mythol. l. v. c. 5. Voss. de Idol. l. ii. Rivend. Diss. de Diis Cabiris. tom. i. Ursin. de Zor. Merc. et Sanch. Basnage Hist. des Juifs. t. iii. c. 18. § 20. Heuman. Act. Phil. v. i. p. 222, &c. Voss. de Scient. Math. c. 13. Burnet. Arch. c. viii. Pignorus in Mens. Isiac. Le Clerc. Bibl. Univ. t. iii. Horus Apollo in Hieroglyph. l. i. Banier Diss. sur le Typhon, ap. Hist. Anc. Inscrip. t. vi. Joach. Operinus de Immort. Mortalium. Liv. Galantes. Compar. Theol. Plat. p. 237, &c. Dickenson. Phys. Vet. et Ver. c. xii. Perizonii Ægypt. investigat. Stillingfleet. Orig. Sac. l. i. c. 2. Reimann. Antiq. Liter. Ægypt. Diss. de Ann. Æg. Misc. Berolin. t. iv. Wachter. Concord. Ration. et Script. l. iii. Warburton Div. Leg. l. iv. § 2, &c. An. Univ. Hist. v. i. Banier sur la Mythol. Ægypt.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ETHIOPIANS.

THE country of Ethiopia, which, in the more confined uſe of the name, nearly correſponds to the modern Abyſſinia, was, at a very remote period, inhabited by a people, whoſe opinions and cuſtoms nearly reſembled thoſe of the Egyptians. Many of their divinities were the ſame; they had the ſame orders of prieſthood, and religious ceremonies; they made uſe of the ſame characters in writing; their mode of dreſs was ſimilar; and the regal ſceptre made uſe of in both countries was in the form of a plough [a]. Whence it is evident, either that the Egyptians received their religion and learning from the Ethiopians, as Lucian aſſerts [b], or, which the great antiquity and celebrity of the Egyptian nation renders much more probable, that the Ethiopians were inſtructed by the Egyptians. Ethiopia ſeems to have been colonized from Egypt, and to have received its inſtitutions from the parent country.

Little can be advanced with certainty concerning the philoſophy of the Ethiopians. Their wiſe men, like thoſe of the Indians, were called Gymnoſophiſts, from their cuſtom of wearing little clothing. They diſcharged the ſacred functions after the manner of the Egyptian prieſts; had diſtinct colleges, and claſſes of diſciples; and taught their dogmas in obſcure and mythological language. They were remarkable for their contempt of death [c].

Strabo ſpeaks of the Southern Ethiopians as atheiſts [d]; but we muſt underſtand by this character, not that they were deſtitute of all belief in a ſupreme power, but that they did not worſhip the ſame

[a] Diod. Sic. l. ii. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. vi. c. 29. Strabo, l. xvii. p. 779.
[b] De Aſtrolog.
[c] Diod. Sic. l. c. Lucian. de Aſtrol. Laert. l. i. § 6. [d] Loc. cit.

gods, or make uſe of the ſame ceremonies, with their neighbours. In another place [b], the ſame hiſtorian ſays, that they acknowledged two gods, one immortal and the other mortal; that the immortal god was always the ſame, the firſt cauſe of all things, but that the mortal god was uncertain, and without a name. Perhaps this mortal god was the principle of evil, which the Egyptians acknowledged under the name of Typhon, who being at length to be overcome by the good principle, might properly be ſaid to be mortal. However this be, it is certain, that the Ethiopians were ſcrupulouſly exact in their religious worſhip, and therefore could by no means deſerve the charge of atheiſm. Homer ſays [c],

Ζεὺς γὰρ ἐπ' Ὠκεανὸν μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας
Χθιζὸς ἔβη μετὰ δαῖτα, θεοὶ δ' ἅμα πάντες ἕποντο [d].

Lucian [e] aſcribes the invention of aſtronomy and aſtrology to the Ethiopians. But it is not probable, that the obſervation and knowledge of the celeſtial phænomena were originally confined to any one country. The Babylonians, Egyptians, Ethiopians, and other nations, who, from their climate and manner of life, had frequent occaſion to obſerve the motions of the ſtars, may be ſuppoſed, independently of each other, to have made many diſcoveries reſpecting the celeſtial *phænomena*. But, though there is no ſufficient reaſon for aſcribing to the Ethiopians the excluſive honour of inventing aſtronomy, the ſtory of Atlas makes it very probable, that this ſcience was early ſtudied among them. The fable of his bearing the heavens upon his ſhoulders perhaps only means, that Atlas was a diligent obſerver of the heavenly bodies, and taught his countrymen

[a] Voſſius de Idolot. Gent. l. i. c. 2. [b] P. 822. Conf. Stobæi Serm. 42.
[c] Il. l. i. v. 423.

[d] The fire of Gods, and all th' ætherial train,
On the warm limits of the fartheſt main,
Now mix with mortals, nor diſdain to grace
The feaſts of Æthiopia's blameleſs race. Pope.

[e] Loc. cit.

aſtronomy [a]. He is ſaid to have had ſeven daughters, called the Hiades, who (perhaps becauſe they had purſued the ſtudy of aſtronomy under their father) were advanced to an honourable ſtation in the heavens, and gave name to a well-known conſtellation [b]. His reſidence was probably near thoſe lofty mountains, which to this day bear the name of Atlas, and which Virgil [c] ſo beautifully deſcribes.

Oceani finem juxta, ſolemque cadentem,
Ultimus Æthiopum locus eſt, ubi maximus Atlas
Axem humero torquet ſtellis ardentibus aptum [d].

Many other particulars are related, concerning the philoſophy of the Ethiopians, by Philoſtratus, in his life of Apollonius Tyanæus; but this, as we ſhall afterwards ſee, is a work, on many accounts, of doubtful credit.

The morality of the Ethiopians, according to Laertius [e], conſiſted in worſhipping the gods, doing no evil, exerciſing fortitude, and deſpiſing death *.

[a] Virg. Æneid. l. i. v. 745.
[b] Natalis Comes Mythol. l. iv. c. 7. [c] Æn. l. iv. ver. 480.

[d] Near Ocean's utmoſt bound a region lies,
Where mighty Atlas props the ſtarry ſkies. PITT.

[e] L. i. § 6.

* Vidend. Scheffer de Phil. Ital. c. 4. Witſii Ægypt. l. ii. Voſſ. de Idol. l. i. c. 1. Marſham. Can. Chron. Sect. xiii. Bochart. Geog. Sac. p. 1. l. ii. c. 3. Lambecii Prodrom. Hiſt. Lit. p. 133. Natal. Comes Myth. l. iv. c. 7. Ludolph. Hiſt. Æthiop. An. Univ. Hiſt. v. 16.

CHAP. X.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CELTS, INCLUDING THE GAULS, BRITONS, GERMANS, AND NORTHERN NATIONS.

HAVING traced the antient hiſtory of barbaric philoſophy through Aſia and Africa, we now paſs over into Europe, to obſerve the forms which it aſſumed in the Weſtern and Northern regions. In this part of the world, beſides the exotic Romans, and the Greeks, of whom we ſhall afterwards treat, we find the nation of the Celts, who, from the northern extremities of Aſia, ſent out colonies, weſtward, ſimilar to each other in their cuſtoms and inſtitutions. Hence not only the Scythians and the Pannonians, but alſo the antient inhabitants of Germany, Britain, Gaul, and Spain, come under the general denomination of Celts.

The hiſtory of the Celtic nations is involved in great obſcurity, not ſo much from the unavoidable depredations of time, as from the total want of antient records. So far were the antient Gauls, Germans, and Britons, from having among them any learned hiſtorians to record their inſtitutions or opinions, that they induſtriouſly diſcouraged every attempt to commit things of this kind to writing. Julius Cæſar, who was well acquainted with the ſtate of Gaul, ſays, that though, in almoſt all their public and private records, the Gauls made uſe of Greek letters, they did not commit their doctrines to writing [a]: but he is to be underſtood as only ſpeaking of his own times; for, at a more remote period, the Gauls were ſtrangers to the art of writing. According to Strabo [b], they were firſt inſtructed in letters by a Greek colony which ſettled at Marſeilles about the year of Rome 165. The Germans became acquainted with this art much later: Tacitus [c] intimates, that it was not in common uſe among

[a] Bell. G. VI. 13. [b] L. iv. p. 181. [c] Mor. Germ. c. 19.

them

them even in his time. Theſe nations had no other records of public tranſactions, than the ſongs of their bards [a].

It is not to be ſuppoſed that they who received the oral inſtructions of wiſe men under an injunction of ſecrecy, as ſeems to have been the general practice among the Celtic nations, would communicate them to ſtrangers. The reports of the Greek and Roman hiſtorians on this ſubject muſt, therefore, have had no better foundation than vulgar rumour, gathered up by foreigners in accidental converſation. Julius Cæſar himſelf, though the conqueror of Gaul, and a curious obſerver of the nations whom he conquered, found little to relate concerning the opinions of the Gauls. No wonder, that other writers have filled their accounts of the Celtic theology with idle tales and extravagant fables.

From the imperfect reports, concerning theſe nations which remain, it is, however, deſirable that we ſhould frame the beſt idea we are able of their philoſophy. For, though their wiſdom was of a very different character from that of the Greeks and Romans, they were not ſo deſtitute of knowledge as not to have their ſchools of inſtruction and their philoſophers.

The Druids (ſo called from *Deru*, a Celtic word which ſignifies *an oak*, ſtill uſed in that ſenſe in the Erſe language [b]) are ſpoken of, by the antient writers, as an order exiſting, in the remoteſt period, among all nations. Diogenes Laertius [c], on the authority of Ariſtotle and Sotion, ranks the Druids of the Celtæ and Galatæ with the Magi of the Perſians, the Chaldeans of Babylonia, and the Gymnoſophiſts of the Indians. In what Celtic nation this order was firſt inſtituted is uncertain [d]; but there can be no doubt, that before the time of Julius Cæſar, it was generally eſtabliſhed in Britain, Gaul, and Germany. The office and character of the Gallic Druids, the cauſes of their authority, their manner of teaching, and other circumſtances, are clearly explained in the Commentaries of Cæſar.

[a] Strabo, l. iv. p. 190. Athæn. l. vi. p. 154.

[b] Toland's Letters on the Druids. [c] L. i. § 2.

[d] Cæſ. Bel. G. l. vi. c. 14. Tacit. Agric. c. xi. Plin. Hiſt. N. l. xxx. c. 1.

The

The chief particulars of his account are the following[a]: "The Druids preſide in religious concerns, direct the public and private ſacrifices, and interpret the will of the gods. Young men are ſent to them for education, by whom they are held in great honour. The deciſion of almoſt all controverſies, both public and private, is referred to them: and if any crime be committed, if any murder be perpetrated, or if any diſpute ariſe concerning an inheritance, or the boundaries of lands, in all ſuch caſes they pronounce ſentence, and decree rewards or puniſhments: and if any one, whether in a private or public ſtation, refuſe to ſubmit to their decree, they interdict him the ſacrifices, which is the ſevereſt penalty they can inflict.—The Druids are under one elective chief.—They never go to war, are exempted from taxes and military ſervices, and enjoy every kind of immunity."

Theſe particulars concerning the Druids prove, that like the Magi, and other prieſts of the Eaſt, they had great power in the ſtate, and ſupported their influence and authority by the aid of ſuperſtition. They were divided into three claſſes; the Bards, who celebrated the praiſes of eminent men in ſongs accompanied with the lyre; the Eubages, who performed the rites of religion and divination; and the Druids, in the more limited ſenſe of the appellation, who had in their hands the direction of public affairs, the adminiſtration of juſtice, and the education of youth[b]. They clothed their dogmas in an allegorical dreſs, and delivered them in verſe, that they might be the more eaſily remembered. They inſtructed their diſciples in retired groves, or in caverns, and forbade them, under the ſevereſt penalties, to divulge the ſecret doctrines which they were taught, or to commit them to writing[c]. Hence the doctrines of the Druids muſt have been very imperfectly known, except among thoſe who were admitted into their interior myſteries. On this ſubject Lucan ſays[d]:

[a] Bell. Gall. l. vi. c. 13.

[b] Diod. Sic. l. v. p. 308. Strabo, l. iv. p. 302. Diog. Laert. i. c. 2. Ammian. Marcell. l. xv. c. 9.

[c] Laert. l. i. § 6. Pomp. Mela, l. iii. c. 2. [d] Pharſal. l. i. v. 427, &c.

Solis

Solis noſſe deos, et cœli numina vobis
Aut ſolis neſcire datum: nemora alta remotis
Incolitis lucis [a].

If this account of the Druids be compared with what has been already related concerning the wiſe men and prieſts of other antient nations, it will be ſufficiently manifeſt, that their mode of education was rather adapted to the ſupport of fraud and impoſture, than to the propagation of knowledge. How far they were from being humanized by cultivation, may be inferred from the barbarous rites which they practiſed. Antient writers atteſt, that they offered human ſacrifices to their gods. Thus Lucan [b]:

——— Et quibus immitis placatur ſanguine diro
Teutates, horrenſque feris altaribus Heſus,
Et Taranis Scythicæ non mitior ora Dianæ [c].

So offenſive were their ſavage cuſtoms to the Romans, that Auguſtus prohibited the uſe of their religious ceremonies in Gaul, and Tiberius and Claudius iſſued edicts for the abolition of the Druidical order [d].

The Germans, Danes, Swedes, and other Northern nations derived from the Celtic ſtock, had cuſtoms ſimilar to thoſe of the Gauls and Britons, and, particularly, had among them Bards or

[a] ——— Who haunt the lonely coverts of the grove:
To theſe, and theſe of all mankind alone,
The gods are ſure reveal'd, or ſure unknown. ROWE.

[b] Pharſal. l. i. v. 444.

[c] And you, where Heſus' horrid altar ſtands,
Where dire Teutates human blood demands;
Where Taranis by wretches is obeyed,
And vies in ſlaughter with the Scythian maid. ROWE.

[d] Sueton. & Victor. in Claud. Seneca in Apocolocynthoſi. Plin. Hiſt. N. l. xxx. c. 4.

Scaldi,

Scaldi, and prieſts, whoſe character was the ſame with that of the Gaulic and Britiſh Druids. Tacitus, in his account of the manners of the Germans, ſays[a]; "None but the prieſts are permitted to chaſtiſe delinquents, or to inflict bonds or ſtripes, that it may appear, not as a puniſhment inflicted by order of the chieftain, but as the conſequence of a command from the divinity, whom they ſuppoſe to be preſent with warriors. They conduct the public omens; and in aſſemblies of the people have authority to command ſilence." Strabo and other writers confirm this account. We muſt therefore ſuppoſe that Cæſar, who ſays[b], that the Germans had neither Druids nor ſacrifices, was, in this inſtance, impoſed upon by reports to which he had given too haſty credit.

It was one of the offices of the Celtic prieſts, or Druids, to explain to their diſciples the meaning of the fables under which their religious tenets were concealed. Theſe fables, or allegories, were ſimilar to thoſe of the Aſiatics, and were delivered in verſe, after their manner: a circumſtance which confirms the conjecture, that theſe nations aroſe from colonies which came out of the Northern regions of Aſia, and which brought with them the tenets which, in the remoteſt periods, had prevailed among the Perſians, Scythians, and other Aſiatic nations. Indeed it is probable, that the Celts and Sarmatians in Europe, and the Medes and Perſians in Aſia, were derived from one common ſtock, the Aſiatic Scythians: for, on the one hand, it appears[c], that the name of Scythians, which long remained in the northern parts of Aſia, paſſed over with the Scythian colonies into Europe, where it was gradually loſt in thoſe of Sarmatians and Germans: and, on the other, authorities are not wanting to prove, that the Medes and Perſians were deſcended from the Scythians[d]. The ſame religious tenets, which the Perſians had received from the Scythians, were probably alſo embraced by the Celts, and by them tranſmitted, in their migrations, through Germany, Gaul, and Spain.

[a] C. 7, 10, 11. Conf. Tac. Hiſt. l. iv. c. 54.
[b] Bell. Gall. l. vi. c. 21. [c] Plin. Hiſt. N. l. iv. c. 12.
[d] Herodot. l. v. c. 9. Ammian. Marcell. l. xxxi. c. 3. Pelloutierrii Celtarum Hiſt. tom. i. p. 19. not. n.

An

An allegorical and poetical repreſentation of the tenets of the antient Northern nations concerning God, the origin of the world, the condition of man after death, and other philoſophical ſubjects, is contained in an antient book, written in the Runic language, called the Edda, whence the Rhythmiſts of Iceland chiefly borrow their fictions. It was compiled from records or traditions, which were probably of Aſiatic original[a], by Saemundus Sigfuſonius, an Icelander, about the year 1114; and is certainly the moſt antient account, which is extant, of the mythology of the Northern nations. This work becoming obſcure from the neglect of the Runic language, and other cauſes, another Edda, or mythological collection was made, in 1215, by Snorro, a native of Iceland, and written in the language of the country. An edition of both theſe curious works, with a Latin tranſlation, was publiſhed at Copenhagen in the year 1665.

From the imperfect accounts which remain of the opinions of the antient Gauls, Germans, Britons, and other Northern nations, it is extremely difficult to frame a tolerably diſtinct view of the Celtic philoſophy.

With reſpect to religion, the Celts, like other antient nations, had their public and vulgar, and their concealed and more philoſophical doctrine. Their theology ſuppoſed the univerſe to be animated by a divinity, portions of which reſide in different parts of nature. This opinion ſeems to have been the ground of their worſhip of the ſun and moon, and of the reverence which they expreſſed for groves, rocks, and caverns. That they imagined the magnificent and gloomy ſcenes of nature to be inhabited by dæmons, fully appears from the Edda. Nor can any other reaſon be aſſigned for the ſuperſtitious notion which prevailed among them, than that theſe ſcenes were frequently the ſeat of oracular communications[b].

The practice of divination prevailed in all the Celtic nations. Many women, both in Gaul and Germany, obtained great credit and

[a] Arnkiel. Relig. Gent. Cimbr. c. ii. § 13. Conf. Rudbeckius in Atlantide.
[b] Keyſler, de Antiquit. Celt. p. 18—21. p. 297, &c.

influence under the character of propheteſſes, ſome of whom were known by the name of Samnitæ [a]. Of the Germans, Tacitus ſays, that no people were more addicted to the method of divining by omens and lots: he relates, that they ſuppoſed ſomewhat of peculiar ſanctity and preſcience to be inherent in the female ſex, and therefore neither deſpiſed their counſels, nor diſregarded their reſponſes [b]. The ſavage manner in which the Cimbrian women performed their divinations is thus deſcribed by Strabo [c]: "The women, who follow the Cimbri to war, are accompanied by grey-haired propheteſſes in white veſtments, with canvas mantles faſtened by claſps, a brazen girdle, and naked feet. Theſe go with drawn ſwords through the camp, and ſtriking down the priſoners they meet, drag them to a brazen kettle. This has a kind of ſtage above it, on which the prieſteſs aſcending cuts the throat of the victim; and from the manner in which the blood flows into the veſſel ſhe judges of the future event. Others tear open the bodies of the captives thus butchered, and from inſpection of the entrails preſage victory to their own party." Theſe and other ſimilar ſuperſtitions doubtleſs aroſe from a general belief, that the divinities who reſided in the groves, and among the rocks, communicated to the prieſts and prieſteſſes the knowledge of future events. And this belief was confirmed by the doctrine, which univerſally prevailed in the Celtic nations, that all events ariſe according to the unalterable laws of deſtiny, known only to the Gods, and to thoſe favoured mortals, to whom they unfold the book of fate.

The Celtic nations had many divinities, which they ſuppoſed to preſide over different parts of nature, and which they worſhipped under various names, ſuch as Odin, Thor, Tuiſco, &c. No divinity was more generally worſhipped, both among the Celts and Scythians, than THE EARTH. The account which Tacitus gives [d] of the worſhip of this goddeſs exhibits a beautiful picture of the ſimplicity of antient manners. "The Reudigni, Aviones, Angli, Eudoſes,

[a] Keyſler, l. c. [b] De Mor. Germ. c. 8, 10. [c] L. vii.
[d] Mor. Germ. c. 40.

Suardones,

Suardones, and Nithuones," ſays he, "unite in the worſhip of HERTHA, or Mother Earth, and ſuppoſe her to interfere in the affairs of men, and viſit the different nations. In an iſland [a] of the ocean ſtands a ſacred and unviolated grove, in which is a conſecrated chariot, covered with a veil, which the prieſt alone is permitted to touch. He perceives when the goddeſs enters this ſecret receſs; and with profound veneration attends the vehicle, which is drawn by yoked cows. At this ſeaſon all is joy, and every place which the goddeſs deigns to viſit is a ſcene of feſtivity. No wars are undertaken; arms are untouched; and every hoſtile weapon is laid aſide. Peace and repoſe are then only known, then only loved: till, at length, the ſame prieſt re-conducts the goddeſs, ſatisfied with mortal intercourſe, to her temple. The chariot, with its covering, and, if we may believe it, the goddeſs herſelf, then undergo ablution in a ſecret lake. This office is performed by ſlaves, whom the lake inſtantly ſwallows up. Hence proceeds a myſterious horror, and a holy ignorance of what that can be, which is beheld only by thoſe who are about to periſh."—This memorable narrative not only ſhews that the earth was worſhipped with myſterious reverence by the Northern nations, but affords a ſtriking example of the ingenuity with which their prieſts clothed the myſteries of religion, in order to guard them from the impertinent intruſion of vulgar curioſity. The reſt of the Celtic divinities were worſhipped with ſimilar rites, in which there can be no doubt that human ſacrifices were frequently introduced [b].

Before the Celtic nations were viſited by the Romans, they appear to have had no other gods, than thoſe which they ſuppoſed reſident in natural bodies. Cæſar expreſsly aſſerts, that in his time, they reckoned thoſe alone among the number of the gods, by whoſe attributes they were viſibly benefited, as the ſun, the moon, and fire. Afterwards, they received, at leaſt nominally, ſeveral of the Roman divinities: but they continued to worſhip them with their antient rites, in groves, or on open plains, and upon altars, compoſed of vaſt

[a] Suppoſed to be Heilegeland (Holy Iſland) near the mouth of the Elbe.

[b] Tac. Mor. Ger. c. 9. 39. Lucan. loc. cit. Cæſar. Bell. G. l. vi. c. 15.

maſſes of ſtone, of which there are ſtill many remains. "They conceive it," ſays Tacitus[a], "to be unworthy of the grandeur of celeſtial beings, to confine them within walls, or to repreſent them under a human form: woods and groves are their temples, and they affix names of divinity to that ſecret power, which they behold with the eye of adoration alone:"—*deorum nominibus appellant Secretum illud, quod ſolâ reverentiâ vident.* Of the ſame kind is the account which this judicious hiſtorian gives of the Semnones, a German nation who inhabited the banks of the Oder. After relating ſome particulars of their religious ceremonies, and mentioning the reverence which they paid to the grove in which they were performed, he adds[b]: "The whole of their ſuperſtition has this import, that, there is the God who is ſupreme governor of all, and that every thing elſe is ſubject and ſubordinate to him:—*ibi regnator omnium deus, cetera ſubjecta atque parentia.* The reſult of theſe accounts is, that the Celtic nations had an idea of a ſupreme deity, the fountain of all other divinities, and the animating and ruling principle of the univerſe. They ſeem to have worſhipped him under the name of Odin[c], whom they called the Father of all.

The Edda[d] contains many paſſages, from which it may be clearly inferred, that the Northern nations had an idea of an eternal deity, prior to the formation of the material world, and that by his energy on the chaotic maſs, which they called the Deep, the ſun, moon, and ſtars, and all other material bodies, were produced.

> Mane erat ſeculorum, cum Ymerus habitavit,
> Erat nec arena, nec mare, nec refrigerantes aurulæ;
> Terra reperta eſt nuſquam, nec in alto cælum:
> Hiatus ingens erat ſpatii, et gramen nullibi[e].

[a] Germ. c. 9. [b] Ib. c. 39. [c] Pelloutier. p. 65, &c.
[d] Bartholin. Antiq. Dan. l. ii. c. 1. Solin. Polyhiſtor. c. 16.

[e] In the beginning, ere the world had birth,
While yet nor ſea, nor ſhore, nor cooling breeze,
Nor the green earth, nor azure ſky, was form'd,
In the vaſt void, Ymerus liv'd alone.

This

This antient record alſo ſpeaks of human nature under the name of *Mannus*, as the joint production of ſeveral ſubordinate divinities, and as formed male and female (*Aſkus* and *Emla*) before they were endued with the vital principle.

> Aſkum et Emlam omni conatu deſtitutos
> Animam nec poſſidebant, rationem nec habebant,
> Nec ſanguinem, nec ſermonem, nec faciem venuſtam,
> Animam dedit Odinus, rationem indidit Hoenerus,
> Loedur ſanguinem addidit et faciem venuſtam [a].

Hence it appears, that theſe Northern nations conceived of the human ſoul as of divine original, rational and immortal. And that this was the univerſal doctrine of the Celts, whether Gauls, Britons, Germans, or other nations, is unanimouſly atteſted by the Greek and Roman writers, and by the remains of northern antiquities. Cæſar relates [b], that the firſt doctrine of the Gallic Druids was, that the ſoul of man is immortal: and Pomponius Mela [c], that one of their doctrines, which is divulged among the people in order to inſpire them with martial courage, is, that the ſoul is immortal. This account is confirmed by Valerius Maximus [d], Strabo [e], and other hiſtorians [f]. And the fables every where received among the Celts, concerning a future ſtate, leave no room to doubt, that the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul was generally received among them [g].

> [a] Without or breath, or reaſoning pow'rs, or ſpeech,
> Or vital blood, or the fair human face,
> Aſkus and Emla lay; till Odin bade
> Them live, Hœnerus kindled in their breaſt
> The lamp of Mind, and Lædur through their veins
> Pour'd forth the purple ſtream; then man aroſe,
> Graceful in youth, an animated form.

[b] Bell. G. l. vi. c. 14. [c] L. iii. c. 2. [d] L. ii. c. 6.
[e] L. iv. [f] Vid. Pelloutierii Hiſt. Celt.
[g] Keyſler. Antiq. p. 129. Schuzius de Statu Anim. c. 2. p. 75.

Such

Such was the actual effect which this doctrine had upon the minds of the Celts, that we find no people ſuperior to them in the magnanimous contempt of death. Valerius Maximus extols the brave and hardy ſpirit of the Cimbrians and Celtiberians, who, in the midſt of the hazards of battle, exulted in the expectation of going to a more glorious and happy life [a]. He alſo ſpeaks of a Thracian people, with whom it was a cuſtom to celebrate the birth of a man with tears, but his funeral with joy; becauſe the end of life is better than the beginning. Of the Hiſpani, who were a Celtic colony, Silius Italicus [b] ſays:

Prodiga gens animæ, et properare facillima mortem;
Namque ubi tranſcendit florentes viribus annos,
Impatiens ævi ſpernet noviſſe ſenectam,
Et fati modus in dextra eſt [c].

The hiſtory of all the Northern nations abounds with facts, which prove their contempt of death to have originated from an expectation of immortality.

What kind of immortality theſe nations expected is not clearly aſcertained. According to Cæſar [d] and Diodorus Siculus [e], they thought that the ſoul, at death, paſſes from one body to another. This doctrine of tranſmigration is alſo aſcribed to them by Lucan [f]:

Vobis auctoribus, umbræ
Non tacitas Erebi ſedes, Ditiſque profundi
Pallida regna petunt: regit idem ſpiritus artus

[a] L. ii. c. 6 [b] L. i.

[c] This hardy race, ſtill laviſh of their breath,
The flow'r of youth once paſt, ruſh on to death;
Scorning life's path with tott'ring ſteps to tread,
With their own hand they cut the fatal thread.

[d] L. iv. c. 14. [e] L. v. [f] Pharſ. l. i. v. 454.

Orbe

Orbe alio: longæ, canitis ſi cognita, vitæ
Mors media eſt [a].

On the contrary Pomponius Mela [b] repreſents the Celts as expecting to paſs, after death, into the inviſible world. And this notion beſt agrees with the authorities already cited on this ſubject, and with the accounts which are given, by various writers, of the funeral ceremonies practiſed in the Northern nations, particularly that of committing to the funeral pile, or to the ſepulchre, what ever had been dear to the deceaſed [c]. It is alſo moſt conſonant to the mythological language of the antient Edda, which every where repreſents the future life, as an aſſembly of good or bad men, in a ſtate of reward or puniſhment, and only ſpeaks of a return to life for the purpoſe of reuniting the ſoul and body, after the ſoul has paſſed through a neceſſary courſe of purification, previouſly to its admiſſion into the regions of the happy. From this ſtate of purgation none were to be excuſed, except thoſe who had voluntarily expoſed themſelves to death in battle: and hence it was, that they who fell in war were deemed to have made a glorious and happy exit from life, whilſt they who died by ſickneſs were thought to have periſhed ſhamefully and wretchedly [d]. To thoſe brave ſpirits who died in battle, the gates of the palace of Odin were immediately opened; and they were to live in his hall (Valhalla) in the full enjoyment of every thing which delighted them on earth. Others, who had lived a pious, juſt, and temperate life, and at laſt died by ſickneſs, were to be admitted, after the neceſſary purification, into Gimle, a bright and happy manſion, where they ſhould live for ever: whilſt they who had, in this life, been guilty of great crimes (among which

[a] If dying mortals doom they ſing aright,
No ghoſts deſcend to dwell in dreadful night;
No parting ſouls to griſly Pluto go,
Nor ſeek the dreary ſilent ſhades below:
But forth they fly, immortal in their kind,
And other bodies in new worlds they find:
Thus life for ever runs its endleſs race,
And, like a line, death but divides the ſpace. ROWE.

[b] Loc. cit.

[c] Cæſar Bell. G. l. ii. c. 6. Pomp. Mela, l. vi. c. 2. Herodot. l. iv. c. 93. Tacit. Germ. c. 27. Val. Max. loc. cit. [d] Valer. Max. l. ii. c. 6. § 11.

perjury, adultery, and aſſaſſination, were reckoned the moſt heinous) were to be conſigned to Hela, where they ſhould remain in puniſhment, till the *twilight of the gods*; a term by which is denoted a general reſtitution of all things, when after the burning of the world[a], a new period of exiſtence would commence.

The ſimilarity of the Celtic doctrines to thoſe of the Eaſtern nations already conſidered, favours the conjecture, that the Northern mythology is derived from Oriental traditions, which accompanied the migrations of the Scythians towards the northern and weſtern parts of Europe.

The antient Celts[c] were probably little acquainted with natural philoſophy. Cæſar indeed ſays[b], that the Gallic Druids philoſophiſed concerning the ſtars and their motions, the magnitude of the world, and the nature of things. But we have no information reſpecting their obſervations or opinions on theſe ſubjects; except that they[c] reckoned time by nights, not by days, and in the obſervance of birth-days, new moons, and the beginning of the year, commenced the celebration from the preceding night." This circumſtance is confirmed by antient Britiſh monuments. If the Druids practiſed medicine, it was rather as an inſtrument of ſuperſtition, than as an art founded upon ſcience, as ſufficiently appears from the wonderful powers which they aſcribed to the miſſletoe[d].

The ſum of their moral doctrine as given by Laertius[e], is, to worſhip the gods, to do good, and to exerciſe fortitude. Perhaps little more was neceſſary among a people who were devoted to war. Their public and private virtues were, as we have ſeen, powerfully ſupported by the hope of immortality *.

[a] Strabo, l. iv. p. 302. [b] Bell. G. l. vi. c. 13. [c] C. 16.
[d] Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xxx. § i. xvi. 44. xxiv. 4. xxxiv. 11. [e] L. i. § 10.

* Videnda. Pezronius de Antiq. Celt. Pelloutier Lettres ſur les Celts, Hague 1740. Martin. de la Relig. des Gaul. Keyſler. Ant. Sept. et Celt. G. Frickius de Druidis, Ulmæ, 1731. Selden. Analect. Anglo-Brit. v. ii. Toland on the Rel. of the Celts. Rowland. Ant. Iſle of Angleſy. Burnet Arch. l. i. c. 2. Diſſ. de Poeſi Scald. Upſal. 1717. Koeller de Scaldis. Gundling. Hiſt. Ph. Mor. c. 6. Moller in Iſagog. ad Hiſt. Cherſ. Cimb. Beronius de Eddis Iſlandicis, Upſal 1733. Rudbeck. Atlant. Ayrmann. Diſſ. de Cult. Idol. Orig. ap. Vet. Germ. Bartholin Ant. Dan. Obrecht. de Phil. Celt. Puffend. de Druid. Banier Myth. t. v. l. vi, vii. Schubert. Hiſt. Ph. c. 2. Schuzius de Statu poſt Mortem ſec. Celt.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ETRURIANS AND ROMANS.

ITALY, in the moſt remote periods of its hiſtory, affords ſome traces of barbaric philoſophy among the Etrurians and Romans. The few particulars which remain, concerning the early philoſophy of each, we ſhall diſtinctly examine.

The origin of the Tuſcans, or Etrurians, is uncertain. Some writers, who abound in conjectures and idle dreams [a], have maintained, that Noah colonized this country. It is more probable, that the Tuſcans were a Celtic nation, who ſettled upon the banks of the river Po [b]. This very well agrees with what is known concerning the Celtic migrations, and will account for the prevalence of opinions, before the arrival of the Egyptians and Pelaſgians upon this coaſt, ſimilar to thoſe of the Eaſt.

Etruria, according to Diodorus Siculus [c], was early diſtinguiſhed by a diligent and ſucceſsful ſtudy of nature. But he ſupports his aſſertion by no proofs; and the facts which are preſerved by hiſtorians, reſpecting this antient people, rather ſhow a diſpoſition towards trivial ſuperſtitions, than an uſeful acquaintance with natural objects [d]. The Etrurians are ſaid to have been the firſt inventors of augury, and to have boaſted that they communicated this art to the Romans. Fabulous accounts are given of Tages [e], who is mentioned as the firſt teacher of augury; to which Ovid alludes [f]:

> Indigenæ dixere Tagen, qui primus Etruſcam
> Edocuit gentem caſus aperire futuros [g].

[a] Vid. Dickenſon's Diſſert. on the Journey of Noah into Italy, Oxon. 1655. Fabricii Codex Pſeud. vol. i. p. 248. [b] Pelloutier. Hiſt. de Celtes, tom. ii. p. 101.

[c] L. v. [d] Cic de Div. l. i. Senecæ Quæſt. Nat. l. ii. c. 32.

[e] Ammian. Marcel. l. xxi. [f] Metam. l. xv. v. 558.

[g] The natives of the place him Tages name,
From whom the Tuſcan arts of aug'ry came. SEWELL.

The ſuperſtitious character of the Etrurians is ſtrongly marked, in the ſtory related by Pliny[a], of an embaſſy ſent from Rome to a celebrated Tuſcan augur, Olerius Calenus, concerning a human ſcull which was found on the Tarpeian hill. The knowledge of nature, attributed to the Etrurians, appears to have extended little farther, than the ſkilful application of natural objects and appearances to the purpoſes of ſuperſtition and impoſture.

It has, nevertheleſs, been aſſerted, that this people were poſſeſſed of the pureſt conceptions of religion. Seneca ſpeaks of the Tuſcan augurs, as employing the terrors of Jupiter's lightnings to keep in awe thoſe who could only be reſtrained from wickedneſs by fear; and adds, that they believed the thunder of heaven to be in the hands, not of the Jupiter worſhipped by the Romans in the Capitol, and other temples, but of a ſupreme intelligence, the guardian and governor of the univerſe, the maker and lord of this world. But he adds[b], "To this deity agree the ſeveral names of Fate, Providence, Nature, or the univerſe ſuſtaining itſelf by its own energy:" a doctrine which, as we ſhall afterwards ſee, was held by the Stoics. On what authority Seneca aſcribed this doctrine to the Etrurians is uncertain. The truth, probably, is, that, with other Weſtern and Northern nations of Celtic origin, they conceived of the deity as the animating principle of the world, acting upon an eternal maſs to produce the viſible creation. The coſmogony of an anonymous Etrurian, preſerved by Suidas[c], confirms this opinion. It limits the duration of the univerſe to a period of twelve thouſand years, ſix thouſand of which paſſed in the production of the viſible world, before the formation of man. Another doctrine, aſcribed to the Etrurians, which agrees with the tenets of the Stoics, is, the entire renovation of nature after a long period, or great year, when a ſimilar ſucceſſion of events would again commence[d]. Two antient brazen tablets, which, from the figures and inſcriptions, appear to repreſent the Egyptian divinities, Iſis and Oſiris[e], have been found in Tuſcany.

[a] L. xxviii. c. 2. [b] Quæſt. Nat. l. ii. c. 41. [c] Verb. Tyrrhen. p. 519.
[d] Plutarch. Vit. Syllæ.
[e] Montfaucon, tom. i. p. i. p. 105, tab. 53.

Theſe afford ſome ground for conjecturing, that, at the time when Egypt ſent out colonies weſtward, the knowledge of their theology paſſed into Etruria. In this manner, it is not improbable, that the Etrurians might acquire the ſame notions concerning God, and the origin of things, which had been long before entertained in Egypt and the Eaſt.

The Romans, ſo illuſtrious in the annals of civil hiſtory, afford, at the early period of which we are now treating, few materials for the hiſtory of barbaric philoſophy. The only name which, at this period, has any pretenſion to be admitted into the liſt of philoſophers, is that of Numa, the ſecond king of Rome. His excellent inſtitutions of civil policy, introduced in the infancy of a ſtate which owed its exiſtence to the force of arms, unqueſtionably prove him to have been a wiſe legiſlator. It has been ſtrenuouſly maintained, that his wiſdom was borrowed from the great founder of one of the Grecian ſchools of philoſophy, Pythagoras. But the arguments urged in ſupport of this opinion are drawn from reſemblances between the inſtitutions of Numa and thoſe of Pythagoras, which are either merely imaginary, or may eaſily be ſuppoſed to have happened, without deſign, from a ſimilarity of ſituation. Beſides, there is little doubt, that Pythagoras the Samian lived more than a century after the time of Numa. And the ſuppoſition that Numa was inſtructed by another Pythagoras, a Lacedemonian, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf at the Olympic Games, in the ſixteenth Olympiad, in the third year of which [a] Numa was choſen king of Rome, is a mere conjecture. It is therefore moſt reaſonable to conclude, that, excepting the aſſiſtance he may be ſuppoſed to have derived from his countrymen, the Sabines, his plan of civilization, both with reſpect to religion and policy, was the product of his own abilities. Livy, on this ſubject, ſays [b]; "Numa poſſeſſed a mind deeply tinctured with virtue, and well furniſhed with good principles, not ſo much from foreign inſtruction, as from the early habits of ſtrict diſcipline, which he had acquired among the Sabines." It will be readily acknowledged, that Numa was a great man, and a wiſe legiſlator; perhaps, as Plutarch ſays, ſuperior even to the

[a] Before Chriſt 714. [b] Hiſt. l. i. c. 8, 18.

Spartan Lycurgus. But practical wiſdom is not to be confounded with philoſophy. The form of government eſtabliſhed by Numa was rather the work of natural good-ſenſe, directed by virtuous principle, than the reſult of philoſophical ſpeculation*.

The wiſe diſcipline which Numa introduced was ill-ſuited to the genius of the Roman people, who were more inclined to purſue the glory of conqueſt, than to cultivate the arts of peace. So prevalent, at this time, was the military character among them, that it rendered them averſe to all improvements in ſcience, and led them to diſcourage every approach of philoſophy, as tending to enfeeble the ſpirit, and corrupt the manners, of their youth *.

* Plut. Vit. Numæ.

* Vidend. Lampredus de Phil. Antl Etruſcorum. Florence 1756. Dempſter ad Roſin. Ant. Rom. l. iii. c. 8. Cudworth's Intell. Syſt. c. iv. § 25. Spon. Miſc. Ant. p. 89. Montfaucon, t. i. p. i. p. 105. Spanhem. de Veſt. et Prytan. Græc. t. v. Theſ. Græv. Herbert. Relig. Gent. c. x. Hiſt. Critiq. de la Phil. tom. iii. p. 7. J. Owen. Theol. l. iii. Burnet. Arch. l. i. c. 2. Univerſ. Hiſt. Etruſc.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCYTHIANS, INCLUDING THE THRACIANS AND GETÆ.

IN our inquiry into the ſtate of barbaric philoſophy, the only country which now remains to be conſidered is Scythia; a general name, which formerly included all the northern parts of Aſia and Europe, but which, after the Celts became a diſtinct people from the Scythians, was chiefly made uſe of to denote thoſe northern regions which lie upon the eaſtern extremity of Europe, and the weſt of Aſia. This is the country which now comes under our notice.

It is univerſally atteſted by the antients, that the Scythians, though rude and illiterate, were honeſt and virtuous. "No crime," ſays an elegant Roman hiſtorian [a], "is eſteemed among the Scythians more heinous than theft: for if any indulgence were given to this crime among a people, whoſe flocks and herds are neceſſarily left unguarded in the open fields, no one's property would be ſecure: they do not, like the reſt of the world, covet gold and ſilver; they are contented to live upon milk and honey, and, notwithſtanding the rigours of their climate, make uſe of no other clothing than the undreſſed ſkins of beaſts." Other writers confirm this account of the Scythians [b]. The innocence of their manners can, however, only be aſcribed to their want of the means of luxury and exceſs. Their virtues were the natural effects of their ſituation, and not the fruits of cultivation and philoſophy. As the writer juſt quoted judiciouſly obſerves, "What the Greeks could not acquire by all the learning of

[a] Juſtin, l. ii. c. 2.

[b] Herod. l. iv. Strabo, l. vii. Q. Curtius, l. vii. c. 8. Arrian, l. iv. Lucian in Toxari.

their

their wiſe men, and all the precepts of philoſophy, was given to theſe Barbarians by nature: of ſo much more efficacy, among the latter, was the ignorance of vice, than among the former, the knowledge of virtue." They were not, however, free from the vices of ſavage life: they conducted their wars with great cruelty; and they admitted human ſacrifices into their religious rites. But, whatever be thought of the manners of the Scythians, to give them the appellation of philoſophers would be to call a block of marble a ſtatue.

The uncivilized ſtate of this nation, and their roving manner of life, have permitted few particulars, either reſpecting their tranſactions or opinions, to paſs down to poſterity. But there can be little doubt, that, like the Celtic nations who migrated from them, they acknowledged the exiſtence of a ſupreme divinity, and the immortality of the ſoul. Of the former, the converſation of Anacharſis, given by Plutarch [a], is a ſufficient proof. Of the latter, the Emperor Julian, on the teſtimony of Trajan, gives the following account [b]: "The Getæ are a moſt warlike people, not only through their natural ſtrength and courage, but through the influence of an opinion taught them by Zamolxis, that after death they ſhall be removed to other habitations. With this perſuaſion, they leave the world with as little concern as they would undertake a journey. Herodotus [c] relates, that they expected after death to go to Zamolxis. Pomponius Mela ſays [d]; "the Getæ are a hardy race, always ready to meet death; but this effect is produced by different opinions: ſome think that the ſouls of the dead return to life; others, that, though they do not return, they are not extinct, but paſs to a happier ſtate; whilſt others have no other opinion concerning death, than that it is better than life." Hence the contempt of death, and the funeral exultations, which were common among the Thracians and Getæ [e].

Several Greek writers take particular notice of the Scythian ABARIS. Jamblichus, among other idle tales, with which his life of

[a] Vit. Solon. [b] In Cæſaribus. [c] L. iv. p. 280.
[d] L. ii. c. 1. [e] Val. Max. l. ii. c. 6.

Pythagoras

Pythagoras abounds, mentions[a] Abaris as a disciple of that philosopher, and relates many wonders which he performed by means of an arrow which he received from Apollo. He also gives the particulars of a conversation which he had with Pythagoras, whilst the latter was detained prisoner by Phalaris, the tyrant. But the narration is filled with so many marvellous circumstances, and chronological errors, that it deserves little credit. Of the latter we shall mention one example. It is said, that, in the time of a general plague[b], Abaris was sent from the Scythians on an embassy to the Athenians. This plague happened in the third[c] Olympiad[d]. Now, it appears, from a learned contest between Bentley on one side, and Boyle, Dodwell, and Wotton, on the other, that Phalaris (in whose presence Abaris is said to have disputed with Pythagoras) did not exercise his tyranny, at the most, longer than twenty-eight years, and that his death happened not earlier than the fourth year of the fifty-seventh Olympiad[e], which is the opinion of Bentley, nor later than the first year of the sixty-ninth Olympiad[f], which is the date fixed by Dodwell. Whence it is evident, that Abaris could not have lived, both at the time of the general plague mentioned above, and during the tyranny of Phalaris[g]. The time when Abaris flourished may, with some degree of probability, be fixed about the third Olympiad; and there seems little reason to doubt, that like Empedocles, Epimenides, Pythagoras, and others, he went from place to place, imposing upon the vulgar by false pretensions to supernatural powers. He passed through Greece, Italy, and many other countries, giving forth oracular predictions, pretending to heal diseases by incantation, and practising other arts of imposture[h]. Hence the fabulous tales concerning Abaris grew up into an entire history, written by Heraclides[i]. Some of the later Platonists, in their zeal against Christianity, collected these and other fables, and exhibited them, not without large additions from

[a] P. 116, 138, 148. [b] Suidas & Harpocratio in Abarid. [c] B. C. 768.
[d] Harpoc. & Suid. in Προπροσία. [e] B. C. 549. [f] B. C. 504.
[g] Conf. Bayle in Abarid. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. vol. i. p. 405.
[h] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. Apollon. Mirab. Hist. c. 4. Plato in Charmide. Bayle in Abar. [i] Plut. Aud. Poet.

their

their own fertile imaginations, in oppoſition to the miracles of Chriſt. On the whole, it may be confidently concluded concerning Abaris, that he has a better title to a place among impoſtors, than among philoſophers.

Very different from this was the character of ANACHARSIS. He was of that race of Scythians, who, from their wandering life are called *Nomadici*. He was the brother of a Scythian prince. Having been early inſtructed by his mother, a native of Greece, in the Greek language, and preferring the purſuits of wiſdom to thoſe of ambition, he left his native country, in the firſt year of the forty-ſeventh Olympiad, and viſited Athens[a]. Here he met with Toxaris, his countryman, who conducted him to the houſe of Solon, the famous Athenian legiſlator. When he came to the houſe, he deſired one of the attendants to inform his maſter, that Anacharſis, a Scythian, was at the door, and requeſted to be received into the houſe, as his gueſt and friend[b]. To this meſſage Solon's anſwer was, that "friendſhips are beſt formed at home." To which Anacharſis replied, "Then let Solon, who is at home, make me his friend, and receive me into his houſe." Solon, ſtruck with the ſmartneſs of the reply, admitted him as his gueſt, and finding him, on account of his good ſenſe and probity, worthy of his confidence, allowed him to ſhare in his friendſhip. Anacharſis, on his part, became ſuch an admirer of Solon, that he conſtantly aſſociated with him, till he made himſelf maſter of all the knowledge which that wiſe man poſſeſſed. During his reſidence in Athens, he was honoured with the privilege of citizenſhip, an honour never before conferred upon a Barbarian[c].

After the death of Solon, Anacharſis travelled through a great part of the world in ſearch of wiſdom, and at laſt returned into his own country, probably with the hope of communicating to his countrymen the wiſdom he had acquired in Greece. But they were too much attached to their old opinions and cuſtoms, to endure with patience the bold attempts which he made, to introduce among them the inſtitutions and manners of the Greeks. As he was one

[a] Laert. l. i. § 102. Suidas. Conf. Lucian. Anach.
[b] Plutarch. Vit. Solon. init. [c] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 308.

day

day hunting, an arrow, ſent, as ſome ſay, from the hand of his brother, put an end to his life. He lamented with his laſt breath the jealouſy and folly of his countrymen, who would not ſuffer one wiſer than themſelves to live among them.

Anacharſis was famous for a manly and nervous kind of language, which was called, from his country, Scythian eloquence. He is ſaid to have invented the anchor and the potter's wheel; but theſe inſtruments were known before his time; perhaps he firſt introduced the uſe of them among the Scythians [a]. Among many other ingenious ſayings, aſcribed by Laertius to Anacharſis, are the following: Being aſked, by what means a man addicted to intemperance might be taught ſobriety, he replied, by placing before his eyes a drunken man. The vine, he ſaid, bears three kinds of fruit; the firſt, pleaſure; the ſecond, intoxication; the third, remorſe. An Athenian of infamous character upbraiding him with being a Scythian, he ſaid; My country is indeed a diſgrace to me, but you are a diſgrace to your country. The epiſtles, which bear his name, were probably produced at a later period, in the ſchool of the Sophiſts.

At the ſame time with Anacharſis flouriſhed TOXARIS, who, from an impatient thirſt after knowledge, left his wife and children in Scythia, and went to reſide at Athens. Here he became acquainted with Solon, and other wiſe men, and made himſelf maſter of all the learning which the times would afford. He ſtudied the art of medicine, and for many years practiſed it with great reputation in Athens, where he ended his days. His deſire of wiſdom, his candid temper, and the ſobriety of his manners, procured him general eſteem. After his death, he was honoured with a ſepulchral monument and ſtatue; and ſuperſtition aſcribed a healing virtue even to his tomb [b].

But the moſt celebrated name among the Scythians was ZAMOLXIS, whom many repreſent, not only as the father of wiſdom with reſpect to the Scythians, but as the teacher of the doctrines of immortality and tranſmigration to the Celtic Druids, and to Pytha-

[a] Laert. Suidas. Anach. Strabo, l. vii. Senec. Ep. 90.
[b] Lucian. in Toxari; Scyth. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. vol. xiii. p 438.

goras [a]. Others ſuppoſe him to have been a ſervant of Pythagoras, who, after having attended him into Egypt, obtained his manumiſſion, and taught his maſter's doctrine among the Getæ. But there can be no doubt, that the doctrine of immortality was known to the Northern nations long before the time of Pythagoras; and Herodotus, mentioning a common tradition, that Zamolxis was a Pythagorean, expreſsly ſays [b], that he flouriſhed at a much earlier period than Pythagoras. The whole ſtory of the connection of Zamolxis with Pythagoras ſeems to have been invented by the Pythagoreans, to advance the fame of their maſter. From the general teſtimony of the antients it appears, that Zamolxis was a Thracian, who, in a very remote period, taught the Scythians the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul; whoſe name they, after his death, enrolled among the divinities, and with whom they aſſured themſelves that they ſhould dwell in the inviſible world. Herodotus relates, that, on certain feſtal ſolemnities, they choſe by lot ſeveral perſons, who were to be ſent as meſſengers to Zamolxis, and that they put them to death, by throwing them up into the air, and catching them, as they fell, upon the points of their ſpears; a ſtory, which is the more credible, as it is well known that the practice of offering human ſacrifices prevailed among the Scythians and Thracians [c].

Theſe particulars concerning the Scythians are ſufficient to prove, that their wiſdom was rather practical than ſpeculative, conſiſtent with rude manners, and adapted to the military character.

From all that we have been able to collect concerning the ſtate of knowledge in the ſeveral nations which have paſſed under our notice, we muſt conclude, that the barbaric philoſophy was very different, in its leading characters, from the philoſophy afterwards ſtudied and taught among the Greeks. It was indeed employed upon important ſubjects, both divine and human; but inſtead of inveſtigating truth from clear principles, and by legitimate methods

[a] Origen. Philoſ. c. xxv. p. 170. Suidas. Zamolx. Strabo, l. vii. [b] L. iv. c. 95.
[c] Laert. l. viii. § 2. Julian in Cæſaribus. Jambl. Vit. Pyth. p. 146.

of reaſoning, it relied chiefly upon tradition, and gave its ſimple and eaſy aſſent to doctrines and fables tranſmitted to poſterity by the prieſts.

In the midſt of every appearance of ignorance, ſuperſtition, and impoſture, it is, however, an important fact, that the doctrines of a Supreme Deity, and the immortality of the ſoul, were univerſally received. "Who does not admire (ſays Ælian*) the wiſdom of the Barbarians, none of whom ever fell into the atheiſtical abſurdities of Eumerus, Diagoras, Epicurus, and other philoſophers? No Indian, Celt, or Egyptian, ever queſtioned, whether there were gods, or whether they concerned themſelves in the affairs of men*."

* Var. Hiſt. l. ii. c. 31.

* Videnda. Rudbeck in Atlantid. p. 62. Voſſ. de Sect. Phil. c. iii. § 1. Jornandes de Rebus Geticis. Cluverius Germ. Ant. l. i. c. 32. Burnet. Arch. l. i. c. 2.

BOOK II.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.

CHAP. I.

OF THE FABULOUS PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.

FROM the barbaric nations, we now paſs on to the Greeks; a people diſtinguiſhed, almoſt from the infancy of their civilization, by the purſuit of wiſdom and learning; among whom, after they had received the elements of knowledge from Barbarians, philoſophy found a ſettled habitation.

Greece was firſt civilized by colonies from Egypt, Phenicia, Thrace, and other countries. Theſe were under the government of wiſe men, who not only ſubdued the ferocity of an ignorant populace by civil inſtitutions, but caſt about them the ſtrong chain of religion, and the fear of the gods. Whatever dogmas they had been taught, in their reſpective countries, concerning things divine and human, they delivered to theſe new formed ſocieties, with the deſign of bringing them under the reſtraint of virtuous diſcipline. Hence the aſpect of ſacred philoſophy was very different in different parts of Greece.

Greece. Phoroneus and Cecrops being Egyptians[a], Cadmus a Phenician, and Orpheus a Thracian[b], each of theſe would, of courſe, bring into Greece, with their ſeveral colonies, the religious and philoſophical tenets of their reſpective nations, and thus lay the foundation of diverſity of opinion.

The practice of delivering the doctrines of religion to the people under the diſguiſe of fable, which univerſally prevailed in Egypt, and was not unknown to the Phenicians, Thracians, and other barbarous nations, was introduced among the Greeks by the firſt founders of their ſtates. They had ſeen the effect of this mode of inſtruction in countries already ſettled, and they judged it particularly ſuitable to their deſign of bringing new-formed ſtates under the yoke of authority. "It was not poſſible," ſays Strabo[c], "to lead a promiſcuous multitude to religion and virtue by philoſophical harangues; this could only be effected by the aid of ſuperſtition, by prodigies and fables. The thunderbolt, the ægis, the trident, the ſpear, torches and ſnakes, were the inſtruments made uſe of by the founders of ſtates to terrify the ignorant vulgar into ſubjection."

That the firſt authors of the Grecian fables meant them as vehicles of inſtruction, cannot be doubted[d]. But it is now become exceedingly difficult, if not impracticable, to decypher their meaning. And it will be eaſily perceived, that this muſt be the caſe, by any one who recollects, how imperfectly we are acquainted with the hiſtory, opinions, manners, and other circumſtances of the times when the Grecian mythology was formed, and from what a variety of ſources it was derived[e]. Of theſe the two principal were the cuſtom[f] of ranking public benefactors, after their death, among the gods; and the practice[g] of applying allegories and fables to natural objects and appearances. The origin of the world, and the pro-

[a] Clem. Alex. Admon. ad Gent. p. 28. Herod. l. ii. Pauſanias in Arcad. Euſeb. in Chron.

[b] Ariſtoph. in Ranis. Eurip. in Rhæſo. Nonni Collect. i. ad calc. Nazianz.

[c] L. i. [d] Verulam. de Sap. Vet. Pref.

[e] Vid. Bocharti Geogr. Sac. Clerici Not. ad Heſiodum.

[f] Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. ii. c. 17. [g] Dionyſ. Halic. Antiq. l. i.

duction

duction of natural bodies, were very early clothed in fable, in the coſmogonies of the Egyptians, Phenicians, Thracians, and other nations: and theſe were afterwards imitated by the Greeks.

Another cuſtom, which has very much contributed to caſt a veil of obſcurity over the fabulous philoſophy of the Greeks, is that, which in early times prevailed among them, of giving their mythological doctrines a poetical dreſs. Theſe were commonly choſen as ſubjects of verſe, and every poet enlarged and moulded the antient fables, according to the fertility or luxuriancy of his own fancy; ſo that they were not only increaſed from time to time without limit, but, in many particulars, ſo materially altered, that their original features could ſcarcely be perceived.

The fabulous philoſophy of the Greeks being, from theſe and other cauſes, involved in great obſcurity, we ſhall paſs with all poſſible expedition through this dark and unprofitable region; leaving the ſolution of thoſe mythological enigmas, which have ſo long amuſed the learned, to more fertile imaginations.

The firſt of the Greeks, who is ſaid to have taught philoſophy and the arts, is PROMETHEUS. It is unneceſſary to repeat his well-known ſtory[a]. Various conjectures have been framed concerning it. Some have imagined, that in the perſon and fable of Prometheus they have found the hiſtory of Adam; others have applied them to Noah; others to Moſes[b]: they might, with as much appearance of probability, have applied them to the Chineſe Fohi. Perhaps the truth is, that Prometheus was an Egyptian, or a Scythian, who inſtructed the Greeks in ſeveral neceſſary arts, particularly in the uſe of fire for the purpoſe of melting metals, and who afterwards ſuffering captivity, was reſcued by Hercules[c]. This account of the fable is at leaſt as probable as thoſe philoſophical explanations, which ſuppoſe

[a] Heſiod. Oper. v. 46. Theog. v. 520. Ovid. Met. l. i. Natalis Comis Mythol. l. iv. c. 6.

[b] Hueti Dem. Ev. pr. iv. c. 8. § 7. Bochart. Geog. l. i. c. 2. Fabricii Cod. Pſ. t. i. 261.

[c] Conf. Æſchyli Prometh. vinct. Natalis Comes, p. 328. Herod.

a kind

a kind of refinement, unknown at the early period when this fable was firſt received.

LINUS, who lived before the time of Homer, is celebrated among the firſt authors of Grecian verſe, and is ſaid to have invented Lyric poetry. He wrote a coſmogony, the beginning of which is preſerved by Laertius [a]. He was an eminent maſter of muſic and verſe, and is ſaid to have inſtructed Hercules, Thamyris, and Orpheus.

ORPHEUS, the moſt celebrated of all the Greeks in the fabulous ages, diſtinguiſhed himſelf as a teacher of religion and philoſophy. His name is as illuſtrious among the Greeks, as that of Zoroaſter among the Perſians, of Buddas among the Indians, or of Thoth, or Hermes, among the Egyptians. But we cannot rely with certainty upon the remaining records of his life and opinions. For it has happened to Orpheus, as to many other wiſe men of antiquity, that ſpurious writings have been aſcribed to him, and modern tenets have been obtruded upon the world under the ſanction of his name [b]. It has even been queſtioned, whether Orpheus ever exiſted. Cicero aſſerts [c], on the authority of Ariſtotle, that there was no ſuch perſon as the poet Orpheus. But no paſſage of this kind is at preſent to be found in the works of Ariſtotle; and the opinion is contradicted by the general teſtimony of the antients, who relate, that Orpheus was a native of Thrace, who flouriſhed before the Trojan war, and paſſed the greater part of his life in Greece [d].

Diodorus Siculus relates [e], that, "having been inſtructed in the religious tenets and ceremonies of his own country, he travelled into Egypt, where he acquired a knowledge of the myſteries of religion, and became an eminent maſter of philoſophy, poetry, and muſic." Thus qualified, he came among the Greeks, who were at that time a rude and unenlightened people, and by the united powers of poetry, religion, and philoſophy, civilized their manners.

[a] L. i. § 4. Sextus Emp. adv. Math. l. i. § 204. Diod. Sic. l. iii. p. 140. Suidas. Pauſan in Bœoticis p. 767.

[b] Fabric. Bibl. Gr. v. i. p. 110. [c] De Nat. Deor. l. i.

[d] Diod. Sic. l. iv. c. 25. Plato de Rep. l. x. [e] Ibid.

Such

Such were the wonderful effects produced by his genius and wiſdom, that, in the language of fable, his muſic is ſaid to have captivated the attention of birds and beaſts, and even to have commanded rocks, woods, and rivers:

Quem Deum, cujus recinet jocoſa
Nomen imago,
Aut in umbroſis Heliconis oris,
Aut ſuper Pindo, gelidove in Hæmo,
Unde vocalem temere inſecutæ
Orphea ſilvæ,
Arte materna rapidos morantem
Fluminum curſus, celereſque ventos,
Blandum et auritas fidibus canoris
Ducere quercus[a]. *

Orpheus is ſaid to have improved the lyre, by increaſing the number of its ſtrings from four to ſeven. To him alſo is aſcribed the invention of hexameter verſe[b]. He, doubtleſs, excelled in poetry of various kinds, but it is juſtly queſtioned whether he committed any of his verſes to writing. He poſſeſſed great ſkill in the art of medicine. Perhaps this circumſtance may ſerve to explain the fable of his recalling his wife Eurydice from hell[c]. The particulars of his death are variouſly related by different writers; but it is generally agreed, that he died by violent means[d]. After his death, he was ranked among the divinities.

[a] Hor. Carm. l. i. Od. xii.

* —— What God, whoſe hallowed name
The ſportive image of the voice
Shall through the ſhades of Helicon reſound,
On Pindus, or on Hæmus ever cool,
From whence the foreſts, in confuſion wild,
To vocal Orpheus urg'd their way;
Who by his mother's art, harmonious muſe,
With ſoft delay could ſtop the falling ſtreams,
And winged winds, with ſtrings of concert ſweet,
Powerful the liſt'ning oaks to lead. FRANCIS.

[b] Antipat. Sidonii Anthol. l. iii. p. 388. Pauſan. Eliac. p. 505. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xxv. c. 2. [c] Virg. Georg. iv.

[d] Pauſan. in Bæotic. p. 586. Eliac. l. c. Ovid. Metam. l. x. v. 83. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 130.

The inſtruments which Orpheus made uſe of, in governing and inſtructing the ignorant Greeks, were poetry, muſic, medicine, magic, and aſtrology, which he had learned in Egypt[a]. Having been accuſtomed, both here and in his own country, to the allegorical mode of inſtruction, he communicated to them the doctrines of religion in a mythological form. He was probably the author of the Eleuſinian and Panathænean myſteries, and other religious inſtitutions. It ſeems to have been owing to the circumſtance of his being a Thracian, that the Grecian rites of religion were called θρησκεία[b].

There were many antient poems which bore the name of Orpheus, but it is much diſputed whether they were really his. Ariſtotle[c] ſpeaks doubtingly of theſe poems, as *commonly aſcribed* to Orpheus. Heſiod and Homer are called by Herodotus the oldeſt Greek poets. Cicero and ſome other writers expreſsly aſcribe them to ſome philoſophers of the Pythagorean ſchool[d]. On the other ſide, Plato[e] cites verſes from Orpheus, and even Cicero[f] ſpeaks of Orpheus as one of the antient poets. Diodorus Siculus[g] affirms Orpheus to have been the author of an excellent poem; and ſeveral Chriſtian fathers mention a work, called Ἱερὸς λόγος, or the Sacred Word, which was written by ſome follower of Pythagoras, and founded upon traditionary doctrines of Orpheus. All that can be concluded with probability is[h], that before the time of Herodotus there were verſes, which were aſcribed to Orpheus, but which were probably not written by himſelf, but collected after his time from traditionary remains of his doctrine and poems. Of theſe antient Orphic verſes we have ſeveral fragments preſerved in the writings of Euſebius[i], Cedrenus[k], Clemens Alexandrinus[l], Proclus[m], and Apuleius[n]; beſides which there are others, which bear evident marks of forgery. The Orphic fragments have been collected by Eſchenbach, in a treatiſe, entitled *De Poeſi Orphica*[o]. As theſe fragments are almoſt the only ſources of our information concerning

[a] Lucian. Aſtrol. [b] Suidas. Clem. Alex. Strom. p. 567. Caſaubon. Exerc. Antibaron. xvi. p. 391. Burnet Archæol. Phil. c. ix. [c] De anima.
[d] Nat. D. l. i. Suidas. [e] De Legibus, l. viii. [f] Ib. l. ii. [g] L. iii. c. 25.
[h] Fab. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 120. [i] Prep. l. iii. c. 9. xiii. 12. & Chron.
[k] Chronagr. p. 46. [l] Strom. l. v. p. 549. [m] In Timæum, p. 95.
[n] De Mundo. [o] Traject. 1689, 120.

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the doctrine of Orpheus, we ſhall quote the following ſpecimens:

Τῦνεκα συν' τῶ παντὶ Διὸς πάλιν εἰλὸς ἐτύχθη,
Αἰθέρος εὐρείης ἠδ' ἠρανε ἄγλαον ὕψος,
Πόντε τ' ατρυγετε, γαιης τ' ἐρικυδέος εὖρη·
Ὠκεανός τε μέγας, καὶ νείαλα Τάρταρα γαίης,
Καὶ ποταμὸς, καὶ πόντος απείρεσος ἄλλά τε παντα,
Πάντες τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ, ἠδε θέαιναι
Ὅσσα τ' ἔην γεγαῶτα, καὶ ὕστερον ὅππος' εμελλεν
Ἐγὲνέσθ'· Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύρφα πεφύκει [a].

"Wherefore, belonging to the univerſe, were, within Jupiter, the glorious height of the ſpacious ethereal heaven; the wide extent of the unſubdued ſea and magnificent earth; the vaſt ocean, the profound Tartarus, the rivers and fountains, and all other things, together with the happy immortals, both male and female: whatever has been, or will be, is produced within Jupiter."

In the book *De Mundo*, tranſlated by Apuleius we have theſe lines:

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὑστατος ἀρχικέραυνος,
Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα· Διὸς δ' ἐκ παντα τέτυκται·
Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη·
Ζεὺς πύθμην γαίης τε καὶ ἠρανῦ ασερόεντος·
Ζεὺς πνοίη παντῶν; Ζευς ἀκαμαντα πυρὸς ορμή·
Ζεὺς πόντε ριζα· Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη
Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς· Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἁπάντων ἀρχιγένεθλος·
Ἓν κράτος εἷς Δαίμων γενετο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων·
Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τασδε σώματι κεῖται.

"Jupiter, the lofty thunderer, is the firſt, and the laſt, and the middle; all things proceed from him: the immortal Jupiter is both male and female: the ſpacious earth and ſtarry heavens are Jupiter: Jupiter is the breath of all things, the irreſiſtible energy of fire, and the ſource of the ſea: Jupiter is king; he is the parent of all: there is one power, one divinity, one ruler of all; for all things are contained within the vaſt body of Jupiter."

Again,

Πάντα ταδε κρύψας, αὖθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθὲς
Μέλλεν ἀπὸ κραδίης προφέρειν, πολυθέσκελα ῥέζων [b].

[a] Proclus in Timæum, p. 95. [b] Ibid.

" Hiding all things within himſelf, he at length ſent forth divine " productions from his boſom into the chearful light."

From theſe and other fragments of Orpheus, the following ſummary of the Orphic doctrine concerning God and nature may be deduced.

God, from all eternity, contained within himſelf the unformed principles of the material world, and conſiſted of a compound nature, active and paſſive[a]. By the energy of the active principle, he ſent forth from himſelf, at the commencement of a certain finite period, all material and ſpiritual beings, which partake, in different degrees, of the divine nature. All beings, proceeding originally from God, will, after certain purgations, return to him. The univerſe itſelf will be deſtroyed by fire, and afterwards renewed[b].

An Orphic fragment is preſerved by Athenagoras[c], in which the formation of the world is repreſented under the emblem of an egg; formed by the union of Night, or Chaos, and Ether, which at length burſt, and diſcloſed the forms of nature. The meaning of this allegory probably is, that by the energy of the divine active principle upon the eternal maſs of paſſive matter, the viſible world was produced[d].

Some writers have aſcribed to Orpheus the doctrine ſince maintained by Spinoza, which confounds the deity with the univerſe, making him the Τὸ Πάν[e]. But the doctrine of emanation, which ſuppoſes that the principles of all things were originally in God, and at length flowed from him, is conſonant to the general tenor of the Orphic fragments, and is the more likely to have been the real doctrine of Orpheus, as it prevailed, in the moſt remote times, through the Eaſt, and paſſed thence, as we have already ſhewn, to the North.

The human ſoul, Orpheus, after the Thracians and Egyptians, from whom he derived his philoſophy, held to be immortal. Diodorus Siculus relates[f], that he was the firſt who taught (that is

[a] Ἀρρενοθήλυν.
[b] Plut. Defect. Orac. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 549. Proclus in Tim. l. ii. p. 49.
[c] Legat. pro Chriſt. p. 18. ed Par. [d] Plut. Queſt. Conv. l. ii.
[e] See Cudworth's Intell. Syſt. b. iv. c. 17. [f] L. i. p. 86.

among

among the Greeks) the doctrine of the future puniſhment of the wicked, and the future happineſs of the good. That this doctrine was commonly received among the followers of Orpheus appears from the following anecdote. A prieſt of Orpheus, who was exceedingly poor and wretched, boaſting to Philip of Macedon that all who were admitted into the Orphic myſteries would be happy after death, Philip ſaid to him, "Why then do you not immediately die, and put an end to your poverty and miſery?"—The planets and the moon, Orpheus conceived to be habitable worlds, and the ſtars to be fiery bodies like the ſun: he taught that they are animated by divinities; an opinion, which had been commonly received in the Eaſt, and which was afterwards adopted by the Pythagoreans, and other Grecian philoſophers[a].

Among the diſciples of Orpheus, the moſt celebrated is MUSÆUS[b], an Athenian philoſopher and poet. He continued, and improved, the myſterious rites of religion which Orpheus had introduced, and wrote poems concerning the gods and nature, of which, however, there are no remains. Laertius ſays[c], that he made the firſt ſphere; but he was probably miſled by the title of a poem ſaid to have been written by Muſæus, *de Sphæra*. The doctrine which he taught was, that all things are produced from one, and ſhall be reſolved into the ſame; an Orphic doctrine, which is the firſt principle of the ſyſtem of emanation, and the foundation of all the antient theogonies. Muſæus died at Phaleræ; and the Athenians honoured him with a ſepulchral monument. His ſon EUMOLPUS, following his ſteps, wrote concerning the myſteries of Ceres. THAMYRIS and AMPHION were, at this period, famous for their ſkill in muſic and poetry[d]. The latter, after the example of Orpheus, employed the united powers of muſic and philoſophy in civilizing the Thebans:

> Silveſtres homines ſacer interpreſque deorum
> Cædibus et victu fædo deterruit Orpheus;

[a] Plut. Placit. Phil. l. ii. c. 13. Procl. in Tim. l. iv. p. 283. Suidas in Orph: Stobæus, l. i. p. 54. ed. Cant. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 132. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 549.

[b] Suidas. [c] L. i. § 3. [d] Hor. Carm. xi. 2.

Dictus

Dictus ob hoc lenire tigres rabidoſque leones:
Dictus et Amphion, Thebanæ conditor arcis,
Saxa movere ſono teſtudinis, et prece blanda
Ducere quo vellet. Fuit hæc ſapientia quondam,
Publica privatis ſecernere, ſacra profanis;
Concubitu prohibere vago; dare jura maritis;
Oppida moliri; leges incidere ligno;
Sic honor et nomen divinis vatibus atque
Carminibus venit [a].

Not inferior to Amphion in fame was MELAMPUS [b], an Argive, who flouriſhed before the Trojan war. Having learned from the Phenicians and Egyptians, who were ſettled in Greece, their religious tenets and myſteries, he taught them to his countrymen. He inſtructed them in augury, and other arts of divination. He was alſo famous for his medical ſkill; and in the practice of this art, after the uſual manner of the antients, made uſe of magical incantations. After his death, his memory was honoured with an annual feſtival [c].

Beſides the writers already enumerated, who have treated of the origin of the world, and of the nature and genealogy of the gods, there are ſeveral others, whoſe works are now loſt. Of the antient

[a] Hor. Ars Poet. v. 391.

The wood-born race of men when Orpheus tam'd,
From acorns and from mutual blood reclaim'd,
This prieſt divine was fabled to aſſuage
The tiger's fierceneſs, and the lion's rage.
Thus roſe the Theban wall; Amphion's lyre,
And ſoothing voice, the liſt'ning ſtones inſpire.
Poetic wiſdom mark'd, with happy mean,
Public and private, ſacred and profane;
The wand'ring joys of lawleſs love ſuppreſs'd;
With equal rites the bond of Hymen bleſs'd;
Plann'd future towns, and inſtituted laws;
So verſe became divine, and poets gain'd applauſe. FRANCIS.

[b] Suidas. Herodot. l. ii. c. 49. Diod. Sic. l. i. p. 96.
[c] Pauſan. l. i. in fin. viii. p. 253. Cic. de Leg. l. ii.

theogonies

theogonies which remain, the moſt celebrated is that of Heſiod[a]. This poem treats of the origin and deſcent of the gods; or rather, under the allegorical dreſs of theogony, repreſents the formation of the world, and the hiſtory of eminent men. The plan of this work is intricate and confuſed. The writer ſeems to have made uſe of ſeveral different theogonies, and to have blended them together with little regard to conſiſtency. He alſo frequently adds, for the ſake of poetical ornament, fictions of his own, which have no relation to the origin and hiſtory of the world. Ariſtophanes, in his comedy of The Birds[b], has introduced a deſcription of the formation of the world, which he doubtleſs borrowed from the antient theogonies; but it is too defective, and applied to too ludicrous a purpoſe, to deſerve much attention.

All the theogonies make an eternal chaos the origin of all things.

> Ante mare, et terras, et quod tegit omnia cælum,
> Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,
> Quem dixere Chaos, rudis indigeſtaque moles,
> Nec quicquam niſi pondus iners, congeſtaque eodem
> Non bene juncturam diſcordia ſemina rerum[c]. *

By Chaos ſome writers[d] underſtand water, and make this the firſt material principle; but this muſt not be underſtood of one of the four elements, but of an heterogeneous maſs, containing all the ſeeds of nature. The idea of Chaos and Night, diveſted of poetical imagery, is ſimply that of unformed matter, eternally exiſting as the paſſive principle whence all forms are produced. Whether, beſides this

[a] Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 36. [b] Ver. 694, &c.
[c] Ovid. Met. l. i. v. 5.

* Ere ſea and earth, and heav'ns high canopy
Were form'd, great nature's face was one;
A lifeleſs, rude, and undigeſted maſs
Of jarring ſeeds in one wild chaos lay.

[d] Cudworth, c. 1. § 22.

chaotic

chaotic maſs, the antient theogonies ſuppoſe an infinite, active, intelligent principle, who from the firſt matter formed the univerſe, is a queſtion which has occaſioned much debate. It is evident, upon the moſt curſory review of the antient theogonies, that God, the great Creator of all things, is not expreſsly introduced; but it is doubted, whether the writers meant to exclude him from their ſyſtem, or indirectly to ſuppoſe his exiſtence, and the exertion of his power in giving motion to matter.

The queſtion admits of various ſuppoſitions, which, in order to arrive at the ſolution, muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed. It is to be conſidered, whether the theogoniſts ſuppoſed God to have exiſted before chaos, and to have created it from nothing; or thought him to have ſprung from a pre-exiſting chaos; or conceived God and matter to have been two co-exiſting and independent principles: whether they imagined God to have been the ſoul of nature, informing the eternal maſs of matter; or were of opinion, that God ſent forth matter as an emanation from himſelf; if the latter, whether this emanation was the effect of neceſſity, or of a free act of volition; whether it was from all eternity, or began at ſome limited period of duration. It muſt alſo be inquired, whether, according to the doctrine of the theogonies, a divine mind interpoſed in the formation of the world, or the effect was produced by the neceſſary laws of motion acting upon homogeneous and heterogeneous portions of matter. If the latter of theſe was their doctrine, it is to be farther conſidered, whether it neceſſarily follows, that they denied the exiſtence of God, or whether it may not be ſuppoſed, that, neglecting all conſideration of deity, they only endeavoured to explain the phyſical formation of the world, by laws originally impreſſed upon matter by the author of nature.

The theogonies certainly do not ſuppoſe God to have been prior in the order of time to matter: they ſpeak of chaos as eternal, and ſeem to have been wholly unacquainted with the doctrine of creation from nothing. But, on the other hand they never ſuppoſe the deity to be derived from chaos: for Jupiter is not to be confounded with the ſupreme being, but merely to be conſidered as

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the chief of thoſe inferior divinities, who, according to the Grecian theology, were either portions of the divinity, inhabiting and animating parts of nature, or departed ſpirits of heroes and illuſtrious men, exalted to divine honours. There is no ſufficient proof that Orpheus, Heſiod, or any other Grecian coſmogoniſt, ſuppoſed two independent principles in nature: for, though they aſcribe the origin of evil to Chaos, they might, nevertheleſs, be of opinion, as we ſhall find to have been the caſe with many later philoſophers, that matter is derived from God.

Some have ſuppoſed [a], that by Love, Heſiod, and the other theogoniſts, meant the ſoul or animating principle in the univerſe. But it is a ſufficient refutation of this opinion to remark, that they ſuppoſe this divinity derived from Chaos, in common with others. By Love, they probably underſtood that attractive principle in nature, by which homogeneous bodies are united. To this principle they poetically aſcribed the attributes of reaſon and wiſdom, to intimate, that in the formation of the world, all things were conſtituted by harmonious laws.

There were, perhaps, different opinions among the antient coſmogoniſts, concerning the firſt cauſe of nature. Some might, poſſibly, aſcribe the origin of all things to a generating force, deſtitute of thought, which they conceived to be inherent in matter, without looking to any higher principle. But it is probable, that the general opinion among them was that which had prevailed among the Egyptians and in the Eaſt, and was communicated by tradition to the Greeks, that matter, or chaos, exiſted eternally with God, and that by the divine energy of emanation, material forms were ſent forth from him, and the viſible world aroſe into exiſtence. This principle being admitted, the whole ſyſtem of the antient theogonies appears conſiſtent, and a ſatisfactory explanation may be given of moſt of the Grecian fables. Upon this ſuppoſition, the ſum of the doctrine of the theogonies, diveſted of allegory and poetry, will be as follows:

[a] Cudworth, book i. c. 3. § 18.

The firſt matter, containing the ſeeds of all future being, exiſted from eternity with God. At length, the divine energy upon matter produced a motion among its parts, by which thoſe of the ſame kind were brought together, and thoſe of a different kind were ſeparated, and by which, according to certain wiſe laws, the various forms of the material world were produced. The ſame energy of emanation gave exiſtence to animals and men, and to gods who inhabit the heavenly bodies, and various other parts of nature. Among men, thoſe who poſſeſs a larger portion of the divine nature than others, are hereby impelled to great and beneficent actions, and afford illuſtrious proofs of their divine original, on account of which, they are after death raiſed to a place among the gods, and become objects of religious worſhip.

Upon the baſis of theſe notions, it is eaſy to conceive, that the whole mythological ſyſtem, and all the religious rites and myſteries of the Greeks, might be founded.

Before we take our leave of the writers of Greek fables, we muſt add a few words concerning Epimenides and Homer.

EPIMENIDES was a Cretan [a], of whom many marvellous fables are related. It is ſaid, that going, by his father's order, in ſearch of a ſheep, he laid himſelf down in a cave, where he fell aſleep, and ſlept for fifty years. Another idle ſtory told of this Cretan is, that he had a power of ſending his ſoul out of his body, and recalling it, at pleaſure. It is added, that he had familiar intercourſe with the gods, and poſſeſſed the powers of prophecy. During a plague in Attica, the Athenians ſent for him to perform a ſacred luſtration, in conſequence of which it is ſaid, that the gods were appeaſed, and the plague ceaſed. He is reported to have lived, after his return to Crete, to the age of 157 years [b]. We probably owe moſt of theſe tales to the Cretans, who were, to a proverb, famous for their powers of invention [c]. All that is credible con-

[a] Laert. l. i. § 109. Val. Max. l. viii. c. 13. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. vii. c. 52. Suidas.

[b] Plut. Solon. et anſeni, &c. Pauſanias in Att. p. 35. Plato de Leg. l. ii. p. 642. Strabo, l. x. 479. [c] Titus i. 12.

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cerning Epimenides is, that he was a man of ſuperior talents, who pretended to intercourſe with the gods, and, to ſupport his pretenſions, lived in retirement upon the ſpontaneous productions of the earth, and practiſed various arts of impoſture. Perhaps, in his hours of pretended inſpiration, he had the art of appearing totally inſenſible and entranced, which would eaſily be miſtaken, by ignorant ſpectators, for a power of diſmiſſing and recalling his ſpirit. Solon, in whoſe time the luſtration above mentioned was performed, ſeems to have been no ſtranger to the true character of Epimenides; for we find, that he greatly diſapproved of the conduct of the Athenians in employing him to perform this ceremony. Divine honours were paid him, after his death, by the ſuperſtitious Cretans. He has no other claim to be mentioned among philoſophers, except that he wrote a theogony, and other poems concerning religious myſteries[a].

The immortal HOMER flouriſhed before any other poet, whoſe writings are now extant. The time of his birth, after all that has been written to aſcertain it, is ſtill diſputed. It is probable that he lived about 900 years before the Chriſtian æra[b]. Many cities and countries have contended for the honour of having given birth to this illuſtrious genius, which Varro has brought together into the following verſe:

Smyrna, Rhodus, Colophon, Salamin, Chius, Argus, Athenæ.

Homer paſſed a wandering life, reciting his verſes at public and private feſtivals. His writings are come down to the preſent time entire. His Iliad and Odyſſey are the eternal monuments of his fame. Beſides theſe, the Batrachomyomachia, or Battles of the Frogs and Mice, and ſeveral hymns, are commonly aſcribed to him[c]. It was cuſtomary among the Greeks, for certain perſons, who from their employment were called Rhapſodiſts, to recite verſes,

[a] Plut. Conv. Sept. Ariſtot. Rhet. l. iii. c. 17.
[b] Aul. Gell. l. iii. c. 11. xvii. 21. Suidas. Clem. Alex. Str. i. p. 327.
[c] Fabr. Bibl. Gr. vol. i. p. 253. Kuſter, Hiſt. Hom. Francf. 1696.

chiefly thoſe of Homer, at feſtivals, and in the public theatres, holding in their hand a branch of laurel[a]. Theſe recitations were not intended merely for amuſement, but for the purpoſe of diſſeminating principles of wiſdom and virtue. It was for this reaſon that the celebrated legiſlators, Lycurgus and Solon, encouraged theſe public recitals, and that, in many cities, ſtatues of Homer were erected, and divine honours were paid to his memory.

Without detailing the extravagant encomiums paſſed upon Homer by ſome of his panegyriſts, who have ſuppoſed him a perfect maſter of ſciences and arts, and called him the prince of philoſophers; and, without adopting the fanciful notion of Juſtin Martyr, who ſuppoſed, that Homer borrowed many things from Moſes, and found, in his poems, the creation of the world, the tower of Babel, and the devils caſt out of heaven, it muſt be allowed that he poſſeſſed as much knowledge as was to be expected from an individual at the period in which he lived. But his works were written merely as a diſplay of poetical genius, without any deſign of delivering precepts of religion, philoſophy, or the arts, farther than as they incidentally aroſe from his ſubject. Nothing therefore can be more abſurd, than the attempts of ſome critics, who have poſſeſſed more learning and ſcience than taſte, to reſt the merit of Homer upon the extent of his knowledge. An antient encomiaſt[b] upon Homer, proves him to have poſſeſſed a perfect knowledge of nature, and to have been the author of the doctrine of Thales and Xenophanes, that water is the firſt principle of all things, from his having called Oceanus the parent of nature; and infers, that he was acquainted with Empedocles' doctrine of friendſhip and diſcord, from the viſit which Juno pays to Oceanus and Thetis to ſettle their diſpute: becauſe Homer repreſents Neptune as ſhaking the earth, he concludes him to have been well acquainted with the cauſes of earthquakes; and becauſe he ſpeaks of the Great Bear as never touching the horizon, he makes him an eminent aſtronomer.

The truth is, the knowledge of nature, which poetry deſcribes, is

[a] Suidas. Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. 12. c. 48. Cuperi Diſſ. Hom. Amſt. 1683.
[b] Galæi Opuſc. Mythol. p. 283.

very

very different from that which belongs to the philoſopher. It would be eaſy to prove, from the beautiful ſimiles of Homer, that he was an accurate obſerver of natural appearances; and to ſhow from his delineation of characters, that he was intimately acquainted with human nature. But he is not, on this account, to be ranked with natural philoſophers or moraliſts. Much pains have been taken to prove, that Homer expreſſes juſt and ſublime conceptions of the divine nature. And it will be acknowledged, that in ſome paſſages, he ſpeaks of Jupiter in language which may not improperly be applied to the Supreme Deity. But, if the whole fable of Jupiter, as it is repreſented in Homer, be fairly examined, it will be very evident, either that he had not juſt conceptions of the divine nature, or that he did not mean to expreſs them in the portrait which he has drawn of the ſon of Saturn, the huſband of Juno, and the preſident of the council of Olympus. It would ſurely have been too great a monopoly of perfection, if the firſt poet in the world had alſo been the firſt philoſopher *.

* Videnda. Burnet. Arch. l. i. c. 9. Cudworth, c. iv. § 14. Budd. Ann. Phil. Diſſ. ii. Eſchenbach, in Epigeni de Poeſi Orph. H. Steph. Poeſ. Phil. Fragm. Huet. Dem. p. iv. c. 8. Nat. Com. l. iv. c. 6. Rhodigen. Lect. vii. Steuchus Eugbin. de Peren. Phil. l. ix. Bochart. G. Sac. p. i. l. i. c. 2. Buddæi Obſ. Hal. t. vi. Obſ. 29. Borrich. de Poet. Diſſ. Lambec. Prod. p. 168. Naudæi Apolog. c. 9. Potter. Arch. Gr. l. ii. p. 246. Malala Hiſt. Chron. p. 88. Baſnage Hiſt. des Juifs. t. iv. c. 4. Warb. Div. Leg. l. ii. § 4. Petit. Obſ. Miſc. c. xii. Clerici Hiſt. Med. p. i. l. ii. Cuper. de Conſecr. Homeri, Amſt. 1683. Kuſter. Hom. Hiſt. Cr. 1696. Dodwel de Cyclis Græc. Diſſ. 3. Le Clerc. Bib. Choiſ. t. xxii. p. 244. Stollii Diſſ. de Hom. Rechenberg de Theol. Hom. Lips. 1679.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.

IN what manner poetry, muſic, and fable, were employed for the purpoſes of civilization, at the period when Greece was firſt peopled, has been already ſhewn.

One principal end of the religious rites and myſteries, which the firſt founders of the Grecian ſtates introduced, was, unqueſtionably, the ſupport of civil authority: and the management of the affairs of religion, and of thoſe of government, were, at firſt, in the ſame hands. But afterwards, in the more ſettled ſtate of ſociety, religion was ſo far ſeparated from policy, that its doctrines and ceremonies were committed to the charge of prieſts; and the inſtitution of laws, and the regulation of manners, were entruſted to men, whoſe ſuperior wiſdom and public ſpirit qualified them for the offices of legiſlation and magiſtracy. Thoſe who, at this period, took the charge of public affairs, ſerved their country not only by inſtituting wiſe and ſalutary laws, but by exhibiting an example of virtuous manners, and by inculcating, in their daily converſation, uſeful maxims and precepts of morals. On theſe accounts they obtained the appellation of Wiſe Men. In treating of the philoſophy of this period, which may properly be called the Political Philoſophy of Greece, we are, then, to conſider, not the refined ſpeculations of contemplative minds, but the practical wiſdom of men employed in active life.

Among the numerous legiſlators of *Greece* (under which appellation is included, on account of the Grecian colonies that ſettled there, the eaſtern ſide of Italy, ſince called *Magna Grecia*) one of thoſe, who firſt diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their wiſdom and authority, was ZALEUCUS, the founder of the Locrian ſtate. He was of obſcure birth, and, in his youth, lived in ſervitude, in the capacity of

of a ſhepherd. But his extraordinary abilities and merit obtained him his freedom, and, at length, raiſed him to the government. The laws which he framed were ſevere; but they were ſo well adapted to the ſituation and manners of the Locrians, that their conſtitution was, for ſeveral ages, highly celebrated[a]. So rigorous was the diſcipline of Zaleucus, that he prohibited the uſe of wine, except in caſes where it was preſcribed as a medicine, and ordained, that adulterers ſhould be puniſhed with the loſs of their eyes[b]. When his own ſon had ſubjected himſelf to this penalty, in order at the ſame time to preſerve the authority of the laws, and ſhew ſome degree of paternal lenity, he ſhared the puniſhment with the offender, and, that he might only be deprived of one eye, ſubmitted to loſe one of his own[c].

The firſt legiſlator of Athens was TRIPTOLOMUS, who pretended to have received his laws from Ceres. Theſe becoming obſolete, or being found inſufficient for the regulation of the ſtate, DRACO, about the thirty-ninth Olympiad, inſtituted a new code of laws, ſo exceedingly rigorous, that they were ſaid to have been written with blood[d]. The ſeverity of this diſcipline was afterwards, in ſome meaſure, relaxed by SOLON, who, in the forty-ſixth Olympiad, on the baſis of the Egyptian and Cretan laws, framed an intirely new conſtitution, to which Athens was principally indebted for its ſubſequent glory[e].

The republic of Sparta was eſtabliſhed, about the beginning of the Olympiads, by the celebrated legiſlator LYCURGUS. His inſtitutions were chiefly adapted to cheriſh thoſe hardy virtues, which form the military character. He committed no laws to writing, but iſſued them forth, as the edicts of Apollo, from the oracle at Delphos, to be committed to memory, and to be carried

[a] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 309. Suidas. Valer. Max. l. ii. & vi. 259. Diod. Sic. l. xii. p. 84. Laert. l. viii. § 16. Senec. Ep. 90. Strabo, l. vi. p. 259.

[b] Athenæus, l. x. p. 429. Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. ii. c. 37.

[c] Ib. c. 24. Stobæi Serm. 39.

[d] Porphyr. de Abſtin. l. iv. p. 431. Plutarch in Solon. Ariſtot. Polit. l. ii. c. 10. Rhet. l. ii. c. 23.

[e] Plut. & Laert. Solon. Fabr. B. Gr. v. i. p. 528.

into

into execution by the regal power; a device, which not only ſerved to eſtabliſh their authority, but gave the magiſtrate an eaſy opportunity of making ſuch future alterations or additions, as the ſtate of public affairs might require. The laws of Lycurgus were delivered in verſe, accompanied with muſic, by Thales the Cretan, Tyrtæus, Terpander, and others[a].

Both Solon and Lycurgus derived great aſſiſtance, in their political inſtitutions, from the laws of Crete, which were inſtituted by Rhadamanthus and Minos, two illuſtrious legiſlators, who pretended to have received their laws from Jupiter. Near the chief city of Crete were the caverns of Ida, ſacred to Jove and other divinities, where the Cretan lawgivers and prieſts were ſuppoſed to receive inſtructions from the gods[b].

Next to the early legiſlators of Greece, the praiſe of civil and moral wiſdom is aſcribed to ſeveral eminent men, commonly known by the name of the SEVEN WISE MEN of Greece. Their hiſtory, which was, probably, at firſt, plain and ſimple, has been rendered obſcure and uncertain by traditionary reports. The incident which firſt gave occaſion to the appellation is thus related.

In the third year of the forty-ninth Olympiad, it happened that certain youths of Ionia, purchaſing from a fiſherman of Miletus a large draught of fiſh, which he had brought to ſhore, found in the net a golden tripod of great value. Upon this, a diſpute aroſe between the fiſherman and the purchaſers; the former maintaining, that he had only ſold them the capture of fiſh, the latter aſſerting that they had bought the chance of the draught, whatever it might be. The queſtion was referred to the citizens of Miletus, who were of opinion, that on ſo extraordinary an affair the Delphic oracle ſhould be conſulted. The anſwer of the oracle was, *To the Wiſeſt.* In obedience to this anſwer, the Mileſians unanimouſly adjudged the tripod to Thales. Thales modeſtly declined the honour intend-

[a] Plutarch. Lycurg. Strabo, l. x. p. 480. Diod. Sic. l. i. p. 48. Libanius, t. ii. p. 497. Polyæn. Strat. l. i. p. 16. Herod. l. vi. c. 57. Plato de Leg. l. i. Ariſt. Pol. l. ii. c. 7. Juſt. ex Trog. l. iii. c. 2. Bayle.

[b] Strabo, l. x. p. 467.

ed

ed him by his fellow citizens, and ſent the tripod to Bias, a wiſe-man of Priene: from him it was paſſed on through ſeveral hands till it came to Solon, the Athenian legiſlator, who, judging that the character of THE WISEST could not properly belong to any human being, ſent the prize of wiſdom to Delphos, to be dedicated to Apollo[a].

An air of fable hangs upon this ſtory; and its circumſtances are differently related by different writers. It is more probable, that, in ſome public aſſembly, a tripod was propoſed as an honorary prize to the man who ſhould recite, in verſe[b], the moſt excellent maxims of political and moral wiſdom, and that the ſages, who engaged in this generous conteſt, afterwards agreed to dedicate the prize to Apollo. This conjecture is confirmed by a paſſage in Plato's Protagoras, which relates, that the wiſe men of this period, who employed themſelves in framing conciſe precepts and maxims for the conduct of life, ſometimes met together, and agreed to ſend ſuch ſentences as were thought moſt valuable to Delphos, to be inſcribed in the temple. It was perhaps owing to this circumſtance, that Apollo is ſaid by the antients to have been the author of the precept, KNOW THYSELF.

—— E cælo deſcendit, Γνῶθι σεαυτόν[c]. *

Trivial as the kind of merit, upon which the immortal fame of theſe ſages has been raiſed, may at preſent appear, it is eaſy to conceive, that in the infancy of civilization, when there were few writings and little knowledge, and when the reaſonings of ſyſtematic philoſophy were ſcarcely known, juſt obſervations on life and manners, uſeful precepts of morals, ſmart repartees, and ingenious ſolutions of perplexing queſtions, expreſſed in conciſe language, and often in verſe, might become real grounds of celebrity. Plain

[a] Laert. l. i. § 22—29. Val. Max. l. i. § 28. viii. § 1. Athæn. l. ii. p. 37. Plut. in Solon.

[b] Laert. l. i. § 35, 61, 68. Athæn. l. xv. p. 678. Aul. Gell. l. xvii. c. 4.

[c] Juv. l. xi. v. 27.

* From heav'n the precept, Know thyſelf, was ſent.

good ſenſe, and practical wiſdom, had not then been taught to give way to uſeleſs ſubtleties [a].

The names, commonly included under the appellation of the ſeven wiſe men of Greece, are, Thales, Solon, Chilo, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, and Periander. Thales, having attempted to unite ſpeculative ſcience with practical wiſdom, will be entitled to particular notice, as one of the fathers of the Grecian philoſophy, in our ſubſequent hiſtory of the Ionic ſect. Of the reſt, we ſhall here relate the moſt intereſting particulars which remain, as far as reſpects the ſubject of philoſophy.

Solon [b] was born at Salamis, of Athenian parents, who were deſcended from Codrus. His father leaving little patrimony, he had recourſe to merchandiſe for his ſubſiſtence. He had, however, a greater thirſt after knowledge and fame, than after riches, and made his mercantile voyages ſubſervient to the increaſe of his intellectual treaſures. He very early cultivated the art of poetry, and applied himſelf to the ſtudy of moral and civil wiſdom. When the Athenians, tired out with a long and troubleſome war with the Megarenſians, for the recovery of the iſle of Salamis, prohibited any one, under pain of death, to propoſe the renewal of their claim to that iſland, Solon, thinking the prohibition diſhonourable to the ſtate, and finding many of the younger citizens deſirous to revive the war, feigned himſelf mad, and took care to have the report of his inſanity ſpread through the city. In the mean time, he compoſed an elegy, adapted to the ſtate of public affairs, which he committed to memory. Every thing being thus prepared, he ſallied forth into the market place, with the kind of cap on his head which was commonly worn by ſick perſons, and, aſcending the herald's ſtand, he delivered, to a numerous crowd, his lamentation for the deſertion of Salamis. The verſes were heard with general applauſe; and Piſiſtratus ſeconded his advice, and urged the people to renew the war. The decree was im-

[a] Cic. de Amic. c. 3. Laert. l. i. § 40.

[b] Plut. in Solon. Laert. l. i. § 45, &c. Max. Tyr. Diſſ. 39. Aul. Gell. l. ii. c. 12. Pauſan. Att. c. 16. Ælian. l. xiii. c. 16.

mediately repealed; the claim to Salamis was reſumed; and the conduct of the war was committed to Solon and Piſiſtratus, who, by means of a ſtratagem, defeated the Megarenſians, and recovered Salamis.[a]

The popularity which Solon acquired by this tranſaction at Athens, was afterwards extended through Greece, in conſequence of a ſucceſsful alliance which he formed among the ſtates, in defence of the temple at Delphos, againſt the Cirrhæans.

At length, when diſſentions in Athens between the rich creditors and their poor debtors had riſen to a dangerous height, and ſeemed to threaten general confuſion, ſo that it became neceſſary to intruſt ſome man of approved integrity and ability with full authority to attempt the cure of theſe public diſorders, Solon was, by unanimous conſent, honoured with this important charge, and, in the third year of the forty-ſixth Olympiad[a], was created Archon, with the united powers of ſupreme legiſlator and magiſtrate. He executed his commiſſion with ſo much wiſdom and firmneſs, that he not only reſtored harmony between the rich and the poor, but brought the ſtate, which had relaxed from its antient diſcipline, under the reſtriction of new inſtitutions. He cancelled the debts which had proved the occaſion of ſo much oppreſſion; and ordained that, in future, no creditor ſhould be allowed to ſeize the body of the debtor for his ſecurity. He made a new diſtribution of the people, inſtituted new courts of judicature, and framed a judicious code of laws, which afterwards became the baſis of the laws of the twelve tables in Rome[b]. The fame, which Solon acquired by this eſtabliſhment, reached the moſt diſtant parts of the world, and, as we have ſeen, brought Anacharſis and Toxaris from Scythia to become acquainted with his wiſdom.

At the opening of this new plan of government, Solon was every day viſited by perſons, who were deſirous, either to propoſe queſtions concerning the meaning and application of his laws, or to ſuggeſt farther corrections and improvements. Finding theſe

[a] B. C. 594. [b] Liv. l. iii. c. 31.

importunities troubleſome, he determined to make his eſcape from the difficult ſituation in which he was placed, and to leave his laws to their own natural operation. For this purpoſe he obtained permiſſion from the ſtate to travel. His firſt voyage was to Egypt. Here he became acquainted with ſeveral of the more eminent prieſts of Heliopolis and Sais, by whom he was inſtructed in the Egyptian philoſophy. One of his preceptors, boaſting of the antiquity of the Egyptian wiſdom, ſaid to him, "Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children; you have not an old man among you." From Egypt he ſailed to Cyprus, where he formed an intimate friendſhip with Philocyprus, one of the princes of the iſland, and aſſiſted him in founding a new city.

It is alſo related, that he viſited Crœſus, king of Lydia, and that, during the interview, the following intereſting converſation paſſed between them. Crœſus, after entertaining his gueſt with great ſplendor, and making an oſtentatious diſplay of the magnificence of his palace, deſirous to extort from Solon expreſſions of admiration which he did not ſeem inclined to beſtow, aſked him, whom, of all mankind, he eſteemed moſt happy? Solon anſwered, "Tellus, the Athenian." Crœſus, ſurprized that Solon ſhould name any other man in preference to himſelf, requeſted to be informed of the grounds of this judgment. "Tellus," replied Solon, "was deſcended from worthy parents, was the father of virtuous children, whom every one reſpected, and, at laſt, fell in an engagement in which, before he expired, he ſaw his country victorious." Crœſus, flattering himſelf that he ſhould at leaſt obtain the ſecond place, in Solon's judgment, among the fortunate, inquired, whom, next to Tellus, he thought moſt happy? Solon, in return, ſaid, two youths of Argos, Cleobis and Biton, who while they lived were univerſally admired for their fraternal affection to each other, and for their dutiful behaviour to their mother; and who, after they had given an illuſtrious example of filial piety, expired without ſorrow or pain. Crœſus, mortified to find the condition of a private citizen of Athens or Argos preferred to his own, could no longer refrain from aſking Solon, whether he meant wholly to exclude him from the number of the happy?

happy? Solon's reply is a memorable proof of his wiſdom: "The events of future life are uncertain; he who has hitherto been proſperous may be unfortunate to-morrow: let no man therefore be pronounced happy before his death." This obſervation made ſo deep an impreſſion upon the mind of Crœſus, that when afterwards, experiencing a reverſe of fortune, he became a priſoner to Cyrus, and was brought forth to be put to death, he cried out, "O Solon! Solon!" Cyrus inquiring into the meaning of the exclamation, Crœſus informed him of what had formerly paſſed between himſelf and Solon. The conſequence was, that Cyrus, ſtruck with the wiſdom of Solon's remark, ſet Crœſus at liberty, and treated him with all the reſpect due to his former greatneſs.—The ſtory is attended with ſome chronological difficulties; but it is ſo conſonant to the character of Solon, and ſo admirable an example of the moral wiſdom of theſe times, that we could not perſuade ourſelves to reject it.

Solon died in the iſland of Cyprus, about the eightieth year of his age. Statues were erected to his memory, both at Athens and Salamis. His thirſt after knowledge continued to the laſt: "I grow old," ſaid he, "learning many things." Among the apothegms and precepts which have been aſcribed to Solon, are the following:

Laws are like cobwebs, that entangle the weak, but are broken through by the ſtrong. He who has learned to obey, will know how to command. In all things let reaſon be your guide. Diligently contemplate excellent things. In every thing that you do, CONSIDER THE END[a].

CHILO, one of the Lacedemonian Ephori, was celebrated both for his probity, and his penetration. He executed the offices of magiſtracy with ſo much uprightneſs, that in his old age, he ſaid, that he recollected nothing in his public conduct which gave him regret, except that, in one inſtance, he had endeavoured to ſcreen a friend from puniſhment That kind of ſagacity, which enables a

[a] Plutarch in Solon. Laert. l. i. § 45. Val. Max. l. viii. c. 1. Demoſthen. de falſa Leg. Pauſan. Attic. Ælian. l. vii. c. 9. Aul. Gell. l. ii. c. 12. Herod. l. i. c. 86.

man,

man, from the contemplation of preſent circumſtances and events, to predict what will happen in future, he eſteemed the higheſt attainment of wiſdom. He lived to a great age, and, at laſt, expired, through exceſs of joy, in the arms of his ſon, when he returned victorious from the Olympic games. The moſt valuable of his precepts and maxims are theſe:

Three things are difficult; to keep a ſecret; to bear an injury patiently; and to ſpend leiſure well. Viſit your friend in misfortune, rather than in proſperity. Never ridicule the unfortunate. Think before you ſpeak. Do not deſire impoſſibilities. Gold is tried by the touchſtone, and men are tried by gold. Honeſt loſs is preferable to ſhameful gain; for, by the one, a man is a ſufferer but once; by the other, always. In converſation make uſe of no violent motion of the hands; in walking, do not appear to be always upon buſineſs of life or death; for rapid movements indicate a kind of phrenzy. If you are great, be condeſcending; for it is better to be loved than to be feared. Speak no evil of the dead. Reverence the aged. KNOW THYSELF.[a]

Chilo, according to Laertius, was an old man in the fifty-ſecond Olympiad[b].

PITTACUS, of Mytelene in Leſbos, was born in the thirty-ſecond Olympiad[c]. Having obtained popularity among his countrymen, by ſucceſsfully oppoſing the tyrant Melancher, he was entruſted with the command of a fleet, in a war with the Athenians, concerning ſome territory which they had ſeized in the iſland. In the courſe of this war, he challenged the Athenian commander, Phryno, a man of uncommon ſize and ſtrength, to ſingle combat. Providing himſelf with a net, which he concealed under his buckler, he took the firſt opportunity, during the encounter, to throw it over the head of his antagoniſt, and by this means gained an eaſy victory. From that time he was held in high eſteem among the Mytelenians, and entruſted with ſupreme power in the ſtate. Among other valuable preſents, his countrymen offered him as much of the lands, which

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 68—74. Aul. Gell. l. i. c. 3. Herodot. l. i. p. 44. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. vii. § 32. [b] B. C. 570. [c] B. C. 650.

had

had been recovered from the Athenians, as he choſe; but he only accepted of ſo much as he could meaſure by a ſingle caſt of a javelin: and one half of this ſmall portion he afterwards dedicated to Apollo, ſaying concerning the remainder, that the half was better than the whole[a]. He ſhewed great moderation in his treatment of his enemies, among whom one of the moſt violent was the poet Alcæus, who frequently made Pittacus the object of his ſatire. Finding it neceſſary to lay ſevere reſtrictions upon drunkenneſs, to which the Leſbians were particularly addicted, Pittacus paſſed a law, which ſubjected offenders of this claſs to double puniſhment, for any crime committed in a ſtate of intoxication. When he had eſtabliſhed ſuch regulations in the iſland, as promiſed to ſecure its peace and proſperity, he voluntarily reſigned his power, and retired into private life. The following maxims and precepts are aſcribed to Pittacus:

The firſt office of prudence is to foreſee threatening misfortunes, and prevent them. Power diſcovers the man. Never talk of your ſchemes before they are executed; leſt, if you fail to accompliſh them, you be expoſed to the double mortification of diſappointment and ridicule. Whatever you do, do it well. Do not that to your neighbour, which you would take ill from him. BE WATCHFUL FOR OPPORTUNITIES[b].

BIAS, of Priene in Ionia, acquired the name and honours of a wiſe man, chiefly by his generoſity and public ſpirit, which endeared him to his countrymen. Several young female captives from Meſſene having been brought to Priene, Bias redeemed them, and educated them as his own daughters; after which he reſtored them, with a dowry, to their parents. He ſet a much greater value upon the treaſures of the mind, than upon the gifts of fortune. During an invaſion, whilſt every one about him was collecting his moſt valuable effects, and preparing for flight, one of his friends, obſerving

[a] Heſiod. Op. v. 40.

[b] Laert. l. i. § 74—8. Herod. l. v. Plut. Conviv. Sap. Strabo, l. xiii. p. 599. Val. Max. l. vi. c. 5. L. iv. c. i. Ælian, l. vii. c. 4. Suidas. Stobæus. Ser. iii.

with

with ſurprize that he took no pains to preſerve any thing, aſked him the reaſon: Bias replied, "I carry all my treaſures with me." The following are ſome of the remains of his ſententious wiſdom:

It is a proof of a weak and diſordered mind to deſire impoſſibilities. The greateſt infelicity is, not to be able to endure misfortunes patiently. Great minds alone can ſupport a ſudden reverſe of fortune. The moſt pleaſant ſtate is, to be always gaining. Be not unmindful of the miſeries of others. If you are handſome, do handſome things; if deformed, ſupply the defects of nature by your virtues. Be ſlow in undertaking, but reſolute in executing. Praiſe not a worthleſs man for the ſake of his wealth. Whatever good you do, aſcribe it to the gods. Lay in wiſdom as the ſtore for your journey from youth to old age, for it is the moſt certain poſſeſſion. Many men are diſhoneſt; therefore LOVE YOUR FRIEND WITH CAUTION, FOR HE MAY HEREAFTER BECOME YOUR ENEMY[a].

CLEOBULUS, of Lindus in Rhodes, excelled all his contemporaries in bodily ſtrength and beauty. He viſited Egypt, in purſuit of wiſdom. Here he acquired great ſkill in the ſolution of enigmas and obſcure queſtions; and it was for this that he was chiefly famous. His prudential maxims were:

Be kind to your friends, that they may continue ſuch, and to your enemies, that they may become your friends. Happy is the family, where the maſter is more loved than feared. When you go abroad, conſider what you have to do; when you return home, what you have done. Marry among your equals, that you may not become a ſlave to your wife's relations. Be more deſirous to hear, than to ſpeak. AVOID EXCESS[b].

Of the ſeven wiſe men of Greece, the laſt which remains to be mentioned is PERIANDER, of Corinth. He gave great offence to his indolent and luxurious countrymen by the rigour of his diſcipline, and rendered himſelf obnoxious to the other Greek ſtates by changing the form of government in Corinth from an

[a] Laert. l. i. 82. Val. Max. l. iii. c. 3. vii. 2. Aul. Gell. l. v. c. 11. Cic. de Amicit. c. 60. Plut. Conv. vii. Ariſtot. Rhet. l. ii. c. 13. Stobæus. Serm. 28.

[b] Laert. l. i. § 89. Athen. l. x. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. iv. p. 523.

ariſtocracy

ariſtocracy to a tyranny, or monarchy. Hence there is reaſon to ſuſpect the accounts, which are given of this prince by Greek writers, of exaggeration and falſehood. It is acknowledged even by thoſe who have moſt ſeverely cenſured him, that his political inſtitutions were juſt and uſeful, and that he was fond of the ſociety of wiſe and good men. The inſcription upon his tomb at Corinth, preſerved by Laertius, proves that his countrymen, after his death, honoured him as a wiſe and able ruler. Although he had, probably, no ſhare in the conteſt for the tripod which was to be given to *The Wiſeſt*, there ſeems then no reaſon for excluding him from the place, which has been allotted him by tradition among the wiſe men of Greece. His political and moral wiſdom, and his poetical talents, were ſufficient, at that time, to entitle him to this honourable diſtinction. Among the moral ſentences aſcribed to Periander are the following:

Let the prince, who would reign ſecurely, truſt rather to the affection of his ſubjects, than to the force of arms. Pleaſure is precarious, but virtue is immortal. Conceal your misfortunes. Study to be worthy of your parents. THERE IS NOTHING WHICH PRUDENCE CANNOT ACCOMPLISH[a]. Periander died in the fourth year of the forty-eighth Olympiad [b], aged eighty years.

Although hiſtorians have generally agreed to give theſe ſages the appellation of the Seven Wiſe Men of Greece, we are not to ſuppoſe, that there were not at this period many others, equal in merit, and perhaps not inferior in fame. Among theſe we muſt not omit to mention a ſage,

Et pueris notum, et qui nondum ære lavantur[c].

ESOP, the celebrated fabuliſt, was probably by birth a Phrygian. It is related, that he was brought as a ſlave to Athens, where, under his maſter Dimarchus, he cultivated his genius, as far as the diſadvantages of his ſervile condition would permit; that he afterwards paſſed into the poſſeſſion of Rhodope, a celebrated

[a] Laert. i. § 98. Ælian. l. xii. c. 35. Plut. Conviv. Herodot. l. i. p. 3. l. v. p. 202. Plato in Protagoram. Heraclides de Politiis, p. 17. Stobæi Serm. xxviii.

[b] B. C. 585.

[c] Well known to boys, and all the infant train.

courtezan, who gave him his liberty; that, upon this, he reviſited Athens, and travelled from Greece into Egypt and Aſia; and that, being ſent by Crœſus to Delphos, with a magnificent preſent of gold to Apollo, the Delphians quarrelled with him, and put him to death [a]. But theſe relations are obſcured by ſo many chronological inconſiſtencies, that they deſerve little credit. Even Herodotus ſpeaks of idle ſtories, which had in his time been circulated concerning Eſop. It is probable that the particulars, which Plutarch relates of him, were gathered up from vague rumour, and were inſerted, in his Converſation of the Seven Wiſe Men of Greece, to fill up an amuſing narrative, without a ſtrict regard to hiſtorical truth or the laws of probability. In the fourteenth century, a monk, named Palanudes, wrote a life of Eſop; but his relation is unſupported by authorities, and has every internal mark of fiction. We can therefore aſſert nothing farther concerning Eſop, than that he was the author of many moral apologues, which were the foundation of that collection of fables, which, under his name, has, for ſo many ages, afforded entertainment and inſtruction to children.

Beſides the teachers of moral wiſdom already enumerated, there were not wanting, at this period, others, who employed the art of poetry in the ſervice of wiſdom and virtue. To this claſs may be referred moſt of the Greek poets of theſe early times, and eſpecially the tragedians, who every where inculcate the pureſt principles of morality, and the preceptive poets, THEOGNIS of Megara, and PHOCYLIDES of Miletus, whoſe works, if the verſes which now bear their name be in any part genuine, have certainly undergone much corruption and interpolation [b]. Both Phocylides and Theognis flouriſhed about the fifty-eighth Olympiad *.

[a] Herodot. l. ii. c. 134. Max. Tyr. Diſſ. 20. 28. Plutarch. Conv. Sept. et De Sera Num. Vind. Ælian. l. x. c. 5. xi. 5. Phædr. Fab. l. iii. Prol. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. v. i. p. 389. x. 533.

[b] Fabric. Bibl. Gr. v. i. p. 432, 439. Suidas.

* Videnda. Dufreſne Epiſt. de Effig. Charond. Par. 1658. Spanhem. de Uſu Numiſm. t. i. Diſſ. 7. Heuman. Act. Phil. v. ii. p. 494. Jonſius de Script. Hiſt. Phil. l. i. c. 8, 16. Voſſ. de Poet. Gr. c. 3. Budd. Sap. Vet. Meurſ. in Solon. Potter. Arch. Gr. l. i. c. 4. Vavaſor Exerc. de Diction. Ludic. Op. p. 4. Mezeriaci Vit. Eſop. Burgis. 1630. apud Mem. de Lit. t. i. p. 90. et apud Æſopi Fab. Oxon. 1716. Bayle.

CHAP. III.

OF THE IONIC SECT.

HITHERTO we have ſeen philoſophy in its ſtate of infancy and childhood. We are now to obſerve its progreſs in that more advanced age, in which it paſſed from traditionary opinion, and ſententious wiſdom, to more accurate ſpeculations and reaſonings.

The Greeks, always an ingenious and penetrating people, very early diſcovered a fondneſs for ſyſtematic philoſophy. Two eminent philoſophers aroſe among them, about the ſame period, who may be conſidered as the fountains from which philoſophy flowed, not only through Greece, but through all other countries in which the Greek language was ſpoken. Theſe gave riſe to diſtinct claſſes of philoſophers, who, becauſe they *followed* the tenets, and the method of philoſophiſing, which had been received by ſome one maſter, and rejected all others, have been uſually denominated SECTS. One of theſe fathers of the SECTARIAN PHILOSOPHY was THALES, whom we have already ranked among the ſeven wiſe men of Greece. He began to philoſophiſe at Miletus in Ionia; and from his ſchool ſprung not only the Ionic ſect, but Socrates and his diſciples, from whom aroſe the ſeveral ſects of Academics, Cyrenaics, Eriſtics, Peripatetics, Cynics, and Stoics. The other was PYTHAGORAS the Samian, who not only founded the Pythagorean ſchool in Magna Grecia, but gave occaſion to the inſtitution of ſeveral other ſects, particularly the Eleatic, the Heraclitic, the Epicurean, and the Pyrrhonic. The ſect founded by Thales, with all its branches, is called the IONIC School: the ſects immediately or more remotely derived from Pythagoras are called the ITALIC School[a]. In treating of the Sectarian philoſophy of Greece, we

[a] Laert. l. i. § 13.

ſhall trace the riſe and progreſs of each of theſe ſchools, beginning with the Ionic.

The antients are generally agreed, in aſcribing the firſt introduction of a ſcientific method of philoſophiſing among the Greeks to Thales[a].

THALES was born at Miletus, in the firſt year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad. He was deſcended from Phenician parents, who had left their country, and ſettled at Miletus[b]. The wealth which he inherited, and his own ſuperior abilities, raiſed him to diſtinction among his countrymen, ſo that he was early employed in public affairs. He choſe to continue in a ſtate of celibacy, that he might avoid parental anxieties, and that he might be the more at liberty to apply himſelf to the ſtudy of philoſophy. So great was his love of ſcience, that he very ſoon reſigned every other occupation, and devoted himſelf to learning. He travelled to Crete, and afterwards to Egypt, in ſearch of wiſdom. Several writers affirm, that he was indebted for all his knowledge of philoſophy and mathematics to the prieſts of Memphis. But it is probable, that he was more indebted to his own ingenuity, than to their inſtructions: for, whilſt he was among them, he taught them, to their great aſtoniſhment, how to meaſure the height of their pyramids[c]. It cannot be ſuppoſed that Thales could acquire much mathematical knowledge, from a people unable to ſolve this eaſy problem. Returning to Miletus with a high degree of reputation for wiſdom and learning, Thales became an object of general attention among his countrymen, and his acquaintance was ſolicited by all who were deſirous of improving in knowledge, or ambitious of being ranked among philoſophers. Theſe engagements did not, however, hinder him from proſecuting his mathematical, aſtronomical, and metaphyſical ſtudies. And, though his attainments may be thought inconſiderable when they are compared with thoſe of later times, it ſhould be remembered, that the firſt truths in ſcience are the moſt important, and that great praiſe is due to thoſe who diſcovered them. With ſo much ardour

[a] Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 3. Strabo, l. xiv. p. 635. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 10. Apul. Florid. l. iv. p. 368. ed Scriv.

[b] Laert. l. i. § 21, &c. [c] Laert. Plut. l. c.

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did Thales devote himſelf to ſcience, that, in order to become free from every avocation, he gave up the care of his eſtate to his nephew. His cloſe attention to his ſtudies, and his acquaintance with nature, have given occaſion to ſeveral tales which deſerve little credit, among which may be reckoned the ſtory of his falling into a pit while he was gazing at the ſtars. He lived to the great age of ninety years, and died, through mere infirmity, whilſt he was attending the Olympic games [a].

Thales was not only famous for his knowledge of nature and his mathematical learning, but for his moral and political wiſdom. Many ingenious aphoriſms and precepts are aſcribed to him, of which the following are a ſpecimen:

Neither the crimes, nor the thoughts, of bad men are concealed from the gods. Health of body, a competent fortune, and a cultivated mind, are the chief ſources of happineſs. Parents may expect from their children that obedience, which they themſelves paid to their parents. Take more pains to correct the blemiſhes of the mind, than thoſe of the face. Stop the mouth of ſlander, by prudence. Be careful not to do that yourſelf, which you blame in another [b].

Neither Thales, nor any of his ſucceſſors in the firſt Ionic ſchool, have left any written records of their doctrine. For information upon this ſubject we are, therefore, obliged to have recourſe to later philoſophers. Our beſt authorities are Plato and Ariſtotle: but the former diſtorted the ſyſtems of his predeceſſors, in order to bend them to his own; and the latter gave an imperfect and obſcure account of antient opinions, that thoſe which he himſelf taught might appear the more valuable and original. The accounts given of this ſchool by Laertius, Plutarch, and other later writers [c], are too mo-

[a] Laert. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 3. & Solon. Platon. Theat. Pauſanias in Phocicis, c. 5. Ariſt. Pol. l. i. c. 11. Plin. Hiſt. N. xviii. 20. Cyrill. contr. Jul. l. i. p. 15.

[b] Laert. Stobæi Serm. 203. Auſon. p. 112.

[c] Vid. Burnet. Arch. Ph. l. i. c. 10. Morhoff. Polyh. l. ii. c. 20. Scipio Aquilianus de Plac. Phyſ. Vet. Phil. ante Ariſt. Venet. 1620. 4to.

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dern to deſerve implicit credit. We cannot therefore preſume to ſpeak with certainty concerning the opinions of Thales. The following account of his doctrine, is the reſult of a diligent compariſon of the repreſentations given by various antient writers.

Thales held, that the firſt principle of natural bodies, or the firſt ſimple ſubſtance from which all things in this world are formed, is water[a]. By this he could not mean to aſſert, that water is the efficient cauſe of the formation of bodies, but merely, that this is the element from which they are produced. It is probable, that by the term *Water* Thales meant to expreſs the ſame idea which the coſmogoniſts expreſſed by the word Chaos, the notion annexed to which was, as we have ſhewn, a turbid and muddy maſs, from which all things were produced. Concerning the grounds of his opinion we have no ſatisfactory information. The reaſons which have been given, ſuch as that all animals and plants are produced and ſupported by moiſture, and the ſun and other celeſtial fires are nouriſhed by vapours[b], are mere conjectures, which were perhaps never thought of by Thales.

It has been a ſubject of much debate, whether Thales, beſides the paſſive principle in nature, which he called Water, admitted an intelligent, efficient cauſe. They who have maintained the affirmative have reſted their opinion upon ſundry aphoriſms concerning God, which are aſcribed by antient writers to this philoſopher, particularly the following[c]: that God is the moſt antient being, who has neither beginning nor end; that all things are full of God; and that the world is the beautiful work of God. They alſo lay great ſtreſs upon the teſtimony of Cicero[d], who ſays, that Thales taught, that water is the firſt principle of all things, and that God is that mind which formed all things out of water. They who are of the contrary opinion[e] urge, that the antients (and among theſe Cicero him-

[a] Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 3. Laert. l. i. § 27. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 7. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 10.

[b] Laert. Plut. Ariſt. l. c. Senec. Queſt. Nat. l. vi. c. 6.

[c] Laert. l. i. § 35. Plut. Plac. Ph. l. ii. c. 1. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 594

[d] Nat. Deor. l. c.

[e] J. Thomas's Obſ. Hal. Lat. t. ii. Obſ. 21. Bayle.

ſelf,

ſelf, though not very conſiſtently) aſcribe to Anaxagoras the honour of having firſt repreſented God as the intelligent cauſe of the univerſe; and add, that the evidence in favour of Thales reſts only upon traditional teſtimony, which may be oppoſed by other authorities[a]. Perhaps the truth is this; that Thales, though he did not expreſsly maintain an independent mind as the efficient cauſe of nature, admitted the antient doctrine concerning God, as the animating principle or ſoul of the world. This ſuppoſition perfectly agrees with the language aſcribed to him concerning the deity, particularly that the world is animated, ἔμψυχον[b]; and that all things are full of God. And this is not inconſiſtent with the notion, that water is the firſt principle in nature, if by the term *principle* we underſtand, not the agency which framed the world, but the firſt matter, from which it was produced[c]. A principle of motion, wherever it exiſts, is, according to Thales, mind. Hence he taught, that the magnet, and amber, are endued with a ſoul, which is the cauſe of their attracting powers. The ſoul, in all beings (as Ariſtotle repreſents his doctrine) is a moving power having the cauſe of motion within itſelf, and is always in action[d]. It was one of his tenets, that all nature is full of dæmons, or intelligences proceeding from God. It is eaſy to conceive, that theſe opinions might have been derived from the notion, that the deity is the ſoul of the world, and the ſource of all motion and intelligence.

Concerning the material world, Thales taught, that night exiſted before day; a doctrine which he probably borrowed from the Grecian theogonies, which placed Night, or Chaos, among the firſt divinities. He held, that the ſtars are fiery bodies; that the moon is an opaque body illuminated by the ſun, and that the earth is a ſpherical body placed in the middle of the univerſe.

In mathematics, Thales is ſaid to have invented ſeveral funda-

[a] Clem. Al. Strom. l. ii. p. 364. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. viii. c. 2. Euſeb. Prep. Ev. l. i. c. 7.

[b] Laert. l. i. § 27.

[c] Conf. Ariſt. de Anima, l. i. c. 5. Plut. Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 7, 8. Stobæi Ecl. Phyſ. c. i. Euſeb. Prep. Ev. l. xiv. c. 6.

[d] Ariſt. ib. c. 2. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. iv. c. 2. Stob. Ecl. Ph. c. xl.

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mental propoſitions, which were afterwards incorporated into the elements of Euclid; particularly the following theorems: that a circle is biſected by its diameter; that the angles at the baſe of an iſoſceles triangle are equal; that the vertical angles of two interſecting lines are equal; that, if two angles and one ſide of one triangle be equal to two angles and one ſide of another triangle, the remaining angles and ſides are reſpectively equal; and that the angle in a ſemicircle is a right angle[a]. Of his knowledge of the principles of menſuration, and conſequently of the doctrine of proportion, his inſtructions to the Egyptian prieſts (already mentioned) for finding the height of their pyramids, are a ſufficient proof. His method was this. At the termination of the ſhadow of the pyramid he erected a ſtaff perpendicular to the ſurface of the earth; and thus obtained two right angled triangles, which enabled him to infer the ratio of the height of the pyramid to the length of its ſhadow, from the ratio of the height of the ſtaff to the length of its ſhadow[b].

Aſtronomical, as well as mathematical ſcience ſeems to have received conſiderable improvements from Thales. He was ſo well acquainted with the celeſtial motions, as to be able to predict an eclipſe; though probably with no great degree of accuracy with reſpect to time; for Herodotus, who relates this fact, only ſays, that he foretold the year in which it would happen[c]. He taught the Greeks the diviſion of the heavens into five zones, and the ſolſtitial and equinoctial points, and approached ſo near to the knowledge of the true length of the ſolar revolution, that he corrected their calendar, and made their year contain 365 days[d].

Theſe few particulars, reſpecting the ſcientific diſcoveries and improvements of Thales, give us no unfavourable idea of the abilities and attainments of this father of the Grecian philoſophy.

[a] Laert. l. i. § 24, 25. Proclus in Euclid. l. i.

[b] Laert. l. i. § 27. Plut. l. c. Plin. Hiſt. N. l. xxxviii. c. 17. Proclus in Euclid. l. i. def. 1.

[c] Herod. l. i. p. 19. Laert. l. i. § 23—35. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. ii. c. 12, 24. Apul. Fl. l. iv. Plin. Hiſt. N. l. ii. c. 9.

[d] Plut. Laert. l. c. Newton's Chronology, p. 86. Shuckford's Connect. vol. ii. p. 5. Comp. Strabo, l. xvii. p. 806.

The

The ſeeds of natural ſcience, which Thales had ſown, were ſucceſsfully cheriſhed in their growth by ANAXIMANDER, who firſt taught philoſophy in a public ſchool, and is therefore often ſpoken of as the founder of the Ionic ſect. He was born in the third year of the forty-ſecond Olympiad [a]. Cicero calls him the friend and companion of Thales; whence it is probable, that he was a native of Miletus. That he was employed in inſtructing youth, may be inferred from an anecdote related concerning him; that, being laughed at for ſinging (that is, probably, reciting his verſes) ill, he ſaid, "We muſt endeavour to ſing better, for the ſake of the boys." Anaximander was the firſt who laid aſide the defective method of oral tradition, and committed the principles of natural ſcience to writing. It is related of him, that he predicted an earthquake: but, that he ſhould have been able, in the infancy of knowledge, to do what is, at this day, beyond the reach of philoſophy, is incredible. He lived ſixty-four years [b].

The general doctrine of Anaximander, concerning nature and the origin of things, was, that infinity, τὸ ἄπειρον, is the firſt principle of all things; that the univerſe, though variable in its parts, as one whole is immutable; and that all things are produced from Infinity, and terminate in it. What this philoſopher meant by infinity, has been a ſubject of much controverſy; and the diſpute has produced many ingenious conjectures, which are, however, too feebly ſupported to merit particular notice. The moſt material queſtion is, whether Anaximander underſtood by infinity the material ſubject, or the efficient cauſe, of nature. Plutarch aſſerts [c], the infinity of Anaximander to be nothing but matter. Ariſtotle explains it in the ſame manner [d]; and ſeveral modern writers adopt the ſame idea [e]. But neither Ariſtotle nor Plutarch could have any better ground for their opinion than conjecture. It is more probable, that Anaximander, who was a diſciple of Thales, would attempt

[a] B. C. 610.

[b] Laert. l. ii. § 1. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 37. Themiſtii Orat. 20. Plin. Hiſt. N. l. ii. c. 79.

[c] Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 3. [d] Phyſ. Auſcult. l. i. c. 5. l. iii. c. 4.

[e] Cudworth, c. iii. § 21. Le Clerc. Biblioth. Choiſée, tom. ii. art. 1.

to improve, than that he would entirely reject the doctrine of his maſter. If, therefore, the explanation, given above, of the ſyſtem of Thales be admitted, there will appear ſome ground for ſuppoſing, that Anaximander made uſe of the term infinity to denote the humid maſs of Thales, whence all things aroſe, together with the divine principle by which he ſuppoſed it to be animated. This opinion is ſupported by the authority of Hermias who aſſerts[a], that Anaximander ſuppoſed an eternal mover or firſt cauſe of motion, prior to the humid maſs, or τὸ ὑγρὸν, of Thales. And Ariſtotle himſelf ſpeaks of the infinity of Anaximander as comprehending and directing all things. After all, however it muſt be confeſſed, that the doctrine of this philoſopher concerning the origin of nature is ſo obſcurely and variouſly related, that nothing can be determined, with certainty, upon this ſubject.

There can be little doubt, that mathematics and aſtronomy were indebted to Anaximander. He framed a connected ſeries of geometrical truths, and wrote a ſummary of his doctrine. He was the firſt, who undertook to delineate the ſurface of the earth, and mark the diviſions of land and water, upon an artificial globe[b]. The invention of the ſun-dial is aſcribed to him; but it is not likely that mankind had remained, till this time, unacquainted with ſo uſeful an inſtrument, eſpecially conſidering how much attention had, in many countries, been paid to aſtronomy, and how early we read of the diviſion of time into hours. Herodotus, with much greater probability, aſcribes this invention to the Babylonians[c]. Perhaps he made uſe of a gnomon in aſcertaining, more correctly than Thales had done, the meridian line, and the points of the ſolſtices. Pliny ſays[d], that he firſt obſerved the obliquity of the ecliptic; but this cannot be true, if Thales was acquainted with the method of predicting eclipſes, which ſuppoſes the knowledge of this obliquity.

Other opinions aſcribed to Anaximander are, that the ſtars are

[a] In Irris. Gent. § 10. ap Tatian.

[b] Laert. l. ii. § 3. Strabo, l. i. Plin. l. vii. c. 56. Suidas. Euſeb. Prep. Ev. l. x. c. ult.

[c] L. ii. c. 32. [d] L. ii. c. 1.

globular

globular collections of air and fire, borne about in the ſpheres in which they are placed; that they are gods, that is, inhabited and animated by portions of the divinity; that the ſun has the higheſt place in the heavens, the moon the next, and the planets and fixed ſtars the loweſt; that the earth is a globe placed in the middle of the univerſe, and remains in its place; and that the ſun is twenty-eight times larger than the earth[a].

ANAXIMENES, a Mileſian, who was born about the fifty-ſixth Olympiad[b], was a hearer and companion of Anaximander. He followed the footſteps of his maſter, in his inquiries into the nature and origin of things, but not without attempting to caſt new light upon the ſyſtem. He taught, that the firſt principle of all things is Air, which he held to be infinite, or immenſe. Anaximenes, ſays Simplicius[c], taught the unity and immenſity of matter, but under a more definite term than Anaximander, calling it air. He held air to be God, becauſe it is diffuſed through all nature, and is perpetually active[d]. The air of Anaximenes is, then, a ſubtle ether, animated with a divine principle, whence it becomes the origin of all beings. In this ſenſe Lactantius[e] underſtood his doctrine; for ſpeaking of Cleanthes as adopting the doctrine of Anaximenes, he adds, the poet aſſents to it, when he ſings:

Tum pater omnipotens fæcundis imbribus æther[f], &c. *

If, in the midſt of the great obſcurity which hangs upon the tenets of the firſt Ionic ſect, there be any ground for a probable opinion, we may aſcribe to Anaximenes the continuation of the doctrine of Thales and Anaximander, concerning the firſt principle of nature, with this difference only, that he ſuppoſed the divine energy to be reſident in air, or ether. Chiefly attentive, however, to

[a] Plut. Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 7. ii. 15, 20, 22. iii. 10. Laert. Stobæus Ecl. Ph. c. 25. Origen. Philoſ. c. vi. p. 58, 60. [b] B. C. 556.
[c] Ad Phyſic. l. i. c. 2. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 3. Cic. Nat. D. i. 10.
[d] Stobæi Ecl. Phyſ. [e] L. i. c. 5. [f] Virg. Georg. ii. 324.

* Almighty Jove deſcends in fruitful ſhow'rs, &c.

material cauſes, he was ſilent concerning the nature of the divine mind.

Anaximenes is alſo ſaid to have taught, that all minds are air; that fire, water, and earth, proceed from it, by rarefaction or condenſation; that the ſun and moon are fiery bodies, whoſe form is that of a circular plate; that the ſtars, which alſo are fiery ſubſtances, are fixed in the heavens, as nails in a chryſtalline plane; and that the earth is a plane tablet reſting upon the air [a].

Anaxagoras, of Clazomene, born in the firſt year of the ſeventieth Olympiad [b], was a diſciple of Anaximenes. He inherited, from his parents, a patrimony, which might have ſecured him independence and diſtinction at home; but, ſuch was his thirſt after knowledge, that about the twentieth year of his age, he left his country, without taking proper precautions concerning his eſtate, and went to reſide at Athens. Here he diligently applied himſelf to the ſtudy of eloquence and poetry, and was particularly converſant with the works of Homer, whom he admired as the beſt preceptor, not only in writing, but in morals. Engaging, afterwards, in ſpeculations concerning nature, the fame of the Mileſian ſchool induced him to leave Athens, that he might attend upon the public inſtructions of Anaximenes. Under him he became acquainted with his doctrines, and thoſe of his predeceſſors, concerning natural bodies and the origin of things. So ardently did he engage in theſe enquiries, that he ſaid concerning himſelf, that he was born to contemplate the heavens. Viſiting his native city, he found that, whilſt he had been buſy in the purſuit of knowledge, his eſtate had run to waſte; upon which he remarked, that to this ruin he owed his proſperity. One of his fellow citizens complaining that he, who was ſo well qualified, both by rank and ability, for public offices, had ſhewn ſo little regard for his country, he replied; My firſt care is for *my* country, pointing to heaven. After remaining for ſome years at Miletus, he returned to Athens, and there taught philoſophy in private. Among his pupils were ſeveral eminent men, particu-

[a] Plut. Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 7. ii. 11. iii. 10. Cic. Nat. D. i. 10. Ac. Queſt. l. iv. Suidas. Auguſt. de Civ. Dei. l. viii. c. 2. [b] B. C. 500.

larly

larly the tragedian Euripides, and the orator and ſtateſman Pericles; to whom ſome add Socrates and Themiſtocles.

The high degree of reputation which he had acquired, at length excited the jealouſy and envy of his contemporaries, and brought upon him a cruel perſecution. It is generally agreed, that he was thrown into priſon, and condemned to death; and that it was with difficulty that Pericles obtained from his judges the milder ſentence of fine and baniſhment; but the nature of the charge alledged againſt him is variouſly repreſented. The moſt probable account of the matter is, that his offence was, the propagation of new opinions concerning the gods, and particularly, teaching that the ſun is an inanimate fiery ſubſtance, and conſequently not a proper object of worſhip. There can be no doubt, that Anaxagoras, who was indefatigable in his reſearches into nature, ventured, on many occaſions, to contradict and oppoſe the vulgar opinions and ſuperſtitions. It is related that he ridiculed the Athenian prieſts, for predicting an unfortunate event from the unuſual appearance of a ram which had but one horn; and that, to convince the people that there was nothing in the affair which was not perfectly natural, he opened the head of the animal, and ſhewed them, that it was ſo conſtructed, as neceſſarily to prevent the growth of the other horn. Such offenſive freedoms as theſe were probably the cauſe of his perſecution.

After his baniſhment, Anaxagoras paſſed the remainder of his days at Lampſacus, where he employed himſelf in inſtructing youth, and obtained great reſpect and influence among the magiſtrates and citizens. Through his whole life he appears to have ſupported the character of a true philoſopher. Superior to motives of avarice and ambition, he devoted himſelf to the purſuits of ſcience; and, in the midſt of the viciſſitudes of fortune, preſerved an equal mind. When one of his friends expreſſed regret on account of his baniſhment from Athens, he ſaid, It is not I who have loſt the Athenians, but the Athenians who have loſt me. Being aſked, juſt before his death, whether he wiſhed to be carried for interment to Clazomene, his native city, he ſaid; It is unneceſſary; the way to the regions below is every where alike open. In reply to a meſſage ſent him, at that time,

time, by the ſenate of Lampſacus, requeſting him to inform them, in what manner they might moſt acceptably expreſs their reſpect for his memory after his deceaſe, he ſaid; By ordaining that the day of my death be annually kept as a holiday in all the ſchools of Lampſacus. His requeſt was complied with, and the cuſtom remained for many centuries. He died about the age of ſeventy-two years. The inhabitants of Lampſacus expreſſed their high opinion of his wiſdom, by erecting a tomb, on which they inſcribed this epitaph:

Ενθάδε πλεῖσον ἀληθείας ἐπὶ τερμα περησας
Οὐρανίε κόσμου κεῖται Ἀναξαγόρας *.

It is alſo ſaid, that two altars were raiſed in honour of his memory, one dedicated to TRUTH, the other to MIND, an appellation which was given him on account of the doctrine which he taught concerning the origin and formation of nature [a].

The material world was conceived by Anaxagoras to have originated from a confuſed maſs, conſiſting of different kinds of particles. Having learned in the Ionic ſchool, that bodies are compoſed of minute parts, and having obſerved in different bodies different, and frequently contrary, forms and qualities, he concluded, that the primary particles, of which bodies conſiſt, are of different kinds; and that the peculiar form and properties of each body depend upon the nature of that claſs of particles, of which it is chiefly compoſed. A bone, for inſtance, he conceived to be compoſed of a great number of bony particles, a piece of gold, of golden particles; and thus he ſuppoſed bodies of every kind to be generated from ſimilar particles, ὁμοιομερείαι, and to aſſume the character of thoſe particles. This ſyſtem is thus exhibited, in the language of poetry, by Lucretius [b]:

[a] Laert. l. ii. c. 6, &c. Suidas. Plato in Hippia Maj. Plut. in Pericle. Cic. Nat. D. l. i. c. 11. Tuſc. Q. iii. 24. v. 39. De Orat. l. iii. c. 15. Brut. c. 2. Val. Max. l. vii. c. 2. l. viii. c. 7. Ariſt. Rhet. l. ii. c. 23. Joſeph. cont. App. l. ii.

[b] L. i. v. 830, &c.

* This tomb great ANAXAGORAS confines,
Whoſe mind explored the paths of heav'nly truth.

—— Principium

—— Principium rerum quam dicit Homæomeriam;
Offa videlicet è pauxillis atque minutis
Offibus; ſic et de pauxillis atque minutis
Viſceribus viſcus gigni; ſanguenque creari
Sanguinis inter ſe multis coëuntibus guttis;
Ex aurique putat micis conſiſtere poſſe
Aurum; et de terris terram concreſcere parvis;
Ignibus ex ignem; humorem ex humoribus eſſe,
Cætera conſimili fingit ratione, putatque [a].

Notwithſtanding the difficulties and abſurdities which obviouſly attend this ſyſtem, the invention of it was a proof of the author's ingenuity, who doubtleſs had recourſe to the notion of ſimilar particles, in hopes of obviating the objections which lay againſt the doctrine of atoms, as he had received it from Anaximenes.

But the moſt important improvement, which Anaxagoras made upon the doctrine of his predeceſſors, was that of ſeparating, in his ſyſtem, the active principle in nature from the material maſs upon which it acts, and thus introducing a diſtinct intelligent cauſe of all things [b]. The ſimilar particles of matter, which he ſuppoſed to be the baſis of nature, being without life or motion, he concluded that there muſt have been, from eternity, an intelligent principle, or infinite mind, exiſting ſeparately from matter, which, having a power of motion within itſelf, firſt communicated motion to the material maſs, and, by uniting homogeneal particles, produced the various forms of nature.

That Anaxagoras maintained an infinite mind to be the author of all motion and life, is atteſted by many antient authorities. Plato expreſsly aſſerts, that Anaxagoras taught the exiſtence of "a diſ-

[a] With Anaxagoras, great Nature's law
Is ſimilarity; and every compound form
Conſiſts of parts minute, each like the whole;
And bone is made of bone, and fleſh of fleſh;
And blood, and fire, and earth, and maſſy gold,
Are, in their ſmalleſt portions, ſtill the ſame.

[b] Ariſt. Metaph. l. i. c. 4.

posing mind, the cause of all things"—Νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος. Aristotle gives it as his doctrine, that mind is the first principle of all things, pure, simple, and unmixed; that it possesses within itself the united powers of thought and motion; and that it gives motion to the universe, and is the cause of whatever is fair and good[a]. Plutarch confirms this account of the doctrine of Anaxagoras, and shews wherein it differed from that of his predecessors. "The Ionic philosophers," says he[b], "who appeared before Anaxagoras, made fortune, or blind necessity, that is, the fortuitous or necessary motion of the particles of matter, the first principle in nature; but Anaxagoras affirmed that a pure mind, perfectly free from all material concretions, governs the universe." From these and other concurrent testimonies[c] it clearly appears, that Anaxagoras was the first among the Greeks who conceived mind as detached from matter, and as acting upon it with intelligence and design in the formation of the universe. The infinite mind, or deity, which his predecessors had confounded with matter, making them one universe, Anaxagoras conceived to have a separate and independent existence, and to be simple, pure intelligence, capable of forming the eternal mass of matter according to his pleasure. Thus he assigned an adequate cause for the existence of the visible world.

Several doctrines are ascribed to Anaxagoras, which might seem to indicate no inconsiderable knowledge of nature: such as, that the wind is produced by the rarefaction of the air; that the rainbow is the effect of the reflection of the solar rays from a thick cloud, placed opposite to it like a mirror; that the moon is an opaque body, enlightened by the sun, and an habitable region, divided into hills, vales, and waters; that the comets are wandering stars; and that the fixed stars are in a region exterior to those of the sun and moon. But the writers who report these particulars have mixed with them such strange absurdities, as weaken the credit of their whole relation. When we are told, that Anaxagoras thought the sun to be a flat circular mass of hot iron, somewhat bigger

[a] Arist. de Anima, l. i. c. 2. Phys. Ausc. l. viii. c. 1. [b] In Pericle.
[c] Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 11. Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. viii. c. 12. Lactant. i. 5.

than

than the Peloponneſus; and the ſtars to have been formed from ſtones whirled from the earth by the violent circumvolution of its ſurrounding ether; we cannot but ſuſpect that, in the courſe of traditionary report, his opinions muſt have been ignorantly miſconceived, or deſignedly miſrepreſented[a].

In the Ionic ſchool, Anaxagoras was ſucceeded by DIOGENES APOLLONIATES, a diſciple of Anaximenes. Following the ſteps of his maſter, he devoted himſelf to the contemplation of nature; not however without mingling with the ſeverer purſuits of philoſophy the ſtudy of eloquence. This qualified him to execute the office of preceptor with great reputation, both at Miletus and at Athens. But his ſucceſs, and perhaps his opinions, excited ſo much jealouſy and averſion among the Athenians, that, like Anaxagoras, he was obliged to provide for his ſafety by flight. What befel him afterwards, or what was the exact time of his birth or death, is unknown. With Anaximenes he taught, that air, or a ſubtle ether, is the firſt material principle in nature, but that it partakes of a divine intelligence, without which nothing could be produced[b]. From comparing the imperfect accounts of his doctrine, which remain, with the opinions of his predeceſſors, it appears probable, that he conceived the infinite ether to be animated by a divine mind, and all things to be formed from this compound principle[c].

ARCHELAUS, of Miletus, was a diſciple of Anaxagoras, and publicly taught, at Athens, his doctrines concerning natural bodies, whence he obtained the appellation of the natural philoſopher. Among the tenets aſcribed to him are the following: that the two principles of things are air and infinity; that the univerſe is unlimited; that heat is the cauſe of motion, and cold of reſt; that the earth was at the beginning a muddy maſs, whence living animals were

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 8, 9. Pſeudo-Orig. c. viii. p. 69. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. ii. c. 8, 13, 16, 25. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. l. i. c. 13. § 33.

[b] Plut. Plac. l. iv. c. 5, 20. Auguſt. de Civ. Dei. l. viii. c. 2. Ariſt. de Anima, l. i. c. 2.

[c] Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 14. Laert. l. ix. § 57, 58. Clem. Al. Protrept. p. 42.

produced and nouriſhed; and that animals have ſouls, which differ in their powers, according to the ſtructure of the bodies in which they reſide*. It cannot be certainly determined, whether, with Anaxagoras, he admitted a diſtinct and independent deity, the author of nature, or whether, with the former philoſophers, he ſuppoſed one compound principle, conſiſting of infinite matter animated by a divine ſpirit. Concerning morals, he is ſaid to have taught, that the diſtinction between right and wrong is not founded in nature, but in arbitrary law; a doctrine, which, if it was really his, obtained little credit at that time, and was never afterwards reſumed, till ſcepticiſm, at a much later period, erected its ſtandard againſt common ſenſe.

The high reputation which Archelaus acquired, procured him many diſciples of great diſtinction, among whom is commonly reckoned Socrates. Under this great man, philoſophy aſſumed a new character; ſo that Archelaus may properly be conſidered as the laſt preceptor in the original Ionic ſchool*.

* Laert. l. ii. § 17. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. v. c. 4. Suidas. Orig. Philoſ. c. ix. p. 78. Plutarch. de Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 3. Stobæus Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 1.

* Vidend. Heuman. Act. Phil. v. i. p. 16. v. iii. p. 165, 173. Burnet. Arch. c. x. Cudworth. Int. Syſt. c. i. § 22. c. iv. § 20. cum Not. Moſhem. Voſſ. de Scient. Math. c. 13, 32, 33. Meurſ. in Cureta, l. iv. Cyril. cont. Julian. l. i. p. 15. Valeſii Phil. Sac. c. 31. Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. viii. c. 2, 11. Jos. Scaliger. Ep. 306. Themiſtii Orat. 26. Morhoff. Polyh. t. ii. c. 20. Lipſii Phyſ. l. ii. Diſſ. 8. Thomaſii Obſerv. Hal. t. ii. Ob. 18, 21. Mullerus de aqua principio rerum ex mente Thaletis, Altdorf. 1718. Buddæus de Phil. Mor. Thalet. § 10. Otium Vindel. Exerc. ii. Slevogtii Diſſ. Phil. p. 386. Amœnit. Lit. t. iii. Brucker Hiſt. de Ideis, ſect. 1. Grotius de Verit. l. i. Oporinus de Immort. Mortalium. Voſſ. de Hiſt. Gr. l. i. c. 6. Dickenſon Phyſ. c. iv. § 10. Thomas Hiſt. Ath. c. iv. § 3. Le Clerc. Bibl. Choiſée, t. ii. art. 1. Parker de Deo. Diſp. i. § 6. Scipio Aquilianus de Plac. Phil. ante Ariſtot. c. 21. Schmidius de Vit. Anaximenis. Cl. Berigard. in Circul. Piſan. p. i. p. 10. Gerdilius allo ſtadio della Religione, c. 2. Ploucquet. Diſſ. de Thalet. et Anaxag. Hygin. Aſtron. l. ii. c. 2. Weidler. Aſtron. c. 5. Bayle in Thal. &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.

WHILST the philoſophers of the Ionic ſchool were, as we have ſeen, induſtriouſly employed in inveſtigating the nature and origin of things, they paid little attention to thoſe ſubjects, in which the happineſs of human life is immediately concerned. Too deeply engaged in profound ſpeculations to attend to uſeful truths, they contented themſelves with admiring virtue, and extolling virtuous actions, without taking the pains to eſtabliſh the principles, and inculcate the precepts, of ſound morality. The merit of correcting this error, and introducing a method of philoſophiſing, which was happily calculated to improve the human mind, and to cheriſh the virtues of ſocial life, is ſolely to be aſcribed to Socrates; a man, whoſe penetrating judgment, exalted views, and liberal ſpirit, united with exemplary integrity, and purity of manners, have juſtly entitled him to that diſtinction, which by the unanimous ſuffrage of antiquity he has obtained, the firſt place among philoſophers.

SOCRATES was born at Alopece, a village near Athens, in the fourth year of the ſeventy-ſeventh Olympiad[a] *. His parents were of low rank. His father, Sophroniſcus, was a ſtatuary; his mother Phænareta, a midwife[b]. Sophroniſcus brought up his ſon, contrary to his inclination, in his own manual employment; in which Socrates, though his mind was continually aſpiring after higher objects, was not unſucceſsful. Whilſt he was a young man, he is ſaid to have formed ſtatues of the habited graces, which were allowed a place in the citadel of Athens[c]. Upon

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 18. Suidas. Arund. Marbles. * B. C. 469.
[b] Plato. Alcib. i. Theatet. Val. Max. l. iii. c. 4. Athæn. Deipn. l. v. p. 219.
[c] Laert. Pauſan. l. i. c. 22. l. ix. c. 35.

the death of his father, he was left with no other inheritance than the ſmall ſum of eighty *minæ*[a], which, through the diſhoneſty of a relation, to whom Sophroniſcus left the charge of his affairs, he ſoon loſt[b]. This laid him under the neceſſity of ſupporting himſelf by labour; and he continued to practiſe the art of ſtatuary in Athens; at the ſame time, however, devoting all the leiſure he could command to the ſtudy of philoſophy.

Crito, a wealthy Athenian, remarking the ſtrong propenſity towards ſtudy which this young man diſcovered, and admiring his ingenuous diſpoſition and diſtinguiſhed abilities, generouſly[c] took him under his patronage, and entruſted him with the inſtruction of his children. The opportunities, which Socrates by this means enjoyed, of attending the public lectures of the moſt eminent philoſophers, ſo far increaſed his thirſt after wiſdom, that he determined to relinquiſh his occupation, and every proſpect of emolument which that might afford, in order to devote himſelf entirely to his favourite purſuits[d]. His firſt preceptor in philoſophy was Anaxagoras. After this eminent maſter in the Ionic ſchool left Athens, Socrates attached himſelf to Archelaus. Under theſe inſtructors he diligently proſecuted the ſtudy of nature, in the uſual manner of the philoſophers of the age, and became well acquainted with their doctrines. Prodicus, the ſophiſt, was his preceptor in eloquence, Evenus in poetry, Theodorus in geometry, and Damo in muſic[e]. Aſpaſia, a woman no leſs celebrated for her intellectual than her perſonal accompliſhments, whoſe houſe was frequented by the moſt celebrated characters, had alſo ſome ſhare in the education of Socrates[f].

Thus furniſhed with preceptors of every kind, Socrates acquired that knowledge at home, which the Greeks had hitherto ſought in foreign countries, but for which, after all, they were more indebted to their own ingenuity and induſtry, than to the inſtructions of the

[a] About 300l. [b] Libanius Appl. t. i. p. 640. Laert.
[c] Laert. Suidas in Critone. Max. Tyr. Diſſ. 22.
[d] Liban. ib. Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. ii. c. 43.
[e] Laert. Suid. Plato in Menone, Theatet.
[f] Plato in Menexeno. Plut. in Pericle.

Oriental

Oriental or Egyptian prieſts. It cannot be reaſonably doubted that, with ſuch advantages, he became maſter of every kind of learning, which the age in which he lived could afford[a].

With theſe uncommon endowments, both natural and acquired, Socrates appeared in Athens, under the reſpectable characters of a good citizen, and a true philoſopher. Being called upon by his country to take arms in the long and ſevere ſtruggle between Athens and Sparta, he ſignalized himſelf at the ſiege of Potidæa[b], both by his valour, and by the hardineſs with which he endured fatigue. During the ſeverity of a Thracian winter, whilſt others were clad in furs, he wore only his uſual clothing, and walked barefoot upon the ice[c]. In an engagement in which he ſaw Alcibiades (a young man of noble rank whom he accompanied during this expedition) falling down wounded, he advanced to defend him, and ſaved both him and his arms: and though the prize of valour was, on this occaſion, unqueſtionably due to Socrates, he generouſly gave his vote that it might be beſtowed upon Alcibiades, to encourage his riſing merit[c]. Several years afterwards, Socrates voluntarily entered upon a military expedition againſt the Bœotians, during which, in an unſucceſsful engagement at Delium, he retired with great coolneſs from the field; when, obſerving Xenophon lying wounded upon the ground, he took him upon his ſhoulders, and bore him out of the reach of the enemy. Soon afterwards he went out a third time, in a military capacity, in the expedition for the purpoſe of reducing Amphipolis; but this proving unſucceſsful, he returned to Athens, and remained there till his death.

It was not till Socrates was upwards of ſixty years of age, that he undertook to ſerve his country in any civil office. At that age, he was choſen to repreſent his own diſtrict, in the *ſenate of five hundred*[d]. In this office, though he, at firſt, expoſed himſelf to ſome degree of ridicule from the want of experience in

[a] Xen. Mem. l. iv. p. 814. Plat. Apol. Laert. [b] Laert. Thucyd. l. i. p. 39.
[c] Plat. Conviv. & Phæd. Plut. in Alcib. Laert. Strabo, l. ix.
[d] Plato. Apolog. p. 31.

the

the forms of buſineſs, he ſoon convinced his colleagues, that he was ſuperior to them all in wiſdom and integrity. Whilſt they, intimidated by the clamours of the populace, paſſed an unjuſt ſentence of condemnation upon the commanders, who, after the engagement at the Arginuſian iſlands, had been prevented by a ſtorm from paying funeral honours to the dead, Socrates ſtood forth ſingly in their defence, and, to the laſt, refuſed to give his ſuffrage againſt them, declaring, that no force ſhould compel him to act contrary to juſtice and the laws[a]. Under the ſubſequent tyranny, he never ceaſed to condemn the oppreſſive and cruel proceedings of the thirty tyrants; and when his boldneſs provoked their reſentment, ſo that his life was in hazard, fearing neither treachery nor violence, he ſtill continued to ſupport, with undaunted firmneſs, the rights of his fellow citizens. The tyrants, probably that they might create ſome new ground of complaint againſt Socrates, ſent an order to him, with ſeveral other perſons, to apprehend a wealthy citizen of Salamis: the reſt executed the commiſſion; but Socrates refuſed, ſaying, that he would rather himſelf ſuffer death, than be inſtrumental in inflicting it unjuſtly upon another[b].

Theſe proofs of public virtue, both in a military and civil capacity, are ſufficient to entitle the name of Socrates to a diſtinguiſhed place in the catalogue of good citizens. But his firſt honours ariſe from the manner in which he ſupported the character of a philoſopher, and diſcharged the duties of a moral preceptor.

Obſerving with regret, how much the opinions of the Athenian youth were miſled, and their principles and taſte corrupted, by philoſophers, who ſpent all their time in refined ſpeculations upon nature and the origin of things, and by ſophiſts, who taught in their ſchools, the arts of falſe eloquence and deceitful reaſoning; Socrates formed the wiſe and generous deſign, of inſtituting a new and more uſeful method of inſtruction. He juſtly conceived the true end of philoſophy to be, not to make an oſtentatious diſplay of ſuperior learning and ability in ſubtle diſputations or ingenious conjectures,

[a] Laert. ii. § 24. Xen. Mem. l. i. Hiſt. Græc. l. i. [b] Plat. Apol.

but to free mankind from the dominion of pernicious prejudices; to correct their vices; to inſpire them with the love of virtue, and thus conduct them in the path of wiſdom to true felicity. He therefore aſſumed the character of a moral philoſopher; and, looking upon the whole city of Athens as his ſchool, and all who were diſpoſed to lend him their attention as his pupils, he ſeized every occaſion of communicating moral wiſdom to his fellow citizens. He paſſed his time chiefly in public. It was his cuſtom, in the morning to viſit the places made uſe of for walking and public exerciſes; at noon, to appear among the crowds in the markets or courts; and to ſpend the reſt of the day in thoſe parts of the city which were moſt frequented[a]. Sometimes he collected an audience about him in the Lyceum, (a pleaſant meadow on the border of the river Ilyſſus) where he delivered a diſcourſe from the chair, whilſt his auditors were ſeated on benches around him. At other times he converſed, in a leſs formal way, with any of his fellow citizens in places of common reſort, or with his friends at meals, or in their hours of amuſement; thus making every place to which he came a ſchool of virtue. Not only did young men of rank and fortune attend upon his lectures, but he ſought for diſciples even among mechanics and labourers.

The method of inſtruction, which Socrates chiefly made uſe of, was, to propoſe a ſeries of queſtions to the perſon with whom he converſed, in order to lead him to ſome unforeſeen concluſion. He firſt gained the conſent of his reſpondent to ſome obvious truths, and then obliged him to admit others, from their relation, or reſemblance, to thoſe to which they had already aſſented. Without making uſe of any direct argument or perſuaſion, he choſe to lead the perſon he meant to inſtruct, to deduce the truths of which he wiſhed to convince him, as a neceſſary conſequence from his own conceſſions[b]. He commonly conducted theſe conferences with ſuch addreſs, as to conceal his deſign, till the reſpondent had advanced too far to recede. On ſome occaſions, he

[a] Xen. Mem. l. i. Laert. ii. Plut. *Utrum ſeni gerenda reſp.*

[b] Cic. Acad. Q. l. iv. c. 5. De Invent. l. i. c. 31. De Orat. l. ii. c. 67. Quintil. Inſt. l. ix. c. 2.

made

made uſe of ironical language, that vain men might be caught in their own replies, and be obliged to confeſs their ignorance. He never aſſumed the air of a moroſe and rigid preceptor, but communicated uſeful inſtruction with all the eaſe and pleaſantry of polite converſation.

Socrates was not leſs diſtinguiſhed by his modeſty than by his wiſdom. His diſcourſes betray no marks of arrogance or vanity. He profeſſed "to know only this, that he knew nothing[a]." In this declaration, which he frequently repeated, he had no other intention, than to convince his hearers of the narrow limits of the human underſtanding. Nothing was farther from his thoughts, than to encourage univerſal ſcepticiſm: on moral ſubjects he always expreſſed himſelf with confidence and deciſion; but he was deſirous of expoſing to contempt the arrogance of thoſe pretenders to ſcience, who would acknowledge themſelves ignorant of nothing. The truth was, that Socrates, though eminently furniſhed, as we have already ſeen, with every kind of learning, preferred moral to ſpeculative wiſdom. Convinced that philoſophy is valuable, not as it furniſhes queſtions for the ſchools, but as it provides men with a law of life, he cenſured his predeceſſors for ſpending all their time in abſtruſe reſearches into nature, and taking no pains to render themſelves uſeful to mankind. His favourite maxim was[b]; Whatever is above us, doth not concern us. He eſtimated the value of knowledge by its utility, and recommended the ſtudy of geometry, aſtronomy and other ſciences, only ſo far as they admit of a practical application to the purpoſes of human life. His great object, in all his conferences and diſcourſes, was to lead men into an acquaintance with themſelves; to convince them of their follies and vices; to inſpire them with the love of virtue; and to furniſh them with uſeful moral inſtructions. Cicero might, therefore, very juſtly ſay of Socrates, that he was the firſt who called down philoſophy from heaven to earth, and introduced her

[a] Cic. Acad. Q. l. i. c. 4. [b] Xen. Mem. l. iv.

into

into the public walks and domeſtic retirements of men, that ſhe might inſtruct them concerning life and manners[a].

The moral leſſons which Socrates taught, he himſelf diligently practiſed; whence he excelled other philoſophers in perſonal merit, no leſs than in his method of inſtruction. His conduct was uniformly ſuch as became a teacher of moral wiſdom.

Through his whole life, this good man diſcovered a mind ſuperior to the attractions of wealth and power. Contrary to the general practice of the preceptors of his time, he inſtructed his pupils without receiving from them any gratuity. He frequently refuſed rich preſents, which were offered him by Alcibiades and others, though importunately urged to accept them by his wife. The chief men of Athens were his ſtewards: they ſent him in proviſions, as they apprehended he wanted them; he took what his preſent wants required, and returned the reſt. Obſerving the numerous articles of luxury, which were expoſed to ſale in Athens, he exclaimed, "How many things are there, which I do not want!" With Socrates, moderation ſupplied the place of wealth. In his clothing and food, he conſulted only the demands of nature. He commonly appeared in a neat, but plain cloak, with his feet uncovered. Though his table was only ſupplied with ſimple fare, he did not ſcruple to invite men of ſuperior rank to partake of his meals. When his wife, upon ſome ſuch occaſion, expreſſed her diſſatisfaction on being no better provided, he deſired her to give herſelf no concern; for if his gueſts were wiſe men, they would be contented with whatever they found at his table; if otherwiſe, they were unworthy of notice. Whilſt others, ſays he, live to eat, wiſe men eat to live. He found by experience that temperance is the parent of health. It was owing to his perfect regularity in this reſpect, that he eſcaped infection in the midſt of the plague, which proved ſo fatal to his fellow citizens[b].

[a] Tuſc. Diſp. l. iv. Acad. Q. l. i.

[b] Xen. Mem. l. iv. Laert. l. ii. § 25—28. Cic. Tuſc. Queſt. l. iii. 32. v. Ælian. l. ix. c. 29. l. xiii. c. 27, 32. Senec. de Benef. l. v. c. 6.

Socrates was a great admirer of a fair external form, as the index of a mind poſſeſſed, or at leaſt capable, of moral beauty, and converſed freely with young perſons, of both ſexes, in order to aſſiſt their progreſs in wiſdom and virtue: but his enemies have never been able to fix upon him the ſtain of incontinence. Modern calumnies, which impute to this great man vices, with which he was never charged by his contemporaries, ought to be treated with univerſal contempt[a]. *

Though Socrates was exceedingly unfortunate in his domeſtic connection, he converted this infelicity into an occaſion of exer-

[a] Max. Tyr. Diſſ. vii. ix. Quintil. Inſt. l. viii. c. 4. Athen. l. v. 209. xiii. p. 566.

* It is ſurpriſing that calumnies, which carry their own refutation along with them, ſhould ſtill be repeated as facts "of which there is no room to doubt." A late writer (ſee Obſerver, N° 77) ſpeaks in this confident manner of the tales, which that literary ſcavenger Athæneus has ſwept up from the ſewers of antiquity, for the purpoſe of beſmearing characters, which mankind have for ages beheld with admiration. The writer, whom Athæneus quotes in ſupport of the infamous ſtories which this Eſſayiſt has retailed, is Herodicus; of whom we know little but from Athæneus himſelf, and who appears to have been not ſo much an hiſtorian, as a collector of humourous tales[a]. Ariſtoxenus, from whom Diogenes Laertius (an induſtrious compiler rather than a judicious biographer) borrowed one of the anecdotes told in this eſſay, is ſaid by the writer to have been "a man of the moſt candid character, whoſe credit ſtands high with all true critics." Of this *candid* hiſtorian Aulus Gellius[b] relates, that he was ſo highly diſpleaſed that Ariſtotle choſe Theophraſtus to ſucceed him in the Peripatetic chair, that he loaded the memory of his maſter with foul reproaches. Such obſcure and doubtful authorities (to which by the way no references are made) placed in oppoſition to the teſtimony of Xenophon and Plato, and to the general voice of antiquity, will certainly have little effect in changing the eſtabliſhed opinion concerning the character of Socrates.—We muſt not take our leave of this Eſſayiſt without remarking, that he has even gone beyond his author in ſlander, by finiſhing the ſtory of the dialogue between Socrates and Critobulus in a manner, for which it will not be eaſy to produce any authority; and that, whilſt he charges Ælian with blackening the character of Ariſtophanes by accuſing him of intemperance, he conceals a circumſtance, related by Athæneus in his ſtory of Socrates's debauch; that the Comic Poet was of the party. Athæneus ſays[c], that Socrates ſat up carouſing with Agatho *and Ariſtophanes*; the Eſſayiſt, to ſave the credit of his favourite poet, ſays, that Socrates ſat up all night carouſing with Agatho *and others*.—After theſe proofs of this writer's fairneſs and candour, the public will judge, what right he has to hold up both Socrates and his admirers to ridicule, by calling him "decidedly the hero of all the Ciceros and declaimers upon morality."

[a] Voſſius de Hiſt. Græc. l. i. c. 21. [c] Noct. Att. l. iv. c. 11. [b] Deipnoſoph. l. v. c. 6.

ciſing

ciſing his virtues. Xantippe, concerning whoſe ill-humour antient writers relate many amuſing tales [a], was certainly a woman of a high and unmanageable ſpirit. But Socrates, whilſt he endeavoured to curb the violence of her temper, improved his own. When Alcibiades expreſſed his ſurpriſe, that his friend could bear to live in the ſame houſe with ſo perverſe and quarrelſome a companion, Socrates replied, that being daily inured to ill-humour at home, he was the better prepared to encounter perverſeneſs and injury abroad. After all, however, it is probable, that the infirmities of this good woman have been exaggerated, and that calumny has had ſome hand in finiſhing her picture: for Socrates himſelf, in a dialogue with his ſon Lamprocles, allows her many domeſtic virtues; and, we find her, afterwards, expreſſing great affection for her huſband during his impriſonment [b]. She muſt have been as deficient in underſtanding, as ſhe was froward in diſpoſition, if ſhe had not profited by the daily leſſons which for twenty years ſhe received from ſuch a maſter.

In the midſt of domeſtic vexations and public diſorders, Socrates retained ſuch an unruffled ſerenity, that he was never ſeen either to leave his own houſe, or to return home, with a diſturbed countenance [c]. If upon any occaſion he felt a propenſity towards anger, he checked the riſing ſtorm by lowering the tone of his voice, and reſolutely aſſuming a more than uſual gentleneſs of aſpect and manner. He not only refrained from acts of revenge, but triumphed over his adverſaries, by deſpiſing the inſults and injuries which they offered him. In all ſituations, as will more fully appear in the ſequel, he exerciſed that ſelf-command, which is founded on virtuous principles, and ſtrengthened by reflection and habit.

In acquiring this entire dominion over his paſſions and appetites, Socrates had the greater merit, as it was not effected without a violent ſtruggle againſt his natural propenſities. Zopyrus, an eminent phyſiognomiſt, declared, that he diſcovered, in the features of the philoſopher, evident traces of many vicious inclinations. The friends of Socrates, who were preſent, ridiculed the ignorance of this pre-

[a] Laert. l. ii. Aul. Gell. l. i. c. 17. Senec. de Ira, l. iii. c. 11. Ælian. l. xi. c. 12. ix. 7. Plut. de Ira. Athen. l. v. p. 219.

[b] Xen. Mem. l. ii. [c] Ælian. l. ix. c. 7, 29. Laert.

tender to extraordinary ſagacity. But Socrates himſelf ingenuouſly acknowledged his penetration, and confeſſed, that he was, in his natural diſpoſition, prone to vice, but that he had ſubdued his inclinations by the power of reaſon and philoſophy[a].

Through the whole courſe of his life, Socrates gave himſelf up to the direction of the divine power of reaſon. And this is, perhaps, all that we are to underſtand by the genius, or dæmon, which is ſaid to have, from time to time, given him inſtruction: though his diſciples, who admitted the antient doctrine of the exiſtence of dæmons, or ſpirits of a middle order between God and man, probably from obſcure or figurative expreſſions which he had made uſe of, imagined that there was, in this matter, ſomething ſupernatural[b]: a notion, which they would the more eaſily admit, and be the more ready to propagate, as they would naturally conceive it to reflect great honour upon the memory of their maſter. It is poſſible, indeed, that Socrates himſelf might, in ſome degree, be influenced by ſuperſtitious credulity concerning this dæmon; for it is expreſsly atteſted, by Xenophon[c], that he believed, that the gods ſometimes communicate to men the knowledge of future events, and, that on this principle, he encouraged the practice of divination[d].

[a] Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. v.

[b] Plut. de Genio Soc. Xen. Mem. l. i. Plato in Eutyhr. Apuleius de Genio Soc. Olearius de Genio Soc. ap. Stanley. Simon. Crit. Hiſt. V. T. l. i. c. 14.

[c] Mem. l. i.

[d] Our Author ſeems loth to give any deciſive opinion on this affair: "I had rather," ſays he, "ſuſpend my judgment, than by conjecturing tranſgreſs the bounds of truth and probability; thinking it, in ancient hiſtory, of great uſe to perceive what thoſe things are which cannot be known."—A late writer advances a notion on this ſubject, which appears to merit attention. Socrates, he remarks, believed in the gods of his country, and was not free from the ſuperſtition connected with that belief: whence it may be inferred, that, in the expreſſions uſually underſtood to refer to his dæmon, he alludes only to ſome ſpecies of *divination*, perfectly analogous to the omens of his age and country. He called the ſign, whatever it was, by means of which he ſuppoſed intimations to be communicated to him, a dæmon or divinity. This explanation of the matter is favoured by a paſſage in Plutarch's Eſſay on the Dæmon of Socrates: "How am I guilty of introducing new deities, when I ſay that the voice of the *divinity* gives me notice what I ſhall do? All men, as well as myſelf, are of opinion that the deity foreſees the future, and ſignifies it to whom he pleaſes: but the difference between us is this; they name the omens as the foretellers of what is to come; I call the ſame thing the divinity, and herein ſpeak more truly and reſpectfully than they who attribute to birds the power which belongs to the gods."—See Nare's Eſſay on the Dæmon of Socrates, 8vo. 1782.

It

It was one of the maxims of Socrates[a], "that a wiſe man will worſhip the gods according to the inſtitutions of the ſtate to which he belongs." He taught, however, a doctrine concerning religion much more pure and rational, than that which was delivered to the people by the prieſts, and he reprobated the popular fables concerning the gods. Convinced of the weakneſs of the human underſtanding, and perceiving that the pride of philoſophy had led his predeceſſors into futile ſpeculations on the nature and origin of things, he judged it moſt conſiſtent with true wiſdom to ſpeak with caution and reverence concerning the divine nature. Nevertheleſs, there can be no doubt that, whilſt he did not deny the exiſtence of inferior divinities, he acknowledged the being and providence of one Supreme Deity, and paid homage, with a pious mind, to the Sovereign Power[b].

In fine, Socrates, both on account of his abilities as a moral preceptor, and on account of his perſonal merit, unqueſtionably deſerves to be ranked in the firſt order of human beings. "The man," ſays Xenophon[c], "whoſe memoirs I have written, was ſo pious, that he undertook nothing without aſking counſel of the gods; ſo juſt, that he never did the ſmalleſt injury to any one, but rendered eſſential ſervices to many; ſo temperate, that he never preferred pleaſure to virtue; and ſo wiſe, that he was able, even in the moſt difficult caſes, without advice, to judge what was expedient and right. He was eminently qualified to aſſiſt others by his counſel; to penetrate into men's characters; to reprehend them for their vices; and to excite them to the practice of virtue. Having found all theſe excellences in Socrates, I have ever eſteemed him the moſt virtuous, and the happieſt of men."

The wiſdom and the virtues of this great man, whilſt they procured him many followers, alſo created him many enemies. There were at this time in Athens a large body of profeſſional preceptors of eloquence, diſtinguiſhed by the appellation of Sophiſts. By the mere pomp of words, theſe men made a magnificent diſplay of wiſdom, upon a ſlight foundation of real knowledge: and they

[a] Xen. Mem. l. i. [b] Ib. l. i. iv. [c] Ib. l. iv. fin.

taught

taught an artificial ſtructure of language, and a falſe method of reaſoning, by means of which they were able, in argument, to make the worſe appear the better cauſe[a]. At the ſame time that they arrogantly aſſumed to themſelves the merit of every kind of learning, they publicly practiſed the art of diſputing with plauſibility on either ſide of any queſtion, and profeſſed to teach this art to the Athenian youth. By theſe impoſing pretenſions, they collected, in their ſchools, a numerous train of young men, who followed them in hope of acquiring thoſe talents, which would give them weight and authority in popular aſſemblies. In ſuch high repute were theſe Sophiſts, that they were liberally ſupported, not only by contributions from their pupils, but by a regular ſalary from the ſtate, and were in many inſtances diſtinguiſhed by public honours, and employed in offices of magiſtracy[b].

That ſuch ſyſtematical proviſion ſhould be made for corrupting the principles and taſte of the Athenian youth, was much lamented by all honeſt men, and particularly by Socrates[c], whoſe good ſenſe revolted againſt every idle abuſe of language and pernicious perverſion of reaſon, and whoſe public ſpirit would not ſuffer him to remain an inactive ſpectator of this growing evil. In order to diſſipate the faſcination which theſe pretenders to wiſdom had ſpread over the minds of youth, Socrates daily employed himſelf, after his peculiar manner, in perplexing them with queſtions, which were ingeniouſly contrived to expoſe their ignorance, and convince the public of their diſhoneſty. The reſult was, that the Sophiſts began to be deſerted, and the Athenian youth to return to the love and purſuit of true wiſdom. The conteſt, though ſalutary to Athens, proved, in the iſſue, fatal to Socrates.

The Sophiſts, finding their reputation and emoluments daily declining, became inveterate in their enmity againſt this bold reformer, and eagerly ſeized every occaſion of expoſing him to

[a] Cic. de Orator. c. 12.

[b] Kriek. Diſſ. de Soph. Jan. 1702. Walchii Diſſ. Acad. p. 104. Menag. ad Laert. l. i. § 12. [c] Cic. Brut. c. 8.

public

public ridicule or cenſure. Whilſt Socrates was proſecuting his deſign of inſtructing the Athenian youth with increaſing reputation and ſucceſs, his enemies deviſed an expedient, by means of which they hoped to check the current of his popularity. They engaged Ariſtophanes[a], the firſt buffoon of the age, to write a comedy, in which Socrates ſhould be the principal character. Ariſtophanes, pleaſed with ſo promiſing an occaſion of diſplaying his low and malignant wit, undertook the taſk, and produced the comedy of THE CLOUDS, ſtill extant in his works. In this piece, Socrates is introduced hanging in a baſket in the air, and thence pouring forth abſurdity and prophaneneſs. The philoſopher, though he ſeldom viſited the theatre, except when the tragedies of Euripides were performed, attended the repreſentation of this play, at a time when the houſe was crowded with ſtrangers, who happened to be at Athens during the celebration of a Bacchanalian feſtival. When the performer, who repreſented Socrates, appeared upon the ſtage, a general whiſper paſſed along the benches on which the ſtrangers ſat, to enquire who the perſon was, whom the poet meant to ſatirize. Socrates, who had taken his ſtation in one of the moſt public parts of the theatre, obſerved this circumſtance; and immediately, with great coolneſs, roſe up, to gratify the curioſity of the audience, and continued ſtanding during the remainder of the repreſentation. One of the ſpectators, aſtoniſhed at the magnanimity which this action diſcovered, aſked him, whether he did not feel himſelf much chagrined, to be thus held up to public deriſion. "By no means," replied Socrates; "I am only a hoſt at a public feſtival, where I provide a large company with entertainment."

The Athenians, who had always a ſtrong propenſity to jealouſy and detraction, fooliſhly ſuffered themſelves to be amuſed by this infamous libel upon the firſt character in their city. But the ſeaſonable confidence which Socrates diſcovered in his own innocence and merit, and the uniform conſiſtency and dignity

[a] Ariſtoph. Nubes. Ælian. Hiſt. Var. l. ii. c. 13. Plut. de Puer. Educ.

of his conduct, ſcreened him, for the preſent, from the aſſaults of envy and malice. When Ariſtophanes attempted, the year following, to renew the piece with alterations and additions, the repreſentation was ſo much diſcouraged, that he was obliged to diſcontinue it. The conſequence was, that the Sophiſts, and other opponents of Socrates, who appear to have made uſe of the expedient of the theatrical repreſentation in order to ſound the inclinations of the public, choſe to poſtpone the farther proſecution of their malignant intention to a more favourable opportunity[a].

From this time, Socrates continued, for many years, to purſue without interruption his laudable deſign of inſtructing and reforming his fellow citizens. At length, however, when the inflexible integrity with which he had diſcharged the duty of a ſenator, and the firmneſs with which he had oppoſed every kind of political corruption and oppreſſion, both under the democracy and the oligarchy, had greatly increaſed the number of his enemies, the conſpiracy, which had long been concerted againſt his life, was reſumed. After the diſſolution of the tyranny, clandeſtine arts were employed to raiſe a general prejudice againſt him. The people were induſtriouſly reminded, that Critias, who had been one of the moſt cruel of the Thirty Tyrants, and Alcibiades, who had inſulted religion by defacing the public ſtatues of Mercury[b], and performing a mock repreſentation of the Eleuſinian myſteries, had, in their youth, been diſciples of Socrates.

The minds of the people being thus artfully prepared for the ſequel, the enemies of Socrates preferred a direct accuſation againſt him before the ſupreme court of judicature. His accuſers were Anytus, a leather-dreſſer, who had long entertained a perſonal enmity againſt Socrates, for reprehending his avarice, in depriving his ſons of the benefits of learning, that they might purſue the gains of trade; Melitus, a young rhetorician, who was capable of undertaking any thing for the ſake of gain; and Lycon, who was glad of any opportunity of diſplaying his talents. The accuſation,

[a] Conf. Schol. in Ariſtoph; Vie de Socr. par. M. Charpentier; and Stanley's Life of Soc. [b] Laert. Plut. in Alcib.

which

which was delivered to the ſenate under the name of Melitus, was this: "Melitus, ſon of Melitus, of the tribe of Pythos, accuſeth "Socrates, ſon of Sophroniſcus, of the tribe of Alopece. Socrates "violates the laws, in not acknowledging the gods which the "ſtate acknowledges, and by introducing new divinities. He "alſo violates the laws by corrupting the youth. Be his puniſh-"ment DEATH[a]."

This charge was delivered upon oath to the ſenate, and Crito, a friend of Socrates, became ſurety for his appearance on the day of trial. Anytus, ſoon afterwards, ſent a private meſſage to Socrates, aſſuring him, that if he would deſiſt from cenſuring his conduct, he would withdraw his accuſation. But Socrates refuſed to comply with ſo degrading a condition, and, with his uſual ſpirit replied, "Whilſt I live I will never diſguiſe the truth, nor ſpeak otherwiſe than my duty requires." The interval between the accuſation and the trial he ſpent in philoſophical converſations with his friends, chuſing to diſcourſe upon any other ſubject, rather than his own ſituation. Hermogenes, one of his friends, was much ſtruck with this circumſtance, and aſked him, why he did not employ his time in preparing his defence: "Becauſe", replied Socrates, "I have never in my life done any thing unjuſt." The eminent orator Lyſias[b] compoſed an apology, in the name of his maſter, which he requeſted him to adopt; but Socrates excuſed himſelf, by ſaying, that, though it was eloquently written, it would not ſuit his character.

When the day of trial arrived, his accuſers appeared in the ſenate, and attempted to ſupport their charge in three diſtinct ſpeeches, which ſtrongly marked their reſpective characters. Plato, who was a young man, and a zealous follower of Socrates, then roſe up to addreſs the judges in defence of his maſter: but, whilſt he was attempting to apologiſe for his youth, he was abruptly commanded by the court to ſit down. Socrates, however, needed no advocate. Aſcending the chair with all the ſerenity of conſcious

[a] Laert. Plato in Apologia. Xen. Apol. Mem. l. iv.
[b] Cic. de Orat. l. i. c. 54.

innocence, and with all the dignity of ſuperior merit, he delivered, in a firm and manly tone, an unpremeditated defence of himſelf, which ſilenced his opponents, and ought to have convinced his judges. After tracing the progreſs of the conſpiracy which had been raiſed againſt him to its true ſource, the jealouſy and reſentment of men whoſe ignorance he had expoſed, and whoſe vices he had ridiculed and reproved, he diſtinctly replied to the ſeveral charges brought againſt him by Melitus. To prove that he had not been guilty of impiety towards the gods of his country, he appealed to his frequent practice of attending the public religious feſtivals. The crime of introducing new divinities, with which he was charged, chiefly, as it ſeems, on the ground of the admonitions which he profeſſed to have received from an inviſible power, he diſclaimed, by pleading, that it was no new thing for men to conſult the gods, and receive inſtructions from them. To refute the charge of his having been a corrupter of youth, he urged, the example which he had uniformly exhibited of juſtice, moderation and temperance, the moral ſpirit and tendency of his diſcourſes, and the effect which had actually been produced by his doctrine upon the manners of the young. Then, diſdaining to ſolicit the mercy of his judges, he called upon them for that juſtice, which their office and their oath obliged them to adminiſter, and profeſſing his faith and confidence in God, reſigned himſelf to their pleaſure.

The judges, whoſe prejudices would not ſuffer them to pay due attention to this apology, or to examine with impartiality the merits of the cauſe, immediately declared him guilty of the crimes of which he ſtood accuſed. Socrates, in this ſtage of the trial, had a right to enter his plea againſt the puniſhment which the accuſers demanded, and inſtead of the ſentence of death, to propoſe ſome pecuniary amercement. But he, at firſt, peremptorily refuſed to make any propoſal of this kind, imagining that it might be conſtrued into an acknowledgment of guilt; and aſſerted, that his conduct merited, from the ſtate, reward rather than puniſhment. At length, however, he was prevailed upon by his friends, to offer, upon their credit,

credit, a fine of thirty *minæ*. The judges, notwithſtanding, ſtill remained inexorable: they proceeded, without farther delay, to pronounce ſentence upon him; and he was condemned to be put to death by the poiſon of hemlock. Socrates received the ſentence with perfect compoſure, and by a ſmile teſtified his contempt both for his accuſers and his judges. Then, turning to his friends, he expreſſed his entire ſatisfaction in the recollection of his paſt life, and declared himſelf firmly perſuaded, that poſterity would do ſo much juſtice to his memory as to believe, that he had never injured or corrupted any one, but had ſpent his days in ſerving his fellow citizens, by communicating to them, without reward, the precepts of wiſdom. Converſing in this manner, he was conducted from the court to the priſon, which he entered with a ſerene countenance and a lofty mind, amidſt the lamentations of his friends*.

On the day of the condemnation, it happened that the ſhip, which was employed to carry a cuſtomary annual offering to the iſland of Delos, ſet ſail. It was contrary to the law of Athens, that, during this voyage, any capital puniſhment ſhould be inflicted within the city. This circumſtance delayed the execution of the ſentence againſt Socrates for thirty days. So long an interval of painful expectation, however, only ſerved to afford farther ſcope for the diſplay of his conſtancy. When his friends were with him, he converſed with his uſual cheerfulneſs. In their abſence, he amuſed himſelf with writing verſes. He compoſed a hymn in honour of Apollo and Diana, and verſified a fable of Eſop. His friends, ſtill anxious to ſave ſo valuable a life, urged him to attempt his eſcape, or at leaſt to permit them to convey him away; and Crito went ſo far, as to aſſure him that, by his intereſt with the jailor, it might be eaſily accompliſhed, and to offer him a retreat in Theſſaly; but Socrates rejected the propoſal, as a criminal violation of the laws; and aſked them, whether there was any place out of Attica, which death could not reach.

* Senec. Conſol. ad Helv. c. 14.

News being, at length, brought of the return of the ſhip from Delos, the officers, to whoſe care he was committed, delivered to Socrates, early in the morning, the final order for his execution, and immediately, according to the law, ſet him at liberty from his bonds. His friends, who came thus early to the priſon that they might have an opportunity of converſing with their maſter through the day, found his wife ſitting by him with a child in her arms. As ſoon as Xantippe ſaw them, ſhe burſt into tears, and ſaid, "O Socrates, this is the laſt time your friends will ever ſpeak to you, or you to them." Socrates, that the tranquillity of his laſt moments might not be diſturbed by her unavailing lamentations, requeſted that ſhe might be conducted home. With the moſt frantic expreſſions of grief, ſhe left the priſon. An intereſting converſation then paſſed between Socrates and his friends, which chiefly turned upon the immortality of the ſoul. In the courſe of this converſation Socrates expreſſed his diſapprobation of the practice of ſuicide, and aſſured his friends, that his chief ſupport in his preſent ſituation was an expectation, though not unmixed with doubts, of a happy exiſtence after death. "It would be inexcuſable in me," ſaid he, "to deſpiſe death, if I were not perſuaded that it will conduct me into the preſence of the gods, who are the moſt righteous governors, and into the ſociety of juſt and good men: but I derive confidence from the hope, that ſomething of man remains after death, and that the condition of good men will then be much better than that of the bad." Crito afterwards aſking him, in what manner he wiſhed to be buried, Socrates replied, with a ſmile, "As you pleaſe, provided I do not eſcape out of your hands." Then, turning to the reſt of his friends, he ſaid, "Is it not ſtrange, after all that I have ſaid to convince you that I am going to the ſociety of the happy, that Crito ſtill thinks this body, which will ſoon be a lifeleſs corpſe, to be Socrates? Let him diſpoſe of my body as he pleaſes, but let him not, at its interment, mourn over it, as if it were Socrates."

Towards the cloſe of the day, Socrates retired into an adjoining apartment to bathe; his friends, in the mean time, expreſſing to one another their grief, at the proſpect of loſing ſo excellent a father,

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and being left to paſs the reſt of their days in the ſolitary ſtate of orphans. After a ſhort interval, during which he gave ſome neceſſary inſtructions to his domeſtics, and took his laſt leave of his children, the attendant of the priſon informed him, that the time for drinking the poiſon was come. The executioner, though accuſtomed to ſuch ſcenes, ſhed tears as he preſented the fatal cup. Socrates received it without change of countenance, or the leaſt appearance of perturbation: then, offering up a prayer to the gods, that they would grant him a proſperous paſſage into the inviſible world, with perfect compoſure he ſwallowed the poiſonous draught. His friends around him burſt into tears. Socrates alone remained unmoved. He upbraided their puſillanimity, and entreated them to exerciſe a manly conſtancy, worthy of the friends of virtue. He continued walking, till the chilling operation of the hemlock obliged him to lie down upon his bed. After remaining, for a ſhort time, ſilent, he requeſted Crito (probably in order to refute a calumny which might prove injurious to his friends after his deceaſe) not to neglect the offering of a cock which he had vowed to Eſculapius. Then, covering himſelf with his cloak, he expired[a]. Such was the fate of the virtuous Socrates! A ſtory, ſays Cicero, which I never read without tears[b].

The friends and diſciples of this illuſtrious teacher of wiſdom were deeply afflicted by his death, and attended his funeral with every expreſſion of grief[c]. Apprehenſive, however, for their own ſafety, they, ſoon afterwards, privately withdrew from the city, and took up their reſidence in diſtant places. Several of them viſited the philoſopher Euclid, of Megara, by whom they were kindly received[d].

No ſooner was the unjuſt condemnation of Socrates known through Greece, than a general indignation was kindled in the minds of good men, who univerſally regretted that ſo diſtinguiſhed

[a] Vid. Xenophont. Apolog. Memor. l. iv. Platon. Apol. Crito. Phædo. Eutyphron. Laert. l. ii. Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. ii. c. 13.
[b] Nat. D. l. iii. c. 33. [c] Plut. Vit. Iſocr. Suidas.
[d] Laert. l. ii. § 43. Plut. de Invid.

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an advocate for virtue ſhould have fallen a ſacrifice to jealouſy and envy. The Athenians themſelves, ſo remarkable for their caprice, who never knew the value of their great men till after their death, ſoon became ſenſible of the folly, as well as criminality, of putting to death the man who had been the chief ornament of their city, and of the age, and turned their indignation againſt his accuſers. Melitus was condemned to death, and Anytus, to eſcape a ſimilar fate, went into voluntary exile. To give a farther proof of the ſincerity of their regret, the Athenians, for a while, interrupted public buſineſs; decreed a general mourning; recalled the exiled friends of Socrates; and erected a ſtatue to his memory in one of the moſt frequented parts of the city[a]. His death happened in the firſt year of the ninety-ſixth[b] Olympiad, and in the ſeventieth year of his age.

Socrates left behind him nothing in writing[c]; but his illuſtrious pupils, Xenophon and Plato, have, in ſome meaſure, ſupplied this defect. The Memoirs of Socrates, written by Xenophon, afford, however, a much more accurate idea of the opinions of Socrates, and of his manner of teaching, than the Dialogues of Plato, who every where mixes his own conceptions and diction, and, as we ſhall afterwards ſee, thoſe of other philoſophers, with the ideas and language of his maſter. It is related, that when Socrates heard Plato recite his Lyſis, he ſaid, "How much does this young man make me ſay, which I never conceived!" Xenophon denies that Socrates ever taught natural philoſophy, or any mathematical ſcience, and charges with miſrepreſentation and falſehood thoſe who had aſcribed to him diſſertations of this kind; probably referring to Plato, in whoſe works Socrates is introduced as diſcourſing upon theſe ſubjects. The truth appears to be, that the diſtinguiſhing character of Socrates was that of a moral philoſopher[d].

The doctrine of Socrates, concerning God and religion, was rather practical than ſpeculative. But he did not neglect to build the

[a] Laert. [b] B. C. 396.

[c] Cic. de Orat. l. iii. Plut. de Fort. Alex. Laert. l. i. § 16.

[d] Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. i. c. 5. Xen. Mem. l. iv. A. Gell. Noct. Att. l. xiv. c. 3. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. § 8.

ſtructure

ſtructure of religious faith, upon the firm foundation of an appeal to natural appearances. He taught, that the Supreme Being, though inviſible, is clearly ſeen in his works, which at once demonſtrate his exiſtence, and his wiſe and benevolent providence. This point is eſtabliſhed, with great perſpicuity and force of reaſoning, in his conferences with Ariſtodemus, and with Euthydemus. "Reflect," ſays he, "that your own mind directs your body by its volitions, and you muſt be convinced that the intelligence of the univerſe diſpoſes all things according to his pleaſure.—Can you imagine, that your eye is capable of diſcerning diſtant objects, and that the eye of God cannot, at the ſame inſtant, ſee all things; or that, whilſt your mind contemplates the affairs of different countries, the underſtanding of God cannot attend, at once, to all the affairs of the univerſe? Such is the nature of the divinity, that he ſees all things, hears all things, is every where preſent, and conſtantly ſuperintends all events[a]."—Again—"He who diſpoſes and directs the univerſe, who is the ſource of all that is fair and good, who, amidſt ſucceſſive changes, preſerves the courſe of nature unimpaired, and to whoſe laws all beings are ſubject, this Supreme Deity, though himſelf inviſible, is manifeſtly ſeen in his magnificent operations.—Learn, then, from the things which are produced, to infer the exiſtence of an inviſible power, and to reverence the divinity[b]."

Beſides the one Supreme Deity, Socrates admitted the exiſtence of beings who poſſeſs a middle ſtation between God and man, to whoſe immediate agency he aſcribed the ordinary *phænomena* of nature, and whom he ſuppoſed to be particularly concerned in the management of human affairs[c]. Hence, ſpeaking of the gods, who take care of men, he ſays, "Let it ſuffice you, whilſt you obſerve their works, to revere and honour the gods: and be perſuaded, that this is the way in which they make themſelves known; for, among all the gods, who beſtow bleſſings upon men, there are none, who, in the diſtribution of their favours make themſelves viſible to mortals." Hence, he ſpoke of thunder, wind, and other agents in nature, as ſervants of

[a] Xen. Mem. l. i.

[b] Ib. l. iv. Cic. de Nat. D. l. ii. Plut. Plac. l. i. c. 3. [c] Xen. Mem. l. iv.

God, and encouraged the practice of divination, under the notion, that the gods ſometimes diſcover future events to good men.

If theſe opinions concerning the Supreme Being, and the ſubordinate divinities, be compared, there will be no difficulty in perceiving the grounds upon which Socrates, though an advocate for the exiſtence of one ſovereign power, admitted the worſhip of inferior divinities. Hence he declared it to be the duty of every one, in the performance of religious rites, to follow the cuſtoms of his country. At the ſame time, he taught, that the merit of all religious offerings depends upon the character of the worſhipper, and that the gods take pleaſure in the ſacrifices of none but the truly pious. "The man," ſays he, "who honours the gods according to his ability, ought to be cheerful, and hope for the greateſt bleſſings: for, from whom may we reaſonably entertain higher expectations, than from thoſe who are moſt able to ſerve us? or how can we ſecure their kindneſs, but by pleaſing them? or, how pleaſe them better, than by obedience[a]?"

Concerning the human ſoul, the opinion of Socrates, according to Xenophon, was, that it is allied to the divine being, not by a participation of eſſence, but by a ſimilarity of nature[b]; that man excels all other animals in the faculty of reaſon, and that the exiſtence of good men will be continued after death, in a ſtate in which they will receive the reward of their virtue[c]. Although it appears that, on this latter topic, Socrates was not wholly free from uncertainty, the conſolation which he profeſſed to derive from this ſource in the immediate proſpect of death, leaves little room to doubt, that he entertained a real belief and expectation of immortality. The doctrine which Cicero aſcribes to Socrates, on this head, is, that the human ſoul is a divine principle, which, when it paſſes out of the body, returns to heaven; and that this paſſage is moſt eaſy to thoſe who have, in this life, made the greateſt progreſs in virtue[d].

The ſyſtem of morality, which Socrates made it the buſineſs of his life to teach, was raiſed upon the firm baſis of religion. The firſt

[a] Mem. l. iv. [b] Ibid. [c] Xen. Mem. l. i. [d] Lelius, c. iv.

principles

principles of virtuous conduct, which are common to all mankind, are, according to this excellent moraliſt, laws of God: and the concluſive argument by which he ſupports this opinion is, that no man departs from theſe principles with impunity. "It is frequently poſſible," ſays he, "for men to ſcreen themſelves from the penalty of human laws, but no man can be unjuſt, or ungrateful, without ſuffering for his crime: hence, I conclude, that theſe laws muſt have proceeded from a more excellent legiſlator than man[a]." Socrates taught, that true felicity is not to be derived from external poſſeſſions, but from wiſdom, which conſiſts in the knowledge and practice of virtue; that the cultivation of virtuous manners is neceſſarily attended with pleaſure, as well as profit; that the honeſt man alone is happy; and that it is abſurd to attempt to ſeparate things, which are in nature ſo cloſely united as virtue and intereſt.

But it is impoſſible, in detached ſentences, to give the reader any tolerable idea of the moral doctrine of Socrates. We muſt therefore refer him, on this head, to that valuable treaſure of antient wiſdom, THE MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES; a work in which he will find his original converſations on many intereſting topics, related with that beautiful ſimplicity, which diſtinguiſhes the writings of Xenophon[b].

The followers of Socrates may be divided into three claſſes. The Firſt Claſs conſiſts of ſuch as were neither philoſophers by profeſſion, nor addicted to the ſtudy of philoſophy, but attended upon Socrates as a moral preceptor, for the purpoſe of correcting and improving their manners. Among theſe were ſeveral young men of the firſt rank in Athens, particularly Alcibiades and Critias[c]. In this claſs may alſo be placed the poets Euenes and Euripides, and the orators Lyſias and Iſocrates. The Second Claſs included all thoſe who, after his death, became founders of particular ſects, and, though they differed from each other greatly, were united under the

[a] Mem. l. iv.

[b] Conf. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 417. l. iii. p. 478. l. v. p. 594. Cic. Off. l. i. c. 3. Max. Tyr. Diſſ. xi. Stob. Serm. 1. 3. 28, &c. Ant. & Max. Serm. 53, &c.

[c] Xen. Mem. l. i.

general appellation of Socratic philoſophers. Theſe were Ariſtippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic ſect; Phædo, of the Eliac; Euclid, of the Megaric; Plato, of the Academic; and Antiſthenes, of the Cynic; whoſe hiſtory will be diſtinctly related in the ſequel of this work. The Third Claſs comprehends thoſe diſciples of Socrates, who, though their names are found in the catalogue of philoſophers, did not inſtitute any new ſect. Among theſe Xenophon, Æſchines, Simon, and Cebes, have ſufficient celebrity to claim ſome notice in the hiſtory of the Socratic School.

XENOPHON[a], an Athenian, born in the third year of the eighty-ſecond Olympiad[b], was unqueſtionably one of the moſt reſpectable characters among the diſciples of Socrates. He ſtrictly adhered to the principles of his maſter in action as well as opinion, and employed philoſophy, not to furniſh him with the means of oſtentation, but to qualify him for the offices of public and private life. Whilſt he was a youth, Socrates, ſtruck with his external appearance (for he regarded a fair form as a probable indication of a well-proportioned mind) determined to admit him into the number of his pupils. Meeting him by accident in a narrow paſſage, the philoſopher put forth his ſtaff acroſs the path, and ſtopping him, aſked, where thoſe things were to be purchaſed, which are neceſſary to human life. Xenophon appearing at a loſs for a reply to this unexpected ſalutation, Socrates proceeded to aſk him, where honeſt and good men were to be found. Xenophon ſtill heſitating, Socrates ſaid to him, "Follow me, and learn." From that time Xenophon became a diſciple of Socrates, and made a rapid progreſs in that moral wiſdom, for which his maſter was ſo eminent.

Xenophon accompanied Socrates in the Peloponneſian war, and fought courageouſly in defence of his country[c]. He afterwards entered into the army of Cyrus, as a private volunteer, in his expedition againſt his brother. This enterprize proving unfortunate, Xenophon, after the death of Cyrus, adviſed his fellow ſoldiers, rather to truſt to their own bravery, than ſurrender themſelves to

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 49, &c. Suidas. [b] B. C. 450. [c] Strabo, l. x. p. 402.

the

the victor, and to attempt a retreat into their own country. They liſtened to his advice; and, having had many proofs of his wiſdom as well as courage, they gave him the command of the army, in the room of Proxenus who had fallen in battle. In this command he acquired great glory by the prudence and firmneſs with which he conducted them back, through the midſt of innumerable dangers, into their own country. The particulars of this memorable adventure are related by Xenophon himſelf in his *Retreat of the Ten Thouſand*[a]. After his return into Greece, he joined Ageſilaus, king of Sparta, and fought with him againſt the Thebans in the celebrated battle of Chæronea[b]. The Athenians, diſpleaſed at this alliance, brought a public accuſation againſt him for his former conduct in engaging in the ſervice of Cyrus, and condemned him to exile. The Spartans, upon this, took Xenophon, as an injured man, under their protection, and provided him a comfortable retreat at Scilluntes in Elea. Here, with his wife and two children, he remained ſeveral years, and paſſed his time in the ſociety of his friends, and in writing thoſe hiſtorical works which have rendered his name immortal. A war at length aroſe between the Spartans and Eleans; and Xenophon was obliged to retire to Lepreus, where his eldeſt ſon had ſettled. He afterwards removed, with his whole family, to Corinth, where, in the firſt year of the hundred and fifth Olympiad[c], he finiſhed his days[d].

The integrity, the piety, the moderation of Xenophon, rendered him an ornament to the Socratic ſchool, and proved how much he had profited by the precepts of his maſter. His whole military conduct diſcovered an admirable union of wiſdom and valour. And his writings, at the ſame time that they have afforded, to all ſucceeding ages, one of the moſt perfect models of purity, ſimplicity and harmony of language[e], abound with ſentiments truly Socratic. By his wife, Phiteſia, Xenophon had two ſons, Gryllus and Diodorus; the former of whom fell with glory in the battle of Mantinea. The news of his death arriving whilſt his father was offering ſacrifice, he

[a] Cyri Expeditio, paſſim.

[b] C. Nepos in Ageſ. c. 1. Plut. in Ageſ. Xen. in Ageſ. Strabo, l. viii. p. 387. Laert. [c] B. C. 360. [d] Laert. [e] Cic. Orat. c. 19.

took off the crown from his head, ſaying, with a ſigh, "I knew that my ſon was mortal:" but when he was told, that he had fought bravely, and died with honour, he again put on the crown, and finiſhed the ſacrifice[a]. His works are, *Memoirs of Socrates*; *Apology for Socrates*; *Of the Affairs of Greece*; *The Expedition of Cyrus*; *The Inſtitution of Cyrus*; *The Banquet*; *Of Oeconomics*; *Of Tyranny*; *Praiſe of Ageſilaus*; *Of the Republic of Athens*; *Of the Republic and Laws of Sparta*; *Of Taxes*; *Of the Office of Maſter of Horſe*; *Of Hunting*[b].

ÆSCHINES, an Athenian of low birth, diſcovered an early thirſt after knowledge, and, though oppreſſed by poverty, devoted himſelf to the purſuit of wiſdom under the tuition of Socrates[c]. When he firſt became his diſciple, he told Socrates, that the only thing with which it was in his power to preſent him, in acknowledgment of his kindneſs in inſtructing him, was himſelf. Socrates replied, that he accepted, and valued the preſent, but that he hoped to render it more valuable by culture. He adhered to his maſter with unalterable fidelity and perſeverance, and enjoyed his particular friendſhip.

Having ſpent many years in Athens, without being able to riſe above the poverty of his birth, he determined, after the example of Plato, and others, to viſit the Court of Dionyſius[d], the tyrant of Sicily, who was at this time, either through vanity or jealouſy, a general patron of philoſophers. Upon his arrival in Syracuſe, though ſlighted, on account of his poverty, by Plato, he was introduced to the prince by Ariſtippus, and was liberally rewarded for his Socratic dialogues. He remained in Sicily till the expulſion of the tyrant, and then returned to Athens. Here, not daring to become a public rival of Plato or Ariſtippus, he taught philoſophy in private, and received payment for his inſtructions. Afterwards, in order to provide himſelf with a more plentiful ſubſiſtence, he appeared as a public orator; and Demoſthenes, probably becauſe he was jealous of his abilities (for he excelled in eloquence) became his opponent. Beſides orations and epiſtles, Æſchines wrote ſeven Socratic dia-

[a] Ælian. Hiſt. V. l. iii. c. 7. Aul. Gell. l. xiv. c. 3. Athæn. l. xi. p. 504.
[b] Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 72.
[c] Laert. l. ii. § 60. Sen. de Benef. l. i. c. 8. [d] Plut. de cohib. Irâ.

logues

logues in the true ſpirit of his maſter, on temperance, moderation, humanity, integrity, and other virtues. Of theſe only three are extant[a].

SIMON, another diſciple of Socrates, was by occupation a leather-dreſſer in Athens. His ſhop being frequently viſited by Socrates and his friends, he wrote down many converſations which paſſed in his hearing, and afterwards made them public. He is ſaid to have been the firſt who publiſhed Socratic dialogues; but none of his pieces are extant. So much value did this man ſet upon freedom of inquiry, that when Pericles invited him to reſide with him, under the promiſe of an ample recompence, he refuſed, ſaying, that he would not ſell the liberty of ſpeaking his mind at any price[b].

The name of CEBES, a Theban, deſerves to be mentioned, on account of his beautiful allegory, entitled, *A Picture of Human Life*. This piece, which is ſtill extant, in its moral ſpirit and character is truly Socratic, but contains ſome ſentiments, which appear to have been borrowed from the Pythagorean ſchool[c].

About this time flouriſhed TIMON of ATHENS, ſo famous for the whimſical ſeverity of his temper, and his hatred of mankind[d]. His character has given birth to many humourous pieces *.

[a] Ed. Clerici Amſtelod. 1711. Fabr. Bibl. Gr. v. i. p. 785.
[b] Laert. l. ii. § 122. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 734.
[c] Laert. ii. § 125. Suidas. Plato in Phæd.
[d] Laert. l. ix. § 112. Suidas. Plut. in Anton. et Alcib. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. iv. c. 2. Plin. Hiſt. N. l. vii. c. 19. Lucian in Timone.

* Videnda. Jonſ. de Script. Hiſt. Ph. l. i. c. 2, 14, 18. Clerici Sylva Phil. c. 3. Boerner Menzer Diſſ. de Socrate. La Vie de Socr. par M. Charpentier. Cooper's Life of Socrates. Fraquier. Diſſ. de Socr. ap. Mem. Acad. Inſcrip. t. vi. Potter's Arch. l. i. c. 9. Petav. Rat. Temp. p. i. l. iii. c. 8. Eſchenbach. de Sympoſ. Sap. Diſſ. Ac. v. Prideaux Hiſt. v. i. p. 511. Theodoret. Therapeut. l. xii. Salv. de Gub. Dei. l. vii. Tertull. Apol. Le Clerc. Bib. Ch. t. 22. p. 426. Cleric. Log. p. iv. c. 9. Crouz. p. iv. c. 7. Perraltii Parall. des Anc. et des Mod. t. iv. p. 139. Heuman. Act. Ph. v. i. p. 473. Murat. Orat. p. 381. Lipſii Manud. Stoic. Diſſ. 18. Parker de Deo. Diſp. 4. Caſaubon de Enthuſ. Heinſii Orat. de Socr. Huet. de la Foibleſſe, &c. l. i. c. 4. Reiman. Hiſt. Ath. c. 21. Cudworth. c. iv. § 23. Zimmerm. Amœn. Lit. t. xi. p. 122. Rep. des Lett. t. vi. p. 186. Vavaſor de Ludic. Dict. Op. p. 8. Baſnage Hiſt. des Juifs, t. iii. c. 20. Olearius de Genio Soc. apud Stanley.

Stanley. Hiſt. Phil. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. viii. c. 14. Naudæi Apol. Mag. c. 13. N. Kreigh Diſſ. de Elog. Soph. Jen. 1702. Mornæus de Ver. Rel. c. 33. Voſſ. de Hiſt. Gr. l. i. c. 5. Stollii Hiſt. Ph. Mor. Gent. § 48. Maſcardi Diſſ. Mor. in Cebetis Tab. De Timon. Miſc. Lipſ. t. iii. Obſ. 57.

CHAP. V.

OF THE CYRENAIC SECT.

FROM the ſchool of Socrates many ſects aroſe, who, though they held opinions eſſentially different from each other, and though moſt of them deviated widely from the ſimplicity of their maſter's doctrine, nevertheleſs affected to call themſelves Socratic philoſophers[a]. Of theſe, ſome were of ſhort duration and little note; others obtained great diſtinction and permanency, and afterwards ſpread into new branches. The inferior ſects in the IONIC ſucceſſion were, the CYRENAIC, the MEGARIC, and the ELIAC or ERETRIAC. Thoſe of higher celebrity, were the ACADEMIC, and the CYNIC, from which latter aroſe the PERIPATETIC, and the STOIC.

The CYRENAIC SECT was founded by Ariſtippus, and derived its name from his native city, Cyrene in Africa.

Of the deſcent and early education of ARISTIPPUS little is known: but, that his father was a man of ſome diſtinction, may be conjectured from his having ſent his ſon to the Olympic games, and ſupported him at Athens, as a pupil of Socrates[b]. This would alſo be confirmed by the incident to which Horace alludes, when he ſays[c],

[a] Cic. de Oratore, l. iii. c. 16. [b] Laert. l. ii. § 65, &c.
[c] Sat. 2. iii. 99.

Quid

Quid ſimile iſti
Græcus Ariſtippus? qui ſervos projicere aurum
In media juſſit Lybia, quia tardius irent
Propter onus ſegnes, &c [a].

were it credible, that a man who was always fond of wealth and ſplendor ſhould order his ſervant, on a journey, to throw away his money, in order to lighten his burden. Whilſt Ariſtippus was attending the Olympic games, he heard reports concerning the wiſdom of Socrates [b], which inſpired him with an impatient deſire of becoming one of his diſciples, and immediately took up his reſidence in Athens. On his firſt arrival, he made Socrates an offer of money, as a gratuity for the privilege of attending his inſtructions; but the philoſopher, after his uſual manner, refuſed it. Admitted among the number of his followers, Ariſtippus diſcovered ſuch marks of ability, and made ſo rapid a progreſs in knowledge, that he was, for ſome time, eſteemed one of the chief ornaments of the Socratic ſchool, and raiſed no ſmall degree of envy among his fellow diſciples. But his mind was too frivolous, and probably his education had been too luxurious, to permit him heartily to adopt the principles, and imbibe the ſpirit, of his maſter. After a long period of reſtraint, his natural temper, or early habits, prevailed, and he diſcovered a fondneſs for exterior ornament, and effeminate indulgence, which gave much offence to Socrates and his friends. This propenſity in Ariſtippus, and his maſter's earneſt deſire to correct it, are illuſtrated in a beautiful dialogue preſerved by Xenophon [c]. The freedom of his manners at length became ſo diſpleaſing to the ſect with which he was connected, that he was obliged to withdraw from Athens.

Ariſtippus now viſited the iſland of Ægina, and there met with the celebrated Lais [d], whom he accompanied to Corinth. A ſtorm

[a] When Ariſtippus on the Lybian waſte
Commands his ſlaves, becauſe it ſtay'd their haſte,
To throw away his gold, &c.

[b] Plut. de Curioſitate. [c] Mem. l. ii.
[d] Cic. Ep. Fam. ix. 26. Athæn. l. v. p. 216. xii. p. 554. xiii. p. 592.

ariſing,

ariſing, on his paſſage thither, which ſomewhat diſconcerted him, one of the crew ſaid to him, "Why are you philoſophers afraid, when we illiterate ſeamen fear nothing?" "Becauſe," replied Ariſtippus, "we have more to loſe[a]." In his way from Corinth to Aſia, he was ſhipwrecked upon the iſland of Rhodes. Accidentally obſerving, as he came on ſhore, a geometrical diagram drawn upon the ſand, he ſaid to his companions, "Take courage, I ſee the foot-ſteps of men[b]". When they arrived at the principal town of the iſland, the philoſopher ſoon found means to engage the attention of the inhabitants, and procured an hoſpitable reception for himſelf and his fellow travellers: a fact which confirms one of this philoſopher's aphoriſms; if you aſk what advantage a man of learning has above one who is illiterate, ſend them together among ſtrangers, and you will ſee.

After ſome interval, we find Ariſtippus in the court of Dionyſius, tyrant of Sicily. Here he incurred much odium from Plato and other philoſophers, by countenancing the luxury and vanity of the prince. He poſſeſſed a verſatility of diſpoſition, and politeneſs of manners, which, whilſt they enabled him to accommodate himſelf to every ſituation—

Omnis Ariſtippum decuit color, et ſtatus, et res[c] *——

eminently qualified him for the eaſy gaiety of a court. Perfectly free from the reſerve and haughtineſs of the preceptorial chair, he ridiculed the ſingularities which were affected by other philoſophers, particularly the ſtately gravity of Plato, and the rigid abſtinence of Diogenes[d]. On a public feſtival, he appeared in a rich and ſplendid dreſs, and converſed and danced like a courtier. Theſe captivating manners, united with a wonder-

[a] Aul. Gell. l. xix. c. 1. Ælian Hiſt. Var. l. ix. 20.
[b] Laert. Vitruv. Archit. l. vi. Galen in Protrept. c. 5. Diod. Sic. l. xiv. p. 298.
[c] Plut. in Dione. Suidas. Hor. Ep. 1. xvii. 23.

* Yet Ariſtippus every dreſs became,
In every various ſtate of life the ſame.

[d] Laert. l. ii. § 62, 7.

ful power of managing the humours of the tyrant, gave him the command of the royal favour. The reſt of the philoſophers, who found themſelves counteracted in their attempts to ſubdue the ſtubborn mind of Dionyſius to the ſeverity of their diſcipline, and who were, perhaps, ſecretly mortified by neglect, beheld this riſing favourite with envy. Although it is impoſſible wholly to exculpate Ariſtippus from the charge of libertiniſm, it ſeems not unreaſonable to impute to the jealouſy of rivalſhip many of thoſe tales, to the diſcredit of this philoſopher, which have been ſo induſtriouſly propagated both by antient and modern writers.

There can be little doubt, that before the expulſion of Dionyſius, Ariſtippus, with the reſt of the philoſophers, left Syracuſe. Æſchines, who had remained in Sicily till after the exile of the tyrant, upon his return to Athens, found him teaching in this ſeat of the muſes[a]. But how long he remained in Greece; whether he ever returned into his own country; in what manner, and when he died, are circumſtances concerning which we have, at this day, no certain information.

The particulars, which have been related, may ſuffice to afford us ſome idea of the character of Ariſtippus. If his natural diſpoſition leaned more ſtrongly towards pleaſure than was conſiſtent with the ſtrictneſs of Socratic morals, he muſt, nevertheleſs, be allowed the credit of elegant manners, a thirſt after knowledge, ready wit, and an ingenuous temper. Of this latter quality we have an example, in the manner in which he reconciled himſelf to his friend Æſchines, who had offended him. In the midſt of a diſpute between them, which was growing violent, "Let us give over," ſaid he, "and be friends, before we make ourſelves the talk of ſervants: we have quarrelled, it is true; but I, as your ſenior, have a right to claim the precedency in the reconciliation." Æſchines accepted the generous propoſal, and acknowledged his ſuperior merit. The following repartees may deſerve to be ſelected from many others, as ſpecimens of this philoſopher's ingenuity.

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 62.

In reply to the inquiry of Dionyſius, why he viſited his court, Ariſtippus ſaid, "To give what I have, and to receive what I have not." His friend Polyxenus happening to call upon him when great preparations were making for an entertainment, entered into a long diſcourſe againſt luxury: Ariſtippus grew tired with his harangue, and invited him to ſtay and ſup with him; Polyxenus accepted the invitation: "I perceive then," ſaid Ariſtippus, "it is not the luxury of my table that offends you, but the expence." To one who was boaſting of his ſkill and activity in ſwimming he ſaid, "Are you not aſhamed to value yourſelf upon that, which every dolphin can do better?" When he was aſked, what he had gained by philoſophy? he replied, "A capacity of converſing, without embarraſſment, with all claſſes of men." A wealthy citizen complaining that Ariſtippus, in requiring five hundred drachmas for the inſtruction of his ſon, had demanded as much as would purchaſe a ſlave; "Purchaſe one, then, with the money," ſaid the philoſopher, "and you will be maſter of two[a]."

Several maxims and obſervations are aſcribed to Ariſtippus, which are not unworthy of the Socratic ſchool; for example: If there were no laws, a wiſe man would live honeſtly. It is better to be poor, than illiterate; for the poor man only wants money, the illiterate want the diſtinguiſhing characters of human nature. The houſes of the wealthy are frequented by philoſophers, for the ſame reaſon for which thoſe of the ſick are frequented by phyſicians. The truly learned are not they who read much, but they who read what is uſeful. Young people ſhould be taught thoſe things, which will be uſeful to them when they become men[b].

Ariſtippus, however, did not uniformly adhere to the excellent model upon which theſe maxims were framed. From the imperfect accounts which remain of his doctrine, it appears that he was eminently the preceptor of pleaſure. He agreed with Socrates in diſmiſſing, as wholly unprofitable, all thoſe ſpeculations which have no connection with the conduct of life. He compared thoſe

[a] Laert. [b] Ibid.

philoſophers who neglected moral ſcience, in the purſuit of that which is purely ſpeculative, to Penelope's ſuitors, who preferred the handmaid to the miſtreſs[a]. The diſtinguiſhing tenets of his ſyſtem, as far as they can be collected from the caſual, and perhaps unfair repreſentations of prejudiced contemporaries, and from the adulterated and vague reports of later writers, are as follows:

Perceptions alone are certain; of the external objects which produce them, we know nothing. No one can be aſſured, that the perception excited in his mind by any external object is ſimilar to that which is excited by the ſame object in the mind of another perſon[b]. Human nature is ſubject to two contrary affections, pain and pleaſure, the one a harſh, the other a gentle emotion. The emotions of pleaſure, though they may differ in degree, or in the object which excites them, are the ſame in all animals, and univerſally create deſire. Thoſe of pain are, in like manner, eſſentially the ſame, and univerſally create averſion. Happineſs conſiſts not in tranquillity or indolence, but in a pleaſing agitation of the mind, or active enjoyment. Pleaſure is the ultimate object of human purſuit; it is only in ſubſerviency to this, that fame, friendſhip, and even virtue, are to be deſired. All crimes are venial becauſe never committed but through the immediate impulſe of paſſion. Nothing is juſt or unjuſt by nature, but by cuſtom and law. The buſineſs of philoſophy is to regulate the ſenſes, in that manner which will render them moſt productive of pleaſure. Since pleaſure is to be derived, not from the paſt or the future, but the preſent, a wiſe man will take care to enjoy the preſent hour, and will be indifferent to life or death[c].

It would have been wonderful if ſo indulgent a ſyſtem of morals had not obtained ſome admirers: but it would have been more wonderful, if a ſyſtem, which only provided for the gratification of the ſenſes and the ſelfiſh paſſions, and left human nature deſtitute

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 79, 80. Ariſt. Met. l. ii. c. 21.

[b] Sextus Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. § 191. Cic. in Lucullo, c. 7. Acad. Q. l. iv. c. 7.

[c] Laert. l. ii. § 92—5. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 71. l. v. c. 128. Tuſc. Q. l. iii. c. 13. ii. c. 6. De Offic. iii. 33. Athæn. l. xii. p. 544. Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. xiv. § 6.

of its nobleſt ornaments and higheſt pleaſures, had not ſoon fallen into the contempt which it deſerved.

After the death of Ariſtippus, his doctrine was profeſſed and taught by his daughter ARETE, a woman of learning and ability, ſufficient to give her a place in the catalogue of philoſophers[a].

Among the more eminent diſciples of this ſchool was HEGESIAS. His temper was too gloomy to find enjoyment upon his maſter's plan, and his principles furniſhed him with no other ſources of happineſs. He was ſo thoroughly diſſatisfied with life that he thought it the only concern of man to avoid miſery, and wrote a book to prove, that death, as the cure of all evil, is the greateſt good. Hence he obtained the appellation of πεισιθάνατος, the advocate for death[b]. *

Another follower of Ariſtippus was ANICERRIS, a Cyrenian. He ſo far receded from the doctrine of his maſter, as to acknowledge the merit of filial piety, friendſhip, and patriotiſm, and to allow that a wiſe man might retain the poſſeſſion of himſelf in the midſt of external troubles; but, he inherited ſo much of his frivolous taſte, as to value himſelf upon the moſt trivial accompliſhments, particularly upon his dexterity in being able to drive a chariot twice round a courſe in the ſame ring[c].

THEODORUS, a diſciple of Anicerris, for the freedom with which he ſpoke concerning the gods, was ſtigmatiſed with the name of Atheiſt, and baniſhed from Cyrene[d]. He took refuge in Athens; but his impiety would here have proved fatal to him, had not Demetrius Phalereus, who, at that time, had great influence over the

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 86. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. iv. p. 523.

[b] Laert. l. ii. § 94, 5. Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. i. c. 34. Val. Max. l. viii. c. 9.

* The paſſage of Laertius, here referred to, is manifeſtly corrupted. The words, τὴν τε ζωὴν τε, καὶ τὸν δε θάνατον αἱρετόν, "death and life are equally eligible"—are inconſiſtent with what is juſt before ſaid of Hegeſias. Caſaubon ingeniouſly connects the words, τὴν τε ζωὴν, with the preceding clauſe, and reads the paſſage thus: ὥστε ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν δε ζωὴν· Τὸν δε θάνατον αἱρετόν "Since there is no real happineſs in life, death is to be preferred."

[c] Laert. l. ii. § 87. Suidas in Anîcerr.

[d] Laert. l. ii. § 98—102. Suidas. Bayle.

Athenians,

Athenians, interpoſed in his favour. Under his protection, he gained acceſs to the court of Ptolemy Lagis. Venturing, after a long interval, to return to Athens, it is related, that he ſuffered death by hemlock: but whether his offence was, in reality, atheiſm, or whether it was merely contempt of the Grecian ſuperſtitions, has been much diſputed. Sextus Empiricus[a] joins Theodorus with Eumerus, and others, who maintained, that they who were eſteemed gods, were men, who had poſſeſſed great power on earth: and Clemens Alexandrinus[b] expreſſes his ſurpriſe that Eumerus, Nicanor, Diagoras, Theodorus, and others, who had lived virtuouſly, ſhould be pronounced atheiſts for their oppoſition to gentile polytheiſm[c]. If theſe teſtimonies be not ſufficient to remove all ſuſpicion of atheiſm from the character of Theodorus, it may at leaſt ſerve to prevent any poſitive deciſion againſt him. The ſame remark may be applied to Eumerus, who flouriſhed in the time of Caſſander the Younger, king of Macedonia, concerning whom it is related, that he undertook long journies in order to aſcertain the places of the death and burial of the gods, and particularly that, in the iſland of Panchaia, in the Southern ocean, he ſaw a pillar dedicated to Jupiter Triphylius, on which the memorable actions of that deity were inſcribed[d].

Among the followers of Theodorus was BION, of Boryſthenes, a man of low extraction. When young he was ſold as a ſlave to an orator, who afterwards gave him his freedom, and left him large poſſeſſions. Upon this, he went to Athens, and applied himſelf to the ſtudy of philoſophy. He had ſeveral preceptors, but chiefly attached himſelf to the doctrine of Theodorus, for which he was a profeſſed advocate. He flouriſhed about the one hundred and twentieth Olympiad[e]. *

The ſhort duration of the Cyrenaic ſect was owing, in part, to the remote diſtance of Cyrene from Greece, the chief ſeat of learning and philoſophy; in part, to the unbounded latitude, which theſe

[a] Adv. Math. l. ix. § 51. [b] Protrept. p. 24.
[c] Conf. Lactant. l. i. c. 12. Minuc. Fel. Oct. c. 8. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 14. Plut. Plac. l. i. c. 7.
[d] Cic. de Nat. D. i. 42. Plut. de Iſ. & Oſ. Euſeb. Prep. l. ii. Clem. Al. loc. cit.
[e] Laert. l. iv. § 46—51. * B. C. 300.

philoſophers

philoſophers allowed themſelves in practice as well as opinion; and in part, to the riſe of the Epicurean ſect, which taught the doctrine of pleaſure in a more philoſophical form *.

* Videnda. Menzii Ariſtippi Vet. Hal. 1719. Thomaſii Introd. in Phil. Rat. c. vi. § 60. Parker de Deo. Diſſ. p. 1, 8. Buddæus de Sceptic. Mor. § 9. Themiſtii Orat. 21. Voſſ. de Idol. Gent. l. i. c. 1. Reiman. Hiſt. Ath. c. 24. Mourges Plan. de Pyth. t. i. c. 3. Gaſſend. Synt. Ph. Epic. p. ii. § 1. c. 3. Stollii Hiſt. Ph. Mor. § 55. Buddæi Theſ. de Atheiſm. c. 1. § 17. Zimmerman. Epiſt. ad Nonn. ap. Muſæum. Hiſt. Brem. v. i. Voſſ. Hiſt. Gr. l. i. c. 11. Wowerius de Polymathia. Bayle in Ariſtipp. &c.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE MEGARIC OR ERISTIC SECT.

THE ſecond ſect, which ſprung from the ſchool of Socrates, was that which was inſtituted by Euclid of Megara, called, from the place which gave birth to its founder, the Megaric ſect, and from its diſputatious character the Eriſtic. It had alſo the appellation of Dialectic; not becauſe it gave riſe to dialectics, or logical debates, which had before this time exerciſed the ingenuity of philoſophers, particularly in the Eleatic ſchool; but becauſe the diſcourſes and writings of this claſs of philoſophers commonly took the form of dialogue [a].

EUCLID OF MEGARA [b], endued by nature with a ſubtle and penetrating genius, early applied himſelf to the ſtudy of philoſophy. The writings of Parmenides firſt taught him the art of diſputation. Hearing of the fame of Socrates, Euclid determined to attend upon

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 106. Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. ii.
[b] Laert. ib. Cic. Qu. Acad. l. iv. c. 42. Suidas.

his

his inſtructions, and for this purpoſe removed from Megara to Athens. Here he long remained a conſtant hearer, and zealous diſciple, of the Moral Philoſopher. And when, in conſequence of the enmity which ſubſiſted between the Athenians and Megarians, a decree was paſſed by the former, that any inhabitant of Megara, who ſhould be ſeen in Athens, ſhould forfeit his life, he frequently came to Athens by night, from the diſtance of about twenty miles, concealed in a long female cloak and veil, to viſit his maſter[a]. Not finding his natural propenſity to diſputation ſufficiently gratified in the tranquil method of philoſophiſing adopted by Socrates, he frequently engaged in the buſineſs and diſputes of the civil courts. Socrates, who deſpiſed forenſic conteſts, expreſſed ſome diſſatisfaction with his pupil for indulging a fondneſs for controverſy[b]. This circumſtance probably proved the occaſion of a ſeparation between Euclid and his maſter; for we find him, after this time, at the head of a ſchool in Megara[c], in which his chief employment was, to teach the art of diſputation. Debates were conducted with ſo much vehemence among his pupils, that Timon ſaid of Euclid, that he had carried the madneſs of contention from Athens to Megara[d]. That he was, however, capable of commanding his temper, appears from his reply to his brother, who in a quarrel had ſaid, "Let me periſh if I be not revenged on you:" "and let *me* periſh," returned Euclid, "if I do not ſubdue your reſentment by forbearance, and make you love me as much as ever[e]." His kind reception of the diſciples of Socrates, after the death of their maſter, has been already noticed. Euclid of Megara is not to be confounded with Euclid the mathematician, who flouriſhed at a later period under Ptolemy Lagus, and died in the hundred and twenty-third Olympiad[f]. *

In diſputation, Euclid was averſe to the analogical method of reaſoning, and judged, that legitimate argumentation conſiſts in deducing fair concluſions from acknowledged premiſes[g]. He held, that there is one ſupreme good, which he called by the different names of

[a] Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. l. vi. c. 10.
[b] Laert. l. ii. § 30. [c] Id. l. iii. § 6. [d] Ib. l. vi. §. 22.
[e] Plut. de Amic. Frat. [f] Fabric. Gr. v. ii. p. 369. * B. C. 283.
[g] Laert. Cic. Qu. Ac. l. iv. c. 42.

Intelligence,

Intelligence, Providence, God; and that evil, conſidered as an oppoſite principle to the ſovereign good, has no phyſical exiſtence. The ſupreme good, according to Cicero, he defined to be, that which is always the ſame. In this doctrine, in which he followed the ſubtilty of Parmenides rather than the ſimplicity of Socrates, he ſeems to have conſidered good abſtractedly, as reſiding in the deity, and to have maintained, that all things which exiſt are good by their participation of the firſt good, and conſequently that there is, in the nature of things, no real evil.—It is ſaid, that when Euclid was aſked his opinion concerning the gods, he replied, I know nothing more of them than this, that they hate inquiſitive perſons[a]. If this apothegm be juſtly aſcribed to Euclid, it may ſerve to prove, either that he had learned from the precepts of Socrates to think ſoberly and reſpectfully concerning the divine nature, or that the fate of that good man had taught him caution in declaring his opinions.

Euclid was ſucceeded, in the Megaric ſchool, by Eubulides of Miletus[b]. He was a ſtrenuous opponent of Ariſtotle, and ſeized every occaſion of cenſuring his writings, and calumniating his character. He introduced new ſubtleties into the art of diſputation, ſeveral of which, though often mentioned as proofs of great ingenuity, deſerve only to be remembered as examples of egregious trifling. Of theſe ſophiſtical modes of reaſoning, called by Ariſtotle Eriſtic ſyllogiſms, a few examples may ſuffice[c]: 1. Of the ſophiſm, called, from the example, *The Lying*: if, when you ſpeak the truth, you ſay you lie, you lie: but you ſay you lie, when you ſpeak the truth; therefore, in ſpeaking the truth, you lie. 2. *The Occult.* Do you know your father? Yes. Do you know this man who is veiled? No. Then you do not know your father; for it is your father who is veiled. 3. *Electra.* Electra, the daughter of Agamemnon, knew her brother, and did not know him: ſhe knew Oreſtes to be her brother, but ſhe did not know that perſon to be her brother who was converſing with her. 4. *Sorites*, Is one grain a heap? No. Two

[a] Anton. et Maxim. Serm. 37. [b] Laert. l. ii. § 108, &c.

[c] Laert. Athæn. l. viii. Cic. de Div. l. ii. c. 4. Qu. Ac. l. iv. c. 30. vi. c. 6. Lucian. in Vit. Auct. A. Gell. l. xvi. c. 2.

grains?

grains? No. Three grains? No. Go on, adding one by one; and, if one grain be not a heap, it will be impoſſible to ſay, what number of grains make a heap[a]. 5. *The Horned.* You have what you have not loſt; you have not loſt horns; therefore you have horns. In ſuch high repute were theſe ſilly inventions for perplexing plain truth, that Chryſippus wrote ſix books upon the firſt of theſe ſophiſms; and Philetas, a Choan, died of a conſumption which he contracted by the cloſe ſtudy which he beſtowed upon it[b]. The inſcription upon his tomb was, Ὁ ψευδόμενος, "The deceived." A ſerious attempt to expoſe the futility of theſe diſputes would now be juſtly deemed an idle waſte of time and words.

Another diſciple of the ſame ſchool was DIODORUS of Caria, a great adept in this kind of verbal combat[c]. A dialectic queſtion was propoſed to him in the preſence of Ptolemy Soter (for ſuch, at that time, was the amuſement of princes) by Stilpo, another of this ingenious fraternity. He acknowledged himſelf incapable of giving an immediate anſwer, and requeſted *time* for the ſolution. The king ridiculed his want of ingenuity, and gave him the ſurname of Chronus. Mortified at this defeat, he retired from the entertainment, wrote a book upon the queſtion, and at laſt, fooliſhly enough! died of vexation. This Diodorus is ſaid to have invented the famous argument againſt motion[d]: If any body be moved, it is either moved in the place where it is, or in a place where it is not; but it is not moved in the place where it is, for where it is, it remains; nor is it moved in a place where it is not, for nothing can either act or ſuffer where it is not; therefore there is no ſuch thing as motion. Diodorus, after the invention of this wonderful argument, was very properly repaid for his ingenuity. Having had the misfortune to diſlocate his ſhoulder, the ſurgeon, whom he ſent for to replace it, kept him ſome time in torture, whilſt he proved

[a] Senec. Ep. 45.
[b] Laert. l. vii. § 196. Athæn. l. ix. 403. Suidas in Philetas.
[c] Laert. l. ii. § 111. Sext. Emp. adv. Log. ii. 115.
[d] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. l. ii. c. 22. § 142. 5.

to him, from his own method of reaſoning, that the bone could not have *moved* out of its place. Diodorus has been ranked among the atomic philoſophers, becauſe he held the doctrine of ſmall indiviſible bodies, infinite in number but finite in magnitude: but it does not appear that he conceived the idea which diſtinguiſhes the atomic doctrine, as it was taught by Democritus and others, that the firſt atoms are deſtitute of all properties except extenſion and figure[a].

Stilpo of Megara[b], who lived about the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, is not only celebrated for his eloquence and his ſkill in dialectics, but for the ſucceſs with which he applied the moral precepts of philoſophy to the correction of his natural propenſities. Though in his youth he had been much addicted to intemperance and licentious pleaſure; after he ranked himſelf among philoſophers, he was never known to violate the laws of ſobriety or chaſtity[c]. With reſpect to riches, he exerciſed a virtuous moderation. When Ptolemy Soter, at the taking of Megara, preſented him with a large ſum of money, and requeſted him to accompany him into Egypt, he returned the greater part of the preſent, and choſe to retire, during Ptolemy's ſtay at Megara, to the iſland of Ægina. Afterwards, when Megara was again taken by Demetrius[d], ſon of Antigonus, the conqueror ordered the ſoldiers to ſpare the houſe of Stilpo, and, if any thing ſhould be taken from him in the hurry of the plunder, to reſtore it. The philoſopher being required to give an account of any effects which he had loſt, he replied, that he had loſt nothing; for no one could take from him his learning and eloquence. At the ſame time he won the affections of the conqueror, by the pathetic manner in which he recommended to him the exerciſe of humanity. So great was the fame of Stilpo, that, when he

[a] Cic. Ac. Q. l. iv. c. 47. Arrian Diſſ. Epict. l. ii. c. 19. Moſheim in Cudworth, c. 1. p. 22.

[b] Laert. l. ii. § 113—119. Suidas.

[c] Cic. de Fato, c. 5. Plut. adv. Colot. Sen. Ep. 9. De Conſtant. c. 5. Athæn. l. x. p. 422. l. xiii. p. 496.

[d] Plut. in Demet. et de Tranquil. Animi.

viſited

viſited Athens, the people ran out of their ſhops to ſee him, and even the moſt eminent philoſophers of Athens took pleaſure in attending upon his diſcourſes.

The peculiar doctrines of Stilpo were, that ſpecies, or univerſals, have no real exiſtence, and that one thing cannot be predicated, or aſſerted, of another[a]. He maintained, that in uſing, for example, the word *man* as an univerſal term, we ſpeak of nothing; for the term neither ſignifies this man nor that man, nor applies to any one man more than another. The doctrine, which he held upon this ſubject, was probably the ſame which was afterwards, in the ſcholaſtic ages, maintained with ſo much acrimony by the nominaliſts. To prove that one thing cannot be predicated of another, he ſaid, that *goodneſs* and *man*, for inſtance, are different things, which cannot be confounded by aſſerting the one to be the other: he argued farther, that goodneſs is an univerſal, and univerſals have no real exiſtence; conſequently, ſince nothing cannot be predicated of any thing, goodneſs cannot be predicated of man. Thus, whilſt this ſubtle logician was, through his whole argument, predicating one thing of another, he denied that any one thing could be the accident or predicate of another. If Stilpo was ſerious in this reaſoning; if he meant any thing more than to expoſe the ſophiſtry of the ſchools, he muſt be confeſſed to have been an eminent maſter of the art of wrangling; and it was not wholly without reaſon that Glycera, a celebrated courtezan, when ſhe was reproved by Stilpo as a corruptor of youth, replied, that the charge might be juſtly retorted upon him, who ſpent his time in filling their heads with ſophiſtical quibbles, and uſeleſs ſubtleties.

On moral topics, Stilpo is ſaid to have taught, that the higheſt felicity conſiſts in a mind free from the dominion of paſſion; a doctrine ſimilar to that of the Stoics.

In reply to a queſtion which Crates propoſed to this philoſopher, whether the gods take pleaſure in the honours which are paid them by mortals, he ſaid, "You fool, do not queſtion me up-

[a] Laert. ibid. Senec. Ep. 9.

on this ſubject in the public ſtreet, but when we are alone." From this circumſtance, and from the freedom with which he is ſaid to have ridiculed the ſtatue of Minerva, it may be concluded that Stilpo had little reverence for the Athenian ſuperſtitions[a]: but there is no proof of his infidelity with reſpect to the exiſtence of a ſupreme divinity.*

[a] Athen. l. x. p. 422.

* Vidend. Jonſii Script. Hiſt. Ph. l. ii. c. 1. Stoll. Hiſt. Mor. § 57. Gaſſend. in Log. Op. t. i. p. 40. Walchii Hiſt. Log. § 3. Parerg. Acad. p. 498. Rapin Reflexions ſur la Philoſophie, § 28. Cudworth, c. 1. cum Moſh. Not. Lipſii Manud. l. iii. c. 7. Bayle.

CHAP VII.

OF THE ELIAC AND ERETRIAC SCHOOL.

THE Eliac ſchool, as far as we can at preſent learn, appears to have adhered ſo cloſely to the doctrine of Socrates, that it is ſcarcely to be conſidered as a ſeparate ſect. It is certain, however, that PHÆDO[a] of Elis eſtabliſhed a diſtinct ſchool of philoſophy, which took its name from the place of his birth. He was deſcended from an illuſtrious family; but had the misfortune, early in life, to be deprived of his patrimony, and ſold as a ſlave at Athens. It happened that Socrates, as he paſſed by the houſe where he lived, remarked in his countenance traces of an ingenuous mind, which induced him to perſuade one of his friends,

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 106. A. Gell. l. ii. c. 18. Suidas. Origen cont. Celſ. l. i. p. 51. l. iii. p. 154.

Alcibiades,

Alcibiades, or Crito, to redeem him. From that time, Phædo applied himſelf diligently to the ſtudy of moral philoſophy under Socrates; and, to the laſt, adhered to his maſter with the moſt affectionate attachment. He inſtituted a ſchool at Elis, after the Socratic model; which was continued by Pliſtanus, an Elian, and afterwards by Menedemus of Eretria.

MENEDEMUS[a], though well deſcended, was, obliged through poverty to ſubmit to the manual employment of an houſebuilder. He formed an early intimacy with Aſclepiades, a Phliaſian, who was a fellow-labourer with him in his humble occupation. Having minds more formed for ſtudy than for labour, they determined to devote themſelves to the purſuit of philoſophy. For this purpoſe, they left their native country, and went to Athens, where Plato then preſided in the Academy. It was ſoon obſerved, that theſe ſtrangers had no viſible means of ſubſiſtence; and, according to a law of Solon, they were cited before the court of Areopagus, to give an account of the manner in which they were ſupported. The maſter of one of the public priſons was, at their requeſt, ſent for, and atteſted that, every night, theſe two youths went among the criminals, and, by grinding with them, earned two drachmas, which enabled them to ſpend the day in the ſtudy of philoſophy. The magiſtrates, ſtruck with admiration at ſuch an extraordinary proof of an indefatigable thirſt after knowledge, diſmiſſed them with high applauſe, and preſented them with two hundred drachmas[b]. They met with ſeveral other friends, who liberally ſupplied them with whatever was neceſſary to enable them to proſecute their ſtudies.

By the advice of his friend, and probably in his ſociety, Menedemus went from Athens to Megara, to attend upon the inſtructions of Stilpo. He expreſſed his approbation of the manner in which this philoſopher taught, by giving him the appellation of The Liberal. He next viſited Elis, where he became a diſciple of Phædo, and afterwards his ſucceſſor. Transferring the Eliac ſchool from Elis to his native city, he gave it the name of Ere-

[a] Laert. l. ii. § 125—140. [b] Athæn. l. iv. p. 168.

* About ſix pounds.

trian.

trian. In his ſchool he neglected thoſe forms which were commonly obſerved in places of this kind: his hearers were not, as uſual, placed on circular benches around him; but every one attended him in whatever poſture he pleaſed, ſtanding, walking, or ſitting.

At firſt Menedemus was received by the Eretrians with contempt; and, on account of the vehemence with which he diſputed, he was often branded with the appellations of cur, and madman. But afterwards he roſe into high eſteem, and was intruſted with a public office, to which was annexed an annual ſtipend of two hundred talents. He diſcharged the truſt with fidelity, but accepted only a fourth part of the appointment. On ſeveral ſucceſſive embaſſies to Ptolemy, Lyſander, and Demetrius, he rendered his countrymen eſſential ſervices, by obtaining a diminution of their tribute, and reſcuing them from other burdens. Antigonus entertained a perſonal reſpect for him, and profeſſed himſelf one of his diſciples. His intimacy with this prince created a ſuſpicion amongſt his countrymen, that he had a ſecret intention to betray their city into his hands. To eſcape the hazards ariſing from their jealouſy, he retired to Oropus in Bœotia, and afterwards fled to Antigonus, where mortification and diſappointment ſoon put a period to his life. He precipitated his end, by abſtaining for ſeveral days from food. He died in the eighty-fourth year of his age and about the hundred and twenty fourth Olympiad[a].

Menedemus poſſeſſed great readineſs and verſatility of genius, and was able to diſpute on every ſubject with keenneſs and fluency. He declared his opinions with freedom, inveighed with ſeverity againſt the vices of others, and by the purity of his own manners commanded univerſal reſpect. He obſerved the ſtricteſt moderation in his manner of living[b]. His entertainments, which were frequented by many philoſophers and men of diſtinction, were ſimple and frugal, conſiſting chiefly of vegetables; and were always enlivened by liberal converſation. His friendſhip for Aſclepiades continued after

[a] B. C. 284. [b] Athæn. l. x. p. 419.

his

his death. A favourite ſervant of his, coming late to the houſe of Menedemus, was refuſed admiſſion by the ſervants; but the maſter ordered them to let him in, adding, that Aſclepiades, though dead, had ſtill the power of opening his doors.

Nothing farther is known concerning the preceptors of the Eliac or Eretriac School, but that they ſtudiouſly avoided, and ſtrenuouſly oppoſed, the ſophiſtical fooleries of the Megaric ſect, and adhered cloſely to the ſimple doctrines, and uſeful precepts, which they had received from SOCRATES *.

* Vidend. Jonſ. l. ii. c. 4. 6. Eſchenbach. Diſſ. Acad. v. De Sympoſ. Sap. Hody de Bibl. Text. Orig. l. i. c. 7.

CHAP. VIII.

OF THE ACADEMIC SECT.

SECTION I.

OF PLATO AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.

HAVING treated of thoſe ſects of philoſophers, derived from the ſchool of Socrates, which were of inferior note and of ſhort duration, we are now to trace the riſe and progreſs of thoſe which were more permanent, and of greater celebrity. Theſe were the ACADEMIC and the CYNIC ſects; the former founded by Plato, the latter by Antiſthenes. The Academic ſect afterwards gave birth to the PERIPATETIC; and the Cynic, to the STOIC.

Of all the diſciples of Socrates, Plato, though he modeſtly calls himſelf the leaſt [a], was unqueſtionably the moſt illuſtrious. As long as philoſophy continued to be ſtudied among the Greeks and Romans, his doctrines were taught, and his name was held in the higheſt veneration. When other ſects fell into oblivion, the Platonic philoſophy, united with the Peripatetic, ſtill flouriſhed. Even to the preſent day, Plato has many followers; his writings ſtill give a tincture to the ſpeculations and language of philoſophy and theology. An inquiry into the particulars of his life and doctrine is therefore an intereſting part of our deſign. And it is the more neceſſary, that this inquiry be made with diligence and accuracy, as his opinions have been frequently miſrepreſented, and his ſyſtem, as we ſhall afterwards ſee, has undergone frequent and material alterations.

PLATO [b] was by deſcent an Athenian; but the place of his birth was the iſland of Ægina, where his father Ariſto reſided after that iſland became ſubject to Athens. His origin is traced back, on his father's ſide to Codrus, and on that of his mother Pericthione, through five generations, to Solon [c]. The time of his birth is commonly placed in the firſt year of the eighty-eighth Olympiad [d]; but perhaps it may be more accurately fixed in the third year of the eighty-ſeventh Olympiad [e]. Fable has made Apollo his father, and has ſaid, that he was born of a virgin [f]. He gave early indications of an extenſive and original genius. Whilſt he was young, he was inſtructed in the rudiments of letters by the grammarian Dionyſius, and trained in athletic exerciſes by Ariſto of Argos. He applied, with great diligence, to the ſtudy and practice of the arts of painting and poetry. In the latter he made ſuch proficiency, as to produce an epic poem, which, however, upon comparing it with Homer, he committed to the flames. At the age of twenty years, he

[a] Apol. Soc. [b] Laert. l. iii. § 1. &c. Suidas.
[c] Proclus ad Timæum. p. 25. [d] B. C. 428. [e] B. C. 430.
[f] Plut. Sympoſ. l. viii. c. 1. Hieronym. adv. Jov. l. i. tom. iv. p. 186. ed Par.

compoſed

compoſed a dramatic piece, which he gave to the performers, to be repreſented upon the theatre; but, the day before the intended exhibition, happening to attend upon a diſcourſe of Socrates, he was captivated by his eloquence, and, from that moment, determined to relinquiſh all pretenſions to poetical diſtinction, and to turn his ambition into the channel of philoſophy. He forſook the Muſes, burned his poems, and applied himſelf wholly to the ſtudy of wiſdom[a].

It is probable, that Plato received the firſt tincture of philoſophy from Cratylus and Hermogenes[b], who taught the ſyſtems of Heraclitus and Parmenides. When he was twenty years old, he became a ſtated diſciple of Socrates, and remained with him in that relation eight years. During this period, he frequently diſpleaſed the followers of Socrates, and ſometimes gave Socrates himſelf occaſions of complaint, by mixing foreign tenets with thoſe of his maſter, and grafting upon the Socratic ſyſtem, opinions which were taken from ſome other ſtock. Plato, nevertheleſs, retained a zealous attachment to Socrates. When that great and good man was ſummoned before the ſenate, Plato, as we have ſeen, undertook to plead his cauſe, and begun a ſpeech in his defence; but the partiality and violence of the judges would not permit him to proceed. After the condemnation, he preſented his maſter with money ſufficient to redeem his life, which, however, Socrates refuſed to accept. During his impriſonment, Plato attended him, and was preſent at a converſation which he held with his friends concerning the immortality of the ſoul, the ſubſtance of which he afterwards committed to writing in the beautiful dialogue entitled Phædo[c], not, however, without interweaving his own opinions and language. Upon the death of his maſter, he withdrew, with ſeveral other friends of Socrates, to Megara, where they were hoſpitably entertained by Euclid, and

[a] Ælian. Hiſt. Var. l. x. c. 21, 27, 30. Val. Max. l. i. c. 6. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xi. c. 29. Cic. de Divin. l. i. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 7.

[b] Apuleius de Dogmat. Plat. Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 6.

[c] Conf. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. iii. c. 33.

remained till the ferment at Athens ſubſided. Under Euclid he ſtudied the art of reaſoning, and probably increaſed his fondneſs for diſputation.

Deſirous of making himſelf maſter of all the wiſdom and learning which the age could furniſh, Plato travelled into every country, which was ſo far enlightened as to promiſe him any recompence of his labour. He firſt viſited that part of Italy, called *Magna Græcia*, where a celebrated ſchool of philoſophy had been eſtabliſhed by Pythagoras, and was inſtructed in all the myſteries of the Pythagorean ſyſtem[a], the ſubtleties of which he afterwards too freely blended with the ſimple doctrine of Socrates. He next viſited Theodorus of Cyrene, and became his pupil in mathematical ſcience. When he found himſelf ſufficiently inſtructed in the elements of this branch of learning, he determined to ſtudy aſtronomy, and other ſciences, in Egypt. That he might travel with ſafety, he aſſumed the character of a merchant, and as a ſeller of oil paſſed through the whole kingdom of Artaxerxes Mnenon. Wherever he came, he obtained information from the Egyptian prieſts concerning their aſtronomical obſervations and calculations. "Whilſt ſtudious youth," (ſays Valerius Maximus[b], rather indeed in the ſtyle of oratory than hiſtory, for Plato had not yet inſtituted his ſchool at Athens) "were crowding to Athens from every quarter in ſearch of Plato for their maſter, that philoſopher was wandering along the winding banks of the Nile, or the vaſt plains of a barbarous country, himſelf a diſciple to the old men of Egypt."

It has been aſſerted, that it was in Egypt that Plato acquired his opinions concerning the origin of the world, and learnt the doctrines of tranſmigration, and the immortality of the ſoul[c]: but it is more probable that he learned the latter doctrine from Socrates, and the former from Pythagoras. It is not likely

[a] Apul. loc. cit. Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. v. c. 29. Quntil. l. i. c. 12. Photii Codex. 259. p. 712.

[b] L. viii. c. 7. [c] Pauſan. in Meſſen. p. 360.

that

that Plato, in the habit of a merchant, could have gained acceſs to the ſacred myſteries of Egypt; for we ſhall afterwards ſee, in the caſe of Pythagoras, that the Egyptian prieſts were ſo unwilling to communicate their ſecrets to ſtrangers, that even a royal mandate was ſcarcely ſufficient, in a ſingle inſtance, to procure this indulgence. [a]Little regard is therefore due to the opinion of thoſe[a] who aſſert, that Plato derived his ſyſtem of philoſophy from the Egyptians.

Nor is there better foundation for ſuppoſing[b], that during his reſidence in Egypt, Plato became acquainted with the doctrine of the Hebrews, and enriched his ſyſtem with ſpoils from their ſacred books. This opinion has, it is true, been ſtrenuouſly maintained by ſeveral Jewiſh and Chriſtian writers: but it has little foundation beyond mere conjecture; and it is not difficult to perceive, that it originated in that injudicious zeal for the honour of revelation, which led theſe writers to make the Hebrew ſcriptures, or traditions, the ſource of all gentile wiſdom.

The opinion, that Plato derived his philoſophy originally from the Hebrews, and conſequently from divine revelation, was commonly embraced by the fathers of the Chriſtian church, and has been adopted by many learned divines. The chief grounds, upon which this opinion reſts, are 1. The authority of the Jewiſh writers, Joſephus and Ariſtobulus, and of the Chriſtian fathers, Juſtin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Euſebius, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, Ambroſe, and others[c]; 2. The opinion that a Greek verſion of the Hebrew ſcriptures appeared in Egypt before the time of Plato, which he might have ſeen and read, as Clemens Alexandrinus and Euſebius, on the teſtimony of Ariſtobulus, aſſert; 3. The preſumption, that the Egyptians borrowed many of their tenets from the Iſraelites, and communicated them to Plato; and 4. The agreement of the doctrines of Plato with thoſe of the Hebrews. But theſe argu-

[a] Jamblich. Myſt. Æg. l. i. c. 2. p. 3.

[b] Huet. Dem. Pr. iv. c. 2. § 15. Gale's Court of the Gent. Conf. Le Clerc Ep. Crit. vii. Baſnage Hiſt. des Juifs. c. 20.

[c] Vid. Lamy de Trinit. Florent. 1733.

ments will not, we apprehend, appear ſatisfactory to thoſe who are not inclined to pay implicit reſpect to antient authority. For, 1. The teſtimony of the Chriſtian fathers is, in the preſent queſtion, of little value; for they had recourſe to no authentic memorials or impartial witneſſes, but gave credit to the ſuggeſtions of certain Jewiſh writers, who, ſeveral centuries after the time of Plato, to gratify their own vanity, and that of their countrymen, pretended that all gentile wiſdom had been originally derived from Moſes; and particularly, that Plato, during his reſidence in Egypt, had been inſtructed in the Hebrew ſchool. This notion was eagerly embraced by ſeveral learned Platoniſts, who, in the ſecond century were converted to Chriſtianity, but ſtill retained an attachment to their former maſter: and from this time it became a common practice, among thoſe who affected the credit of Greek erudition, to maintain, that whatever opinions Plato and his followers held, ſimilar to the doctrines of revelation, had been borrowed either from the Hebrews or the Chriſtians. 2. A Greek verſion of the Hebrew ſcriptures, prior to the time of Alexander, never exiſted, but in the brain of Ariſtobulus, as will more fully appear when we come to treat of the Jewiſh philoſophy. Neither the author, nor the occaſion, of this verſion can be produced; nor does any ſuch work appear to thoſe who might have been acquainted with it, and whoſe intereſt it would have been to have read it. Separated as the Jews were, before the time of Alexander, from all intercourſe with other nations, and carefully as they concealed their myſteries and ſacred books from gentile ſtrangers, it is not eaſy to conceive how ſuch a verſion could have been made; not to urge, that Greek literature was firſt introduced into Egypt by Alexander. 3. Equally unſupported is the aſſertion, that the Egyptians, and even Plato himſelf, converſed with the Jews on theological ſubjects. Upon this queſtion, learned men have confounded the time, when the Greeks poſſeſſed Egypt, with a preceding period, in which it would not be eaſy to prove, that any ſuch intercourſe took place between the Egyptians and Jews. Nor is it at all probable, that the ſmall remnant of the Jewiſh nation, who after the captivity went with Jeremiah into Egypt, would appear of ſo much conſequence,

quence, as to engage the attention of all Egypt and Greece to their religious cuſtoms and tenets. Laſtly, no proof of the point in queſtion can ariſe from the ſuppoſed agreement between the Moſaic and Platonic doctrines; for either the agreement is imaginary, or, it conſiſts in ſuch particulars as might eaſily be diſcovered by the light of reaſon. Beſides, it has not been ſufficiently attended to, that the true doctrine of Plato was, in the Alexandrian ſchool, ſo far adulterated, and blended with other ſyſtems, that thoſe fathers of the Chriſtian church, who had ſtudied Platoniſm in this ſchool, might eaſily imagine a greater harmony between the Platonic doctrine and their own creed than in reality exiſted. The Chriſtian fathers ſeem to have thought the ſuppoſition, that Heathen philoſophy had been the reſult of the natural powers of the human mind, derogatory to the honour of revelation. But its grounds and principles are now too well underſtood, to render it neceſſary to borrow any part of its credit and authority from Plato. But to return to the narrative.

When Plato had, in his travels, exhauſted the philoſophical treaſures of diſtant countries, he returned into Italy, to the Pythagorean ſchool at Tarentum [a], where he endeavoured to improve his own ſyſtem, by incorporating with it the doctrine of Pythagoras, as it was then taught by Archytas, Timæus, and others [b]. And afterwards, when he viſited Sicily (as we ſhall preſently relate) he retained ſuch an attachment to the Italic ſchool, that, through the bounty of Dionyſius, he purchaſed [c], at a vaſt price, ſeveral books, which contained the doctrine of Pythagoras, from Philolaus, one of his followers.

From the particulars which we have related, concerning the manner in which Plato acquired his knowledge, we are enabled to aſcertain, with ſome degree of preciſion, the ſources of his philoſophy. His dialectics he borrowed from Euclid of Megara: the principles of natural philoſophy he learned in the Eleatic ſchool from Hermogenes and Cratylus; and combining theſe with the Pythagorean

[a] Cic. Cato Maj. c. 16. [b] Apul. loc. cit. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 29.
[c] Conf. Aul. Gell. l. iii. c. 17. Laert. iii. 9. viii. 84. Jamblich. Vit. Pyth. c. 31.

doctrine

doctrine of natural cauſes, he framed from both his ſyſtem of metaphyſics. Mathematics and aſtronomy he was taught in the Cyrenaic ſchool, and by the Egyptian prieſts. From Socrates he imbibed the pure principles of moral and political wiſdom; but he afterwards obſcured their ſimplicity by Pythagorean ſpeculations.

Returning home richly ſtored with knowledge of various kinds, Plato ſettled in Athens, and executed the deſign, which he had doubtleſs long had in contemplation, of forming a new ſchool for the inſtruction of youth in the principles of philoſophy. The place which he made choice of for this purpoſe was a public grove, called the Academy, from Hecademus[a], who left it to the citizens for the purpoſe of gymnaſtic exerciſes. Adorned with ſtatues, temples, and ſepulchres, planted with lofty plane-trees, and interſected by a gentle ſtream, it afforded a delightful retreat for philoſophy and the muſes. Of this retreat Horace ſpeaks[b]:

Atque inter ſylvas Academi quærere verum[c].

Within this incloſure he poſſeſſed, as a part of his humble patrimony, purchaſed at the price of three thouſand drachmas, a ſmall garden, in which he opened a ſchool for the reception of thoſe, who might be inclined to attend his inſtructions. How much Plato valued mathematical ſtudies, and how neceſſary a preparation he thought them for higher ſpeculations, appears from the inſcription which he placed over the door of his ſchool: Οὐδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω. "Let no one, who is unacquainted with geometry, enter here."

This new ſchool ſoon became famous, and its maſter was ranked among the moſt eminent philoſophers. His travels into diſtant countries, where learning and wiſdom flouriſhed, gave him celebrity among his brethren of the Socratic ſect. None of theſe had ventured to inſtitute a ſchool in Athens, except Ariſtippus; and he

[a] Pauſan. in Atticis. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xii. c. 1. Plut. in Cimone et de Exil. Fabric. Bibliograph. Ant. c. 21. § 3. Potter's Arch. Græc. Book i. c. 8.

[b] Ep. ii. 45.

[c] 'Midſt Academic groves to ſearch for truth.

had confined his inſtructions almoſt entirely to ethical ſubjects, and had brought himſelf into ſome diſcredit by the freedom of his manners. Plato alone remained to inherit the patrimony of public eſteem, which Socrates had left his diſciples; and he poſſeſſed talents and learning adequate to his deſign of extending the ſtudy of philoſophy beyond the limits, within which it had been incloſed by his maſter. The conſequence was, not only that young men crowded to his ſchool from every quarter, but that people of the firſt diſtinction, in every department, frequented the Academy. Even females, diſguiſed in men's clothes, often attended his lectures[a]. Among the illuſtrious names which appear in the catalogue of his followers are Dion, the Syracuſan prince, and the orators Hyperides, Lycurgus, Demoſthenes, and Iſocrates.

Such diſtinguiſhed reputation naturally produced among the companions of Plato, formerly the diſciples of Socrates, a ſpirit of emulation, which ſoon degenerated into envy, and loaded him with detraction and obloquy[b]. It can only be aſcribed to mutual jealouſy, that Xenophon and Plato, though they relate the diſcourſes of their common maſter, ſtudiouſly avoid mentioning one another. Diogenes the Cynic ridiculed Plato's doctrine of ideas, and other abſtract ſpeculations. In the midſt of theſe private cenſures, however, the public fame of Plato daily increaſed. His political wiſdom was in ſuch high eſtimation, that ſeveral ſtates ſolicited his aſſiſtance in new modelling their reſpective forms of government[c]. Applications of this kind from the Arcadians, and from the Thebans, he rejected, becauſe they refuſed to adopt the plan of his republic, which required an equal diſtribution of property. He gave his advice in the affairs of Elis, and other Grecian ſtates, and furniſhed a code of laws for Syracuſe. Plato was in high eſteem with ſeveral princes, particularly Archelaus, king of Macedon, and Dionyſius, tyrant of Sicily. At three different periods he viſited the court of this latter prince, and made ſeveral bold, but unſucceſsful attempts to ſubdue his

[a] Athæn. l. vii. p. 279. l. xi. p. 546. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 69.
[b] Athæneus, l. xi. p. 507. Sen. de Vit. Beat. c. 18.
[c] Ælian. Hiſt. Var. l. ii. c. 42. Plut. adv. Colot. l. iii.

haughty

haughty and tyrannical ſpirit. A brief relation[a] of the particulars of theſe viſits to Sicily, may ſerve to caſt ſome light upon the character of our philoſopher.

The profeſſed object of Plato's firſt viſit to Sicily, which happened in the fortieth year of his age, during the reign of the elder Dionyſius, the ſon of Hermocrates, was, to take a ſurvey of the iſland, and particularly to obſerve the wonders of Mount Etna. Whilſt he was reſident at Syracuſe, he was employed in the inſtruction of Dion, the king's brother-in-law, who poſſeſſed excellent abilities, though hitherto reſtrained by the terrors of a tyrannical government, and relaxed by the luxuries of a licentious court. Diſguſted by the debauched manners of the Syracuſans, he endeavoured to reſcue his pupil from the general depravity. Nor did Dion diſappoint his preceptor's expectations. No ſooner had he received a taſte of that philoſophy which leads to virtue, than he was fired with an ardent love of wiſdom. Entertaining an hope, that philoſophy might produce the ſame effect upon Dionyſius, he took great pains to procure an interview between Plato and the tyrant. In the courſe of the conference, whilſt Plato was diſcourſing on the ſecurity and happineſs of virtue, and the miſeries attending injuſtice and oppreſſion, Dionyſius, perceiving that the philoſopher's diſcourſe was levelled againſt the vices and cruelties of his reign, diſmiſſed him with high diſpleaſure from his preſence, and conceived a deſign againſt his life. It was not without great difficulty that Plato, by the aſſiſtance of Dion, made his eſcape. A veſſel which had brought over Pollis, a delegate from Sparta, was fortunately at that time returning to Greece. Dion engaged Pollis to take the charge of the philoſopher, and land him ſafely in his native country; but Dionyſius diſcovered the deſign, and obtained a promiſe from Pollis, that he would either put him to death, or ſell him as a ſlave, upon the paſſage. Pollis, accordingly, ſold him in the iſland of Ægina, the inhabitants of which were then at war with the Athenians. Plato could not long remain unnoticed: Aniceris, a Cyrenaic philoſopher, who happened to be at that time in the iſland, diſcovered the ſtranger, and thought himſelf

[a] Platon. Epiſt. ii. vii. Plut. in Dione. Laert. l. iii.

happy

happy in an opportunity of ſhewing his reſpect for ſo illuſtrious a philoſopher: he purchaſed his freedom for thirty *minæ*, and ſent him home to Athens. Repayment being afterwards offered to Anicerris by Plato's relations, he refuſed the money, ſaying, with that generous ſpirit which true philoſophy always inſpires, that he ſaw no reaſon why the relations of Plato ſhould engroſs to themſelves the honour of ſerving him.

After a ſhort interval, Dionyſius repented of his ill-placed reſentment, and wrote to Plato, earneſtly requeſting him to repair his credit by returning to Syracuſe; to which Plato gave this high ſpirited anſwer, that philoſophy would not allow him leiſure to think of Dionyſius. Dion, who, through the influence of Plato's inſtructions had become a determined votary of virtue, was earneſtly deſirous of inſpiring others with the ſame ſentiments. In hope of making an advantageous impreſſion upon the mind of the younger Dionyſius, he took every occaſion of making him acquainted with the doctrines and precepts of his maſter. The effect was ſuch as Dion wiſhed. The youth ſoon expreſſed an earneſt deſire to become acquainted with the philoſopher. Letters were immediately diſpatched to Plato, from the tyrant, from Dion, and from ſeveral followers of Pythagoras, who were at that time reſident in Sicily, importuning him to return to Syracuſe, and take upon him the education of the young prince. After ſome heſitation, apprehending leſt a refuſal might ſeem to imply an unworthy neglect of the intereſt of philoſophy, and entertaining ſome hope, that by cleanſing the fountain of public manners in Sicily, he ſhould be able to purify the ſtream, he conſented. It has alſo been ſaid[a], and not without plauſibility, that he was induced to undertake this ſecond journey to Syracuſe, by a promiſe, on the part of Dionyſius, that he would adopt the philoſopher's plan of government. In the mean time, the enemies of Dion prevailed upon Dionyſius to recal from exile Philiſtus, a man of tyrannical principles and ſpirit, from whom they hoped for a powerful oppoſition to the doctrine and the meaſures of Plato. The philoſopher was conducted

[a] Athæneus, l. xi. p. 507.

to Syracuſe with public honours; the king himſelf received him into his chariot, and ſacrifices were offered in congratulation of his arrival. New regulations were immediately introduced; the licentiouſneſs of the court was reſtrained; moderation reigned in all public feſtivals; the king aſſumed an air of benignity; philoſophy was ſtudied by his courtiers; and every good man aſſured himſelf of a happy revolution in the ſtate of public manners. But Philiſtus and his adherents, envious of the philoſopher's increaſing influence with the tyrant, ſoon found means to rekindle his jealouſy. Through their intrigues, Dion became ſo obnoxious to Dionyſius, that he ordered him to be impriſoned, and afterwards baniſhed him into Italy. Plato, and the friends of Dion, were exceedingly alarmed at this meaſure, and began to be apprehenſive for their own ſafety. Dionyſius, however, continued to treat them courteouſly. Under the pretence of friendſhip, he allotted Plato an apartment in his palace, but at the ſame time placed a ſecret guard about him, that no one might viſit him without his knowledge. At length, upon the commencement of a war, Dionyſius ſent Plato back into his own country, but not without a promiſe, that he would recal both him and Dion upon the return of peace.

Dion, who now reſided in Athens, diligently attended upon the lectures of his maſter, and ſo far profited by his moral precepts, as to lay aſide every thing effeminate and luxurious in his manner of living. The tyrant, in the mean time, that he might, if poſſible, obliterate the ignominy which he had brought upon himſelf by the baniſhment of Plato, invited philoſophers, from every quarter, to his court. Their diſcourſes recalled his attention to philoſophy; and he again became exceedingly deſirous of Plato's return. The philoſopher received his ſolicitations with coolneſs, pleaded in excuſe his advanced age, and reminded the tyrant of the violation of his promiſe, that on the return of peace Dion ſhould be reſtored. It was not till the requeſt of Dionyſius was ſeconded by the intreaties of the wife and ſiſter of Dion, and by the importunities of Archytas of Tarentum, and other Pythagorean philoſophers, to whom the tyrant had pledged himſelf for the performance of his promiſes, that he could be prevailed upon to return.

When

When Plato arrived the third time at Syracuſe, the king met him in a magnificent chariot, and conducted him to his palace. The Sicilians too, whoſe hatred of Philiſtus inclined them to favour the party of Dion, rejoiced in his return; for they hoped that the wiſdom of Plato would at length triumph over the tyrannical ſpirit of the prince. Dionyſius ſeemed wholly diveſted of his former reſentments, liſtened with apparent pleaſure to the philoſopher's doctrine, and, among other expreſſions of regard, preſented him with eighty talents of gold. In the midſt of a numerous train of philoſophers, Plato now poſſeſſed the chief influence and authority in the court of Syracuſe. Whilſt Ariſtippus was enjoying himſelf in ſplendid luxury; whilſt Diogenes was freely indulging his acrimonious humour; and whilſt Æſchines was gratifying his thirſt after riches; Plato ſupported the credit of philoſophy with an air of dignity, which his friends regarded as an indication of ſuperior wiſdom, but which his enemies imputed to pride. After all, it was not in the power of Plato to prevail upon Dionyſius, to adopt his ſyſtem of policy, or to recal Dion from his exile. Mutual diſtruſt, after a ſhort interval, aroſe between the tyrant and the philoſopher; each ſuſpected the other of evil deſigns, and each endeavoured to conceal his ſuſpicion under the diſguiſe of reſpect. Dionyſius attempted to impoſe upon Plato by condeſcending attentions, and Plato to deceive Dionyſius by an appearance of confidence. At length, the philoſopher became ſo much diſſatisfied with his ſituation, that he earneſtly requeſted permiſſion to return to Greece.

After ſome oppoſition on the part of the tyrant, permiſſion was granted, and a veſſel of convoy was provided. But, before the ſhip ſet ſail, Dionyſius repented, and detained Plato in Syracuſe againſt his inclination. From this time the freedom of the philoſopher's complaints and reproofs became offenſive to the tyrant, and Dionyſius diſmiſſed Plato from his court, and put him under a guard of ſoldiers, whom falſe rumours had incenſed againſt him. His Pythagorean friends at Tarentum, being informed of his dangerous ſituation, immediately diſpatched an embaſſy to Dionyſius, demand-

ing an inſtant completion of his promiſe to Archytas. The tyrant, not daring to refuſe this demand, but at the ſame time deſirous to ſave himſelf, as much as poſſible, from the diſgrace of having baniſhed from his court the firſt philoſopher of the age, gave Plato a magnificent entertainment, and ſent him away loaded with rich preſents. On his way to Athens, paſſing through Elis, during the celebration of the Olympic games, he was preſent at this general aſſembly of the Greeks, and engaged univerſal attention.

From this narrative it appears, that if Plato viſited the courts of princes, it was chiefly from the hope of ſeeing his ideal plan of a republic realiſed; and that his talents and attainments rather qualified him to ſhine in the academy, than in the council or the ſenate.

Plato, now reſtored to his country and his ſchool, devoted himſelf to ſcience, and ſpent the laſt years of a long life in the inſtruction of youth. Having enjoyed the advantage of an athletic conſtitution, and lived all his days temperately, he arrived at the eighty-firſt, or, according to ſome writers, the ſeventy-ninth, year of his age, and died, through the mere decay of nature[a], in the firſt year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad. He paſſed his whole life in a ſtate of celibacy, and therefore left no natural heirs, but transferred his effects by will to his friend Adiamantus. The grove and garden, which had been the ſcene of his philoſophical labours, at laſt afforded him a ſepulchre[b]. Statues and altars were erected to his memory; the day of his birth long continued to be celebrated as a feſtival by his followers; and his portrait is to this day preſerved in gems; but the moſt laſting monuments of his genius are his writings, which have been tranſmitted, without material injury, to the preſent times.

The perſonal character of Plato has been very differently repreſented. On the one hand, his encomiaſts have not failed to adorn him with every excellence, and to expreſs the moſt ſuperſtitious veneration for his memory[c]. His enemies, on the other,

[a] Seneca Ep. 58. Laert. l. iii. § 2. Cic de Senect. c. 5.
[b] Pauſan. Attic.
[c] Vid. Ficini Dedicat. Op. Plat. Seneca de Vita beata. c. 18.

have

have not ſcrupled to load him with reproach, and charge him with practices ſhamefully inconſiſtent with the purity and dignity of the philoſophical character[a]. We cannot ſo implicitly adopt the panegyrics of the former, as to ſuppoſe him to have been free from human frailties; and we have a right to require much better proofs than his calumniators have adduced, before we can ſuppoſe him to have been capable of ſinking, from the ſublime ſpeculations of philoſophy, into the moſt infamous vices. To load the character of a great man with infamy, upon ſlight ſuſpicions, is a ſpecies of impiety.

Several anecdotes are preſerved, which reflect honour upon the moral principles and character of Plato. Such was his command of temper, that, when, he was lifting up his hand to correct his ſervant for ſome offence, perceiving himſelf angry, he kept his arm fixed in that poſture, and ſaid to a friend, who, coming in at that inſtant, aſked him what he was doing, "I am puniſhing a paſſionate man[b]." At another time, he ſaid to one of his ſlaves, "I would chaſtiſe you, if I were not angry." At the Olympic games, he happened to paſs a day with ſome ſtrangers, who were much delighted with his eaſy and affable converſation, but were no farther informed concerning him than that his name was Plato; for he had purpoſely avoided ſaying any thing concerning Socrates or the Academy. At parting, he invited them, when they ſhould viſit Athens, to take up their reſidence at his houſe. Not long afterwards, they accepted his invitation, and were courteouſly entertained. During their ſtay, they requeſted that he would introduce them to his nameſake, the famous philoſopher, and ſhew them his Academy. Plato, ſmiling, ſaid, "I am the perſon you wiſh to ſee." The diſcovery ſurpriſed them exceedingly; for they could not eaſily perſuade themſelves, that ſo eminent a philoſopher would condeſcend to converſe ſo familiarly with ſtrangers[c]. When Plato was told, that his enemies were buſily employed

[a] Athæn. l. xi. p. 507. Laert. l. iii. c. 26. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. iv.
[b] Seneca de Ira, l. ii. c. 22. l. iii. c. 12.
[c] Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. iv. c. 9. Plut. in Symp. Laert.

in

in circulating reports to his diſadvantage, he ſaid, "I will live ſo, that none ſhall believe them." One of his friends remarking, that he ſeemed as deſirous to learn himſelf, as to teach others, aſked him, how long he intended to be a ſcholar? "As long," ſays he, "as I am not aſhamed to grow wiſer and better."

It is from the writings of Plato, chiefly, that we are to form a judgment of his merit as a philoſopher, and of the ſervice which he rendered to ſcience. No one can be converſant with theſe without perceiving, that his diction always retained a ſtrong tincture of that poetical ſpirit, which he diſcovered in his firſt productions. This is the principal ground of thoſe lofty encomiums, which both antient and modern critics have paſſed upon his language, and, particularly, of the high eſtimation in which it was held by Cicero[a], who, treating on the ſubject of language, ſays, that "if Jupiter were to ſpeak in the Greek tongue, he would borrow the ſtyle of Plato." The accurate Stagyrite deſcribes it, as "a middle ſpecies of diction, between verſe and proſe[b]." Some of his dialogues are elevated by ſuch ſublime and glowing conceptions, are enriched with ſuch copious and ſplendid diction, and flow in ſo harmonious a *rythmus*, that they may truly be pronounced highly poetical. Moſt of them are juſtly admired for their literary merit: the introductions are pertinent and amuſing; the courſe of the debate, or converſation, is clearly marked; the characters are accurately ſupported; every ſpeaker has his proper place, language, and manners; the ſcenery of the conference is painted in lively colouring; and the whole is, with admirable art, adorned and enlivened by thoſe minute embelliſhments, which render the colloquial mode of writing ſo peculiarly pleaſing. Even upon abſtract ſubjects, whether moral, metaphyſical, or mathematical, the language of Plato is often clear as the running ſtream, and in ſimplicity and ſweetneſs vies with the humble violet which perfumes the vale. In theſe beautiful parts of his works, it has been conjectured, not without probability, that Socrates and Lyſias were his models. At other times, however, we find

[a] Orat. c. 3. 20. De Offic. l. i. De Leg. l. ii.
[b] Ariſt. apud Laert.

him ſwelling into the turgid ſtyle, a tincture of which he ſeems to have retained from his juvenile ſtudies, and involving himſelf in obſcurities, which were the offspring of a lofty fancy, or were borrowed from the Italic ſchool. Several antient critics have noticed theſe blemiſhes in the writings of Plato. Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis[a] particularly cenſures Plato for the harſhneſs of his metaphors, and his bold innovations in the uſe of terms, and quotes from his Phædrus examples of the bombaſt, the puerile, and the frigid ſtyle. The ſame inequality, which is ſo apparent in the ſtyle of Plato, may alſo be obſerved in his conceptions. Whilſt he adheres to the ſchool of Socrates, and diſcourſes upon moral topics, he is much more pleaſing than when he loſes himſelf, with Pythagoras, in abſtruſe ſpeculations.

The Dialogues of Plato, which treat of various ſubjects, and were written with different views, are claſſed by the antients[b] under the two heads of DIDACTIC and INQUISITIVE. The Didactic are ſubdivided into SPECULATIVE, including *phyſical* and *logical*; and PRACTICAL, comprehending *ethical* and *political*. The ſecond claſs, the Inquiſitive, is characteriſed by terms taken from the athletic art, and divided into the Gymnaſtic, and the Agoniſtic; the dialogues termed Gymnaſtic were imagined to be ſimilar to the *exerciſe*, and were ſubdivided into the Maieutic as reſembling the teaching of the rudiments of the art, and the Peiraſtic, as repreſented by a ſkirmiſh, or trial of proficiency. The Agoniſtic dialogues, ſuppoſed to reſemble the *combat*, were either Endeictic, as exhibiting a ſpecimen of ſkill, or Anatreptic, preſenting the ſpectacle of a perfect defeat. Inſtead of this whimſical claſſification, an arrangement of the dialogues, taken from the ſubjects on which they treat, would be much more obvious and uſeful. They may not improperly be divided into *phyſical*, *logical*, *ethical* and *political*.

The writings of Plato were originally collected by Hermodorus, one of his pupils: they conſiſt of thirty-five dialogues, and thirteen

[a] Epiſt. ad Pomp. [b] Laert. l. iii.

epiſtles.

epiſtles. They were firſt publiſhed, after the invention of printing, by Aldus Manutius, at Venice, in 1513[a]. The editions of Ficinus and Serranus are the moſt valuable; but their notes and interpretations are to be read with caution; for Ficinus, having formed his conceptions of the doctrine of Plato, after the model of the Alexandrian ſchool, frequently, in his *Arguments*, miſrepreſents the deſign of his author, and in his verſion obſcures the ſenſe of the original; and Serranus, for want of an accurate acquaintance with the doctrine of his author, and through the influence of a ſtrong predilection for the ſcholaſtic ſyſtem of theology, ſometimes gives an incorrect and injudicious explanation of the text.

Many of the particulars, which have been related concerning Plato, had doubtleſs an influence upon the nature and form of his Philoſophical Syſtem, to the conſideration of which we are now to proceed. In order to diſcover, as far as we are able, the true characters of the Platonic doctrine, and at the ſame time to ſhow from what cauſes it happens that this ſubject is neceſſarily involved in great obſcurity, ſeveral general obſervations muſt be ſubmitted to the reader's diligent attention.

Plato, diſdaining the ſober method of reaſoning introduced by Socrates, left his firſt maſter in ſearch of other preceptors. His natural propenſity towards exceſſive refinement in ſpeculation, and the celebrity of the Italic ſchool, which abounded in ſubtleties, induced him to attach himſelf to the Pythagorean philoſophy. He afterwards ſtudied, as we have ſeen, under the Egyptian prieſts, who, doubtleſs, ſeduced him yet farther from the plain path of common ſenſe, which had hitherto been followed in the Socratic ſchool. One circumſtance it is particularly neceſſary to remark; that, among other things which Plato received from foreign philoſophy, he was careful to borrow[b] the art of concealing his real opinions. His inclination towards this kind of concealment appears from the obſcure language which abounds in his writings, and may

[a] Fabricius Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 42.

[b] Porph. Vit. Pyth. p. 49. Apul. flor. c. 15. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. i. De Fin. l. v.

indeed

indeed be learned from his own expreſs aſſertions. "It is a difficult thing," ſays he [a], "to diſcover the nature of the creator of the univerſe; and, being diſcovered, it is impoſſible, and would even be impious, to expoſe the diſcovery to vulgar underſtandings." Again [b], "It would be to no purpoſe to lay open to mankind at large the doctrines of philoſophy, which are adapted only to the comprehenſion of a few intelligent perſons, who, from imperfect hints, are capable of conceiving their full import." Plato did not, indeed, after the example of Pythagoras, ſhut up the door of the Academy, or demand an oath of ſecreſy from his diſciples, but he purpoſely threw a veil of obſcurity over his public inſtructions, which was only removed for the benefit of thoſe, who were thought worthy of being admitted to his more private and confidential lectures. This concealed method of philoſophiſing he was induced to adopt, from a regard to his perſonal ſafety, and from motives of vanity. He apprehended, that this was the only way to ſecure himſelf from the inconveniences which ſeveral of his predeceſſors among the Greeks had brought upon themſelves by an undiſguiſed declaration of their opinions; and he had ſeen how ſucceſsfully both the Pythagoreans and the Egyptians had employed the arts of concealment to excite the admiration of the vulgar, who are always inclined to imagine ſomething more than human in things which they do not underſtand.

The colloquial form of inſtruction, which had been introduced by Socrates, in his conteſts with the Sophiſts, and which had been alſo adopted in the Dialectic ſchools, Plato found peculiarly convenient for the purpoſe of concealing his opinions. His ſucceſs in the application of this expedient appears in almoſt every dialogue which he has written. The main queſtion of the dialogue is ſo long kept in ſuſpence by the minute detail of induction, and the buſineſs of the piece meets with ſuch frequent colloquial interruptions, that it is not without great difficulty, that the reader can follow the thread of

[a] In Timæo. ed. Serrani, tom. iii. p. 28.
[b] Epiſt. vii, t. iii. p. 341. Ep. ii. ad Dionyſ.

argument, or perceive the general concluſion. More pains is taken to expoſe an inaccurate or inadequate definition or explanation of any ſubject, than to ſubſtitute one more perfect in its ſtead. The writer's meaning is frequently loſt in the obſcurity of ſubtle diſtinctions, and ſometimes, after the Egyptian manner, concealed under the cloak of fable. Cicero, though an enthuſiaſtic admirer of Plato, was not inſenſible of the uncertainty which, from this cauſe, hangs upon his doctrine. "Plato," ſays he [a], "affirms nothing, but after producing many arguments, and examining a queſtion on every ſide, leaves it undetermined."

Farther difficulties ariſe from the language in which Plato expreſſes his conceptions. Sometimes the reader is dazzled by the ſplendor of his poetical diction; and ſometimes he is perplexed by ſtudied ambiguities, and finds the ſame term uſed in different ſenſes, and different terms employed to expreſs the ſame meaning [b]. Plato has alſo greatly increaſed the obſcurity of his writings, by frequently mixing the ideas and language of mathematics with thoſe of metaphyſics. Had he made uſe of mathematical learning merely as a preparatory exerciſe for ſublimer ſpeculations his pupils might have reaped much benefit from the practice. But he attempted, after the example of the Pythagorean ſchool, to expreſs philoſophical conceptions by mathematical diagrams and proportions, and thus involved, in artificial perplexity, ſubjects in themſelves ſufficiently obſcure [c].

But, the principal cauſe of a want of perſpicuity in the writings of Plato, is, after all, the extreme ſubtlety of his ſpeculations upon abſtract and ſublime topics. The implicit followers of this philoſopher have been willing to exculpate their maſter from the charge of obſcurity, by accuſing his readers of dulneſs in their conceptions. But thoſe who have attended to the origin of the Platonic philoſophy will acknowledge, that it partakes largely of the characters of ſubtlety and enthuſiaſm, which, as we ſhall afterwards ſee, diſtinguiſhed the Pythagorean ſyſtem. It was not without reaſon, that

[a] Acad. Qu. l. i. [b] Laert. l. iii. § 63, 64.
[c] Burnet. Archæolog. l. i. c. 11.

Xenophon,

Xenophon, or whoever elſe was the author of the epiſtle to Æſchines preſerved in his works, cenſures Plato for neglecting the ſober philoſophy of Socrates, and through a vain affectation of extraordinary refinement, and a fond partiality for the myſteries of Egypt, and for the prodigies of Pythagoras, devoting himſelf to ſubtle ſpeculations, and becoming a haughty profeſſor of wiſdom. That this remark was not dictated by envy, but founded on truth, the whole conſtitution of the Platonic philoſophy clearly proves. Raiſing man above his condition and nature, he unites him to certain imaginary divine principles; leads him through various orders of emanation, and forms of intelligence, to the Supreme Being, and repreſents theſe fictions of fancy [a] as the firſt principles of wiſdom. In ſuch a wonderous maze of words does Plato involve his notions, that none of his diſciples, not even the ſagacious Stagyrite, could unfold them: and yet we receive them as ſacred myſteries, and, if we do not perfectly comprehend them, imagine that our intellects are too feeble to penetrate the conceptions of this divine philoſopher, and that our eyes are blinded by that reſplendent blaze of truth, upon which his eagle ſight could gaze without injury [b].

The truth appears to have been, that Plato, ambitious of the honour of forming a new ſect, and endued by nature with more brilliancy of fancy than ſtrength of judgment, collected the tenets of other philoſophers, which were, in many particulars, contradictory, and could by no exertion of ingenuity be brought to coaleſce; and that, out of this heterogeneous maſs, he framed a confuſed ſyſtem, deſtitute of form or conſiſtency. This will be acknowledged by every one, who, in peruſing the philoſophical writings of Plato, is capable of diveſting himſelf of that blind reſpect for antiquity, by which the learned ſo frequently ſuffer themſelves to be miſled. In confirmation of the propriety of this judgment, we need only refer to the dialogue entitled *Timæus*; a chaotic maſs of opinions, which no commentators have yet been able to reconcile, or to explain [c].

[a] Τερατίσματα, ſo Ariſtotle calls Plato's *ideas*. Anal. Poſter. l. i. c. 19. Conf. Metaph. l. i. c. 7. [b] Burnet, l. c.

[c] Cic. ad Attic. l. vii. Ep. 13. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. i. c. 13.

The followers of Plato, far from diſperſing the clouds which, from the firſt, hung over his ſyſtem, appear to have entered into a general combination to increaſe its obſcurity. The ſucceſſive changes, which took place in the Academy after the death of its founder, by introducing a ſucceſſion of new opinions, continually increaſed the difficulty of arriving at the true ſenſe of Plato. And when, in a ſubſequent period, the Platonic philoſophy was profeſſed in Alexandria, it was ſtill further adulterated by an injudicious and abſurd attempt to mould into one ſyſtem the doctrines of Plato, the traditionary tenets of Egypt and the eaſtern nations, and the ſacred creeds of the Jews and Chriſtians: a coalition, which, as we ſhall afterwards ſee, proved exceedingly injurious both to philoſophy and religion.

If theſe ſeveral circumſtances be duly conſidered, it will be acknowledged to be no eaſy taſk to delineate an accurate ſketch of the Platonic philoſophy. In our attempt to exhibit, in miniature, a faithful portrait of the mind of Plato, we have found it neceſſary, chiefly to rely upon his own writings, and upon the repreſentations of thoſe antient writers, who were free from the ſpirit of confuſion which poſſeſſed the ſchools of the later Platoniſts. Among the pureſt ſources of ſecondary information upon this ſubject, we have ſeen reaſon to place the philoſophical writings of Cicero, and the methodical arrangements of Apuleius and Alcinous.

The philoſophy of Plato, as he himſelf ſuggeſts, and his interpreters unanimouſly allow, may be divided into three branches, the firſt of which treats of the art of reaſoning, or dialectics; the ſecond, of theoretical queſtions concerning nature, or phyſics; the third, of practical ſubjects reſpecting life and manners, or ethics. Before we enter upon the diſtinct examination of each of theſe branches, it will be neceſſary to premiſe a few words concerning the Platonic notion of philoſophy in general.

Wiſdom, in the ſtrict Platonic ſenſe of the term, is the knowledge of thoſe things which truly exiſt, and are comprehended by the intellect, particularly thoſe which reſpect God, and the human ſoul

ſoul as diſtinct from the body[a]. Philoſophy is the deſire of divine ſcience, or the liberation of the mind from the body, and its direction towards thoſe real eſſences, which are perceptible only by the underſtanding[b]. A philoſopher muſt poſſeſs a mind naturally turned towards contemplation, an ardent love of truth, a penetrating judgment, and a retentive memory. He muſt, withal, be inured to the exerciſe of temperance and fortitude, that nothing corporeal may divert him from the purſuit of wiſdom[c]. Philoſophy, as it is employed in the contemplation of truth, is termed theoretical; as it is converſant in the regulation of actions, it is practical[c]. Theoretical philoſophy produces a contemplative life, in which the mind, occupied in meditations purely intellectual, acquires a reſemblance to the divinity. Practical philoſophy leads to an active life, and applies the principles of wiſdom to the benefit of ſociety[d]. Beſides the contemplation of truth and virtue, the philoſopher will inquire into the right conduct of the underſtanding, and the powers of ſpeech, in the purſuits of knowledge, or will ſtudy the art of reaſoning and diſputation. The office of philoſophy then is threefold, DIALECTIC, THEORETICAL, and PRACTICAL.

On DIALECTICS, the ſum of Plato's doctrine, as collected from his dialogues, is this:

Truth is diſcerned, not by the ſenſes, but by the underſtanding. The human intellect is employed, either upon things which it comprehends by itſelf, and which are in their nature ſimple and invariable, or upon things which are ſubject to the ſenſes, and which are perpetually liable to fluctuation and change[e]. The contemplation of the former creates Science; attention to the latter produces Opinion[f]. Senſe is the paſſive perception of the ſoul through the medium of the body[g]. When the forms of things are, by means of the corporeal organs, ſo deeply impreſſed upon the

[a] In Phædro. t. iii. p. 278. [b] Protag. t. i. p. 313. Phædr. t. iii. p. 247.
[c] Rep. l. vi. t. ii. p. 484, 495. Alcinous, c. 2. [d] Philebo, t. ii. p. 57.
[e] De Rep. l. vii. t. ii. p. 531. 4. Phileb. t. ii. p. 63.
[f] Cic. Ac. Qu. l. i. c. 5. Platon. Theæt. t. i. p. 186. Phæd. t. i. p. 74.
[g] Theæt. p. 186. Phileb. t. ii. p. 34.

mind,

mind, as not to be eaſily effaced by time, this permanent impreſſion is called Memory. From the union of ſenſe and memory, or from the compariſon of a preſent with a recollected perception, ariſes Opinion. Where theſe agree, the opinion is true; where they differ, it is falſe. The ſeat of perception and memory is like a waxen tablet, or picture, which the mind contemplates, and thence frames opinions[a]. In meditation, the ſoul converſes with itſelf; thought flows through the lips by means of the vocal organs. Intellection is the operation of the underſtanding contemplating intelligible forms, or ideas. It is twofold; the firſt, that of the ſoul contemplating ideas before it deſcends into the body; the other, that which it exerciſes after it is immerſed in the body, which may be alſo termed natural knowledge[b]. This kind of knowledge conſiſts in the recollection of thoſe things which the mind had known in its pre-exiſtent ſtate, and differs from memory in the object; memory being employed upon ſenſible things, reminiſcence upon things purely intelligible[c]. The intelligible objects of contemplation are either Primary, or Secondary; the primary are Ideas, which will be farther explained under the next head; the ſecondary, are the forms inſeparable from material objects[d]. The mind, in exerciſing its judgment, conſiders theoretically what is true or falſe, and practically what may, or may not, be done[e].

Dialectics conſider the Eſſence and the Accidents of things; concerning the former, it makes uſe of Diviſion, Definition, and Analyſis[f]. Diviſion ſeparates the genus into its ſpecies, the whole into its parts, and the like. Definition expreſſes the genus of the thing to be defined, and diſtinguiſhes it from all others by adding its ſpecific difference. Analyſis riſes from objects of ſenſe to intelligibles; from demonſtrable propoſitions to axioms, or from hypotheſis to experience. Induction riſes from individuals to univerſals. Syllogiſm produces a concluſion by means of ſome intermediate propoſition[g].

[a] Theæt. t. i. p. 191. 202. [b] In Timæo, t. iii. p. 30.
[c] Phæd. t. i. p. 75. [d] Parmenid. t. iii. p. 135. [e] Phædr. t. iii. p. 266.
[f] Theæt. t. i. p. 146. Polit. t. ii. p. 262. Phædr. t. iii. p. 266.
[g] Theæt. p. 147. 210. Laert. l. iii. § 80. Apul. de Dogm. Plat. l. iii. p. 313.

Theſe

Theſe topics are curſorily touched upon by Plato, and it is rather by examples than by precepts, that he teaches the true art of reaſoning, or expoſes the fallacies of ſophiſtry. The ingenious artifices and deceptions practiſed by the Sophiſt are clearly repreſented in ſeveral of Plato's dialogues, particularly in his Euthydemus and his Sophiſta. Rhetoric is an art which Plato thought unfavourable to the ſtudy of philoſophy: he inveighs againſt it with great vehemence in his Gorgias; and the ground of his invective is judiciouſly explained by Quintilian[a]. Etymology is a ſubject on which Plato particularly treats in his Cratylus[b], in which he maintains, that names, when rightly given, correſpond to the nature of the things which they repreſent: but what he advances on this head is too fanciful to merit attention[c].

Theſe are the principal particulars to be collected from the diſcourſes of Plato concerning the Dialectic Art, as diſtinguiſhed from Theology and Phyſics.

THEORETICAL philoſophy Plato divides into three branches, THEOLOGICAL, PHYSICAL, and MATHEMATICAL.

On THEOLOGY, the fundamental doctrine of Plato, as of all other antient philoſophers, is, that from nothing nothing can proceed. This univerſal axiom, applied not only to the infinite efficient, but to the material cauſe, Plato, in his Timæus[d], lays down as the ground of his reaſoning concerning the origin of the world. In this dialogue, which comprehends his whole doctrine on the ſubject of the formation of the univerſe, matter is ſo manifeſtly ſpoken of as eternally co-exiſting with God, that this part of his doctrine could not have been miſtaken by ſo many learned and able writers, had they not been ſeduced by the deſire of eſtabliſhing a coincidence of doctrine between the writings of Plato and Moſes. It is certain, that neither Cicero[e], nor Apuleius[f], nor Alcinous[g], nor even the

[a] Inſtit. Orat. l. ii. c. 15.
[b] T. i. p. 383. Conf. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. i. c. 8. Sophiſt. t. i. p. 216, 253.
[c] Menag. ad Laert. l. iii. § 23.
[d] T. iii. p. 28. Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 4, 8. Cic. De Div. l. ii.
[e] Ac. Qu. l. i. c. 6. [f] L. i. p. 284. [g] C. 12.

later commentator Chalcidius [a], underſtood their maſter in any other ſenſe, than as admitting two primary and incorruptible principles, God and Matter; to which we ſhall afterwards ſee reaſon to add a third, namely Ideas. The paſſages quoted by thoſe who maintain the contrary opinion are by no means ſufficient for their purpoſe. Plato, it is true, in his Timæus, calls God "the parent of the univerſe," and in his Sophiſta ſpeaks of him as "creating animate and inanimate beings, which did not before exiſt;" but theſe expreſſions do not neceſſarily imply that this offspring of deity was produced from nothing, or that no prior matter exiſted, from which theſe new beings were formed. Through the whole dialogue of the Timæus [b], Plato ſuppoſes two eternal and independent cauſes of all things; one, that *by* which all things are made, which is God; the other, that *from* which all things are made, which is matter. He diſtinguiſhes between God, matter, and the univerſe, and ſuppoſes the architect of the world to have formed it out of a maſs of pre-exiſtent matter. Plutarch ſeems to have given a juſt repreſentation of the doctrine of Plato, when he ſpeaks [c] of matter as neither made nor produced, but as preſenting itſelf before the great artificer to receive form and arrangement. Laertius, to the ſame purpoſe, relates [d], that Plato unfolded two principles in nature, God and matter; that to the former he gave the appellation of Mind and Cauſe; and that he conceived the latter to have been immenſe, without form, and perpetually agitated, and to have been, at length, collected and arranged by that deity, who preferred order to confuſion. And Plato himſelf, in his Timæus [e], expreſſes the ſame doctrine, nearly in the ſame language.

Matter, according to Plato, is an eternal and infinite principle. His doctrine on this head is thus explained by Cicero [f]. "Matter, from which all things are produced and formed, is a ſubſtance without form or quality, but capable of receiving all forms and undergoing every kind of change; in which, however,

[a] Op. p. 3. Comment. in Tim. c. 13. § 305. [b] T. iii. p. 28, &c.
[c] De gen. Anim. t. iii. p. 78. [d] L. iii. § 69. [e] Loc. cit.
[f] Ac. Qu. l. i. c. 8.

it

it never ſuffers annihilation, but merely a ſolution of its parts, which are in their nature infinitely diviſible, and move in portions of ſpace which are alſo infinitely diviſible. When that principle which we call quality is moved, and acts upon matter, it undergoes an entire change, and thoſe forms are produced, from which ariſes the diverſified and coherent ſyſtem of the univerſe." This doctrine Plato unfolds at large in his Timæus, and particularly inſiſts upon the notion, that matter has originally no form, but is capable of receiving any. He calls it the mother and receptacle of forms, by the union of which with matter the univerſe becomes perceptible to the ſenſes; and maintains, that the viſible world owes its forms to the energy of the divine intellectual nature.

It is eaſy to perceive, that Plato's notion of matter is eſſentially different from that which ſuppoſes it to conſiſt of ſmall indiviſible particles, and conſequently that Plato is not to be ranked amongſt the atomic philoſophers. Sometimes indeed he ſeems to aſſert, that all bodies are compoſed of particles. "The parts of bodies," ſays he[a], "muſt be conceived ſo minute, as to be ſingly inviſible, and it is by collecting many of theſe into one maſs, that they become viſible." But, in this paſſage, Plato is ſpeaking of ſmall corpuſcles already endowed with forms or qualities, and not of primary matter, which, according to him, was without form, and infinitely diviſible.

Another conception reſpecting matter, which ariſes from the preceding, is[b], that matter is not body, but that from which bodies are formed. Body is that which is produced from matter by the energy of the efficient cauſe. This diſtinction is found in almoſt all the antient ſyſtems of philoſophy: it is therefore neceſſary, in examining them, not to underſtand the terms *incorporeal* and *immaterial* as ſynonimous[c].

It was alſo a doctrine of Plato, that there is in matter a neceſſary, but blind and refractory force; and that hence ariſes a propenſity in matter to diſorder and deformity, which is the cauſe of all the imperfection which appears in the works of God, and the origin

[a] In Timæo. [b] Cic. l. c. [c] Stobæus Ecl. Phyſ. c. 14.

of evil. On this ſubject Plato writes with wonderful obſcurity: but, as far as we are able to trace his conceptions, he appears to have thought, that matter, from its nature, reſiſts the will of the ſupreme artificer, ſo that he cannot perfectly execute his deſigns, and that this is the cauſe of the mixture of good and evil which is found in the material world. "It cannot be," ſays he[a], "that evil ſhould be deſtroyed, for there muſt always be ſomething contrary to good:" and again, "God wills, *as far as it is poſſible*, every thing good, and nothing evil." What property there is in matter, which oppoſes the wiſe and benevolent intentions of the firſt intelligence, our philoſopher has not clearly explained; but he ſpeaks of it as ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, "an innate propenſity" to diſorder[b]; and ſays, "that before nature was adorned with its preſent beautiful forms, it was inclined to confuſion and deformity, and that from this habitude ariſes all the evil which happens in the world." Plutarch ſuppoſes the Platonic notion to be[c], that there is in matter an unconſcious irrational ſoul; and this ſuppoſition has been adopted by ſeveral modern writers. But there is no proof from the writings of Plato, that he conceived the imperfection of matter to ariſe from any cauſe diſtinct from its nature. Such a notion is incongruous with Plato's general ſyſtem, as far as we are able to diſcover it. To this we may add, that it is contrary to the doctrine of the Pythagorean ſchool, to which Plato was probably indebted for his notions on this ſubject; for the philoſophers of that ſect held, that motion is the effect of a power eſſential to matter.

The principle oppoſite to matter, in the ſyſtem of Plato, is God. He taught, that there is an intelligent cauſe, which is the origin of all ſpiritual being, and the former of the material world[d]. The nature of this great being he pronounced it difficult to diſcover, and when diſcovered, impoſſible to divulge[e]. The exiſtence of God he inferred from the marks of intelligence, which appear in the form and arrangement of bodies in the viſible world[f]: and from the unity

[a] Theæt. t. i. p. 176. [b] Phileb. [c] De Anim. Procr. t. ii. p. 155.
[d] Tim. t. iii. p. 29. Phæd. t. i. p. 78. [e] Tim. l. c. Ep. vii. t. iii. p. 341.
[f] De Legibus, t. ii. p. 886.

of the material ſyſtem he concluded, that the mind by which it was formed muſt be one[a]. God, according to Plato, is the ſupreme intelligence, incorporeal, without beginning, end, or change, and capable of being perceived only by the mind. He certainly diſtinguiſhed the deity, not only from body, and whatever has corporeal qualities, but from matter itſelf, from which all things are made. He alſo aſcribed to him all thoſe qualities which modern philoſophers aſcribe to immaterial ſubſtance, and conceived him to be in his nature ſimple, uncircumſcribed in ſpace, the author of all regulated motion, and, in fine, poſſeſſed of intelligence in the higheſt perfection. But whether he entirely ſeparated all ideas of extenſion from his conception of the deity, is a queſtion which we find ourſelves unable to ſolve. Thus much however is certain, that whatever were Plato's conceptions reſpecting the eſſence of deity, he aſcribed to him power and wiſdom ſufficient for the formation and preſervation of the world, and ſuppoſed him poſſeſſed of goodneſs, which inclined him to deſire, and, as far as the refractory nature of matter would permit, to produce, the happineſs of the univerſe[b]. This great being he diſtinguiſhed by the appellation of Το Αγαθον, *The Good.*

"God, that he might form a perfect world, followed that eternal pattern, which remains immutable, and which can only be comprehended by reaſon." Theſe are the expreſs words of Plato[c], who every where inculcates this doctrine as fundamental in coſmology. But concerning this pattern, or archetype, he writes ſo obſcurely that his interpreters and followers have been led to adopt very different opinions. He frequently ſpeaks of God under the appellation of *mind*, and repreſents him as the cauſe of all things. "That good cauſe," ſays he, "which appointed the years, and months, and hours, juſtly claims the appellation of wiſdom and intelligence[d]." And again, "You muſt confeſs in the nature of God himſelf a ruling mind, and the energy of an efficient cauſe." From theſe and other

[a] Tim. t. iii. p. 30. Polit. t. ii. p. 174. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 7.
[b] Polit. t. ii. p. 174. De Leg. l. x. t. ii. p. 899. [c] Tim. t. iii. p. 29.
[d] Philebo, t. ii. p. 30, &c.

ſimilar paſſages ſome have inferred, that the whole of Plato's doctrine, on the formation of the world, amounts to nothing more, than that the deity employed his underſtanding or reaſon in planning and executing the ſyſtem of the univerſe; and conſequently, that by Ideas exiſting in the Reaſon of God are only meant, conceptions formed in the divine mind. But by Ideas Plato appears to have meant ſomething much more myſterious; namely, patterns, or archetypes, ſubſiſting by themſelves, as real beings, ὄντως ὄντα, in the divine Reaſon, as in their original and eternal region, and iſſuing thence to give form to ſenſible things, and to become objects of contemplation and ſcience to rational beings. It is the doctrine of the Timæus, that ὁ λογίσμος τῦ Θεῦ, the Reaſon of God, comprehends exemplars of all things, and that this Reaſon is one of the primary cauſes of things. Plutarch ſays[a], that Plato ſuppoſes three principles, God, Matter, and Idea. Juſtin Martyr[b], Pſeudo-Origen[c], and others, aſſert the ſame. Laertius, indeed, repreſents the principles in nature, according to the Platonic ſyſtem, to be two, God and Matter: but he may be ſuppoſed to ſpeak only of the two ſources of being which are primary and independent; for the third, namely the Idea or exemplar, is only to be conſidered as inſtrumental, and dependent upon the efficient cauſe: "The exemplar," ſays Seneca[d], "is not the efficient cauſe of nature, but an inſtrument neceſſary to the cauſe." The divine Reaſon, the eternal region of Ideas or forms, Plato ſpeaks of[e], as having always exiſted, λογισμὸν τῦ θεῦ ἀεὶ ὄντως, and as the divine principle which eſtabliſhed the order of the world, λογον τῶν πάντων θειότατον, ὃς ἔταξε τὸν κόσμον. He appears to have conceived of this principle, as diſtinct not merely from matter but from the efficient cauſe, and as eternally containing within itſelf Ideas, or intelligible forms, which, flowing from the fountain of the divine eſſence, have in themſelves a real exiſtence, and which, in the formation of the viſible world, were, by the energy of the efficient cauſe, united to matter, to produce ſenſible bodies. Theſe Ideas Plato defines to be the peculiar natures of things, or eſſences as

[a] Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 10. [b] Ad Græc. p. 7.
[c] Philoſophum, c. 19. p. 108. [d] Ep. 65.
[e] Tim. l. c. Epinomid. t. ii. p. 986.

ſuch;

ſuch; and aſſerts, that they always remain the ſame, without beginning or end[a].

That this is the true Platonic doctrine of Ideas will appear probable, if we attend to the manner in which Plato framed his ſyſtem of opinions concerning the origin of things. "Having been from his youth," ſays Ariſtotle[b], "converſant with Cratylus, a diſciple of Heraclitus, and inſtructed in the doctrine of that ſchool, that all ſenſible things are variable, and cannot be proper objects of ſcience, he reaſonably concluded, that if there be any ſuch thing as ſcience, there muſt exiſt, beſides ſenſible objects, certain permanent natures, perceptible only by the intellect." Such natures, divine in their origin, and eternal and immutable in their exiſtence, he admitted into his ſyſtem, and called them Ideas." Theſe objects of contemplation and ſcience Plato ſeems to have found in the ſchool of Pythagoras, whoſe theology and metaphyſics he had ſtudied, and whom, as Ariſtotle aſſerts, he followed in many things. For we ſhall find in the ſequel, that the Numbers of Pythagoras agreed in many leading characters with the Ideas of Plato, and were employed for the ſame purpoſes, namely, to furniſh objects of true ſcience, and to elevate the human mind to a reſemblance to the divine. Plato, at the ſame time that, after Heraclitus, he retained the fluctuating world of ſenſe as the object of opinions, adopted from Pythagoras the permanent world of intelligible natures, as the object of ſcience. Viſible things were regarded by Plato as fleeting ſhades, and Ideas as the only permanent ſubſtances. Theſe he conceived to be the proper objects of ſcience, to a mind raiſed, by divine contemplation, above the perpetually varying ſcenes of the material world. His conceptions on this ſubject are beautifully expreſſed in a paſſage of his Republic[c], in which he compares the ſtate of the human mind with reſpect to the material and the intellectual world, to that of a man, who, in a cave into which no light can enter but by a ſingle paſſage, views, upon a wall oppoſite to the entrance, the ſhadows of external objects, and miſtakes them for realities. So ſtrongly was the imagination of

[a] Tim. t. iii. p. 28. Parmen. t. iii. p. 135.
[b] Metaph. l. i. c. 6. l. xiii. c. 4. [c] L. vii. init. t. ii. p. 515.

Plato

Plato impreſſed with this conception, that[a], in the election of magiſtrates for his republic, he required that no one ſhould be choſen, who had not, by the habitual contemplation of the world of Ideas, attained a perfect power of abſtraction.

It was another doctrine in the Platonic ſyſtem, that the Deity formed the material world after a perfect archetype, which had eternally ſubſiſted in his Reaſon, and endued it with a ſoul. "God," ſays he[b], "produced mind prior in time as well as excellence to the body, that the latter might be ſubject to the former."—"From that ſubſtance which is indiviſible and always the ſame, and from that which is corporeal and diviſible, he compounded a third kind of ſubſtance, participating of the nature of both." This ſubſtance, which is not eternal but produced, and which derives the ſuperior part of its nature from God, and the inferior from matter, Plato ſuppoſed to be the animating principle in the univerſe, pervading and adorning all things[c]. This third principle in nature is, in the Platonic ſyſtem, inferior to the Deity, being derived from that divine Reaſon, which is the ſeat of the ideal world; herein differing fundamentally from the Stoical doctrine of the ſoul of the world, which ſuppoſed the eſſence of the divine nature diffuſed through the univerſe.

The doctrine of a two-fold ſoul of the world, the one ὑπερκόσμιον, preſiding over it, the other ἐγκόσμιον, reſiding in it, is an appendage to the antient Platonic ſyſtem introduced, by the later Platoniſts[d], to accommodate this ſyſtem to the notions adopted by many of the Chriſtian fathers concerning the divine nature.

It is evident, from the preceding account of the doctrine of Plato concerning God and the ſoul of the world, that it differs materially from the doctrine of the Trinity afterwards received in the Chriſtian church. Plato did not ſuppoſe three ſubſiſtences in one divine eſſence, ſeparate from the viſible world; but taught, that the λόγος, or Reaſon of God, is the ſeat of the intelligible world, or of Ideas,

[a] Rep. l. vii. t. ii. p. 518. [b] Tim. t. iii. p. 34.
[c] Cratyl. t. iii. p. 53. Conf. Ariſt. Metaph. l. xiv. c. 6.
[d] Plotin. Ennead. iii. l. v. c. 2.

and

and that the Soul of the World is a third ſubordinate nature, compounded of intelligence and matter. In the language of Plato, the univerſe, being animated by a ſoul which proceeds from God, is the Son of God; and ſeveral parts of nature, particularly the heavenly bodies, are Gods[a]. He probably conceived many ſubordinate divinities to have been produced at the ſame time with the Soul of the World[b], and imagined, that the Supreme Being appointed them to the charge of forming animal bodies, and ſuperintending the viſible world: a doctrine which he ſeems to have borrowed from the Pythagoreans, and particularly from Timæus the Locrian, who ſays; "The ruler of all aſſigned the inſpection of human affairs to dæmons, and committed to them the government of the world."

Upon the foundation of the doctrine, which has been explained, concerning God, Matter, Ideas, the Soul of the World, and Dæmons, Plato raiſed the ſtructure of his phyſics.

Plato taught, that the ſupreme architect, by uniting eternal and immutable Ideas or Forms to variable matter, produced the viſible world. That he believed the world to have had a beginning in time, and not to have exiſted from eternity, appears from the whole courſe of his reaſoning in his Timæus concerning the formation of the world. Ariſtotle[c], indeed, intimates, that when Plato ſeems to aſſert this doctrine, he ſpeaks of the author of nature, as prior to his works, not in time, but in the order of our conceptions: but this interpretation was probably offered, merely for the ſake of reconciling the doctrine of his maſter with his own opinion concerning the eternity of the world. The Epicureans, in their diſputes with the Platoniſts upon this queſtion, as they are ſtated by Cicero, proceeded upon the ſuppoſition, that there was a period, in infinite duration, when the univerſe did not exiſt. "I aſk," "ſays Velleius[d], "why the architects of the world, after having ſlept through innumerable ages, ſo ſuddenly diſplayed their power; or why, in the field of infinite ſpace, they deſiſted from their operations?"

[a] Tim. l. c. Tim. Locr. t. iii. p. 95. Op. Plat. Laert. l. iii. §75.
[b] Tim. t. iii. p. 40. Conviv. t. iii. p. 201. Apolog. Soc.
[c] De Cælo. l. i. c. 10. [d] De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 9.

Other

Other tenets included in the Platonic doctrine of nature were, that the univerſe is one animated being[a], including within its limits all animated natures; that, in the formation of the viſible and tangible world, fire and earth were firſt formed, and were afterwards united by means of air and water; that from perfect parts one perfect whole was produced, of a ſpherical figure, as moſt beautiful in itſelf, and beſt ſuited to contain all other figures[b]; that the elementary parts of the world are of regular geometrical forms, the particles of earth being cubical, thoſe of fire pyramidical, thoſe of air in the form of an octohedron, and thoſe of water in that of an icoſohedron; that theſe are adjuſted, in number, meaſure, and power, in perfect conformity to the geometrical laws of proportion; that the ſoul which pervades this ſphere, is the cauſe of its revolution round its center; and laſtly, that the world will remain for ever, but, that by the action of its animating principle, it accompliſhes certain periods, within which every thing returns to its antient place and ſtate. This periodical revolution of nature is called the Platonic, or Great, year.

Plato refers to the head of the philoſophy of nature his doctrine concerning the Human Soul; a doctrine which he treats obſcurely, on the ground of his aſſumed hypotheſis concerning ſpiritual emanations from the divine nature. He appears to have taught, that the ſoul of man is derived by emanation from God; but that this emanation was not immediate, but through the intervention of the ſoul of the world, which was itſelf debaſed by ſome material admixture; and conſequently, that the human ſoul, receding farther from the firſt intelligence, is inferior in perfection to the ſoul of the world[c]. He conceived the ſoul of man to be, in the material part of its nature, formed for converſing with ſenſible objects, and, in its intellectual part, capable of ſpiritual contemplation[d]: but what he meant by ὄχημα, the material vehicle of the ſoul, is uncertain. The relation which the human ſoul, in its original conſtitution, bears to matter, Plato appears to have conſidered as the

[a] Tim. t. iii. p. 32. [b] Ib. &c. [c] Tim. t. iii. p. 41.
[d] Phileb. t. ii. p. 30. De Leg. l. x. t. ii. p. 899.

ſource

ſource of moral evil[a]. Since the ſoul of the world, by partaking of matter, has within itſelf the ſeeds of evil, he inferred, that this muſt be the caſe ſtill more with reſpect to the ſoul of man. Upon the great queſtion, in what manner the ſoul acts upon the body, Plato ſpeaks obſcurely and inconſiſtently but it is probable that, as he conceived the ſoul of the world to produce the motion of the earth, and the heavenly bodies, by means of that part of its nature which is material; ſo he ſuppoſed the power of moving bodies, which belongs to the human ſoul, to be the effect of its material principle.

To account for the origin and preſent ſtate of human ſouls, Plato ſuppoſes, that when God formed the univerſe, he ſeparated from the ſoul of the world inferior ſouls, equal in number to the ſtars, and aſſigned to each its proper celeſtial abode; but that theſe ſouls (by what means, or for what reaſon, does not appear) were ſent down to the earth into human bodies, as into a ſepulchre or priſon. He aſcribes to this cauſe the depravity and miſery to which human nature is liable; and maintains, that it is only by diſengaging itſelf from all animal paſſions, and riſing above ſenſible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence, that the ſoul of man can be prepared to return to its original habitation[b].

Not inconſiſtently with the preceding doctrine, our philoſopher frequently ſpeaks of the ſoul of man as conſiſting of three parts[c]; the firſt, the ſeat of intelligence; the ſecond, of paſſion; the third, of appetite; and aſſigns to each its proper place in the human body. The firſt of theſe *portions* or *faculties* of the ſoul (for Plato ſpeaks of them under both theſe denominations) he conceived to have been derived from God; the ſecond and third, from matter. The irrational parts of the ſoul, in the Platonic ſyſtem, are not, however, to be confounded with the blood and nerves, which they were ſuppoſed to inhabit, and to move.

Laſtly, Plato teaches, in expreſs terms, the doctrine of the im-

[a] Chalcid. in Tim. § 51. p. 298.
[b] Tim. l. c. Phæd. t. i. p. 66. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. i. c. 11.
[c] Tim. t. iii. p. 59.

mortality of the rational ſoul: but he has reſted the proof of this doctrine upon arguments, drawn from the more fanciful parts of his ſyſtem[a]. For example: In nature, all things terminate in their contraries; the ſtate of ſleep terminates in that of waking; and the reverſe: ſo, life ends in death, and death in life. The ſoul is a ſimple indiviſible ſubſtance, and therefore incapable of diſſolution, or corruption. The objects to which it naturally adheres are ſpiritual and incorruptible; therefore its nature is ſo. All our knowledge is acquired by the reminiſcence of ideas contemplated in a prior ſtate: as the ſoul therefore muſt have exiſted before this life, it is probable, that it will continue to exiſt after it. Life being the conjunction of the ſoul with the body, death is nothing more than their ſeparation. Whatever is the principle of motion, muſt be incapable of deſtruction. Such is the ſubſtance of the arguments for the immortality of the ſoul, contained in the celebrated dialogue of the Phædo. It is happy for mankind, that their belief of this important doctrine reſts upon firmer grounds, than ſuch futile reaſonings.

Preparatory to the ſtudy of theoretical philoſophy, Plato required from his diſciples a knowledge of the elements of mathematics[b]. Although he has left no direct treatiſe upon this ſubject, he has made frequent uſe of mathematical ideas and language to explain and illuſtrate his philoſophical tenets; and he recommends theſe ſtudies, as peculiarly adapted to raiſe the mind from ſenſible to intellectual objects, and to inure it to abſtract and general conceptions.

Plato was a zealous advocate for the importance of that kind of ſcience which is purely ſpeculative, and, though a diſciple of Socrates, cenſured thoſe who make utility the only meaſure of the value of learning. Notwithſtanding this predilection for abſtract ſpeculation, he did not, however, neglect, in his writings, to deliver precepts of practical philoſophy. On the ſubjects of policy and morals, he preſcribes rules, which are intended for the direction of ſocieties and individuals in the offices of life, but which

[a] Phædo, t. i. p. 69, &c. [b] Rep. l. vii. t. ii. p. 522.

would

would be much more valuable, were they leſs tinctured with his theoretical doctrines.

Concerning policy, Plato has written at large in his Republic, and in his Dialogue on Laws. He was ſo much enamoured with his own conceptions on this ſubject, that it was chiefly the hope of having an opportunity to realiſe his plan of a republic, which induced him to viſit the court of Dionyſius. But they who are converſant with mankind, and capable of calmly inveſtigating the ſprings of human actions, will eaſily perceive, that his projects were chimerical, and could only have originated in a mind replete with philoſophical enthuſiaſm. Of this nothing can be a clearer proof, than the deſign of admitting, in his republic, a community of women[a], in order to give reaſon an entire controul over deſire. The main object of his political inſtitutions appears to have been, the ſubjugation of the paſſions and appetites, by means of the abſtract contemplation of ideas. A ſyſtem of policy, raiſed upon ſuch fanciful grounds, cannot merit a more diſtinct conſideration.

The chief heads of Plato's moral doctrine, as it may be gathered up from detached paſſages in his writings (for he ſeldom treats directly on any moral topic) are theſe:

Our higheſt good conſiſts in the contemplation and knowledge of the firſt good, which is Mind, or God[b]. All thoſe things, which are called good by men, are in reality ſuch, only ſo far as they are derived from the firſt and higheſt good. The only power in human nature, which can acquire a reſemblance to the Supreme Good, is reaſon. The minds of philoſophers are fraught with valuable treaſures; and, after the death of the body, they ſhall be admitted to divine entertainments; ſo that, whilſt, with the gods, they are employed in ſurveying the fields of truth, they will look down with contempt upon the folly of thoſe, who are contented with earthly ſhadows[c]. Goodneſs and beauty conſiſt in the know-

[a] Rep. l. v. t. ii. p. 457, 461. Tim. t. iii. p. 18.

[b] Parmenid. t. iii. p. 134. Rep. l. vi. t. ii. p. 505, 6. Phileb. t. ii. p. 20. Protag. t. i. p. 351. Gorg. t. i. p. 467.

[c] Rep. l. vii.

ledge of the firſt good, and the firſt fair. That only which is becoming, is good: therefore virtue is to be purſued for its own ſake; and, becauſe it is a divine attainment, it cannot be taught, but is the gift of God[a]. He alone, who has attained the knowledge of the firſt good, is happy. The end of this knowledge is, to render man as like to God as the condition of human nature will permit. This likeneſs conſiſts in prudence, juſtice, ſanctity, temperance[b]. In order to attain this ſtate, it is neceſſary to be convinced, that the body is a priſon, from which the ſoul muſt be releaſed, before it can arrive at the knowledge of thoſe things which are real and immutable[c]. Virtue is the moſt perfect habit of mind, which adorns the man, and renders him firm, reſolute and conſiſtent, in action and ſpeech, in ſolitude and ſociety[d]. The virtues are ſo nearly allied, that they cannot be ſeparated; they are perfect, and therefore neither capable of increaſe nor of diminution[e]. The paſſions are motions of the ſoul, excited by ſome apparent good or evil: they originate in the irrational parts of the ſoul, and muſt be regulated and ſubdued by reaſon[f]. Friendſhip is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, reciprocal benevolence, which inclines each party to be as ſolicitous for the welfare of the other, as for his own. This equality of affection is created and preſerved by a ſimilarity of diſpoſition and manners[g].

On the whole, although many juſt and ſublime ſentiments on moral ſubjects are to be found in the writings of Plato, it will appear, upon an impartial examination, that his ethical doctrine is in ſome particulars defective, and in others extravagant and abſurd. The fanciful notions which he entertained concerning the divine nature, the world of Ideas, and matter, ſeem to have given a romantic and enthuſiaſtic turn to his conceptions on morals; a defect, which may be in part aſcribed to his connection with

[a] Alcib. t. ii. p. 116. Menon. t. ii. p. 98.
[b] Leg. l. iv. t. ii. p. 716. Theæt. t. i. 176. Cratyl. t. i. p. 402.
[c] Phæd. t. i. p. 66.
[d] Leg. l. vii. t. ii. p. 804. Gorg. t. i. p. 506. Protag. t. i. p. 329.
[e] Protag. p. 345. Phæd. t. iii. p. 102. [f] Phil. t. ii. p. 47.
[g] Lyſid. t. ii. p. 214.

the

the Pythagorean ſchool, but which was, perhaps, chiefly owing to the peculiar propenſity of his genius towards metaphyſical fiction *.

* Vidend. Jonſ. Scrip. Hiſt. Phil. l. i. c. 6, 11, 13. l. iii. c. 10. Olympiodor. de Vit. Plat. poſt Laert. ed. Cauſab. Ficinus de Vit. Plat. Guarinus de Vit. Illuſt. Græc. Rapin Comp. Plat. et Ariſtot. Dacier Vit. Plat. Delin. Melanchthon. de Vit. Plat. Petav. Rat. Temp. l. iii. c. 13. Cyrill. contra Julian. l. vi. Æn. Gaza de Immort. p. 12. Eugben. de Perenni Phil. l. i. c. 27. Hanſchius de Enthuſ. Plat. Balt Defens des S. Peres. l. iv. c. 22. Lamius de Trinit. Florent. 1733. Cleric. Epiſt. Cr. vii. 177. Budd. Hiſt. Vet. Teſt. t. ii. p. 1006. L'Enfant. Diſſ. Bibl. Germ. t. ii. art. 5. Heuman. Act. Phil. v. i. p. 1056. Baſnage Hiſt. des Juifs. t. iv. c. 3, 4. Gundling. Hiſt. Phil. Mor. c. 1. § 1. Paſchius de Var. Mod. Trad. Mor. c. i. § 9. Meurſ. Ceramic. c. 19. Fabric. Bibl. Antiq. c. 21. Potter Arch. l. i. c. 8. Schmidii Diſſ. de Gymnas. Junius de Acad. Herm. Conring. Ant. Acad. p. 197. Blount Cenſ. Cel. Vir. p. 26. Beſſario contra Trapezuntium. Voſſ. de Idol. l. i. c. 4. Vavaſor de Dict. ludic. c. 3. Cauſſin. de Eloq. t. 1. c. 69. Fleury Diſſ. de Plat. adject. lib. de Stud. Inſtit. Burnet Arch. l. i. c. 11. Brucker. Hiſt. de Ideis. ed. Aug. Vind. 1723. Suppl. Amœn. Lit. t. viii. Diſſ. de Numeris Pyth. Am. Lit. t. 7. Puffendorf. Diſſ. de Theol. Plat. inter Opuſc. Benii Theol. Plat. Cudworth, c. iv. v. cum Not. Moſh. Criſpus de Platone caute legendo. Trevener. Diſſ. de Theol. Plat. et Ariſt. Zimmerman. de Ath. Plat. Amœn. Lit. t. 9, 12, 13. Reimann. Hiſt. Ath. c. 22. Wolf. de Manich. § 32. Bayle. Art. Zoroaſt. n. E. Javelli Mor. Phil. Plat. Ven. 1536. Omeiſii Ethica Plat. Altdorf. 1698. Zentgravii Spec. Doct. Plat. de. Jure Nat. *Souverain Platoniſme devoilé.*

SECTION

SECTION 2.

OF THE OLD, THE MIDDLE, AND THE NEW ACADEMY.

THE ſchool of Plato long continued famous, but paſſed through ſeveral changes, on account of which it was ſucceſſively diſtinguiſhed into the OLD, the MIDDLE, and the NEW ACADEMY [a].

The OLD ACADEMY conſiſted of thoſe followers of Plato, who taught the doctrine of their maſter without mixture or corruption. The firſt of theſe was SPEUSIPPUS [b], an Athenian, a nephew of Plato: he occupied the chair of inſtruction during the term of eight years from the death of his maſter. Through the intereſt of Plato he enjoyed an intimate friendſhip with Dion, whilſt he was reſident at Athens; and it was at his inſtigation, that Dion [c], encouraged by the promiſe of ſupport from the malcontents of Syracuſe, undertook his expedition againſt Dionyſius the tyrant, by whom he had been baniſhed. Contrary to the practice of Plato, Speuſippus required from his pupils a ſtated gratuity. He placed ſtatues of the Graces in the ſchool which Plato had built. On account of his infirm ſtate of health, he was commonly carried to and from the Academy in a vehicle. On his way thither he one day met Diogenes, and ſaluted him; the ſurly philoſopher refuſed to return the ſalute, and told him, that ſuch a feeble wretch ought to be aſhamed to live; to which Speuſippus replied, that he lived not in his limbs, but in his mind [d]. At length, being wholly incapacitated, by a paralytic ſtroke, for the duties of the chair, he reſigned it to Xenocrates. He is ſaid to have been of a violent temper, fond of pleaſure,

[a] Cic. Qu. Acad. paſſim. [b] Laert. l. iv. § 1. Suidas.
[c] Plut. in Dione. [d] Laert. l. c. Stobæus Serm. 273. p. 583.

and

and exceedingly avaricious. Speuſippus wrote many philoſophical works, which are now loſt, but which Ariſtotle thought ſufficiently valuable, to purchaſe at the expence of three talents[a]. From the few fragments which remain of his philoſophy, it appears that he adhered very ſtrictly to the doctrine of his maſter. Concerning the ſupreme mind he taught, Τὸν νοῦν ἔτε τῷ ἑνί ἔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτὸν, ἰδιόφυ ἢ δὲ εἶναι, that "it is neither the ſame with unity nor goodneſs, but of a nature peculiar to itſelf."

XENOCRATES[b], a Chalcedonian, born in the ninety-fifth Olympiad[c], at firſt attached himſelf to Æſchines, but afterwards became a diſciple of Plato, who took much pains in cultivating his genius, which was naturally heavy. Plato, comparing him with Ariſtotle, who was alſo one of his pupils, called the former a dull aſs, who needed the ſpur, and the latter a mettleſome horſe, who required the curb. His temper was gloomy, his aſpect ſevere, and his manners little tinctured with urbanity. Theſe material defects his maſter took great pains to correct; frequently adviſing him to ſacrifice to the Graces: and the pupil was patient of inſtruction, and knew how to value the kindneſs of his preceptor. He compared himſelf[d] to a veſſel with a narrow orifice, which receives with difficulty, but firmly retains whatever is put into it. So affectionately was Xenocrates attached to his maſter, that when Dionyſius, in a violent fit of anger, threatened to find one who ſhould cut off his head, he ſaid, "not before he has cut off this;" pointing to his own. As long as Plato lived, Xenocrates was one of his moſt eſteemed diſciples; after his death he cloſely adhered to his doctrine; and, in the ſecond year of the hundred and tenth Olympiad[e], he took the chair in the Academy, as the ſucceſſor of Speuſippus. Ariſtotle, who about this time returned from Macedonia, in expectation, as it ſhould ſeem, of filling the chair, was greatly diſappointed and chagrin-

[a] Fabric. Bibl. Græc. v. ii. p. 230. A. Gell. Noct. Att. l. iii. § 17.
[b] Laert. l. iv. § 9. 14. Athæneus, l. xi. p. 507. Ælian. H. V. l. xiv. c. 9.
[c] B. C. 400.
[d] Plut. de Auditione, t. iv. p. 144. [e] B. C. 339.

ed at this nomination; and immediately inſtituted a ſchool, in the Lyceum, in oppoſition to that of the Academy, where Xenocrates continued to preſide till his death.

Xenocrates, was celebrated among the Athenians, not only for his wiſdom, but for his virtues[a]. So eminent was his reputation for integrity, that when he was called upon to give evidence in a judicial tranſaction, in which an oath was uſually required, the judges unanimouſly agreed, that his ſimple aſſeveration ſhould be taken, as a public teſtimony to his merit. Even Philip of Macedon found it impoſſible to corrupt him. When he was ſent, with ſeveral others, upon an embaſſy to that prince, he declined all private intercourſe with him, that he might eſcape the temptation of a bribe. Philip afterwards ſaid[b], that of all thoſe who had come to him on embaſſies from foreign ſtates, Xenocrates was the only one whoſe friendſhip he had not been able to purchaſe. During the time of the Lamiac war[c], being ſent as ambaſſador to the court of Antipater, for the redemption of ſeveral Athenian captives, he was invited by the prince to ſit down with him at ſupper, but declined the invitation in the words of Ulyſſes to Circe[d]:

Ὦ Κίρκη, τὶς γάρ κεν ἀνὴρ ὃς ἐναίσιμος εἴη
Πρὶν τλαίη πάσασθαι ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτῆτος,
Πρὶν λυσασθ' ἑτάρους καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδεσθαι[e];

This pertinent and ingenious application of a paſſage in Homer, or rather the generous and patriotic ſpirit which it expreſſed, was ſo pleaſing to Antipater, that he immediately releaſed the priſoners. It may be mentioned, as another example of moderation in Xenocrates, that when Alexander[f], to mortify Ariſtotle, againſt whom he had

[a] Val. Max. l. ii. c. 10. Cic. ad Att. ii. 16. Laert. l. iv. § 7.
[b] Laert. l. iv. § 8. [c] Ib. § 9, 10. Plut. in Phoc.
[d] Odyſſ. l. x. ver. 383.
[e] What man, whoſe boſom burns with gen'rous worth,
His friends enthrall'd, and baniſh'd from his ſight,
Would taſte à ſelfiſh, ſolitary joy?
[f] Plut. in Alex. t. v. p. 551. Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. v. c. 22. Suidas. Val. Max. l. iv. c. 3. Stob. Ecl. 37.

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an accidental pique, ſent Xenocrates a magnificent preſent of fifty talents, he accepted only thirty *minæ*, returning the reſt to Alexander with this meſſage; that the large ſum, which Alexander had ſent, was more than he ſhould have been able to ſpend during his whole life. So abſtemious was he with reſpect to food, that his proviſion was frequently ſpoiled before it was conſumed. His chaſtity was invincible. Phryne[a], a celebrated Athenian courtezan, attempted without ſucceſs to ſeduce him. Of his humanity, no other proof can be neceſſary than the following pathetic incident. A ſparrow, which was purſued by a hawk, flew into his boſom; he afforded it ſhelter and protection till its enemy was out of ſight, and then let it go, ſaying, that he would never betray a ſuppliant[b]. He was fond of retirement, and was ſeldom ſeen in the city. He was diſcreet in the uſe of his time, and carefully allotted a certain portion of each day to its proper buſineſs[c]. One of theſe he employed in ſilent meditation. He was an admirer of the mathematical ſciences, and was ſo fully convinced of their utility, that when a young man, who was unacquainted with geometry and aſtronomy, deſired admiſſion into the Academy, he refuſed his requeſt, ſaying, that he was not yet poſſeſſed of the handles of philoſophy. In fine, Xenocrates was eminent both for the purity of his morals, and for his acquaintance with ſcience, and ſupported the credit of the Platonic ſchool, by his lectures, his writings, and his conduct[d]. He lived to the firſt year of the hundred and ſixteenth Olympiad[e], or the eighty-ſecond of his age, when he loſt his life by accidentally falling, in the dark, into a reſervoir of water[f].

The philoſophical tenets of Xenocrates were truly Platonic; but in his method of teaching he made uſe of the language of the Pythagoreans. He made Unity and Diverſity principles in nature, or gods; the former of whom he repreſented as the father, and the latter as the mother, of the univerſe. He taught, that the heavens are divine, and the ſtars celeſtial gods; and that beſides theſe divinities, there are terreſtrial dæmons, of a middle order between the gods and

[a] Laert. l. iv. § 7. Val. Max. l. iv. c. 3. [b] Ælian. l. xiii. c. 31.
[c] Laert. [d] Plut. de Virt. Mor. t. ii. p. 399. [e] B. C. 316. [f] Laert.

man, which partake of the nature both of mind and body, and are therefore, like human beings, capable of paſſions, and liable to diverſity of character[a]. After Plato, he probably conceived the ſuperior divinities to be the Ideas, or intelligible forms, which immediately proceeded from the Supreme Deity, and the inferior gods, or dæmons, to be derived from the ſoul of the world, and therefore, like that principle, to be compounded of a ſimple and a diviſible ſubſtance, or of that which always remains the ſame, and that which is liable to change[b].

The direction of the Academy, after the death of Xenocrates, devolved upon POLEMO[c], an Athenian of diſtinction, who in his youth had been addicted to infamous pleaſures. The manner in which he was reclaimed from his licentious courſe of life, and brought under the diſcipline of philoſophy, affords a memorable example of the power of eloquence, when it is employed in the cauſe of virtue. As he was, one morning about the riſing of the ſun, returning home from the revels of the night, clad in a looſe robe, crowned with garlands, ſtrongly perfumed, and intoxicated with wine, he paſſed by the ſchool of Xenocrates, and ſaw him ſurrounded with his diſciples. Unable to reſiſt ſo fortunate an opportunity of indulging his ſportive humour, he ruſhed, without ceremony, into the ſchool, and took his place among the philoſophers. The whole aſſembly was aſtoniſhed at this rude and indecent intruſion, and all but Xenocrates diſcovered ſigns of reſentment. Xenocrates, however, preſerved the perfect command of his countenance; and, with great preſence of mind, turned his diſcourſe from the ſubject on which he was treating to the topics of temperance and modeſty, which he recommended with ſuch ſtrength of argument, and energy of language, that Polemo was conſtrained to yield to the force of conviction. Inſtead of turning the philoſopher and his doctrine to ridicule, as he at firſt intended, he became ſenſible of the folly of his former conduct, was heartily aſhamed of the contemptible figure

[a] Laert. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 3. Plut. de Iſ. et Oſir. t. ii. p. 157.
[b] Plut. de Anim. Gen. t. iii. p. 75. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 13. Laert.
[c] Laert. l. iv. § 16. Suidas.

which he made in ſo reſpectable an aſſembly, took his garland from his head, concealed his naked arm under his cloak, aſſumed a ſedate and thoughtful aſpect, and, in ſhort, reſolved from that hour to relinquiſh his licentious pleaſures, and devote himſelf to the purſuit of wiſdom. Thus was this young man, by the powerful energy of truth and eloquence, in an inſtant converted from an infamous libertine to a reſpectable philoſopher[a]. In ſuch a ſudden change of character it is difficult to avoid paſſing from one extreme to another. Polemo, after his reformation, in order to brace up his mind to the tone of rigid virtue, conſtantly practiſed the ſevereſt auſterity and moſt hardy fortitude. From the thirtieth year of his age to his death, he drank nothing but water. When he ſuffered violent pain, he ſhewed no external ſign of anguiſh. In order to preſerve his mind undiſturbed by paſſion, he habituated himſelf to ſpeak in an uniform tone of voice, without elevation or depreſſion. The auſterity of his manners was, however, tempered with urbanity and generoſity. He was fond of ſolitude, and paſſed much of his time in a garden near his ſchool. He died, at an advanced age, of a conſumption[b]. Of his tenets little is ſaid by the antients, becauſe he ſtrictly adhered to the doctrine of Plato. He is ſaid to have taught, that the world is God[c]; but this was, doubtleſs, according to the Platonic ſyſtem, which made the Soul of the World an inferior divinity.

Polemo was ſucceeded by CRATES[d], an Athenian, to whom he had long been attached by a ſimilarity of diſpoſitions and purſuits. While they lived, their friendſhip continued inviolate, and they were both buried in the ſame grave.

The laſt celebrated name in the Old Academy is CRANTOR[e], who ſtudied under Xenocrates and Polemo. He adhered to the Platonic ſyſtem, and was the firſt who wrote commentaries on the works of Plato, but, as he died before Polemo and Crates, he could not ſucceed them in the Academic chair. He was highly celebrated for the

[a] Val. Max. l. vi. c. 9. Lucian in his accuſato, t. ii. p. 677. Cic. de Fin. l. iv. c. 6.

[b] Laert. Athenæus, l. ii. p. 44. [c] Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 3.

[d] Laert. l. iv. §. 21. [e] Laert. ib.

purity of his moral doctrine, as may be inferred from the praiſes which are beſtowed by the antients upon his diſcourſe "On Grief," which Cicero[a] calls, "a ſmall but golden piece, adapted to heal the wounds of the mind, not by encouraging ſtoical inſenſibility, but by ſuggeſting arguments drawn from the pureſt fountains of philoſophy." That Crantor acquired great reputation as a moral preceptor Horace[b] alſo intimates:

> Qui quid ſit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
> Plenius et melius Chryſippo et Crantore dicit[c].

Hitherto the pure doctrine of Plato continued to be taught in his ſchool. But after the death of Crates a new tribe of philoſophers aroſe, who on account of certain innovations in their manner of philoſophiſing, which in ſome meaſure receded from the Platonic ſyſtem without entirely deſerting it, have been diſtinguiſhed by the name of the Middle Academy.

The firſt preceptor, who appears in this claſs, is Arcesilaus[d], a native of Æolis, who was born in the firſt year of the hundred and ſixteenth Olympiad[e]. He was early initiated in mathematical ſcience and polite literature, and was intended by his elder brother, who had the charge of his education, for the profeſſion of the law, but choſe rather to devote himſelf to the ſtudy of philoſophy. He firſt attended upon Theophraſtus, then upon Ariſtotle, and afterwards became a diſciple of Polemo. Among his intimate friends and fellow diſciples, were Crantor the moraliſt, and Zeno, the celebrated founder of the Stoic ſect. After the death of Crates, Soficrates, who had taken the Academic chair, reſigned it to the ſuperior abilities and learning of Arceſilaus, whoſe method of inſtruction was univerſally admired. He was intimately converſant with the antient poets, particularly Homer and Pindar, and frequently in converſation quoted pertinent paſſages from their

[a] Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 44. Tuſc. Qu. l. iii. c. 6. [b] Ep. l. i. ep. 2. v. 3.

[c] Who better taught fair virtue's ſacred rules
Than Crantor or Cratippus in the ſchools.

[d] Laert. l. iv. § 28, &c. Euſeb. Prep. l. xiv. c. 9. [e] B. C. 316.

works.

works[a]. Though he reprehended the faults of his pupils with great freedom, his addreſs was ſo captivating, and his powers of perſuaſion ſo commanding, that he ſeldom failed to conciliate their affection. He poſſeſſed a happy facility in adapting his diſcourſes and converſation to every occaſion and character. His ſingular accompliſhments, as well as the ſtation which he filled in the Academy, brought him many followers. But his generoſity was ſo far ſuperior to his vanity, that he frequently adviſed his diſciples to viſit the ſchools of other maſters. When one of his pupils, a Chian youth[b], expreſſed a predilection in favour of another philoſopher, Hieronymus, he took him by the hand, and conducted him to his ſchool, and requeſted the philoſopher to treat him in a manner ſuitable to his merit. This action was the more generous, as Hieronymus was of the Peripatetic ſect, and a violent opponent of the Academy. Arceſilaus, with extenſive learning, ſweetneſs of temper, and elegance of manners, united many moral qualities which could not fail to procure him univerſal eſteem. In beſtowing favours, he was liberal without oſtentation. Viſiting a ſick friend, whom he obſerved to be in poverty, he ſilently conveyed a purſe of gold under his pillow. When the attendant diſcovered it, the ſick man ſaid with a ſmile, "This is one of the generous frauds of Arceſilaus[c]." He employed a great part of the plentiful income which he received from an eſtate at Pitane, in ſimilar acts of liberality. The merit of his virtues was, however, contaminated by ſeveral vices[d]. Like Ariſtippus, he was fond of ſplendid entertainments, and a luxurious manner of living; and there is little doubt, that he frequently indulged his natural propenſities, in a manner not very conſiſtent with the character of a philoſopher. He ſpent the greateſt part of his time in the Academy, but ſometimes on feſtivals viſited Hierocles the governor of Munychia, and the Pyræum, where the freedom of his manners often expoſed him to danger. He died in the fourth

[a] Laert. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. v. i. p. 354.
[b] Laert.
[c] Laert. Seneca de Benef. l. ii. c. 10.
[d] Athæn. l. vii. p. 276.

year

year of the hundred and thirty-fourth Olympiad[a], at the age of ſeventy-five, in a delirium occaſioned by exceſſive drinking[b].

Arceſilaus was the author of thoſe innovations in the Platonic ſchool, on account of which it aſſumed the appellation of the Middle Academy. In order to obtain a clear idea of the nature and cauſes of this revolution, it will be neceſſary to take a retroſpect of the ſtate of opinions in the preceding period.

From the ſurvey which we have taken of the riſe and progreſs of philoſophical tenets, it appears, that not only the Greek, but alſo the barbaric, philoſophers held, that there can be no certain knowledge of things ſo variable and fluctuating as thoſe material objects, which fall under the notice of the ſenſes. Not that human reaſon is ſuppoſed wholly incapable of arriving at truth; or that the doctrine of univerſal ſcepticiſm was admitted in the infancy of philoſophy. But in excluding material objects from the field of perfect ſcience, the firſt philoſophers diſcovered an inclination to inquire with modeſty concerning the nature of things, to diveſt themſelves of prejudice, and to ſatisfy themſelves with a ſober aſſent to ſuch truths as lay within the reach of the human intellect. It is alſo ſufficiently clear, that the earlier barbaric philoſophers, and after them the Greeks, had two kinds of doctrine, the popular, and the concealed; the former of which was intended to amuſe the vulgar, the latter was only diſcovered to thoſe diſciples, who were admitted to their more retired and confidential inſtruction. By this expedient, they at once ſecured themſelves from danger, and gave the authority of myſterious ſanctity to their doctrine.

Such was the ſtate of philoſophy when Socrates appeared. This great man did much to regulate the conduct of the human underſtanding. In oppoſition to the Sophiſts, who boaſted, that they knew every thing, he confeſſed that he knew nothing. By this confeſſion, however, he did not mean to aſſert the univerſal uncertainty of human knowledge, but merely to convince his followers of the futility of thoſe ſpeculations, which do not reſt upon the firm

[a] B. C. 241. [b] Laert. l. iv. § 45. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 31.

foundation

foundation of experience, and to teach them modeſty in their enquiries, and diffidence in their aſſertions.

Of the ſects which aroſe from the ſchool of Socrates, the greater part ſoon forſook the plain path of moral diſcipline, and turned aſide into the thorny mazes of diſputation. They reſumed the Sophiſtic manner of arguing on either ſide of every queſtion, and perplexed themſelves, and others, with trifling quibbles, and idle cavillings. This was particularly the caſe, as we have already ſeen, in the Megaric, Eliac, and Eretriac ſchools. Plato, from natural diſpoſition as well as education, was inclined to a ſtricter method of philoſophiſing; and whilſt he diſputed publicly in the Socratic manner, refuting the opinions of others, but leaving his hearers undecided concerning his own, he fully explained the principles of his philoſophy, in private, to thoſe of his pupils who were honoured with his confidence. His doctrine was, that no certain knowledge can be obtained concerning the varying forms of natural bodies, and that Ideas are the only objects of ſcience. This doctrine was univerſally taught in the Old Academy; but before the time of Arceſilaus, it was never denied, that uſeful opinions may be drawn from the ſenſes[a].

About this time, two new ſects aroſe; one founded by Pyrrho, which held the doctrine of univerſal ſcepticiſm; the other under Zeno, which maintained the certainty of human knowledge, and taught, with great confidence, a ſyſtem and doctrine eſſentially different from that of Plato. Theſe ſects, eſpecially the latter, became ſo popular, as to threaten the deſtruction of the Platonic ſyſtem.

In this ſituation, Arceſilaus thought it neceſſary to exerciſe a cautious reſerve with reſpect to the doctrine of his maſter, concealing his opinions from the vulgar, under the appearance of doubt and uncertainty[b]. His maxim was, that it was ſafer to *unteach* thoſe who had been ill inſtructed, than to teach thoſe who were not well inclined to receive inſtruction. He was more deſirous to

[a] Cic. Acad. Qu. l. i. c. 8. 32.

[b] Laert. l. iv. § 28. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iii. 18. iv. c. 6. De Fin. l. ii. c. 1. Auguſt. contr. Acad. l. iii. c. 17. t. i. p. 219.

prevent

prevent the progreſs of other innovators, than to become himſelf the author of a new ſect. He therefore profeſſed to derive his doctrine concerning the uncertainty of knowledge from Socrates, Plato, and other philoſophers[a].

The doctrine of Arceſilaus, was, that although there is a real certainty in the nature of things, every thing is uncertain to the human underſtanding, and conſequently that all confident aſſertions are unreaſonable. He thought it diſgraceful to aſſent to any propoſition, the truth of which is not fully eſtabliſhed, and maintained that, in all queſtions, oppoſite opinions may be ſupported by arguments of equal weight. He diſputed againſt the teſtimony of the ſenſes, and the authority of reaſon; but at the ſame time acknowledged, that they are capable of furniſhing probable opinions ſufficient for the conduct of life[b]. In all this, his ſecret deſign ſeems to have been to eſtabliſh the doctrine of Plato, that every kind of knowledge derived from ſenſible objects is uncertain, and that the only true ſcience is that which is employed upon the immutable objects of intelligence, or Ideas.

During the interval between the death of Arceſilaus, and the appearance of Carneades in the Academic Chair, the Platonic ſchool was ſucceſſively under the care of[c] Lacydes, Evander, and Egeſinus, none of whom were ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed to merit particular notice. Lacydes aſſumed his office in the fourth year of the hundred and thirty-fourth Olympiad. He is ſaid to have been the founder of a new ſchool, not becauſe he introduced any new doctrine, but becauſe he changed the place of inſtruction, and held his ſchool in the garden of Attalus, ſtill however within the limits of the Academic grove. In the ſecond year of the hundred and forty-firſt Olympiad he died of a palſy, into which he had fallen by exceſſive drinking[d].

Arceſilaus, in the violence of his oppoſition to the Stoic, and other dogmatical philoſophers, carried his doctrine of uncertainty to ſuch

[a] Plut. adv. Colot. [b] Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 6. 12, &c. Laert.
[c] Laert. l. iv. § 59—61. Suidas.
[d] Laert. ib. Ælian. l. ii. c. 41. Athæn. l. x. p. 438.

an heighth, as to alarm not only the general body of philoſophers, but even the governors of the ſtate[a]; the former treating him as a common enemy to philoſophy, and the latter beginning to apprehend that his tenets would produce the diſſolution of all the bonds of ſocial virtue, and of religion. Hence his ſucceſſors found it difficult to ſupport the credit of the Academy; and Carneades, one of the diſciples of this ſchool, thought it expedient to relinquiſh, in words at leaſt, ſome of the more obnoxious tenets of Arceſilaus. From this period the Platonic ſchool took the appellation of the NEW ACADEMY.

CARNEADES[b], one of the moſt illuſtrious ornaments of the Academy, was an African, a native of Cyrene. The time of his birth has been a ſubject of much debate: it is probable, that he was born in the third year of the hundred and forty-firſt Olympiad[c]. He received his firſt knowledge of the art of reaſoning from Diogenes the Stoic; whence he uſed ſometimes to ſay, in the courſe of a debate; "If I have reaſoned right, I have gained my point; if not, let Diogenes return me my *minæ*[d]," meaning the price he had paid him for his inſtruction. Afterwards, becoming a member of the Academy, he attended upon the lectures of Egeſinus, and by aſſiduous ſtudy became an eminent maſter of the method of diſputing which Arceſilaus had introduced: he ſucceeded Egeſinus in the chair, and reſtored the declining reputation of the Academy. With Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic, he was ſent on an embaſſy[e] from Athens to Rome, complaining of the ſeverity of a fine inflicted upon the Athenians, under the authority of the Romans, by their neighbours the Sicyonians, for having laid waſte Oropus, a town in Bœotia. The Athenians would undoubtedly, upon this occaſion, employ none but thoſe in whoſe judgment, eloquence, and integrity they could confide. The three philoſophers whom they entruſted

[a] Laert. ib. Auguſt. l. c.

[b] Laert. l. iv. § 62, &c. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. iv. c. 6. Suidas. [c] B. C. 214.

[d] Cic. ib. c. 30.

[e] Plut. Vit. Caton. A. Gell. Noct. At. l. vii. c. 14. Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. iii. c. 17. Macrob. Sat. l. i. c. 5.

with their embaſſy, whilſt they were in Rome, gave the Roman people many ſpecimens of Grecian learning and eloquence, with which till then they had been unacquainted. Carneades excelled in the vehement and rapid, Critolaus, in the correct and elegant, and Diogenes in the ſimple and modeſt kind of eloquence. Carneades particularly attracted the attention and admiration of his new auditors, by the ſubtlety of his reaſoning, and the fluency of his language. Before Galba, and Cato the Cenſor, he harangued, with great variety of thought, and copiouſneſs of diction, in praiſe of juſtice[a]. The next day, to eſtabliſh this doctrine of the uncertainty of human knowledge, he undertook to refute all his former arguments. Many were captivated by his eloquence; but Cato, apprehenſive leſt the Roman youth ſhould loſe their military character in the purſuit of Grecian learning, perſuaded the ſenate to ſend back theſe philoſophers, without further delay, to their own ſchools.

From this incident, of which we ſhall afterwards have further occaſion to take notice, it ſufficiently appears, that Carneades was an eminent orator and philoſopher. He obtained ſuch high reputation in his ſchool, that other philoſophers, when they had diſmiſſed their ſcholars, frequently came to hear him[b]. In application to ſtudy he was indefatigable. So intenſely did he fix his thoughts upon the ſubject of his meditations, that even at meals he frequently forgot to take the food which was ſet before him[c]. He ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the Stoic Chryſippus, but was always ready to do juſtice to his merit. He uſed to ſay, that if there were no Chryſippus, there would be no Carneades; intimating, that he derived much of his reputation as a diſputant from the abilities of his opponent. His voice was remarkably ſtrong, and he had ſuch a habit of vociferation, that the maſter of the gymnaſtic exerciſes, in the public field, deſired him not to ſpeak ſo loud: in return, he requeſted ſome meaſure to regulate his voice; to which the maſter very judiciouſly replied, you have a meaſure, the number of your hearers[d]. As Carneades grew old, he diſcovered ſtrong apprehenſions of dying; and frequently

[a] Lactant. Inſt. l. v. c. 14. Quint. Inſt. l. xii. c. 1. Cic. de Leg. l. i.
[b] Laert. l. iv. § 63. [c] Val. Max. l. viii. c. 7. [d] Laert.

 lamented,

lamented, that the ſame nature which had compoſed the human frame could diſſolve it. He paid the laſt debt to nature in the eighty-fifth [a], or, according to Cicero [b] and Valerius Maximus [c], in the ninetieth year of his age.

It was the doctrine of the New Academy [d], that the ſenſes, the underſtanding, and the imagination, frequently deceive us, and therefore cannot be infallible judges of truth; but that, from the impreſſions which we perceive to be produced on the mind, by means of the ſenſes, we infer appearances of truth, or probabilities. Theſe impreſſions Carneades called Phantaſies, or Images. He maintained, that they do not always correſpond to the real nature of things, and that there is no infallible method of determining when they are true or falſe, and conſequently that they afford no certain criterion of truth. Nevertheleſs, with reſpect to the conduct of life, and the purſuit of happineſs, Carneades held, that probable appearances are a ſufficient guide, becauſe it is unreaſonable not to allow ſome degree of credit to thoſe witneſſes who commonly give a true report. Probabilities he divided into three claſſes; Simple, Uncontradicted, and, Confirmed by accurate examination. The loweſt degree of probability takes place, where the mind, in the caſual occurrence of any ſingle image, perceives in it nothing contrary to truth and nature; the ſecond degree of probability ariſes, when, contemplating any object in connection with all the circumſtances aſſociated with it, we diſcover no appearance of inconſiſtency, or incongruity, to lead us to ſuſpect, that our ſenſes have given a falſe report; as, when we conclude, from comparing the image of any individual man with our remembrance of that man, that he is the perſon we ſuppoſed him to be. The higheſt degree of probability is produced, when, after an accurate examination of every circumſtance, which might be ſuppoſed to create uncertainty, we are able to diſcover no fallacy in the report of our ſenſes. The judgments ariſing from this operation of the mind are, according to the doctrine of the New Academy, not

[a] Ib. [b] Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 6. [c] Loc. cit.
[d] Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. Sextus Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. § 153.

ſcience, but opinion, which is all the knowledge that the human mind is capable of attaining.

This doctrine of Carneades, concerning truth, may ſerve to ſhew, in what ſenſe we are to underſtand an aſſertion, which has been advanced reſpecting this philoſopher and his ſect[a], that they would not allow it to be certain, that things which are equal or ſimilar to the ſame thing, are equal or ſimilar to one another. They did not, probably, deny this axiom, conſidered as an abſtract truth; but merely maintained, that in its application to any particular caſe, ſome uncertainty muſt ariſe, from our imperfect knowledge of the things which are brought into compariſon, ſo that it is impoſſible to prove the abſolute equality of any two things to a third, or to one another. It appears, moreover, that the chief point of difference between Arceſilaus and Carneades, or between the Middle and the New Academy, was, that the latter taught the doctrine of uncertainty in leſs exceptionable terms than the former. Arceſilaus, through his earneſt deſire of overturning all other ſects, gave his opponents ſome pretence for charging him with having undermined the whole foundation of morals: Carneades, by leaving the human underſtanding in poſſeſſion of probability, afforded ſufficient ſcope for the uſe of practical principles of conduct. Arceſilaus was chiefly employed in oppoſing the doctrines of other philoſophers in logic and phyſics, and paid little attention to ethics: Carneades, at the ſame time that he taught the neceſſity of ſuſpence in ſpeculative reſearches, preſcribed rules for the direction of life and manners[b].

Carneades, as Cicero[c] has related at large, ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the doctrine of the Stoics concerning the gods; but this he did, adds Cicero, not with a view to deſtroy the belief of ſuperior powers, but merely to prove that the theological ſyſtem of the Stoical ſchool was unſatisfactory. He was likewiſe earneſtly deſirous of refuting their doctrine concerning fate[d]. On this ſubject,

[a] Bayle. Carn. note C.
[b] Numenius ap. Euſeb. l. xiv. c. 7, 8. Auguſt. l. c.
[c] De Nat. Deor. l. iii. c. 18. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. ix. § 140, &c.
[d] Cic. de Fato, c. 14.

he

he aſſumed, on the ground of experience, the exiſtence of a ſelf-determining power in man, and hence inferred, that all things did not happen, as the Stoics maintained, in a neceſſary ſeries of cauſes and effects, and conſequently, that it is impoſſible for the gods to predict events dependent on the will of man. As the foundation of morals, he taught, that the ultimate end of life is the enjoyment of thoſe things, towards which we are directed by the principles of nature.

Such is the general idea which the ancients have left us concerning the doctrine of Carneades. But, after all, it muſt be owned, that his real tenets are not certainly known. Even his immediate ſucceſſor, Clitomachus, confeſſed, that he was never able to diſcover them.

CLITOMACHUS[a] was a native of Carthage. In his early years he acquired a fondneſs for learning, which induced him to viſit Greece for the purpoſe of attending the ſchools of the philoſophers. From the time of his firſt arrival in Athens, he attached himſelf to Carneades, and continued his diſciple till his death, when he became his ſucceſſor in the Academic chair. He ſtudied with great induſtry, and made himſelf maſter of the ſyſtems of the other ſchools; but profeſſed the doctrine of ſuſpenſion of aſſent, as it had been taught by his maſter. Cicero relates, that he wrote four hundred books upon philoſophical ſubjects. At an advanced age, he was ſeized with a lethargy. Recovering in ſome meaſure the uſe of his faculties, he ſaid, "The love of life ſhall deceive me no longer," and laid violent hands upon himſelf. He entered upon the office of preceptor in the Academy immediately after the death of Carneades, and held it thirty years, that is, till the hundred and ſeventieth Olympiad[b]. According to Cicero, he taught, that there is no certain criterion by which to judge of the truth of thoſe reports, which we receive from the ſenſes, and that therefore a wiſe man will either wholly ſuſpend his aſſent, or decline giving a peremptory opinion; but that, nevertheleſs[c], men are ſtrongly impelled by nature to follow probability. His moral doctrine[d] eſtabliſhed a natural alliance between

[a] Laert. l. iv. § 67, &c. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 31, 32. [b] B. C. 100.
[c] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. l. i. c. 33. [d] Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. v. c. 30.

pleaſure

pleaſure and virtue. He was a profeſſed enemy to rhetoric, and thought that no place ſhould be allowed, in ſociety, to ſo dangerous an art[a].

PHILO of Lariſſa[b], the ſucceſſor of Clitomachus, or, according to ſome, the founder of a fourth Academy, is celebrated by Cicero for his learning and eloquence, and for the elegance of his manners. In the Mithridatic war, he took refuge at Rome, and Cicero attended his lectures. He held, that truth in its nature is comprehenſible, but not by the human faculties. CHARMIDAS, the companion of Philo, is celebrated for the compaſs and fidelity of his memory, and for his moral wiſdom[c].

The laſt preceptor of the Platonic ſchool in Greece was ANTIOCHUS of Aſcalon[d]. He attempted to reconcile the tenets of the different ſects, and maintained, that the doctrines of the Stoics were to be found in the writings of Plato. Cicero greatly admired his eloquence, and the politeneſs of his manners; and Lucullus took him as his companion into Aſia. He reſigned the Academic chair in the hundred and ſeventy-fifth Olympiad[e]. After his time, the profeſſors of the Academic philoſophy were diſperſed by the tumults of war, and the ſchool itſelf was transferred to Rome *.

[a] Sext. Emp. adv. Rhet. § 20.

[b] Cic. de Orat. l. iii. c. 16. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. l. i. c. 33. Plut. Vit. Cic. Cic. Ep. ad Fam. l. xiii. ep. 1. l. ix. ep. 8. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 4, 6.

[c] Tuſc. Qu. l. i. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. x. c. 16. Stobæus, Serm. 212.

[d] Sext. Emp. l. c. Cic. Ac. Q. l. iv. c. 4. 22. 35. 43. 45. De Fin. l. v. c. 3. 5. De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 7. Plut. l. c.

[e] B C. 80.

* Videnda Meurſ. de Archont. Ath. l. iii. c. 9. Potter. Arch. l. i. c. 10. l. iv. c. 20. Amœn. Lit. t. vii. p. 232. t. viii. p. 326. Reiman. Hiſt. Ath. c. 22. § 6. c. 33. § 5. Cudworth. c. iv. § 24. Jonſ. de Scrip. l. ii. c. 13. 14. Bayle. Fouchier. Diſſ. de Phil. Acad. Par. 1692. Huet de la Foibleſſe, &c. Auguſt. contr. Acad. Gaſſen de Log. l. ii. c. 4. Carpzovii Diſſ. de Critolao.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

OF ARISTOTLE AND THE PERIPATETIC SECT.

SECT. I.

OF ARISTOTLE AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.

IN the preceding chapter, we have traced the riſe and progreſs of the Ionic ſchool, from Thales, through Socrates, and his pupil Plato, into the ſeveral forms which it aſſumed in the Old, Middle, and New Academy. We are next to enquire into the hiſtory of another principal branch of this ſchool, the Peripatetic ſect, founded by Ariſtotle; a philoſopher, whoſe extenſive and penetrating genius has entitled him to immortal fame, and whoſe doctrines have been tranſmitted, through various channels, to the preſent day, and have been ſurpriſingly interwoven with almoſt the whole circle of the ſciences. The hiſtory of his life and opinions will require a minute and impartial diſcuſſion.

ARISTOTLE[a] was a native of Stagyra, a town of Thrace[b], on the borders of the bay of Strymon, which at that time was ſubject to Philip of Macedon. His father was a phyſician, named Nicomachus; his mother's name was Phæſtias. From the place of his birth he is called the Stagyrite. Antient writers are generally agreed in fixing the time of his birth in the firſt year of the ninety-ninth

[a] Laert. l. v. § 1. &c. Suidas. Ammonii Vita Ariſt. apud Proleg. Categ.
[b] Herod. Polymn. p. 265. Pauſan. Eliac. p. 462.

Olympiad.

Olympiad[a]. * He received the firſt rudiments of learning from Proxenus, of Atarna in Myſia, of whom he always retained a reſpectful remembrance. In gratitude for the care which he had taken of his early education, he afterwards honoured his memory with a ſtatue, inſtructed his ſon Nicanor in the liberal ſciences, and adopted him as his heir[b]. At the age of ſeventeen, Ariſtotle went to Athens, and devoted himſelf to the ſtudy of philoſophy, in the ſchool of Plato[c]. The uncommon acuteneſs of his apprehenſion, and his indefatigable induſtry, ſoon attracted the attention of Plato, and obtained his applauſe. Plato uſed to call him the *Mind of the ſchool*, and to ſay, when he was abſent, "Intellect is not here." His acquaintance with books was extenſive and accurate, as ſufficiently appears from the conciſe abridgment of opinions, and the numerous quotations, which are found in his works. According to Strabo[d], he was the firſt perſon who formed a library. Ariſtotle continued in the Academy till the death of Plato, that is, to the thirty-ſeventh year of his age. After the death of his maſter, he erected a monument to his memory, on which he inſcribed an epitaph expreſſive of the higheſt reſpect, of which a Latin verſion is preſerved[e]:

Gratus Ariſtoteles ſtruit hoc altare Platoni,
Quem turbæ injuſtæ vel celebrare nefas[f].

He likewiſe wrote an oration and elegies in praiſe of Plato, and gave other proofs of reſpect for his memory. Little regard is therefore due to the improbable tale, related by Ariſtoxenus[g], of a quarrel between Ariſtotle and Plato, which terminated in a temporary ex-

[a] Laert. Dionyſ. Hal. Epiſt. 1. ad Ammæum. * B. C. 384.
[b] Laert. Ammon. Dion. Hal. loc. cit. [c] Philopon. de Mundi Etern.
[d] L. xiii. p. 608. [e] Ammon.

[f] To Plato's ſacred name this tomb is rear'd,
A name by Ariſtotle long revered!
Far hence, ye vulgar herd! not dare to ſtain
With impious praiſe this ever hallow'd fane.

[g] Euſeb. Prep. l. xv. c. 2. Suidas in Ariſtox. Ælian. l. iii. c. 19.

cluſion

cluſion of Ariſtotle from the Academy, and in his erection of a ſchool in oppoſition to Plato during his life. We find no proof that Ariſtotle inſtituted a new ſyſtem of philoſophy before the death of Plato.

It is certain, however, that when Speuſippus, upon the death of his uncle, ſucceeded him in the Academy, Ariſtotle was ſo much diſpleaſed, that he left Athens, and paid a viſit to Hermias, king of the Atarnenſes, who had been his friend and fellow diſciple, and who received him with every expreſſion of regard[a]. Here he remained three years, and during this interval diligently proſecuted his philoſophical reſearches. At the cloſe of this term, his friend Hermias was taken priſoner by Memnon, a Rhodian, and ſent to Artaxerxes king of Perſia, who put him to death. Upon this, Ariſtotle placed a ſtatue of his friend in the temple at Delphos, and out of reſpect to his memory, married his ſiſter, whom her brother's death had reduced to poverty and diſtreſs[b]. Upon the death of Hermias Ariſtotle removed to Mitylene[c], but from what inducement does not appear. After he had remained there two years, Philip, king of Macedon, having heard of his extraordinary abilities and merit, made choice of him as preceptor to his ſon Alexander, and wrote him the following letter[d]:

"PHILIP to ARISTOTLE, *wiſheth health:*

"Be informed that I have a ſon, and that I am thankful to the gods, not ſo much for his birth, as that he was born in the ſame age with you; for if you will undertake the charge of his education, I aſſure myſelf, that he will become worthy of his father, and of the kingdom which he will inherit."

Ariſtotle accepted the charge; and in the ſecond year of the hundred and ninth Olympiad[e], when Alexander was in his fifteenth year, he took up his reſidence in the court of Philip. He had been himſelf well inſtructed, not only in the doctrines of the ſchools, but in the manners of the world, and therefore was excellently qualified

[a] Laert. l. c.
[b] Strabo, l. xiii. p. 610. Euſeb. l. c. Conf. Athæn. l. xv. p. 694.
[c] Strabo, ib. A. Gell. l. ix. c. 3. Plut. de Fort. Alex. t. ii. p. 346.
[d] B. C. 343.

for the office of preceptor to the young prince. Accordingly, we find that he executed his truſt ſo perfectly to the ſatisfaction of Philip and Olympia, that they admitted him to their entire confidence, and conferred upon him many acceptable tokens of eſteem [a]. Philip allowed him no ſmall ſhare of influence in his public counſels; and it reflected great honour upon Ariſtotle, that he made uſe of his intereſt with his prince, rather for the benefit of his friends and the public, than for his own emolument [b]. At his interceſſion, the town of Stagyra, which had fallen into decay, was rebuilt, and the inhabitants were reſtored to their antient privileges. In commemoration of their obligations to their fellow citizen, and as a teſtimony of reſpect for his merit, they inſtituted an annual Ariſtotelian feſtival [c]. Alexander entertained ſuch an affection for his preceptor, that he profeſſed himſelf more indebted to him than to his father; declaring, that Philip had only given him life, but that Ariſtotle had taught him the art of living well [d]. He is ſaid, not only to have inſtructed his pupil in the principles of ethics and policy, but alſo to have communicated to him the moſt abſtruſe and concealed doctrines of philoſophy. But it may be queſtioned, whether a preceptor, who was himſelf ſo well trained by experience in the prudential maxims of life, would think of conducting a youth, who was deſtined to wield a ſceptre, through the intricate mazes of metaphyſics; or whether a pupil of Alexander's enterpriſing ſpirit would be able to bend his mind to ſuch ſtudies. What is related concerning the pains which Ariſtotle took to make his pupil acquainted with Homer, and to inſpire him with a love of his writings, is much more credible; for he certainly could not have adopted a more judicious method of enriching the mind of the young prince with noble ſentiments, or of inſpiring him with ambition to diſtinguiſh himſelf by illuſtrious actions.

Immediately after the death of Philip, which happened in the firſt year of the hundred and eleventh Olympiad [e], Alexander, whoſe ambitious ſpirit could not bear to be incloſed within the limits of his paternal kingdom, formed the deſign of his Aſiatic expedition. It is

[a] Ammonius, l. c. [b] Plut. l. c. Laert. [c] Ammonius, l. c.
[d] Plut. Alex. t. ii. p. 346. [e] B. C. 336.

not

not improbable, that Ariſtotle, who after eight years daily intercourſe muſt have been well acquainted with the character of his pupil, approved of this enterprize. For his own part, however, he preferred the enjoyment of literary leiſure to the proſpect of ſharing with Alexander the glory of conqueſt, and therefore determined to return to Athens[a]. His nephew Calliſthenes, remained with the hero, and accompanied him in his exploits.

After Ariſtotle had left his pupil, they carried on a friendly correſpondence, in which the philoſopher prevailed upon Alexander to employ his increaſing power and wealth in the ſervice of philoſophy, by furniſhing him, in his retirement, with the means of enlarging his acquaintance with nature. Alexander accordingly[b] employed ſeveral thouſand perſons in different parts of Europe and Aſia to collect animals of various kinds, birds, beaſts, and fiſhes, and ſend them to Ariſtotle, who, from the information which this collection afforded him, wrote fifty volumes on the hiſtory of animated nature, only ten of which are now extant. Calliſthenes[c], in the courſe of the Aſiatic expedition, incurred the diſpleaſure of Alexander[d], by the freedom with which he cenſured his conduct; the averſion was by a natural aſſociation transferred to Ariſtotle; and from that time a mutual alienation and jealouſy took place between the philoſopher and his prince. But there is no ſufficient reaſon to believe[e], that their attachment was converted into a ſettled enmity, which at length led them to form deſigns againſt each other's life.

Ariſtotle, upon his return to Athens, finding the Academy, in which he probably intended to preſide, occupied by Xenocrates, reſolved to acquire the fame of a leader in philoſophy, by founding a new ſect in oppoſition to the Academy, and teaching a ſyſtem of doctrines different from that of Plato[f]. The place which he choſe for his ſchool was the Lyceum[g], a grove in the ſuburbs of Athens,

[a] Laert. &c. [b] Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. viii. c. 16. [c] Laert.
[d] Q. Curtius, l. viii. c. 6.
[e] Plut. l. c. Patricii Diſcuſſiones Peripateticæ, Baſil. 1571.
[f] Laert. l. c. Cicero de Orat. l. iii. c. 35. Quintil Inſt. Orat. l. iii. c. 1.
[g] Laert. Suidas in Lyc.

which had hitherto been made uſe of for military exerciſes. Here he held daily converſations on ſubjects of philoſophy with thoſe who attended him, walking as he diſcourſed; whence his followers were called Peripatetics [a].

According to the long eſtabliſhed practice of philoſophers among the Grecians, Egyptians, and other nations, Ariſtotle had his public and his ſecret doctrine, the former of which he called The Exoteric, the latter the Acroamatic or Eſoteric. Hence [b], he divided his auditors into two claſſes, to one of which he taught his Exoteric doctrine, diſcourſing on the principal ſubjects of logic, rhetoric, and policy; the other he inſtructed in the acroamatic, or concealed and ſubtle doctrine, concerning Being, Nature, and God. His more abſtruſe diſcourſes he delivered in the morning to his ſelect diſciples, whom he required to have been previouſly inſtructed in the elements of learning, and to have diſcovered abilities and diſpoſitions ſuited to the ſtudy of philoſophy. He delivered lectures to a more promiſcuous auditory in the evening, when the Lyceum was open to all young men without diſtinction. The former he called his Morning Walk, the latter his Evening Walk. Both were much frequented.

Ariſtotle continued his ſchool in the Lyceum twelve years [c]; for, although the ſuperiority of his abilities, and the novelty of his doctrines created him many rivals and enemies, during the life of Alexander the friendſhip of that prince protected him from inſult. But after Alexander's death, which happened in the firſt year of the hundred and fourteenth Olympiad [d], the fire of jealouſy [e], which had long been ſmothered, burſt into a flame of perſecution. His adverſaries inſtigated Eurymedon, a prieſt, to accuſe him of holding and propagating impious tenets. What theſe were, we are not expreſsly informed; but it is not improbable, that the doctrine of Ariſtotle concerning fate might be conſtrued into a denial of the neceſſity of prayers and ſacrifices, and might conſequently be reſented as inimical to the public inſti-

[a] Laert. Cic. Ac. Q. l. i. c. 4. [b] A. Gellius, l. xx. c. 4.
[c] Laert. l. v. § 5. [d] B. C. 324.
[e] Athæn. l. xv. p. 697. Orig. contr. Celſ. l. i. p. 52. l. ii. p. 68.

tutions

tutions of religion. This would doubtleſs be thought, on the part of the prieſthood, a ſufficient ground of accuſation, and would be admitted by the judges of the Areopagus as a valid plea for treating him as a dangerous man. That Ariſtotle himſelf was apprehenſive of meeting with the fate of Socrates, appears from the reaſon which he gave[a] his friends for leaving Athens, "I am not willing," ſays he, "to give the Athenians an opportunity of committing a ſecond offence againſt philoſophy." It is certain, that he retired, with a few of his diſciples, to Chalcis, where he remained till his death. He left Athens in the ſecond year of the hundred and fourteenth Olympiad[b], and died at Chalcis the third year of the ſame Olympiad, and the ſixty-third year of his age[c]. Many idle tales are related[d] concerning the manner of his death. It is moſt likely that it was the effect of premature decay, in conſequence of exceſſive watchfulneſs, and application to ſtudy. His body was conveyed to Stagyra, where his memory was honoured with an altar, and a tomb.

Ariſtotle was twice married, firſt to Pythias, ſiſter to his friend Hermias, and after her death to Herpilis a native of Stagyra[e]. By his ſecond wife, he had a ſon named Nicomachus, to whom he addreſſed his *Magna Moralia*, "Greater Morals." His perſon[f] was ſlender, he had ſmall eyes, and a ſhrill voice, and when he was young, heſitated in his ſpeech. He endeavoured to ſupply the defects of his natural form, by an attention to dreſs, and commonly appeared in a coſtly habit, with his beard ſhaven, and his hair cut, and with rings upon his fingers. He was ſubject to frequent indiſpoſitions, through a natural weakneſs of ſtomach; but he corrected the infirmities of his conſtitution by a temperate regimen.

Concerning the character of Ariſtotle, nothing can be more contradictory than the accounts of different writers. Some of his panegyriſts, not contented with aſcribing to him the virtues of a phi-

[a] Ælian. l. iii. c. 36. [b] B. C. 323. [c] Laert.

[d] A. Gell. l. xiii. c. 5. Juſt. Martyr. Cohort. ad Græc. p. 34. Greg. Naz. Orat. iii. p. 79. Heſychius. Suidas. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 166.

[e] Laert.

[f] Id. Cic. ad Attic. l. iv. Ep. 9. Gronov. Theſ. Græc. t. ii. Tab. 90.

loſopher,

loſopher, or rather, perhaps, jealous of the credit which heathen philoſophy might acquire from ſo illuſtrious a name, have aſcribed his wiſdom to divine revelation. Jews have ſaid[a], that he gained his philoſophy in Judea, and borrowed his moral doctrine from Solomon, and have even aſſerted, that he was of the ſeed of Iſrael, and the tribe of Benjamin. Chriſtians have aſſigned him a place amongſt thoſe who were ſupernaturally ordained to prepare the way for divine revelation[b], and have acknowledged themſelves indebted to the aſſiſtance of the Peripatetic philoſophy, for the depth and accuracy of their acquaintance with the ſublime myſteries of religion[c]. Others, who have confined their encomiums within the limits of probability, have ſaid[d], that Ariſtotle was an illuſtrious pattern of gratitude, moderation, and the love of truth; and in confirmation of this general praiſe, have referred to his behaviour to his preceptor, his friends, and his countrymen, and to the celebrated apothegm, which has been commonly aſcribed to him; *Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, magis tamen amica Veritas*; "I reſpect Plato, and I reſpect Socrates, but I reſpect Truth ſtill more". On the other hand, there have not been wanting writers, who have repreſented Ariſtotle as the moſt infamous of human beings, and charged him with every kind of impiety and wickedneſs. Many of the calumnies againſt his

[a] Joſeph. contr. Apion. l. i. Clem. Alex. Str. l. i. Euſeb. Prep. l. ix. c. 5. R. Gedalias in Schalcheleth, p. 102. ed. Ven. Bartoloccius Bibl. Rabb. t. i. p. 476. Baſnage Hiſt. des Juifs, t. iii. c. 7. § 14. Fabric. Bib. G. t. ii. p. 162.

[b] It is ſaid, that Ariſtotle cried out, in the article of death, *Cauſa cauſarum, miſerere mei*—and that he ſaid to his attendants that Homer had well ſaid the gods have deſcended upon earth for the ſalvation of men[a]. But theſe are unqueſtionably to be ranked among the lying tales ſo plentifully produced in the ages of monkiſh ignorance and credulity: they were probably invented by the ingenious author of the book *De Pomo*, &c. "Of the Apple which Ariſtotle held in his hand juſt before his death, and with the ſmell of which he refreſhed himſelf, whilſt he diſcourſed to his friends concerning the Contempt of Death, and the Immortality of the Soul:" a book which Ariſtotle himſelf is ſaid to have dictated in his laſt moments, in order to ſhew, that wiſe men need not lament their exit from their lodging of clay. About the year 1200, an Hebrew verſion of the Arabic tranſlation from the ſuppoſed original was rendered into Latin by Manfred, ſon of the Emperor Frederic I. Vid. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 166.

[c] Euſeb. Pr. l. xv. c. 8. [d] Ammonius, &c.

[a] Cæl. Rhodogin. Ant. l. xviii. c. 31. Liber de Pomo. ed. Loſii, Gieſſæ. 1706.

memory

memory which have been tranſmitted to poſterity, doubtleſs, originated in the jealouſy and envy of the rival ſects, which were contemporaries with the Peripatetic ſchool. To this ſource may be fairly referred, the abuſe of Timæus the Tauromenite, who ſays[a], that Ariſtotle, when he was a young man, after waſting his patrimony in prodigality, opened a ſhop for medicine in Athens; and that he was a pretender to learning, a vile paraſite, and addicted to gluttony and debauchery. To the ſame origin we may aſcribe the inconſiſtent and abſurd cavils which have been raiſed againſt his reputation, on the ground of his attachment to Hermias, and the honours which he paid to his memory, and to that of his wife Pythias.

If, without regard to the fictions either of calumny or panegyric, the merit of Ariſtotle be weighed in the equal balance of hiſtorical truth, it will perhaps be found, that neither were his virtues of that exalted kind which command admiration, nor his faults ſo highly criminal as not to admit of ſome apology. He may, perhaps, be juſtly cenſured for having taught his pupil Alexander principles of morals and policy, which were accommodated to the manners of a court, and which might eaſily be rendered ſubſervient to his ambitious views. And it cannot be doubted, that his philoſophical doctrines concerning nature were not favourable to the public forms of religion. But neither his doctrine, nor his life, afford ſufficient ground for condemning him as an advocate for immorality or impiety.

As a writer, there can be no doubt, that Ariſtotle is entitled to the praiſe of deep erudition. At the ſame time it muſt be owned, that he is frequently deſerving of cenſure, for giving a partial and unfair repreſentation of the opinions of his predeceſſors in philoſophy, that he might the more eaſily refute them; and that he ſeems to have made it the principal object of his extenſive reading, to depreciate the wiſdom of all preceding ages. In ſhort, whilſt in point of genius we rank Ariſtotle in the firſt claſs of men, and whilſt we aſcribe to him every attainment which, at the period

[a] Suidas. Athæn. l. viii. p. 354. Euſeb. Prep. l. c.

in which he lived, indefatigable induſtry, united with ſuperior abilities, could reach, we muſt add, that his reputation in philoſophy is in ſome meaſure tarniſhed by a too daring ſpirit of contradiction and innovation; and in morals, by an artful conformity to the manners of the age in which he lived.

A large catalogue of the writings of Ariſtotle is given by Laertius, Fabricius, and others, from which it appears, that he wrote many books beſides thoſe which have been transmitted to the preſent times. Few of his works were made public during his life, and it was not long after his death before ſpurious productions were mixed with his genuine writings, ſo that it became difficult to diſtinguiſh them. Thoſe which are at preſent generally received under his name, may be claſſed under the ſeveral heads of Logic, Phyſics, Metaphyſics, Mathematics, Ethics, Rhetoric, and Poeſy.

The Logical writings of Ariſtotle are the "Categories," attributed by ſome to Archytas a Pythagorean; "Of the Explanation of Nouns and Verbs," a work which explains the philoſophical principles of grammar; "Analytics," including the whole doctrine of ſyllogiſm and demonſtration; eight books of "Topics," or common places, from which probable arguments are to be drawn; and "Sophiſtic Arguments," enumerating the ſeveral ſpecies of falſe reaſoning. Theſe logical pieces are uſually publiſhed in one volume under the general title of the Organon of Ariſtotle. His Physical writings are, "On the Doctrine of Nature," explaining the principles and properties of natural bodies; "On the Heavens;" "On the Production and Diſſolution of Natural Bodies;" "On Meteors;" "Of Animal life;" "Phyſical Miſcellanies;" "On the Natural Hiſtory of Animals;" "On the Anatomy of Animals;" "On Plants;" "On Colours;" "On Sound;" "A Collection of Wonderful Facts;" "Againſt the Doctrine of Xenophanes, Zeno, and Gorgias;" "On the Winds;" "On Phyſiognomy," and, "Miſcellaneous Problems." The Metaphysics of Ariſtotle are contained in fourteen books. Under the head of Mathematics are included a "Book of Queſtions in Mechanics," and another "On Incommenſurable Lines." His doctrine of Ethics is contained in ten books "To Nicomachus," "The Greater Morals;" ſeven books "To Eudemus," aſcribed by ſome to Theophraſtus; A book

book "On Virtue and Vice;" two "On Oeconomics;" and eight "On Government." He treats, in three diſtinct books, "On the Art of Rhetoric," and in another "On the Art of Poetry[a]."

The works of Ariſtotle, together with his library, paſſed very early through hazards, which have rendered it a ſubject of critical enquiry, how far the preſent volumes which bear his name are genuine[b]. Ariſtotle left his own writings, together with his library, to his ſucceſſor, Theophraſtus, who, doubtleſs, knew their value. Theophraſtus, at his death, bequeathed all his books to Neleus, of Scepſis. Some of them were ſold to Ptolemy Philadelphus, and ſhared the fate of the Alexandrian library. The heirs of Neleus, in order to ſecure the reſt from being ſeized by the kings of Pergamus, under whoſe juriſdiction the town of Scepſis was, and who were induſtriouſly collecting a library, buried them in a ſubterraneous cavern, where they lay an hundred and thirty years, and ſuffered much injury. They were, after this, ſold to Apellico, a Teian, a great collector of books, who was particularly attached to the Peripatetic philoſophy. Finding the manuſcripts injured by time, he had them tranſcribed, and, with injudicious induſtry, ſupplied, from his own conjectures, and thoſe of his copyiſts, ſuch paſſages as were become illegible. It is impoſſible to ſay, how many corruptions were by this means introduced into the text. After the death of Apellico, Sylla, at the taking of Athens, in the fourth year of the hundred and ſeventy-third Olympiad[c], ſeized his library, and ordered it to be conveyed to Rome. Here Tyrannio, a grammarian, obtaining permiſſion to make uſe of the manuſcripts of Ariſtotle, employed ignorant amanuenſes to take copies of them, which he ſuffered to paſs out of his hands, without proper correction. Theſe errors have been increaſed by the officiouſneſs of later tranſcribers and commentators, who have frequently introduced variations, according to their own conjectures, into the original text. To this we muſt add, that there is reaſon to believe, that

[a] Of the entire works of Ariſtotle, the moſt valuable editions are thoſe of Caſaubon, Lugd. 1590, 1646, and Du Val, Par. 1629, 1654.

[b] Fabricii Bib. Græc. v. ii. p. 109, &c. Strabo, l. xiii. p. 609. Plut. in Sylla. Ammon. Athæn. l. i. p. 3. [c] B. C. 85.

the antient arrangement of the books has been diſturbed, ſo that it is now become impoſſible to reduce them to their original order.

From theſe circumſtances, many errors muſt have crept into the writings of Ariſtotle. But, beſides theſe incidental cauſes of obſcurity, there are others, ariſing from the nature and ſcope of his philoſophy, and the peculiarity of his diction, which it will be neceſſary particularly to remark.

Moſt of the ſubjects on which Ariſtotle treats are in the higheſt degree abſtruſe, and difficult to be comprehended. Univerſal ideas of exiſtence, attributes, and relations, ſeparated from real being; modes of reaſoning conſidered abſtractedly; metaphyſical diſquiſitions concerning matter, mind, and deity; explanations of nature, deduced from conjecture rather than experience; vague and indeterminate notions, which were probably never clearly conceived by the author himſelf; and ſubtle diſtinctions, merely verbal, are the materials which chiefly fill up the voluminous writings of Ariſtotle.

The obſcurity neceſſarily ariſing from the nature of the ſubjects which the Stagyrite diſcuſſes, is greatly increaſed by the manner in which he treats them. Aulus Gellius relates[a], that, when Alexander complained to Ariſtotle that he had divulged, in his writings, his Eſoteric doctrines, Ariſtotle replied, that theſe doctrines were publiſhed, and not publiſhed; ſince what he had written upon theſe ſubjects was intelligible only to ſuch as had been his hearers. The ſtory will be eaſily credited by thoſe who are converſant with his works. No writer ever afforded more frequent examples of the poet's maxim,

——— Brevis eſſe laboro,
Obſcurus fio ———[b].

He affects cloſe periods and a conciſe diction. He often ſuppoſes things to be known, which have either not been before explained, or may eaſily have eſcaped the reader's memory. Sometimes he makes uſe of different terms to expreſs the ſame idea,

[a] Noct. Att. l. xx. c. 5.

[b] ——— I ſtrive to be conciſe;
I prove obſcure.

and at other times annexes different ideas to the ſame term. It is not an uncommon practice with him to uſe new words in an artificial and technical ſenſe, which, nevertheleſs, he does not clearly define. His tranſitions are frequently ſo abrupt, or his progreſs from his premiſes to his concluſions ſo rapid, that it is extremely difficult for the reader to perceive the train of his reaſoning. Through artifice, negligence, or a change of opinion, many contradictions occur, which the ingenuity of criticiſm has never yet been able to reconcile. His general propoſitions are frequently obſcure for want of examples; and even his examples themſelves, when he condeſcends to introduce them, are often as incomprehenſible as the doctrines they are intended to elucidate. Mathematical ideas, with which he was exceedingly converſant, he ſometimes applies to ſubjects to which they have no natural relation, and thus encumbers, with artificial difficulties, diſquiſitions which are in themſelves ſufficiently obſcure. Laſtly, in quoting the opinions of former philoſophers, whether to examine, confirm, or confute them, he takes ſo little care to mark the tranſition from their words to his own, that the reader is frequently at a loſs to determine, whether Ariſtotle is giving his own opinion, or reporting that of ſome other philoſopher.

It will ſerve to account, in ſome meaſure, for the obſcurity of Ariſtotle's writings, if the leading deſign, with which he formed his ſyſtem of philoſophy, be conſidered. There can be little doubt, that an ambitious deſire of diſtinguiſhing himſelf above all other philoſophers induced him to become the founder of a new ſect; and that, for the ſake of increaſing the luſtre of his own ſyſtem, he made uſe of every expedient to eclipſe that of others. His object was, to erect his own edifice upon the ruin of every other ſtructure. As Lord Bacon has finely remarked*, "Like a Turkiſh deſpot, he thought he could not reign ſecure, unleſs all his brethren were ſlain." Innovating rather in words than in reality, and determining to oppoſe his new philoſophy to antient tenets, many of which were founded on truth and experience, he ſometimes miſrepreſents

* De Augment. Scient. l. iii. c. 4.

the opinions of former philoſophers; ſometimes ſelects thoſe which were moſt trifling, or moſt eaſily refuted; and ſometimes has recourſe to uncertain principles and vague terms, in hopes that obſcurity will be miſtaken for novelty.

Another circumſtance in the life of Ariſtotle, which had no ſmall influence upon his philoſophy, was, that from his childhood he had frequented the court of Amyntas with his father Nicomachus, and acquired the habits and manners of high life; and that, afterwards, when he was choſen preceptor to Alexander, he had occaſion to accommodate his philoſophy to the rules of the court, and to the ambition of the young prince whom he was to educate. Deſerting therefore the fanciful republic of Plato, and finding the morals of Socrates too confined for his purpoſe, he conſtructed a ſyſtem of ethics for himſelf, which would allow full ſcope for the aſpiring views of Alexander and his friends.

'Theſe remarks are not, however, intended entirely to depreciate the writings of Ariſtotle. Although we cannot approve of the blind veneration for antiquity, which has led many, in contempt of better guides, to extol the Ariſtotelian philoſophy, as the higheſt effort of human ability; although we are of opinion that the writings of this philoſopher abound with trifles, and are in ſome places clouded with impenetrable obſcurity; we, nevertheleſs, readily admit, that many parts of his voluminous remains diſcover profound penetration, and great ſtrength of genius. His treatiſes on rhetoric and poetry have perhaps ſcarcely obtained applauſe equal to their merit.

The philoſophy of Ariſtotle, of which we now proceed to take a more particular ſurvey, may be divided into three diſtinct branches, INSTRUMENTAL, THEORETICAL, and PRACTICAL. Under the firſt head are included his doctrines concerning LOGIC; under the ſecond, his principles of PHYSICS, PNEUMATOLOGY, ONTOLOGY, and MATHEMATICS; and under the third, his ſyſtem of ETHICS and POLICY.

The ſum of Ariſtotle's doctrine concerning LOGIC is as follows*.

The end of logic is the diſcovery of truth, either probable or

* Laert. l. v. § 28, &c.

certain.

certain. Analytics inveſtigate the truth by incontrovertible demonſtration. Dialectics eſtabliſh opinions by probable arguments. Logic, whether analytic or dialectic, ſearches after truth by means of ſyllogiſms. Syllogiſms conſiſt of propoſitions; and propoſitions of ſimple terms. Terms are of three kinds [a]; Homonymous, where a common word is applied to different things; Synonymous, or univocal, where the meaning of the word, and the definition of the thing coincide; and Paronymous, where the word only varies in caſe or termination. The Peripatetic preceptors added to theſe, which they called antipredicaments, analogical terms, where the ſame word belongs to one thing primarily, and to another ſecondarily and improperly. They alſo premiſed the doctrine of Predicables, or general modes of predicating. Ariſtotle having left nothing on this ſubject, Porphyry wrote an Introduction to his works, in which he treats of the five predicables, Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident.

Univocal terms are reduced to ten claſſes, which are called Categories, or Predicaments. Theſe are, 1. Subſtance; which is either primary, and can neither be predicated of, nor inherent in, any other ſubject; or ſecondary, which ſubſiſts in primary ſubſtances, as genera or ſpecies. 2. Quantity, continued or diſcrete; which has no contrary, and denominates things equal or unequal. 3. Relation, expreſſing the manner in which one thing is affected towards another. 4. Quality, by which a thing is ſaid to be ſuch as it is. 5. Action, ſignifying the motion of the agent. 6. Paſſion, ſignifying the ſtate of the patient. 7. When, denoting time. 8. Where, denoting place. 9. Situation, expreſſing the external circumſtance of local relation. 10. Habit, expreſſing the external circumſtance of being habited [b]. In order to ſupply the deficiencies of this arrangement, five other general heads were afterwards added, Oppoſition, Priority, Coincidence, Motion, and Poſſeſſion. Excepting Subſtance, all the categories, and their ſupplements, may be compriſed under the general head of Accident [c].

[a] Ariſtot. de Categ. c. i. t. i. Op. p. 8. [b] De Categ. c. 10.
[c] See Harris's Philoſophical Arrangements.

The

The arrangement of the Categories was borrowed from the Pythagorean ſchool, in which the number ten was eſteemed the moſt perfect. It is ſaid, that it was firſt invented by Archytas of Tarentum. From him Plato probably received it, when he converſed with him in Italy; and from Plato it would of courſe paſs to Ariſtotle.

Of Terms, are formed enunciative Propoſitions, or ſentences, in which ſomething is affirmed or denied [a]. Every propoſition conſiſts of a Subject, a Predicate, and a Copula; or expreſſes the thing concerning which the aſſertion is made, the accident which is aſſerted or predicated of it, and the aſſertion itſelf. From propoſitions are formed Syllogiſms, in which, from given premiſes, certain concluſions are drawn. A Syllogiſm conſiſts of three propoſitions, of which the two former are the Premiſes, and the third, the Concluſion, and in which three terms are variouſly arranged. Theſe three terms are called the Major, the Minor, and the Middle term. The Predicate of the Concluſion, is called the Major Term, the ſubject, the Minor, and both together the Extremes. The Middle Term is that which is introduced to ſhew the connection between the Major and Minor, and thus bring out the concluſion. The Matter of a Syllogiſm is, the propoſitions of which it conſiſts; the Form is, the framing and diſpoſing theſe according to Figure and Mode. Figure is the proper diſpoſition of the Middle Term. Mode is the arrangement of the propoſitions according to quantity and quality; that is, as they are univerſal or particular, affirmative or negative [b].

The figures of Syllogiſms are three, in the Firſt, the middle term is the ſubject of the major propoſition, and the predicate of the minor. It contains four modes which are concluſive. In the Second, the middle term is the predicate of both the extremes; it has alſo four concluſive modes. In the Third, the middle term is the ſubject of both the extremes; it has ſix modes. Every Syllogiſm is conſtituted of ſome one of theſe three figures; but the firſt

[a] Ariſt. De Interpretatione, t. i. [b] Analyt. prior. l. i. t. i. p. 40.

is

is the moſt perfect. Other forms of reaſoning may eaſily be reduced to the Syllogiſtic[a] *.

On the invention and application of ſyllogiſms, Ariſtotle treats with a degree of minuteneſs and ſubtlety, which produces obſcurity. His logical diſſertations would have been clearer, as well as more

[a] Analyt. prior. l. ii. c. 23.

* The Ariſtotelian doctrine of Syllogiſms may be illuſtrated by the following examples:

The ſentence, *God is omnipotent*, is a Propoſition, in which *God* is the Subject; *Omnipotent*, the Predicate; and *is*, the Copula.

In the following Syllogiſm:

Our Creator muſt be worſhipped;
God is our Creator;
Therefore God muſt be worſhipped:

The two former propoſitions are the Premiſes; the third, the Concluſion. The three Terms are *Worſhip—God—Creator*. The firſt, the Major; the ſecond, the Minor; the third, the Middle Term, introduced to ſhew the connection between the two ideas of *God* and *Worſhip*.

Syllogiſm of the Firſt Figure.

Every bad man is miſerable:
All tyrants are bad men;
Therefore all tyrants are miſerable.

Syllogiſm of the Second Figure.

No deceiver is to be credited:
Every good hiſtorian is to be credited;
Therefore no good hiſtorian is a deceiver.

Syllogiſm of the Third Figure.

All honeſt men are beloved:
All honeſt men have faults;
Therefore ſome who have faults are beloved.

conciſe,

conciſe, had he carefully diſtinguiſhed between words and ideas, and confined his attention chiefly to the latter.

Concerning demonſtrative reaſoning, Ariſtotle lays it down as a fundamental principle, that all diſquiſition producing ſcience reſts upon ſome previous knowledge of the ſubject. Demonſtration can only ariſe from principles which are true in themſelves, and not referable to any prior truth; which involve in them, by immediate conſequence, the concluſion to be demonſtrated; and laſtly, which are clearly perceived, and perfectly known. Demonſtrative ſyllogiſms reſpect certain truths, and therefore conſiſt of propoſitions, which neceſſarily ariſe from the nature of things, or the definition of terms. The proper ſubjects of demonſtration are thoſe common natures, or univerſal attributes, ſubſiſting in individuals, which make them to be what they are, and which may be predicated of them. It is one thing to know *that* a thing is ſo, and another to know *why* it is ſo; hence ariſes two kinds of demonſtration; one τῦ ὅτι, which demonſtrates the exiſtence of the cauſe from its effects; the other, τῦ διότι, which reaſons from the nature of cauſes. No ſcience can ariſe immediately from the ſenſes, which are only converſant with individual objects; for ſcience is employed upon thoſe univerſal natures which are diſcovered from the induction, or collection, of particulars perceived by the ſenſes [a]. Dialectics [b] deduce concluſions from probable premiſes; that is from premiſes which appear probable to all, or at leaſt to the moſt intelligent part of mankind. The art of dialectic reaſoning is conjectural, and therefore does not always certainly attain its end. Dialectic propoſitions expreſs Genus and Difference, Definition, Property, or Accident; or declare concerning any ſubject to what claſs it belongs, and wherein it differs from others; by what terms its nature may be explained; what particular properties it poſſeſſes, or what caſual circumſtances attend it. Refutation, Ἔλεγχος [c], contradicts a concluſion drawn by the opponent from aſſumed premiſes; and, for this purpoſe, either

[a] Analytic. poſter. l. i. c. 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 18.
[b] Topic. l. i. c. 1, 3, 4, 10.
[c] De Elench. Sophiſt. t. i. p. 173.

makes

makes uſe of legitimate ſyllogiſms in defending truth, or of ſophiſtical arts in ſupport of error. Of theſe latter the principal are: 1. By departing from the point, and proving ſomething which ſeems to determine the queſtion, but in reality does not. 2. By ſuppoſing what is not allowed, or taking for granted in other terms that which is to be proved. 3. By reaſoning in a circle, when, in a ſeries of arguments, the ſame things are mutually made uſe of, both as the medium of proof, and as the concluſion. 4. By aſſigning a falſe cauſe, or making that to be the cauſe of any effect, which either does not exiſt at all, or does not exiſt as a cauſe in the preſent queſtion. 5. By repreſenting a mere accident as eſſential to the nature of the ſubject. 6. By deducing an univerſal aſſertion, from that which is true only in particular circumſtances; and the reverſe. 7. By aſſerting any thing in a compound ſenſe, which is only true in a divided ſenſe; and the reverſe. 8. By an abuſe of the ambiguity of words. To this latter ſource of fallacy, ſeveral of the former may be eaſily reduced [a].

This brief ſketch of the logic of Ariſtotle may ſuffice to give the reader a general idea of the firſt branch of his philoſophy, the Inſtrumental. We next proceed to the ſecond branch, the THEORETICAL, comprehending his doctrine of phyſics, metaphyſics, and mathematics.

1. OF PHYSICS. The principles of nature are neither the Similar Parts of Anaxagoras, nor the Atoms of Leuſippus and Democritus, nor the Senſible Elements of Thales, nor the Unity of Parmenides, nor the Numbers of Pythagoras, nor the Ideas of Plato. There muſt neceſſarily be in nature oppoſite principles, independent and underived, from which all things proceed. But, ſince from two contrary principles nothing could be produced, but they would rather deſtroy each other, a third is neceſſary to the exiſtence of natural bodies. Theſe three principles are [b], Form, Privation, and Matter; the two former contrary to each other; the third, the common ſubject of both. Mat-

[a] For examples of theſe ſeveral kinds of ſophiſms, ſee Watts's Logic, part ii. ch. iii. ſect. 1.

[b] Laert. l. v. § 23. Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 3. 4.

ter and Form are the conſtituent principles of things; Privation enters not into their conſtitution, but is accidentally aſſociated with them. All things are produced from that which exiſts potentially, namely*, the Firſt Matter; not from that which exiſts actually, nor from pure nihility. Matter is neither produced nor deſtroyed, but is the firſt infinite ſubject, from which things are formed, and into which they are at laſt reſolved. Form is the nature and eſſence of any thing, or that which makes it to be what it is. Matter cannot be ſeparated from form and real exiſtence.

It may, perhaps, caſt ſome light upon this part of Ariſtotle's doctrine, to remark the prior ſtate of opinions on this ſubject. Before his time, all the philoſophers, who had treated on natural cauſes, had agreed in the opinion, that there is ſome ſubſtance, from which all bodies were made, and upon which the forms of things are impreſſed; and to this ſubſtance moſt of them gave the name of Matter. Although they could not deny the exiſtence of this ſubſtance, they were unable to ſay what it was, or in what manner it received the forms of things. The common idea was, that matter conſiſted of indefinitely ſmall particles which had been eternally in motion; and it was for the moſt part believed, that theſe particles were collected and united by the agency of an intelligent principle. It was alſo generally ſuppoſed, that different particles of matter originally poſſeſſed different qualities: but, in explaining the nature of this difference, various hypotheſes were advanced. Empedocles, Thales, and others, taught, that there are in matter four primary elements, which are the baſis of all corporeal forms; whilſt Anaxagoras and his followers maintained, that all bodies conſiſt of indefinitely ſmall particles, each ſimilar in form to the whole. Plato, diſſatisfied with theſe theories, had recourſe to the doctrine of Ideas, and held that the Eſſential Forms of things, proceeding by emanation from the deity, had a real exiſtence, and that in the union of theſe with matter conſiſted the formation of bodies. Ariſtotle had too much penetration not to ſee, that theſe hypotheſes were inadequate to the ſolution of the great queſtion concerning the formation of nature. In

* Phyſ. c. 8, 9.

hopes of ſucceeding better than his predeceſſors, he aſſumed, as the baſis of a new ſyſtem, Firſt Matter[a], entirely deſtitute of all qualities, and therefore not body, but the eternal ſubject on which forms might be impreſſed, and in which they might inhere. This notion of a primary ſubſtance, without quantity or quality, form or figure, or any of the properties of body, that is incorporeal matter, though in reality borrowed from the Pythagoreans[b], Ariſtotle claimed as his own invention; boaſting[c], that he was the firſt who had diſcovered the true principle of bodies.

Concerning Nature, Ariſtotle ſpeaks with more than uſual obſcurity. He defines it to be the principle and cauſe of motion and of reſt, wherever it exiſts primarily and not by accident. Nature, he ſays, ſubſiſts in material ſubſtances, and conſiſts of two parts, matter and form; but form has more of nature than matter, becauſe it is in act[d]. By nature, he certainly does not mean, as ſome writers have ſuppoſed, a ſubſtance different from material things, by which they are produced and arranged[e]; for he conſiders nature as intimately connected and neceſſarily combined with matter[f]. The truth ſeems to be, that Ariſtotle, in framing his ſyſtem, finding himſelf in want of a principle by which form and matter might be united, and being determined to advance ſomething new, conceived in his mind a vague notion of ſome internal cauſe of motion and arrangement, to which he applied the term Nature; and thus cut the knot, which he was not able to untie. To endeavour further to elucidate his doctrine concerning the principle which he calls Nature, would therefore only be to add to the number of unmeaning words, which have been already thrown away upon this ſubject.

Cauſes are diſtinguiſhed by this philoſopher into four kinds; Material, of which things are made; Formal, by which a thing is that which it is, and nothing elſe; Efficient, by the agency of

[a] Metaph. l. i. c. 6. t. ii. p. 450. l. vii. c. 3. p. 708.
[b] Timæus Locrus de Anima Mundi. Op. Phyſ. Galei, p. 554. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. i. c. 7.
[c] De Gen. et Corr. l. i. c. 2. [d] Phyſ. l. ii. c. 1. p. 26.
[e] Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem, p. 157. [f] Phyſ. l. ii. c. 11.

which any thing is produced; and Final, or the end, for which it is produced[a].

Motion, or change of any kind, is ſucceſſive with reſpect to time, finite, and produced by ſome cauſe, either external or internal.

Subſtances are of three kinds[b]; two of theſe are natural ſubſtances; the firſt, eternal, as the heavens; the ſecond, periſhable, as animal bodies; the third, is the immutable nature; of which more hereafter.

The heavens[c] are perfect, becauſe they are compoſed of perfect bodies, and comprehend all perfection, being comprehended by nothing. Circular motion about a center is peculiar to the heavenly ſphere; it has therefore a diſtinct nature from all terreſtrial bodies, whoſe motion is rectilineal. From its circular motion, it appears that the heavenly ſphere has neither levity nor gravity. Becauſe it has no contrary, it is not liable to any increaſe, diminution, or change, and is eternal[d]. The natural motion of the heavenly ſphere is circular, but this motion is not of one kind through the whole heavenly region; for there are other ſpheres, which move in a direction contrary to that of the firſt ſphere, in order to produce the viciſſitudes of terreſtrial things. The motion of the firſt ſphere, or *Primum Mobile*, "that which is firſt moved," is equable and uniform, without beginning, middle, or end; the *Primum Mobile*, and the Firſt Mover, being eternal and immutable. The ſtars are of the ſame nature with the ſpheres by which they are ſupported, but more denſe; they communicate light and heat to the air, and thence to the inferior world, by means of friction[e]. They are moved in conſequence of the motion of the ſpheres in which they are placed. The earth is a ſpherical body immoveably fixed, and is the center of motion to all the ſpheres. The firſt ſphere, revolves with the greateſt velocity, and its motion is from Weſt to Eaſt; the inferior ſpheres revolve from Eaſt to Weſt. The

[a] Phyſ. l. ii. c. 3. p. 165. [b] Metaph. l. xi. c. 1. p. 738.
[c] De Cælo, l. i. c. 3, 4. p. 337, 8. [d] Ibid. c. 3, 12.
[e] De Cælo, l. ii. c. 3—11.

velocities

velocities of the ſpheres of the ſeven planets are inverſely as their diſtances from the firſt ſphere[a].

The world is not infinite, nor is there any infinite body beyond it; for no body can be infinite. There cannot be more than one world, for if there were more, they would move towards each other, out of their reſpective places. The world is eternal, without beginning or end[b].

Bodies are either ſimple or compound. Simple bodies are the elements, or ſecondary matter, produced by the union of primary matter and form. Compound bodies are thoſe which are produced from the combination of elementary bodies. Elements being produced, and capable of diſſolution, are not eternal. The elements are four; fire, air, water, and earth. There are in elementary bodies two principles of motion, gravity and levity; by the former, bodies deſcend towards the center of the world, by the latter, they riſe towards the heavens. The element of earth has ſimple gravity; that of fire ſimple levity; air and water partake of both. Compound bodies deſcend or aſcend, in proportion to the prevalence of gravity or levity in their component parts. Thoſe elements, which by their levity are uppermoſt, are moſt perfect. They partake, with reſpect to the inferior elements, of the nature of forms; for it is the property of matter to be contained, and of form to contain[c].

In conſequence of the perpetual agency of the firſt mover and the celeſtial ſphere upon matter, bodies ſuffer a perpetual ſucceſſion of diſſolution and reproduction. Diſſolution always ſucceeds production, becauſe the termination of the diſſolution of one body is the commencement of the production of another; the primary matter in the mean time remaining the ſame. When the whole eſſential ſubſtance of any body is changed, reproduction takes place; when its accidental properties are changed, it undergoes alteration by means of augmentation or diminution[d].

[a] De Cælo, l. ii. c. 13, 14. [b] Ib. l. iii. c. 7, 8, 12.
[c] De Cælo, l. iii. c. 3. p. 372. l. iv. c. 1. p. 378. De Gen. et Cor. l. i. c. 3. p. 386. [d] De Gen. et Corr. l. i. c. 5. p. 390.

From

From the mutual contact of different bodies ariſes a mutual action and paſſion, each endeavouring to reduce the other to its own likeneſs. In ſenſible bodies there are certain primary qualities, ſome active and others paſſive, which conſtitute their ſpecific difference. Of this kind are heat and cold, moiſture and dryneſs, heavineſs and lightneſs, hardneſs and ſoftneſs, roughneſs and ſmoothneſs, and the like. It is from the union of the two firſt of theſe pairs of primary qualities, that the elements are formed. Fire, from the union of heat and dryneſs; air, from the union of heat and moiſture; water, from the union of cold and moiſture; earth, from the union of cold and dryneſs. All the elements may be reciprocally tranſmuted; and this tranſmutation is made, not by diſſolution, but by alteration. Mixed bodies are formed by a combination of all the elements. The cauſes of mixed bodies are three; the matter; the form; and the univerſal efficient, the circular motion of the heavens, by means of which the ſun and the ſtars, the immediate agents in production and diſſolution, approach towards or recede from the earth [a].

From the general principles of production and diſſolution, and from the mutual action and paſſion of the ſimple qualities, Ariſtotle endeavours to aſſign the cauſes of natural appearances, and to explain the nature of mixed bodies, whether perfect or imperfect. But it is unneceſſary, in a general ſummary of his doctrine concerning nature, to purſue his conjectural theories through a tedious detail of particulars.

From Ariſtotle's ſyſtem of Phyſics, we paſs to his doctrine concerning Being conſidered abſtractedly, concerning Deity, and concerning the Soul. Theſe are comprehended under the general term METAPHYSICS [b], becauſe they *paſs beyond* ſenſible bodies to things which are perceived only by the underſtanding: whence this branch of ſcience is alſo called by Ariſtotle, The Firſt Philoſophy. We ſhall here follow the order which Ariſtotle himſelf has purſued, in his Book of Metaphyſics.

[a] De Gen. et Corr. l. i. c. 6. p. 393. l. ii. c. 2, 3. p. 400. c. 8, 9. p. 406.
[b] Metaph. l. i. c. 1. l. v. c. 1. l. vi. c. 1.

Of

Of the doctrine of BEING, conſidered as ſuch, the firſt principle or axiom is, that it is impoſſible that the ſame thing ſhould be, and not be, in the ſame ſubject, at the ſame time, and in the ſame reſpect[a]. To this univerſal principle all demonſtration may be reduced, but it is itſelf incapable of demonſtration, becauſe it is a primary truth.

Being is either by itſelf, or by accident. Of theſe the firſt is that which exiſts by itſelf; becauſe upon this all properties, or accidents, depend. Of accidental being no certain knowledge can be obtained. Being may be diſtributed into the ten Categories, or Predicaments, before enumerated. Subſtance includes primary matter, or the firſt ſubject of all things, form and eſſence, and the compounds ariſing from the union of theſe[b].

Being may be either in power, or in act. Power is either active or paſſive: active power is the principle of motion, or change, acting upon another ſubſtance: paſſive power ſubſiſts in the ſubject upon which active power is exerciſed. Theſe are correlatives, and cannot be ſeparated. Power remains, when it is not exerted in action. Action takes place, when a thing is otherwiſe than when it was in power[c].

Being is either notional or real: notional, as it is conceived in the mind; real, as it exiſts in nature. Notional being is either true or falſe; true, when it correſponds to the real nature of things; falſe, when the conception and the reality differ from each other. In the knowledge of things immutable, the intellect cannot be deceived: miſtake and error can only ariſe concerning contingent and variable objects. If Being be conſidered with reſpect to numbers, unity is one of its properties. To unity are nearly related identity, equality, and ſimilarity. Being admits of genus and ſpecies: thoſe things differ in genus which are not of the ſame primary nature; things which differ from each other, but have the ſame genus, are ſaid to differ in ſpecies[d].

Concerning the Firſt Cauſe of Motion, the ſum of Ariſtotle's doctrine is this:

[a] Metaph. l. iv. c. 4. p. 688, &c. [b] L. iv. c. 7. p. 679. l. vi. c. 3, 6. p. 693, 696. [c] L. ix. c. 1—6. p. 711, &c. [d] L. ii. c. 4. l. iv. c. 6, 9.

Of

Of ſubſtances, which have been already ſaid to be of three kinds, corruptible, incorruptible, and immoveable, the third kind is the Firſt Mover, itſelf unmoved. The exiſtence of this kind of ſubſtance may be inferred from the local motion of the heavens: for, ſince it is not poſſible that the circular motion which is peculiar to the celeſtial ſphere ſhould have had a beginning, not only muſt the ſphere, which is the ſeat of this motion, be an eternal ſubſtance, but there muſt likewiſe be an eternal ſubſtance which has from eternity cauſed this motion, which therefore remains itſelf immoveable, but is eternally communicating motion to other ſubſtances. That ſubſtance, which is the cauſe of eternal motion, muſt itſelf be ſimple, pure energy, void of matter, eternal, and immutable. The act of the firſt mover, by which it is the firſt efficient cauſe of all motion, conſiſts in the ſimple energy of pure Intelligence. This influence operates, independently and immediately, upon inferior intelligences, or ſubſtances of the ſame nature with the firſt mover; and it is by their agency that the motions in the primary and ſubordinate ſpheres are produced. The intelligent powers move the heavenly ſpheres, not for the ſake of producing inferior things, but that they may reſemble the firſt power. Nevertheleſs, the viciſſitudes of nature are the effect of their action upon the inferior orbs, eſpecially upon the ſun, which is the immediate cauſe of production and decay.

The eſſence of the Firſt Mover is different from that of corporeal ſubſtances; indiviſible, becauſe unity is perfect; immutable, becauſe nothing can change itſelf; and eternal, becauſe motion itſelf is eternal. This power is an incorporeal Intelligence; happy in the contemplation of himſelf; the firſt cauſe of all motion, and in fine, the Being of Beings, or God [a].

Upon reviewing this part of Ariſtotle's metaphyſical reaſoning, it ſeems no very difficult taſk to diſcover the progreſs of his inveſtigation. After he had aſcended in the ſcale of being to the firſt ſubſtance, and had derived all motion from the perfect and eternal circular motion of the heavens, which he ſuppoſed to have been

[a] Met. l. xi. c. 6, 7, 8. p. 740. De Cælo, l. ii. c. 3.

eternal,

eternal, he found it neceſſary to admit into his ſyſtem a Firſt Mover. To avoid the abſurdity of an infinite ſeries of effects without a cauſe, he conceived the firſt ſpring of all motion to have been itſelf immoveable; but, in what manner the firſt mover produced this motion he was at a loſs to explain. It was contrary to his whole ſyſtem, and to his firſt notions of matter and local motion, to admit (which nevertheleſs ſome writers have imputed to him) that the celeſtial orbs are animated bodies, which move by their own innate force. Having deprived this firſt mover of all quantity, matter, and motion, he perceived the neceſſity of aſſigning to it ſome method of communicating motion, different from that in which bodies act upon each other. But, finding himſelf unable to ſay, in what manner a ſimple immaterial ſubſtance, incapable of motion, could produce motion in material ſubſtances, he endeavoured to extricate himſelf from his embarraſſment by recurring to analogy, and ſuppoſed that the firſt mover acts upon the firſt celeſtial ſphere to give it motion, in a manner ſimilar to that in which the mind of man acts upon the human body. From the well known fact, that the motion of the body follows the conceptions and volition of the mind, he aſſumed a certain intellectual influence, exerciſed by the firſt mover, as the principle of local motion, and thus imagined, that he had ſolved the great problem which had hitherto been found inexplicable, in what manner mind acts upon body. However, after all that Ariſtotle has ſaid concerning the ſpring of motion in his firſt mover, which he deſcribes as having intelligence, deſire, and affection, it ſtill remains an inexplicable myſtery, in what manner pure ſpirit, either human or divine, is the efficient cauſe of motion in material bodies.

If it be enquired, whether Ariſtotle is to be ranked in the claſs of theiſts or of atheiſts; the preceding view of his theology will juſtify us in replying, that his ſyſtem does not exclude the idea of deity; for he ſpeaks of the firſt mover, as a being diſtinct from the world; wholly ſeparated in his nature from matter; of a peculiar ſubſtance; poſſeſſing intellect, deſire, and a power of communicating motion; upon whom the univerſe is dependent, not as upon an animating principle, but an external moving power. This being he

repreſents as ſuperior to all other intelligent natures, and calls him God. At the ſame time, it muſt be owned, that it is impoſſible to reconcile Ariſtotle's notion of deity with juſt conceptions of the divine nature and attributes. He makes God, indeed, the cauſe of all motion; but in ſuppoſing the univerſe to have exiſted from eternity, he diveſts him of the glory of creation, and connects him with a world already formed by the chain of neceſſity, for no other purpoſe, than to make him the firſt ſpring of a vaſt machine.

As, according to the doctrine of Ariſtotle, God is immutable, ſo alſo is the celeſtial ſphere, which is the region of his reſidence. In producing motion, the deity acts, not voluntarily, but neceſſarily; not for the ſake of other beings, but for his own pleaſure. Eternally employed in the contemplation of his own nature, he obſerves nothing, he cares for nothing, beyond himſelf. Reſiding in the firſt ſphere, he poſſeſſes neither immenſity nor omnipreſence: far removed from the inferior parts of the univerſe, he is not even a ſpectator of what is paſſing among its inhabitants, and therefore cannot be a proper object of worſhip and reverence. He is inferior even to the deity of Epicurus, who, on account of his excellent nature was worthy of homage. He is indeed intelligent and immaterial, but his duration is occupied in no other action, than the exerciſe of an inexplicable power of communicating motion. How far this doctrine of the Firſt Mover falls ſhort of the true idea of the Supreme Being, thoſe who have been better inſtructed will eaſily perceive.

Concerning intelligent natures inferior to the firſt mover, Ariſtotle taught, that they are ſimple immaterial ſubſtances who preſide over the lower celeſtial ſpheres. Theſe he ſuppoſed to be dependent on the firſt mover; to be employed in contemplating the firſt mover, as the beſt and moſt perfect model; and to be impelled to action, by a deſire of receiving his influence, and of communicating, by a ſimilar influence, motion to their reſpective ſpheres, and hence to the reſt of the univerſe. Whether they are proper objects of religious worſhip, he has no where clearly determined; but it is probable, that he ranked every thing of this kind amongſt the popular ſuperſtitions, and that this was the cauſe of the complaints which

were brought againſt him by the Athenians. It may be queſtioned whether Ariſtotle conſidered the inferior intelligences as proceeding by emanation from the ſupreme; for ſuch a dogma would not be very conſiſtent with the opinion, that theſe intelligences had been *eternally* connected with their reſpective ſpheres.

We ſhall conclude our view of the Metaphyſics of Ariſtotle by enquiring into his doctrine concerning the Human Mind and Animal Life.

Ariſtotle, having undertaken to teach a new ſyſtem of philoſophy, was deſirous of receding as far as poſſible from former philoſophers, and particularly from Plato; and in treating upon any ſubject, on which he had no new doctrine to offer, he gave old opinions the air of novelty, by clothing them in new language. This latter method he adopted on the ſubject of Mind. He aſſerted with Plato, that there are in man different faculties, which have reſpectively a different organ; but he deſignedly expreſſed his doctrine upon this head in obſcure terms, which cannot be explained with entire perſpicuity, without ſuppoſing, as many writers have done, what Ariſtotle ought to have taught, inſtead of endeavouring to diſcover what he actually did teach.

His leading tenets on this ſubject are theſe[a]:

The ſoul is the firſt principle of action in an organiſed body, poſſeſſing life potentially. The ſoul does not move itſelf; for, whatever moves, is moved by ſome other moving power. It is not a rare body, compoſed of elements; for then it would not have perception, more than the elements which compoſe it[b]. The ſoul has three faculties, the nutritive, the ſenſitive, and the rational; the ſuperior comprehending the inferior potentially. The nutritive faculty is that by which life is produced and preſerved. The ſenſitive faculty is that by which we perceive and feel; it does not perceive itſelf nor its organs, but ſome external object through the intervention of its organs, which are adapted to produce the ſenſations of ſight, hearing, ſmell, taſte, and touch. The ſenſes

[a] De Anima, l. i. t. i. p. 476, &c. l. ii. c. 1. p. 487.
[b] De Anima, l. ii. c. 4, 5, 6.

receive ſenſible ſpecies, or forms, without matter, as wax receives the impreſſion of a ſeal, without receiving any part of its ſubſtance. The external ſenſes perceive objects, but it is the common or internal ſenſe, which obſerves their difference[a]. The internal ſenſe perceives various objects at the ſame inſtant. Perception differs from intellect; the former being common to all animals, the latter to a few. Fancy is the perception produced in any animal by the immediate action of the ſenſes. It is accompanied with different feelings, according to the nature of the object by which it is produced. Memory[b] is derived from fancy, and has its ſeat in the ſame power of the ſoul. It is the effect of ſome image impreſſed upon the ſoul by means of the ſenſes. Where this image cannot be retained, through an exceſs of moiſture or dryneſs in the temperature of the brain, memory ceaſes. Reminiſcence[c] is that faculty of the mind by which we ſearch for any thing, which we wiſh to recollect, through a ſeries of things nearly related to it, till at laſt we call to mind what we had forgotten. The intellect[d] is that part of the ſoul by which it underſtands. It is of two kinds, paſſive and active; paſſive intellect is that faculty, by which the underſtanding receives the forms of things: it is the ſeat of ſpecies. Active intellect is the efficient cauſe of all knowledge; and is either ſimple, when it is employed in the near apprehenſion of its object, or complex, when it compounds ſimple conceptions, in order to produce belief and aſſent. The latter is either true or falſe, the former neither. The action of the intellect is either theoretical or practical; theoretical, when it ſimply conſiders what is true or falſe; and practical, when it judges whether any thing is good or evil, and hereby excites the will to purſue or avoid it. The principle of local motion is the deſire, or averſion, which ariſes from the practical exerciſe of the underſtanding. This deſire, or averſion, produces either rational volition, or ſenſitive appetite. The production of animal life ariſes from the union of the nutritive ſoul

[a] De An. l. iii. c. 2, 3. p. 500, &c. [b] De Memor. l. i. c. 1. p. 523.
[c] Ib. c. 2. [d] De Anim. l. iii. c. 4—11. p. 502, &c.

with

with animal heat. Life is the continuance of this union; death, its diſſolution[a].

The nature of the firſt principle of animal life, and of all perception, intelligence, and action, Ariſtotle, as well as all other philoſophers, was at a loſs to explain. Having no other way of judging concerning it, than by obſerving its operations as far as they are ſubjects of experience, he could only define the mind to be that principle by which we live, perceive, and underſtand. When he attempted to form an abſtract conception of this principle, he ſaw, that there muſt be ſome ſubſtance, which enjoys ſuch *perfection*, as to be capable of performing this function; but he was wholly ignorant of the nature of this ſubſtance, and therefore, in defining it, he made uſe of a term expreſſive of the confuſed idea which he had formed to himſelf from obſerving its operations, and called it ἐντέλεχια, or *Perfect Energy*; that is, if he had confeſſed the truth, ſome ſubſtance, I know not what, which is adapted to produce ſenſitive and rational life in certain organiſed bodies. This term will afford the attentive reader a ſtriking example of the manner, in which Ariſtotle endeavoured to explain the principles of nature by vague notions and unmeaning words.

Nothing is to be met with in the writings of Ariſtotle, which deciſively determines, whether he thought the ſoul of man mortal or immortal: but the former appears moſt probable, from his notion of the nature and origin of the human ſoul[b], which he conceived to be an intellectual power, externally tranſmitted into the human body from an Eternal Intelligence, the common ſource of rationality to human beings. Ariſtotle does not inform his readers what he conceived this Univerſal Principle to be; but there is no proof, that he ſuppoſed the union of this Principle with any individual to continue after death[c].

The

[a] De Vita et Morte, c. 17, 18.

[b] De Gen. An. l. ii. c. 3. l. iii. c. 11. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. i. c. 10.

[c] In cenſuring Ariſtotle's ſpeculative phyſics, his extenſive practical knowledge of nature ſhould not be overlooked. His writings on Natural Hiſtory are a continued chain.

The third branch of the Ariſtotelian philoſophy, the PRACTICAL, included his doctrine of Ethics, Politics, and Economics.

Ariſtotle, though ſufficiently copious in his diſcourſes on the ſubject of morals, yet, from cauſes which have been already hinted, affords the intelligent reader little ſatisfaction. Upon this branch of his philoſophy, therefore, a brief enumeration of ſome of the leading heads of his doctrine may ſuffice [a].

Moral felicity conſiſts neither in the pleaſures of the body; nor in riches; nor in civil glory, power, and rank; nor in the contemplation of truth; but in the virtuous exerciſe of the mind. A virtuous life is in itſelf a ſource of delight. External goods, ſuch as friends, riches, power, beauty, and the like, are inſtruments, by means of which illuſtrious deeds may be performed. Virtue is either theoretical or practical: theoretical virtue conſiſts in the due exerciſe of the underſtanding; practical, in the purſuit of what is right and good. Practical virtue is acquired by habit, and exerciſe [b].

Virtue, as far as it reſpects ourſelves and the government of the paſſions, conſiſts in preſerving that mean in all things, which reaſon and prudence preſcribe: it is the middle path between two extremes, one of which is vicious through exceſs, the other through defect. Virtue is a ſpontaneous act, the effect of deſign and volition. It is completed by nature, habit, and reaſon. The firſt virtue is Fortitude; which is the mean between timidity and raſh confidence. Temperance is the mean between the exceſſive purſuit and the neglect of pleaſure. Liberality is the mean between prodigality and avarice. Magnificence preſerves a due decorum in great expences,

chain of phyſical and anatomical facts, which appear to have been the reſult of accurate obſervation. Ariſtotle relied leſs than any of the ancient naturaliſts on uncertain and fabulous report. He induſtriouſly collected and examined natural bodies: he appears to have himſelf diſſected, or to have been preſent at the diſſection of, many animals, particularly of fiſhes. There are in his writings * references by letters, to figures by which he illuſtrated his obſervations. See, on this ſubject, Haller. Method. Stud. Med. p. iv. c. 2. Borrich. de Sap. Herm. c. 10. Schulze in Spec. Hiſt. Anat. v. ii. p. 6.

[a] Stobæi Ecl. Phyſ. & Eth. l. ii. p. 184.

[b] Ariſt. Mor. l. i. c. 3—6, 9, 10. l. x. c. 6.

* Hiſt. Anim. l. i. c. 17. l. iii. c. 1. l. iv. c.

and

and is the mean between haughty grandeur and low parſimony. Magnanimity reſpects the love of applauſe, and the judgment a man forms of his own merit; and holds the middle place between meanneſs of ſpirit and pride. Moderation reſpects diſtinction in rank, and is the mean between ambition and the contempt of greatneſs. Gentleneſs is the due government of the iraſcible paſſions, and obſerves a proper medium between anger and inſenſibility. Affability reſpects the deſire of pleaſing in the ordinary occurrences of life, and purſues the middle path between moroſeneſs and ſervility. Simplicity in the practice of virtue is the mean between arrogant pretenſions to merit, and an artful concealment of defects. Urbanity reſpects ſports and jeſts, and avoids ruſticity and ſcurrility. Modeſty is a certain apprehenſion of incurring diſgrace, and lies in the middle way between impudence and baſhfulneſs. Juſtice includes the obſervance of the laws for the preſervation of ſociety, and the diſcharge of obligations and debts between equals. Equity corrects the rigour of laws, or ſupplies their defects. Friendſhip is nearly allied to virtue; it conſiſts in perfect affection towards an equal. Friendſhips are formed for the ſake of pleaſure, convenience, or virtue. Friendſhip is cheriſhed by mutual acts of generoſity; it is begun in kindneſs, and preſerved by concord; its end is, the pleaſant enjoyment of life[a].

Pleaſures are eſſentially different in kind. Diſgraceful pleaſures are wholly unworthy of the name. The pureſt and nobleſt pleaſure, is that which a good man derives from virtuous actions. Happineſs, which conſiſts in a conduct conformable to virtue, is either contemplative or active. Contemplative happineſs, which conſiſts in the purſuit of knowledge and wiſdom, is ſuperior to active happineſs, becauſe the underſtanding is the higher part of human nature, and the objects on which it is employed are of the nobleſt kind. The happineſs, which ariſes from external poſſeſſions, is inferior to that which ariſes from virtuous actions; but both are neceſſary to produce perfect felicity[b].

[a] Mor. l. ii. c. 5—9. l. iii. c. 4, 5, 9—14. l. iv. c. 1, 7, 11, 13. 15. l. v. c. 2, 3, 8, 9. l. vi. c. 2—7. l. vii. c. 1. l. viii. c. 1, 6. l. ix. c. 4—6. 12.

[b] L. x. c. 5—8. Conf. Laert. l. v. § 30, &c. Orig. Phil. p. 139. Stob. l. c.

Thus

Thus much may ſerve as a ſpecimen of the moral philoſophy, which is to be found in Ariſtotle's *Book of Ethics*, dedicated to Nicomachus, in his *Greater Morals*, and his diſcourſe *On the Virtues*. The truth is, that, though theſe writings contain many uſeful precepts, and juſt obſervations, they are by no means to be conſidered as a perfect code of morals, adapted to produce genuine integrity and ſimplicity of manners. Ariſtotle's deſign, in his ethical writings, ſeems to have been, to lay down precepts for civil life, introductory to his doctrine of political wiſdom. In his treatiſe concerning Policy, he not only inſiſts upon the general theory of government, but enters into a diſtinct conſideration of its particular duties. Whence it appears, that Ariſtotle was intimately acquainted with the principles of government, as well as with thoſe of philoſophy. But for the particulars of his precepts on Policy, as well as on Economics, which do not admit of an eaſy application to the preſent times, we ſhall content ourſelves with referring our readers to his works.

As the reſult of the brief ſurvey, which we have taken, of the philoſophy of Ariſtotle, it may be aſſerted, that it is rather the philoſophy of Words than of Things; and that the ſtudy of his writings tends more to perplex the underſtanding with ſubtle diſtinctions, than to enlighten it with real knowledge *.

SECT.

* Vidend. Ammon. Proleg. in Categ. Auct. anon. Vit. Ariſt. apud Verſ. Lat. Op. Venet. 1496. Nunneſii Inſtit. Phil. Perip. Id. de Cauſis Obſcurit. Ariſt. Helmeſtad. 1667. Vit. Ariſt. apud Menag. Comment. in Diog. Laert. p. 201. ed. Wetſtein. Gaurini, Aretini, et Gemuſæi Vit. Ariſt. Melanchthonis Orat. de Ariſt. t. iii. Beureri Vit. Ariſt. Baſil. 1581. Weinrichii Orat. Apol. Lipſ. 1611. Schotti. Ariſt. et Demoſth. Comp. Aug. Vend. 1603. Patricii Diſcuſſ. Perip. Baſil. 1571. Conringii Orat. de Ariſt. Bayle. Baſnage Hiſt. des Juifs, t. iii. c. 7. Clerici Hiſt. Med. p. i. l. iv. c. 3. p. ii. l. i. c. 2. Licetus de Piet. Ariſt. Patav. 1692. Jonſ. de Scr. Hiſ. Ph. l. ii. c. 13. l. ii. c. 15. Potter. Arch. Gr. l. i. c. 8. Schmid. Diſſ. de Gymn. Lit. Jonſ. Diſſ. de Hiſt. Perip. Gronov. Exerc. Acad. de Muſeo Alex. t. iii. Ant. Gr. Heumanni Act. Phil. v. ii. p. 676. Voſſ. de Sectis, c. xvii. § 9. Horn. Hiſt. Phil. l. vii. c. 9. Piccart. Intr. in Phil. Ariſt. c. 10. Paſchius de var. Mod. Trad. Mor. c. v. Morhoff. Polyhiſt. t. ii. l. i. c. 8. 11. l. ii. c. 12. Rachelius in Phil. Mor. Ariſt. Gron. Theſ. Ant. t. ii. tab. xc. Buddæi Hiſt. Ph. Heb. § 32. Id. Hiſt. Ecc. N. T. t. ii. p. 1973. Frederic. de Relig. Ariſt. Rheg. 1705. Lipſii Manud. l. i. Diſſ. iv. Malebranche de Inquir. Verit. l. ii. c. 7. Parker de Deo. Diſp. i. & iv. Obſ. Hal. t. viii. Obſ. 10. Gaudent. Diſſ. de Ariſt. Vet. Contemptu. Par. 1640.

Blount

Blount Cenſ. Ecl. Auct. p. 32. Magiri Eponymolog. Crit. p. 82. Tribbochov, de Diſp. Schol. p. 218. Paſchal. de opt. Gen. expl. Ariſt. Monlor. de Util. Anal. Ariſt. Franc. 1591. Ludov. Vives de Cauſ. Cor. Art. l. i. Gaſſendi Exercit. Parad. adv. Ariſt. Walch. Hiſt. Log. l. ii. Parerg. Ac. 300. 315. Scip. Aquilianus de Plac. Phil. ante Ariſt. Medol. 1615. Cudworth Int. Syſt. c. v. § 2. Burnet Arch. l. ii. c. ii. Berigard. Circ. Piſan. p. i. l. iii. iv. Balt. Jugement des S. Peres, c. 17. Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l. xv. c. 9. Launois de Var. Fort. Ariſt. c. 1. Oregii Ariſt. de Immort. Sententia, Rom. 1633. Pererius de Commun. Rer. Princip. l. vi. c. 19. Soner. Metaph. l. v. c. 6. Thomas de Exuſt. Mund. Stoic. Diſſ. 4. 14. Koenigman. et Maius de Mor. Ariſt. Kil. 1706. Du Hamel de Conf. Vet. et Nov. Phil. l. ii. c. 1. Hollman Phil. Nat. Prol. § 7. Dreierus de Philoſophia prima.

SECT. 2.

OF THE SUCCESSORS OF ARISTOTLE.

WHEN Ariſtotle withdrew, as we have already related, to Chalcis, his diſciples importuned him to nominate a ſucceſſor in the ſchool of the Lycæum. In compliance with their requeſt, he appointed to this office, in the ſecond year of the hundred and fourteenth Olympiad[a], one of his favourite pupils, THEOPHRASTUS[b].

This philoſopher was a native of Ereſium[c], a maritime town in Leſbos. He was born in the ſecond year of the hundred and ſecond Olympiad[d], and received the firſt rudiments of learning under Alcippus, in his own country; after which he was ſent by his father, who was a wealthy man, to Athens, and there became a diſciple of Plato, and after his death of Ariſtotle. Under theſe eminent maſters, bleſt by nature with a genius capable of excelling in every liberal accompliſhment, he made great progreſs both in philoſophy and eloquence. It was on account of his high attain-

[a] B. C. 323. [b] Suidas. Laert. l. v. § 36, &c.
[c] Strabo. l. xiii. p. 618. [d] B. C. 371.

ments in the latter, that instead of Tyrtamus his original name, he was called, as some say by his master, but more probably by his own followers, Theophrastus[a]. When he undertook the charge of the Peripatetic school, he conducted it with such high reputation, that he had about two thousand scholars[b]; among whom were, Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, whom his father entrusted by will to his charge; Erasistratus, a celebrated physician; and Demetrius Phalereus, who resided with him in the same house. His erudition and eloquence, united with engaging manners, recommended him to the notice of Cassander and Ptolemy, who invited him to visit Egypt. So great a favourite was he among the Athenians, that when one of his enemies accused him of teaching impious doctrines, the accuser himself escaped with difficulty the punishment which he endeavoured to bring upon Theophrastus.

Under the archonship of Xenippus, in the fourth year of the hundred and eighteenth Olympiad[c], Sophocles, the son of Amphiclides, obtained a decree (upon what grounds we are not informed) making it a capital offence for any philosopher to open a public school without an express licence from the senate. Upon this, all the philosophers left the city. But the next year, the person who had proposed this law was himself fined five talents, and the philosophers returned with great public applause to their respective schools. Theophrastus, who had suffered, with his brethren, the persecution inflicted by this oppressive decree, shared the honour of the restoration, and continued his debates and instructions in the Lyceum[d].

Theophrastus is highly celebrated for his industry, learning, and eloquence; and for his generosity and public spirit[e]. He is said to have twice freed his country from the oppression of tyrants. He contributed liberally towards defraying the expence attending the public meetings of philosophers, which were held, not for the sake of shew, but for learned and ingenious conversation. In the public

[a] Cic. Orat. c. 19, 24. Plin. Præf. l. i. Laert. l. v. § 32. [b] Ib. § 39.
[c] B. C. 305.
[d] Laert. Athæn. l. xiii. p. 610.
[e] Laert. Athæn. l. i. p. 21. l. v. p. 186. Plut. adv. Colot.

ſchools he commonly appeared, as Ariſtotle had done, in an elegant dreſs, and was very attentive to the graces of elocution. He lived to the advanced age of eighty-five. Towards the cloſe of his life, he grew exceedingly infirm, and was carried to the ſchool on a couch. He expreſſed great regret on account of the ſhortneſs of life; and complained, that nature had given long life to ſtags and crows, to whom it is of ſo little value, and had denied it to man, who, in a longer duration, might have been able to attain the ſummit of ſcience, but now, as ſoon as he arrives within ſight of it, is taken away[a]. His laſt advice to his diſciples was, that, ſince it is the lot of man to die as ſoon as he begins to live, they would take more pains to enjoy life as it paſſes, than to acquire poſthumous fame. His funeral was attended by a large body of Athenians. He wrote many valuable works, of which all that remain are, ſeveral treatiſes "On the Natural Hiſtory of Plants and Foſſils;" "Of Winds;" "Of Fire," &c. a rhetorical work entitled "Characters," and a few Metaphyſical Fragments[b].

Although Theophraſtus held the firſt place among the diſciples of Ariſtotle, he did not ſo implicitly follow his maſter as to have no peculiar tenets of his own. In ſeveral particulars he deviated from the doctrine of Ariſtotle; and he made ſome material additions to the ſyſtem of the Peripatetic ſchool. The following is a ſpecimen of the tenets of this philoſopher, where he appears to have followed his own judgment, or, at leaſt, to have uſed language different from that of his maſter.

Theophraſtus taught, that the Predicaments, or Categories, are as numerous as the motions and changes to which beings are liable; and that, among motions, or changes, are to be reckoned deſires, appetites, judgments and thoughts. In this opinion he deviated widely from Ariſtotle: for, if theſe actions of the mind are to be referred to motion, the firſt mover, in contemplating himſelf, is not immoveable.

[a] Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. iii. c. 28. Seneca (de Brev. Vit. c. 1.) aſcribes this reflection to Ariſtotle; but it is inconſiſtent with his opinion, that man lives longer than any other animal, except the elephant. De Gen. Anim. l. v. c. 10.

[b] Laert. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 241. His works were edited by Heinſius, Lugd. Bat. 1631. fol. His *Characters* by Needham, Cantab. 1712.

He maintained, that all things are not produced from contraries; but ſome from contraries, ſome from ſimilar cauſes, and ſome from ſimple energy: that motion is not to be diſtinguiſhed from action; and that there is one divine principle of all things, by which all things ſubſiſt[a]. By this divine principle Theophraſtus probably meant the Firſt Mover, without whom other things could not be moved, and therefore could not ſubſiſt.

To theſe theoretical tenets might be added ſeveral moral apothegms[b], which are aſcribed to Theophraſtus; but they are too trite and general to merit particular notice, except perhaps the following: "Reſpect yourſelf, and you will never have reaſon to be aſhamed before others. Love is the paſſion of an indolent mind. Bluſhing is the complexion of virtue."

Theophraſtus was ſucceeded by STRATO[c] of Lampſacus. He undertook the charge of the Peripatetic ſchool in the third year of the hundred and twenty-third Olympiad[d], and preſided eighteen years with a high degree of reputation for learning and eloquence. Ptolemy Philadelphus made him his preceptor, and repayed his ſervices with a royal preſent of eighty talents.

In his doctrine[e] concerning matter, Strato departed eſſentially from the ſyſtem both of Plato and Ariſtotle. His opinions, as far as they can be collected from the brief hints which remain, were; that there is inherent in nature a principle of motion, or force, without intelligence, which is the only cauſe of the production and diſſolution of bodies; that the world has neither been formed by the agency of a deity, diſtinct from matter, nor by an intelligent animating principle, but has ariſen from a force innate to matter, originally excited by accident, and ſince continuing to act, according to the peculiar qualities of natural bodies[f]. It does not appear, that Strato expreſsly either denied or aſſerted the exiſtence

[a] Conf. F. Patricii Diſcuſſ. Perip. t. i. l. xii. p. 154, &c.

[b] Laert. Stobæus, &c.

[c] Laert. l. v. § 58. Suidas. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. ii. c. 38. [d] B. C. 286.

[e] Cic. ib. et de Fin. l. v. c. 5. Plut. adv. Colot. t. iii. p. 418. Simpl. in Phyſ. l. iv. c. 53. l. vi. c. 23. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i.

[f] Cic. De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 13.

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of a divine nature; but in excluding all idea of deity from the formation of the world, it cannot be doubted, that he indirectly excluded from his ſyſtem the doctrine of the exiſtence of a Supreme Being[a]. Strato alſo taught, that the ſeat of the ſoul is in the middle of the brain[b]; and that it only acts by means of the ſenſes[c].

After the death of Strato, which happened about the end of the hundred and twenty-ſeventh Olympiad, the Peripatetic ſchool was continued, in ſucceſſion, by LYCON[d] of Troas, who enjoyed the friendſhip of Attalus, and Eumenes, and filled the chair till the hundred and thirty-eighth Olympiad;—by ARISTO[e], of the iſland of Coos, whom Cicero characteriſes as more diſtinguiſhed for the elegance of his language, than the depth of his philoſophy;—by CRITOLAUS[f], a Lydian, who, with Carneades and Diogenes, was deputed by the Athenians on an embaſſy to Rome, and who is ſaid[g] to have held the doctrine of the eternity of the world;—and by DIODORUS, in whom the uninterrupted ſucceſſion of the Peripatetic ſchool terminated.

Among the followers of Ariſtotle, who, though not ranked with his ſucceſſors in the chair, have been mentioned with diſtinction, are Dicæarchus, Eumenes, and Demetrius Phalereus.

DICÆARCHUS, a Meſſenian, acquired a diſtinguiſhed name by his philoſophical diſputations and hiſtorical writings. Cicero[h] ſpeaks of him as a learned and eloquent writer. His tenets were, that there is no ſuch thing as mind, or ſoul, either in man or beaſt; that the principle, by which animals perceive and act, is equally diffuſed through the body, is inſeparable from it, and expires with it; that the human race always exiſted; that it is im-

[a] Cudworth's Intell. Syſt. c. iii. § 4. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 311.
[b] Plut. Plac. Phil. l. iv. c. 5.
[c] Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. § 350. Pyrrh. l. iii. c. 4.
[d] Laert. l. v. § 66. & Athæn. l. xii. p. 546.
[e] Laert. l. vii. § 164. Strabo. l. x. p. 658. Cic. De Fin. l. v. c. 5. Athæn. l. x. p. 419. l. xv. p. 674.
[f] Plut. de Exil. t. ii. p. 527. Cic. l. c. Stobæus Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 1.
[g] Philo. Mund. Incor. Op. p. 943. [h] Tuſc. Qu. l. i. c. 10. Suidas.

poſſible

poſſible to foretel future events; and that the knowledge of them would be an infelicity[a]. He was an eminent geographer, and took great pains to meaſure the height of mountains, and to conſtruct accurate maps of countries[b].

Eudemus, of Rhodes, was a pupil of Ariſtotle. The ethics of Ariſtotle are inſcribed to him, and ſome ſuppoſe them to have been written by him[c].

Demetrius Phalereus[d] was an illuſtrious ornament of the Peripatetic ſchool. In the fourth year of the hundred and fifteenth Olympiad[e] he was appointed by Caſſander, king of Macedon, to the government of Athens. He conducted the government with ſo much wiſdom and moderation, and rendered ſo many eſſential ſervices to the citizens, that he acquired an unuſual ſhare of popularity. After he had enjoyed the ſupreme power in Athens ten years, the ſpirit of popular jealouſy, for which the Athenians were ſo remarkable, was raiſed againſt him: he was condemned, during his abſence from the city, to forfeit his life: his houſe and effects were given up to the populace, and all his ſtatues were thrown down. To eſcape the reſentment which raged againſt him in Athens, he fled to Ptolemy Soter, who afforded him protection, and admitted him to his confidence[f]. Being conſulted by the king concerning the choice of a ſucceſſor, he adviſed Ptolemy to chuſe the ſon which he had by his wife Eurydice, in preference to his ſon Berenices, afterwards called Philadelphus. The king rejected his advice, and during his life aſſociated Philadelphus with him in the government. The young prince retained a ſettled enmity againſt Demetrius, for the counſel he had given his father, and when he aſſumed the throne, baniſhed him to a diſtant province. Here Demetrius, after a ſhort interval, unable

[a] Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. i. c. 20, 31, 34. De Off. l. ii. c. 5. Ep. ad Attic. l. xiii. ep. 31, 39. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. ii. c. 3. adv. Math. l. vii. § 349. Plut. contr. Colot. Euſeb. Prep. l. xv. c. 9. Cic. de Div. l. i. c. 3. l. ii. c. 48, 51.

[b] Plin. l. ii. c. 65. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 295. [c] Ib. p. 156.

[c] Laert. l. v. § 70, &c. Cic. de Leg. l. iii. Strabo. l. x. Plin. l. xxxiv. c. 6.

[d] B. C. 317.

[e] Laert. Ælian. l. iii. c. 17. Cic. Orat. pro. Rabirio.

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to ſupport the repeated misfortunes he had met with, put an end to his life by the bite of an aſp.

This fact is ſupported by the concurrent teſtimony of the antients. Hence it has, not without reaſon, been queſtioned, whether credit be due to the reports of Ariſtobulus, Philo, Joſephus, and others, that Demetrius Phalereus was librarian to Ptolemy Philadelphus, and that it was by his advice, that this prince gave orders for a verſion of the Jewiſh ſcriptures from the Hebrew into the Greek language. The truth is, that the whole ſtory of a royal mandate for this undertaking is deſtitute of ſatisfactory proof, and probably firſt aroſe from Jewiſh vanity, and was afterwards haſtily adopted by the Chriſtian fathers. It is moſt probable, that the Septuagint verſion was the private labour of the Jews, who were at this time reſident in Egypt [a].

Concerning Demetrius Phalereus we have only to add [b], that though he wrote many works on philoſophy, hiſtory, and rhetoric, time has deſtroyed them all; for the elegant piece [c], *De Interpretatione*, "On Interpretation," which ſome aſcribe to him, is probably a work of later date *.

[a] Hody de Sept. Interp. c. 9. Voſſius de Hiſt. Gr. l. i. c. 12. Prideaux Conn. p. ii. l. i. p. 19. [b] Laert. ib. § 80. [c] Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. iv. p. 423.

* Vidend. Jonſ. de Script. Hiſt. Phil. l. i. c. 2. Schloſſer. Spicileg. de Stratone. Cudw. c. iii. § 4—6, et Not. Moſh. Leibnitz Theod. p. 428. Budd. de Spinoz. p. 316. D'Argens Phil. des Bons Sens Reſt. iii. Thom. Hiſt. Ath. c. vi. Le Clerc. Bibl. Ch. t. ii. art. 1. § 7. Parker de Dei. Diſſ. vi. Schloſer. de Hylozoiſmo Stratonis, Wittenb. 1720. Reiman. Hiſt. Ath. ſ. ii. c. 27. Voſſ. Hiſt. Gr. l. i. c. 10, 11. Hody de Sept. Int. c. 9. Prideaux Conn. p. ii. l. i. Carpzov. Inſt. Orat. l. ii. c. 15. Bayle.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

OF THE CYNIC SECT.

BEFORE we diſmiſs the Ionic or Socratic ſchool, two ſects yet remain to be conſidered, the CYNIC, and the STOIC.

Whilſt other philoſophers, who profeſſed themſelves diſciples of Socrates, taught ſyſtems of ſpeculative opinions, which had little connection with the doctrine of their maſter, Antiſthenes, judging it more conſonant to the ſpirit of the Socratic ſchool to adhere in practice to the precepts of morality which Socrates had taught, than to proſecute the ſubtle diſquiſitions in which many of his followers were engaged, became the founder of a ſchool, the ſole object of which was, to ſupport a rigid moral diſcipline.

ANTISTHENES[a], an Athenian, was born about the ninetieth Olympiad[b]. In his youth he was engaged in military exploits, and acquired fame by the valour which he diſplayed in the battle of Tanagra. His firſt ſtudies were under the direction of the Sophiſt Gorgias, who inſtructed him in the art of rhetoric. Soon growing diſſatisfied with the futile labours of this ſchool, he ſought for more ſubſtantial wiſdom from Socrates. Captivated by the doctrine and the manner of his new maſter, he prevailed upon many young men, who had been his fellow ſtudents under Gorgias, to accompany him. So great was his ardour for moral wiſdom, that though he lived at the Piræum, which was at the diſtance of forty *ſtadia*[c] from the city, he came daily to Athens to attend upon Socrates. This wiſe man, as we have already ſeen, at the ſame time that he made morality the only ſubject of his inſtructions, powerfully recommended virtuous manners to his diſciples by his own example. Deſpiſing the purſuits of avarice, vanity, and ambition, he ſought the reward

[a] Laert. l. vi. § 1. &c. Suidas. Plut. de Exil. t. ii. p. 530.
[b] B. C 420. [c] About five miles

of

of virtue in virtue itſelf, and declined no labour or ſuffering which virtue required. This noble conſiſtency of mind was the part of the character of Socrates which Antiſthenes chiefly admired; and he reſolved to make it the object of his diligent imitation. Whilſt he was a diſciple of Socrates, he diſcovered his propenſity towards ſeverity of manners by the meanneſs of his dreſs[a]. He frequently appeared in a thread-bare and ragged cloak. Socrates, who had great penetration in diſcovering the characters of men, remarking that Antiſthenes took pains to expoſe, rather than to conceal, the tattered ſtate of his dreſs, ſaid to him, "Why ſo oſtentatious? Through your rags I ſee your vanity."

After the death of Socrates, whilſt all good men were lamenting his fate, and were indignant againſt his perſecutors, Antiſthenes, by a ſeaſonable jeſt, haſtened the deſerved puniſhment of Melitus and Anytas. Meeting with certain young men from Pontus, who came to Athens with a deſign of attending upon Socrates, whoſe fame had reached their country, he publicly introduced them to Anytas, aſſuring them, that he far exceeded Socrates in wiſdom. This ſarcaſtic encomium inflamed the reſentment of the Athenians, who happened to be preſent, againſt the author of the diſgrace which had been brought upon their city by the baniſhment of ſo excellent a man. The conſequence was, that Anytas was ſoon baniſhed, and Melitus ſentenced to death.

Whilſt Plato, and other diſciples of Socrates, were, after his death forming ſchools in Athens, Antiſthenes choſe, for his ſchool, a public place of exerciſe without the walls of the city, called The Cynoſargum, or, The Temple of the White Dog[b]; whence ſome writers derive the name of the ſect of which he was the founder. Others ſuppoſe, that his followers were called Cynics from the ſnarling humour of their maſter. Here he inculcated, both by precept and example, a rigorous diſcipline. In order to accommodate his own manners to his doctrine, he wore no other garment than a coarſe

[a] Ælian, l. ix. c. 36.

[b] Suidas, t. ii. Κυνόσαργες. Heſych. p. 572. Pauſan. in Atticis. Potter's Antiq. l. i. c. 9.

cloak, ſuffered his beard to grow, and carried a wallet and ſtaff like a wandering beggar. Renouncing all the ſplendid luxuries of life, he contented himſelf with the moſt ſimple diet, and refrained from every kind of effeminate indulgence. In his diſcourſes, he cenſured the manners of the age with a degree of harſhneſs, which procured him the ſurname of The Dog. He expreſſed the utmoſt contempt for pleaſure, accounting it the greateſt evil, and ſaying, that he would rather be mad, than addicted to a voluptuous manner of living. Towards the cloſe of his life, the gloomy caſt of his mind, and the moroſeneſs of his temper, increaſed to ſuch a degree, as to render him troubleſome to his friends, and an object of ridicule to his enemies. In his laſt illneſs he was fretful and impatient; tired of life, yet loth to die. When Diogenes, at that time, aſked him, whether he needed a friend, Antiſthenes replied, "Where is the friend that can free me from my pain?" Diogenes preſented him with a dagger, ſaying, "Let this free you:" but Antiſthenes anſwered, "I wiſh to be freed from pain, not from life." Neither his doctrine, nor his manners, were ſufficiently inviting to procure him many followers. He paid little reſpect to the gods, and the religion of his country; but, as might be expected from a diſciple of Socrates, he thought juſtly concerning the Supreme Being. In his book, which treats on Phyſics, ſays Cicero[a], he obſerves that, THE GODS OF THE PEOPLE ARE MANY, BUT THE GOD OF NATURE IS ONE. Antiſthenes wrote many books, of which none are extant, except two [b] declamations under the names of Ajax and Ulyſſes [c].

The ſect of the Cynics, founded by Antiſthenes, is not ſo much to be regarded as a ſchool of philoſophy, as an inſtitution of manners. It was formed, rather for the purpoſe of providing a remedy for the moral diſorders of luxury, ambition, and avarice, than with a view to eſtabliſh any new theory of ſpeculative opinions. The diſciples of Antiſthenes, and other leaders of this ſect, conſidered their maſters, not as authors of any new doctrine, but as patrons of ſtrict and inflexible virtue; and were regarded by them, rather as examples

[a] De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 13. [b] Laert. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 789.
[c] Conf. Ælian, l. x. c. 116. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. l. iii. c. 23. A. Gell. l. ix. c. 5.

for

for their imitation in the conduct of life, than as preceptors to guide them in the ſearch of truth. The ſole end of the Cynic philoſophy was, to ſubdue the paſſions, and produce ſimplicity of manners. The characteriſtic peculiarities of the ſect were, an indignant contempt of effeminate vices, and a rigorous adherence to the rules of moral diſcipline. A Cynic, according to the original ſpirit of the ſect, was one who appeared in a coarſe garb, and carried a wallet and ſtaff, as external ſymbols of ſeverity, and who regarded every thing with indifference, except that kind of virtue, which conſiſts in a haughty contempt of external good, and a hardy endurance of external ill[a]. Simplicity and moderation were indeed in this ſect carried to the extreme of auſterity, and at laſt produced the Stoic ſyſtem of apathy; but the real deſign of the founders both of the Cynic and the Stoic ſect ſeems to have been, to eſtabliſh virtuous manners. The rigorous diſcipline which was practiſed by the firſt Cynics, and which afterwards degenerated into the moſt abſurd ſeverity, was at firſt adopted for the laudable purpoſe of exhibiting an example of moderation and virtuous ſelf-command. If, in executing this praiſeworthy deſign, a portion of vanity blended itſelf with the love of virtue, who will not be inclined to pardon the weakneſs, out of reſpect to the merit, of the character[b]?

That they might be perfectly at liberty to apply themſelves to the cultivation of virtuous habits and manners, without interruption from the noiſy conteſts of ſpeculative philoſophy, the Cynics renounced every kind of ſcientific purſuit; contending, that to thoſe who are endued by nature with a mind diſpoſed to virtue, the purſuits of learning are an unneceſſary and troubleſome interruption of the main buſineſs of life. Hence they entirely diſcarded all dialectic, phyſical, and mathematical ſpeculations, and confined themſelves to the ſtudy, or rather to the practice, of virtue. This was certainly injudicious; but it is ſome apology for their error, that Socrates had taken pains to inſpire his followers with a contempt of theoretical

[a] Laert. l. vi. § 103, &c.

[b] Juliani Orat. vi. vii. Maxim. Tyr. Diſſert. 21. Arrian. Diſſ. Epict. l. iii. Diſſ. 22. Lucian in Vit. Auct. et Cynico, et Demonacte.

ſcience, when conſidered in compariſon with practical wiſdom. It may alſo be added, that the learning which flouriſhed at that time in Greece, chiefly conſiſted in futile ſpeculations, and an illegitimate kind of eloquence, which contributed little towards the happineſs of ſociety, or the real improvement of the human mind [a].

Farther to account for, and excuſe, the ſingularities of the Cynic ſect, it ſhould be recollected, that the manners of the Greeks were, at this time, ſtrongly tending towards the extreme of effeminacy. So much attention was now paid to external appearance, eſpecially among the Athenians, that not only the citizens at large were addicted to luxury and vanity, but even the philoſophers themſelves caught the infection, as ſufficiently appears from what has been related concerning the dreſs and manners of Ariſtippus, Arceſilaus, Ariſtotle, Stilpo, and others. Socrates had endeavoured, by modeſt cenſure mingled with eaſy pleaſantry, as well as by a laudable example of moderation, to correct the public taſte and manners. Antiſthenes, without poſſeſſing either judgment or moderation equal to his maſter, adopted the ſame plan, but carried it to an extreme, which paſſed beyond the limits of decorum. Judging all regard to external appearance to be unfavourable to virtue, he neglected every attention of this kind, and went back towards the ſimplicity of nature, nearer than was conſiſtent with civilized life. His followers, obſerving the high degree of reputation for wiſdom and fortitude, which the ſtrictneſs of his manners had procured him, determined to follow his ſteps, and carried his peculiarities to a ridiculous and abſurd extreme. At firſt, a Cynic philoſopher, being nothing more than a ſevere public monitor,

"Virtutis veræ cuſtos, rigiduſque ſatelles [b], *

commanded attention and reſpect; but when the freedom of cenſure degenerated into ſcurrility, whilſt the vulgar admired the boldneſs of

[a] Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 361. Arr. Epict. l. iii. p. 301.

[b] Hor. Ep. i. 1. 17.

* The ſtern defender of pure virtue's cauſe.

theſe philoſophers, the more judicious wondered at their impudence; and the whole order gradually fell into diſeſteem and contempt.

Theſe circumſtances will account for the diſgraceful tales which have been ſo induſtriouſly propagated concerning this ſect. The ſingularity of the early Cynics, and many groſs violations of decorum, which, at a later period, rendered the ſect not only ridiculous but infamous, furniſhed occaſion to thoſe, who did not carefully diſtinguiſh between the firſt deſign of this inſtitution and its ſubſequent abuſes, to declaim againſt the Cynical philoſophy, as nothing better than a compound of vulgarity, ſpleen, and malignity. An impartial enquirer will, therefore, in this part of the hiſtory of philoſophy, be particularly cautious in giving credit to Athæneus, Lucian, and other writers, who, to diſplay their own wit, or to bring philoſophy into diſcredit, have, on every occaſion, eagerly caught hold of ſtories diſreputable to philoſophers, without taking the pains, and perhaps without wiſhing, to diſtinguiſh truth from falſehood.

The ſum of the moral doctrine of Antiſthenes and the Cynic ſect is this[a]: Virtue alone is a ſufficient foundation for a happy life. Virtue conſiſts, not in a vain oſtentation of learning, or an idle diſplay of words, but in a ſteady courſe of right conduct. Wiſdom and virtue are the ſame. A wiſe man will always be contented with his condition, and will live rather according to the precepts of virtue, than according to the laws or cuſtoms of his country. Wiſdom is a ſecure and impregnable fortreſs; virtue, armour which cannot be taken away. Whatever is honourable is good; whatever is diſgraceful is evil. Virtue is the only bond of friendſhip. It is better to aſſociate with a few good men againſt a vicious multitude, than to join the vicious, however numerous, againſt the good. The love of pleaſure is a temporary madneſs.

The following maxims and apothegms are alſo aſcribed to Antiſthenes[b]:

As ruſt conſumes iron, ſo doth envy conſume the heart of man. That ſtate is haſtening to ruin, in which no difference is

[a] Laert. l. v. § 11, 12. [b] Laert. Stobæus.

made

made between good and bad men. The harmony of brethren is a ſtronger defence than a wall of braſs. A wiſe man converſes with the wicked, as a phyſician with the ſick, not to catch the diſeaſe, but to cure it. A philoſopher gains at leaſt one thing from his manner of life, a power of converſing with himſelf. The moſt neceſſary part of learning is, to unlearn our errors. The man who is afraid of another, whatever he may think of himſelf, is a ſlave. Antiſthenes, being told that a bad man had been praiſing him, ſaid, What fooliſh thing have I been doing?

Diogenes[a], another celebrated Cynic, was born, in the third year of the ninety-firſt Olympiad, at Sinope, a city of Pontus. His father, who was a banker, was convicted of debaſing the public coin, and was obliged to leave his country. This circumſtance gave the ſon an opportunity of viſiting Athens, where he ſoon found in Antiſthenes a preceptor of a diſpoſition ſimilar to his own. When Diogenes offered himſelf as a pupil of Antiſthenes, that philoſopher, having been mortified by neglect, was in a peeviſh humour, and refuſed to receive him. Diogenes ſtill perſiſting to importune him for admiſſion, Antiſthenes lifted up his ſtaff to drive him away; upon which Diogenes ſaid, "Beat me as you pleaſe; I will be your ſcholar[b]." Antiſthenes, overcome by his perſeverance, received him, and afterwards made him his intimate companion and friend. Diogenes perfectly adopted the principles and character of his maſter. Renouncing every other object of ambition, he determined to diſtinguiſh himſelf by his contempt of riches and honours, and by his indignation againſt luxury. He wore a coarſe cloak; carried a wallet and a ſtaff; made the porticos, and other public places, his habitation; and depended upon caſual contributions for his daily bread. A friend, whom he had deſired to procure him a cell, not executing his order ſo ſoon as he expected, he took up his abode in a tub[c], or large open veſſel, in the *Metroum*. It is probable, however, that this was only a temporary expreſſion of indignation and con-

[a] Laert. l. vi. § 20, &c. Suidas. [b] Ælian. l. x. c. 116.
[c] Laert. Athæn. l. xiii. c. 26.

tempt,

tempt, and that he did not make a tub the ſettled place of his reſidence. This famous tub is indeed celebrated by Juvenal[a]:

—— Dolia nudi
Non ardent Cynici. Si fregeris altera fiet
Cras domus, aut eadem plumbo commiſſa manebit[b].

It is alſo ridiculed by Lucian[c], and mentioned by Seneca[d]: but no notice is taken of ſo ſingular a circumſtance by other antient writers who have mentioned this philoſopher; not even by Epictetus, who diſcourſes at large concerning Diogenes, and relates many particulars reſpecting his manner of life. It may therefore be queſtioned, whether this whole ſtory is not to be ranked among the numerous tales, which have been invented to expoſe the ſect of the Cynics to ridicule.

It cannot, however, be doubted, that Diogenes practiſed the moſt hardy ſelf-controul, and the moſt rigid abſtinence[e]; expoſing himſelf to the utmoſt extremes of heat and cold, and living upon the ſimpleſt diet, caſually ſupplied by the hand of charity. That he might accompliſh the end for which this ſect was inſtituted, the correction of luxurious and profligate manners, he reprehended the Athenians, eſpecially thoſe of the higher ranks, with great freedom and ſternneſs. His reproofs, though exceedingly pungent, diſcovered ſo much ingenuity, that they commanded the admiration even of thoſe againſt whom they were immediately directed. He inculeated a hardy patience of labour and pain, frugality, temperance, and an entire contempt of pleaſure. His rigid diſcipline, whilſt it gained him reſpect and admiration from ſome, brought upon him contempt and indignity from others. He appeared, however, alike indifferent to both, and at all times preſerved an entire command of himſelf.

[a] Sat. xiv. v. 308.

[b] Safe in his tub, the naked Cynic lives
Fearleſs of fire: break up his houſe; next day
Brings him a new one, or repairs the old.

[c] De Scrib. Hiſt. [d] Ep. 90. [e] Epict. ap. Arr. l. iii. Diſſ. 24.

It is ſaid, that Diogenes, in his old age (it does not appear from what motive) ſailed to the iſland of Ægina[a]. Upon his paſſage he was taken by a company of pirates, who carried him into Crete, and there expoſed him to ſale in the public market. When the auctioneer aſked him, what he could do, he ſaid, "I can govern men, therefore ſell me to one who wants a maſter." Xeniades, a wealthy Corinthian, happening at that inſtant to paſs by, was ſtruck with the ſingularity of his reply, and purchaſed him. When he was delivered to his maſter, he ſaid, "I ſhall be more uſeful to you as your phyſician, than as your ſlave." On their arrival at Corinth, Xeniades remarking the ſingular character and genius of his new ſlave, gave him his liberty, and, at length, committed to him the education of his children, and the direction of his domeſtic concerns. Diogenes executed his truſt with ſo much judgment and fidelity, that Xeniades uſed to ſay, that the gods had ſent a good genius to his houſe. He trained up his pupils in the diſcipline of the Cynic ſect, and took more pains to give them habits of ſelf-command than to inſtruct them in the elements of ſcience. He did not however neglect to teach them leſſons of moral wiſdom[b]; and for this purpoſe he chiefly made uſe of ſententious maxims, written in verſe by himſelf and others, which he required them to commit to memory. He allowed them the moderate uſe of athletic exerciſes and hunting. The young men were ſo well pleaſed with their preceptor, that they afterwards treated him with great reſpect, and recommended him to the attention of their parents.

During this period of his life, Diogenes frequently attended the aſſemblies of the people at the Craneum, a place of exerciſe in the vicinity of Corinth, and at the Iſthmian games. Here he appeared in the character of a public cenſor, and, after his uſual manner, ſeverely laſhed the follies of the times, and inculcated rigid leſſons of ſobriety and virtue. It was at one of theſe aſſemblies, that the celebrated conference between Alexander the Great and this philoſopher is ſaid to have happened. The

[a] Laert. [b] A. Gellius, l. ii. c. 19.

ſtory

ſtory, as it has been related on the authority of Plutarch[a] is this: Alexander, at this general aſſembly, received the congratulations of all ranks, on being appointed, after the death of his father, to command the general army of the Grecians on their intended expedition againſt the Perſians. The young prince, who was not unacquainted with the character of Diogenes, expreſſed his ſurprize, that whilſt other philoſophers were ready on this occaſion to pay him reſpect, Diogenes, who reſided at Corinth, was abſent. Curious to ſee a philoſopher, who had given ſo ſignal a proof of the haughty independence of his ſpirit, Alexander viſited the Craneum, where he found the Cynic ſitting in his tub in the ſun. In the midſt of a numerous crowd of attendants, the king came up to him, and ſaid, "I am Alexander the Great." The philoſopher, without at all relaxing the tone of his ſurly humour, immediately replied, "And I am Diogenes the Cynic." Alexander then requeſted, that he would inform him, if there were any ſervice that he could render him. "Yes," ſays he, "not to ſtand between me and the ſun." Struck with aſtoniſhment at the magnanimity of this reply, Alexander ſaid to his friends, who were ridiculing the whimſical ſingularity of the Cynic, "If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes." The ſtory is too good to be omitted; but there are ſeveral circumſtances, which in ſome degree diminiſh its credibility. It ſuppoſes Diogenes to live in his tub in the Cranium of Corinth; whereas it appears, from the preceding narrative, that at Corinth he lived in the houſe of Xeniades, and that, if he ever dwelt in a tub, he left it behind him at Athens. Alexander was at this time ſcarcely twenty years old, and could not call himſelf Alexander the Great, for he did not receive this title till his Perſian and Indian expedition, after which he never returned into Greece; yet the whole tranſaction ſuppoſes him elated with the pride of conqueſt. Thus much however may be conceived to be probable; that Diogenes, who, at the beginning of the hundred and eleventh

[a] Vit. Alex. t. iv. p. 455. et de Fort. Alex. p. 352. Dion. Orat. 8. p. 131. Senec. de Benef. l. v. c. 4. Arr. Exped. Al. l. vii. c. 1. Diſſ. Epict. l. iii. c. 22.

Olympiad, when Alexander held the general aſſembly of the Greeks, was upwards of ſeventy years old, might frequently appear in the public walks of Corinth, and that Alexander might have the curioſity to ſee a man celebrated for his ſingularity, and might for this purpoſe viſit him in his uſual public ſtation. It is not unlikely too, that the ſurly Cynic, to ſhew his contempt for kings, might treat him with ſome kind of rudeneſs, ſimilar to that which is related above.

Some writers aſſert, that after the death of Antiſthenes, Diogenes paſſed his ſummers in Corinth, and his winters in Athens. But there ſeems to be no better foundation for this ſtory, than for the whole detail of ſmall anecdotes and jeſts which have been aſcribed to him. As to theſe they are entirely contrary to the general ſcope of his philoſophy, and to that authority and reſpect which he enjoyed with the wiſe men of his age; and are undoubtedly to be aſcribed to that ſtrong propenſity to the fabulous, which has ſo often diſgraced the memoirs of celebrated men with idle and ſilly tales. If we can pay any credit to the repreſentation of the antients[a], Diogenes was a philoſopher of a penetrating genius, not unacquainted with learning, and deeply read in the knowledge of mankind. He moreover poſſeſſed a firm and lofty mind, ſuperior to the injuries of fortune, hardy in ſuffering, and incapable of fear. Contented with a little, and poſſeſſing within himſelf treaſures ſufficient for his own happineſs, he deſpiſed the luxuries of the age. From an earneſt deſire to correct and improve the public manners, he cenſured reigning follies and vices with a ſteady confidence which ſometimes degenerated into ſeverity. He ſpared neither the rich nor the powerful; and even ventured to ridicule the religious ſuperſtitions of the age. This freedom gave great offence to multitudes, who could not endure ſuch harſh and reproachful lectures from the mouth of a mendicant philoſopher. The conſequence was, that he ſuffered much obloquy, and was made the ſubject of ludicrous and diſgraceful calumny. It

[a] Arrian. Epic. l. iii. Diſſ. 21. Laert.

is

is wholly incredible, that a man, who is univerſally celebrated for his ſobriety and contempt of pleaſure, and who, for his vehement indignation againſt vice, and his bold attempts to reform the age in which he lived, has been repreſented by ſome of the moſt eminent philoſophers[a] as one endued with divine wiſdom, ſhould have been capable of committing the groſſeſt indecencies[b]. The tale of his having obtained thoſe favours from Lais, the celebrated courtezan, without reward, which Ariſtippus purchaſed at a great price, is wholly inconſiſtent with chronology; for Lais was ſeven years old when ſhe was brought a captive by Nicias from Sicily to Corinth, in the ninety-firſt Olympiad, and Diogenes came to live there, as we have ſeen, about the hundred and tenth Olympiad; Lais muſt therefore have been fourſcore years old, and Diogenes ſeventy, when this famous amour commenced, not to mention ſeveral inſuperable difficulties in the hiſtory of Lais[c], nor to urge, that for theſe ſtories we are chiefly indebted to Athæneus, a writer who ſeems to have ranſacked every corner of antiquity, and of his own invention too, for tales to the diſcredit of philoſophy.

But though we can, without difficulty, abſolve Diogenes from the accuſation of groſs impudence, we cannot ſo eaſily acquit him of the charge of philoſophical pride[d]. There can be no doubt, that he valued himſelf too highly upon a ſingular ruggedneſs of manners, which, though ſome might admire, few would be inclined to imitate. It was owing to this haughty temper, that he treated other philoſophers, and even magiſtrates and princes, with contempt, and that he reprehended vice, wherever he found it, with bitterneſs, and even ſcurrility. That neglect of civility and decorum which this humour produced, is certainly not to be juſtified. Wiſdom did not require Diogenes to take the cloak and wallet of a mendicant.

Various accounts are given, concerning the manner and time

[a] Epict. l. c. Max. Tyr. l. c. Le Vayer de Virt. Gent. t. v. p. 134.
[b] Laert. Plut. de Rep. Stoic. t. iii. p. 23. Athæn. l. iv. p. 158. l. xiii. p. 588.
[c] Bayle, Lais. [d] Ælian, l. iii. c. 29.

of his death. It ſeems moſt probable that he died at Corinth, of mere decay, in the ninetieth year of his age, and in the hundred and fourteenth Olympiad[a]. His friends contended for the honour of defraying the expences of his funeral; but the magiſtrates of Athens ſettled the diſpute, by ordering him an honourable interment at the public expence. A column of Parian marble, terminated by the figure of a dog, was raiſed over his tomb; and his friends erected many brazen ſtatues from reſpect to his memory.

Diogenes left behind him no ſyſtem of philoſophy. After the example of his maſter, he was more attentive to practical, than theoretical wiſdom. The chief heads of his moral doctrine may be thus briefly ſtated[b]:

Virtue of mind, as well as ſtrength of body, is chiefly to be acquired by exerciſe and habit. Nothing can be accompliſhed without labour, and every thing may be accompliſhed with it. Even the contempt of pleaſure may, by the force of habit, become pleaſant. All things belong to wiſe men, to whom the gods are friends. The ranks of ſociety originate from the vices and follies of mankind, and are therefore to be deſpiſed. Laws are neceſſary in a civilized ſtate; but the happieſt condition of human life is that which approaches the neareſt to a ſtate of nature, in which all are equal, and virtue is the only ground of diſtinction. The end of philoſophy is, to ſubdue the paſſions, and prepare men for every condition of life.

From the numerous maxims and apothegms which have been aſcribed to Diogenes we ſhall ſelect the following; without ſtaying to enquire, what right he has to the credit of them[c]:

Diogenes, treading upon Plato's robe, ſaid, "I trample under foot the pride of Plato." "Yes," ſaid Plato, "with greater pride of your own." Being aſked in what part of Greece he had ſeen good men, he anſwered, "Nowhere; at Sparta I have ſeen good boys". To a friend who adviſed him, in his old age, to indulge himſelf, he ſaid, "Would you have me quit the race, when I have almoſt reached the goal?" Obſerving a boy drink water out of the hollow of his hand, he took

[a] Laert. [b] Laert. [c] Laert. Stob. Plut.

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his cup out of his wallet, and threw it away, ſaying, that he would carry no ſuperfluities about him. Plato having defined man to be a two-legged animal without wings, Diogenes plucked off the feathers from a cock, and turned him into the academy, crying out, "See Plato's man." In reply to one who aſked him, at what time he ought to dine; he ſaid, "If you are a rich man, when you will; if you are poor, when you can." "How happy," ſaid one, "is Calliſthenes, in living with Alexander!" "No," ſaid Diogenes, "he is not happy; for he muſt dine and ſup when Alexander pleaſes." Plato, diſcourſing concerning ideas, ſpoke of the abſtract idea of a table and a cup (τραπεζότητα, κυαθότητα); Diogenes ſaid, "I ſee the table and the cup, but not the idea of the table and the cup." Plato replied, "No wonder, for you have eyes but no intellect." His anſwer to an invitation from Craterus to come and live with him was, "I had rather lick ſalt at Athens, than ſit down to the richeſt feaſt with Craterus." Being aſked what countryman he was, he anſwered, "A citizen of the world." To one that reviled him he ſaid, "No one will believe you, when you ſpeak ill of me, any more than they would me, if I were to ſpeak well of you." Hearing one of his friends lament, that he ſhould not die in his own country, he ſaid, "Be not uneaſy; from every place there is a paſſage to the regions below." "Would you be revenged upon your enemy," ſaid Diogenes, "be virtuous, that he may have nothing to ſay againſt you."

ONESICRITUS of Ægina[a], who afterwards accompanied Alexander in his Aſiatic expedition, was an admirer of the doctrine and diſcipline of the Cynic ſect, and a follower of Diogenes. MONIMUS[b], a Syracuſian, who was in the ſervice of a Corinthian banker, feigning himſelf mad, left his maſter, that he might aſſume the character of a Cynic. His wiſdom and hardy virtue were celebrated by Menander[c]. His doctrine was, Τὸ ὑπολῃφθὲν τύφον εἶναι παν[d], "All the opinions of men are unſubſtantial, and fleeting, as a vapour:" a ſentiment which Sextus Empiricus preſſes into the ſervice of Scepti-

[a] Laert. l. vi. § 76. Arrian. l. c. p. 149. [b] Laert.
[c] Grot. in not. ad Excerp. ex Tragic. p. 727.
[d] Antonin. de ſe ipſo, l. ii. § 15. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. § 87, 53.

ciſm.

ciſm; but it was probably borrowed from Democritus, or ſome other of the Eleatic ſchool; and only denotes, that material things, which are the objects of opinion, are too variable and mutable to be the ground of certain knowledge; a doctrine admitted by Plato, Pythagoras, and moſt other antient philoſophers. Monimus is alſo celebrated for the ſucceſsful application of ridicule to the reprehenſion of vice, according to the maxim of Horace [a],

——————— Ridiculum acri
Fortius ac melius magnas plerumque ſecat res [b].

After Diogenes, the moſt diſtinguiſhed profeſſor of the Cynic philoſophy was Crates, a Theban [c], who flouriſhed about the hundred and thirteenth Olympiad. He was of honourable deſcent, and inherited a large eſtate: but, when he devoted himſelf to philoſophy, that he might be free from the dominion of thoſe paſſions which are foſtered by wealth, he diſtributed his whole property among the poorer citizens. Leaving his native city, where he had been a diſciple of Bryſo, an Achæan philoſopher who has been reckoned among the Cynics [d], he went to Athens, and there became a zealous diſciple of Diogenes; adopting, in the utmoſt extreme, the ſingularities of his maſter [e]. In his natural temper, however, he was not, like Diogenes, moroſe and gloomy, but cheerful and facetious. His mirthful humour gained him many friends, and procured him acceſs to the houſes of the moſt wealthy Athenians. He acquired ſo much confidence among the citizens at large, that he was freely admitted into their domeſtic circles, and frequently became an arbiter of diſputes and quarrels among relations. His influence in private families is ſaid to have had a great effect in correcting the luxuries and vices, which were at that time prevalent in Athens [f].

[a] Sat. i. x. 14.

[b] Oft will the edge of ridicule ſucceed
To cut the knot, where graver reaſ'ning fails.

[c] Laert. l. vi. § 85. Suidas. Plut. de Vit. Aer. al. t. ii. p. 437.
[d] Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 361.
[e] Laert. Apul. Apol. p. 202. Florid. p. 355.
[f] Laert. Plut. de Tranq. An. t. ii. p. 252. Sympoſ. 2. tom. iii. p. 150. Apul. ib.

The wife of Crates, HIPPARCHIA [a], muſt be mentioned in the liſt of Cynic philoſophers. She was rich, of a good family, and had many ſuitors. She entertained, nevertheleſs, ſo violent a paſſion for this philoſopher, that ſhe was deaf to every other propoſal, and threatened her parents that, if ſhe were not permitted to marry Crates, ſhe would put an end to her life. Crates, at the requeſt of her parents, repreſented to Hipparchia every circumſtance in his condition and manner of living, which might induce her to change her mind. Still ſhe perſiſted in her reſolution, and not only became the wife of Crates, but adopted all the peculiarities of the Cynic profeſſion. Diſgraceful tales have been induſtriouſly circulated concerning Crates and his wife; but ſince they do not appear in any writings of the period in which they lived, and are neither mentioned by Epictetus, who wrote an apology for the Cynic philoſophy, nor by Lucian or Athæneus, who were ſo induſtrious in accumulating calumnies againſt philoſophers, they muſt unqueſtionably be ſet down among the malicious fictions of later writers, who were deſirous to bring the Cynic and Stoic ſects into diſcredit. Had either Diogenes or Crates been the beaſts which ſome have repreſented them, it is wholly incredible that Zeno and the Stoics would have treated their memory with ſo much reſpect [b].

METROCLES [c], the brother of Hipparchia, was alſo a diſciple of Crates. He had formerly been a follower of Theophraſtus and of Xenocrates; but when he commenced Cynic, he committed their works to the flames, as the uſeleſs dreams of idle ſpeculation. In his old age he became ſo diſſatisfied with the world, that he ſtrangled himſelf. MENIPPUS of Sinope, another Cynic, was the author of many ſatirical pieces, and is introduced by Lucian into ſeveral of his dialogues [d]. In MENEDEMUS, of Lampſacus [e], the ſpirit of the Cynic ſect degenerated into downright madneſs. Dreſſed in a black

[a] Laert. l. vi. c. 96. Apul. l. c.

[b] Laert. Sext. Emp. Pyrr. Hyp. l. i. c. 14. l. iii. c. 24. Apul. l. c. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. iv. Lactant. l. iii. c. 15. Stob. Serm. 143. p. 662.

[c] Laert. l. vi. § 94. Stob. S. 237. p. 778.

[d] Laert. l. v. § 99. Luc. Char. & Men.

[e] Laert. l. vi. § 102.

cloak;

cloak, with an Arcadian cap upon his head, on which were drawn the figures of the twelve ſigns of the zodiac, with tragic buſkins on his legs, with a long beard, and with an aſhen ſtaff in his hand, he went about like a maniac, ſaying, that he was a ſpirit, returned from the infernal regions to admoniſh the world[a]. He lived in the reign of Antigonus, king of Macedon *.

[a] Suidas in φαὸς, t. iii. p. 589. Athæn. l. p. 15. l. iv. p. 162.

* Videnda. Potter Arch. Gr. l. i. c. 9. Jonſ. l. i. c. 8. et Diſſ. Perip. 1. Voſſ. de Sect. c. 17. § 3. 9. Auguſt. Civ. Dei. l. xiv. c. 20. Stollii Diſſ. de Antiſthene Cyn. Hiſt. Phil. Mor. p. 77, 83, 97. Ferrarius de Re Veſtiaria, p. ii. l. iv. c. 19. Juliani Orat. de Cynicis. Lipſ. Manud. l. i. Diſſ. 13. Horn. Hiſt. Ph. p. 209. Heuman. Diſſ. de Doliari hab. Pæcil. tom. 1. l. iv. Reiman. Hiſt. Ath. c. 26. Cudworth, c. iv. § 22. La Vayer de Virt. Gent. t. v. Op. p. 134. Fontenelle Dial. des Morts, p. 175. Menzius de Faſtu Phil. Lipſ. 1712. Macrob. Somn. Scip. l. i. c. 12. Bayle.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

OF THE STOIC SECT.

SECT. I.

OF ZENO AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.

THE Stoic ſect was a branch from the Cynic, and, as far as reſpected morals, differed from it in words more than in reality. Its founder, whilſt he avoided the offenſive ſingularities of the Cynics, retained the ſpirit of their moral doctrine: at the ſame time, from a diligent compariſon of the tenets of other maſters, he framed a new ſyſtem of ſpeculative philoſophy. This ſect roſe to great diſtinction among the Grecians, and gave birth to many illuſtrious philoſophers, whoſe names and doctrines have been tranſmitted with great reſpect to the preſent times. This part of the hiſtory of philoſophy will, therefore, require a diligent and minute diſcuſſion.

ZENO[a], the father of the Stoic ſect, was a native of Cittius, a maritime town of Cyprus. This place having been originally peopled by a colony of Phenicians, Zeno is ſometimes called a Phenician[b]. His father was by profeſſion a merchant, but diſcovering in the youth a ſtrong propenſity towards learning, he early devoted him to philoſophy. In his mercantile capacity he had frequent occaſion to viſit Athens, where he purchaſed for his ſon ſe-

[a] Laert. l. vii. Suidas. [b] Cic. de Fin. l. iv. Tuſc. Qu. l. v. c. 12.

veral of the writings of the moſt eminent Socratic philoſophers. Theſe he read with great avidity; and when he was about thirty years of age, he determined to take a voyage to a city, which was ſo celebrated both as a mart of trade and of ſcience. Whether this voyage was in part mercantile, or wholly undertaken for the ſake of converſing with thoſe philoſophers, whoſe writings Zeno had long admired, is uncertain. If it be true, as ſome writers relate, that he brought with him a valuable cargo of Phenician purple, which was loſt by ſhipwreck upon the coaſt of Piræus, this circumſtance will account for the facility with which he at firſt attached himſelf to a ſect, whoſe leading principle was the contempt of riches. Upon his firſt arrival in Athens, going accidentally into the ſhop of a bookſeller, he took up a volume of the Commentaries of Xenophon, and after reading a few paſſages, was ſo much delighted with the work, and formed ſo high an idea of the author, that he aſked the bookſeller, where he might meet with ſuch men. Crates, the Cynic philoſopher, happening at that inſtant to be paſſing by, the bookſeller pointed to him, and ſaid, "Follow that man." Zeno ſoon found an opportunity of attending upon the inſtructions of Crates, and was ſo well pleaſed with his doctrine, that he became one of his diſciples*. But though he highly admired the general principles and ſpirit of the Cynic ſchool, he could not eaſily reconcile himſelf to their peculiar manners. Beſides, his inquiſitive turn of mind would not allow him to adopt that indifference to every ſcientific enquiry, which was one of the characteriſtic diſtinctions of the ſect. He therefore attended upon other maſters, who profeſſed to inſtruct their diſciples in the nature and cauſes of things. When Crates, diſpleaſed at his following other philoſophers, attempted to drag him by force out of the ſchool of Stilpo, Zeno ſaid to him, "You may ſeize my body, but Stilpo has laid hold of my mind." After continuing to attend upon the lectures of Stilpo ſeveral years, he paſſed over to other ſchools, particularly thoſe of Xenocrates and Diodorus Cronus. By the latter he was inſtructed in dialectics. He was ſo much

* Laert. Senec. de Tranq. Anim. c. 14. Plut. de Cap. ex hoſt. util. tom. ii. p. 200.

delighted with this branch of ſtudy, that he preſented to his maſter a large pecuniary gratuity, in return for his free communication of ſome of his ingenious ſubtleties. At laſt, after attending almoſt every other maſter, he offered himſelf as a diſciple of Polemo. This philoſopher appears to have been aware, that Zeno's intention, in thus removing from one ſchool to another, was to collect materials, from various quarters, for a new ſyſtem of his own; for, when he came into Polemo's ſchool, he ſaid to him, "I am no ſtranger, Zeno, to your Phenician arts; I perceive that your deſign is, to creep ſlily into my garden, and ſteal away my fruit[a]."

Polemo was not miſtaken in his opinion. Having made himſelf maſter of the tenets of others, Zeno determined to become the founder of a new ſect. The place which he made choice of for his ſchool was called the *Poecile*, or Painted Porch; a public portico ſo called, from the pictures of Polygnotus, and other eminent painters, with which it was adorned. This portico, which was the moſt famous in Athens, was called Στοὰ, The Porch. It was from this circumſtance, that the followers of Zeno were called Stoics[b].

Zeno excelled in that kind of ſubtle reaſoning, which was at this time popular. At the ſame time, he taught a ſtrict ſyſtem of moral doctrine, and exhibited a pleaſing picture of moral diſcipline in his own life. It is not therefore at all ſurpriſing, that he obtained the applauſe and affection of numerous followers, and even enjoyed the favour of the great. Antigonus Gonates, king of Macedon, whilſt he was reſident at Athens, attended his lectures, and, upon his return, earneſtly invited him to his court. He poſſeſſed ſo large a ſhare of eſteem among the Athenians, that, on account of his approved integrity, they depoſited the keys of their citadel in his hands. They alſo honoured him with a golden crown, and a ſtatue of braſs. Among his countrymen, the inhabitants of Cyprus, and with the Sidonians, from whom his family was derived, he was likewiſe highly eſteemed[c].

[a] Laert. § 35. Suidas.
[b] Plin. Hiſt. N. l. xxxv. c. 9. Pauſan. l. i. p. 13. 27. 78. Suidas v. Polygnotus.
[c] Laert. l. vii. § 6, 7.

In his perſon, Zeno was tall and ſlender; his aſpect was ſevere, and his brow contracted. His conſtitution was feeble; but he preſerved his health by great abſtemiouſneſs. The ſupplies of his table conſiſted of figs, bread, and honey[a]; nothwithſtanding which, he was frequently honoured with the company of great men. It was a ſingular proof of his moderation, mixed indeed with that high ſpirit of independence which afterwards diſtinguiſhed his ſect, that when Democharis, ſon of Laches, offered to procure him ſome gratuity from Antigonus, he was ſo offended, that from that time he declined all intercourſe with him. In public company, to avoid every appearance of an aſſuming temper, he commonly took the loweſt place. Indeed, ſo great was his modeſty, that he ſeldom choſe to mingle with a crowd, or wiſhed for the company of more than two or three friends at once. He paid more attention to neatneſs and decorum in external appearance, than the Cynic philoſophers. In his dreſs indeed he was plain, and in all his expences frugal; but this is not to be imputed to avarice, but a contempt of external magnificence. He ſhowed as much reſpect to the poor as to the rich; and converſed freely with perſons of the meaneſt occupations. He had only one ſervant, or, according to Seneca, none[b].

Although Zeno's ſobriety and continence were even proverbial, he was not without enemies. Among his contemporaries, ſeveral philoſophers of great ability and eloquence employed their talents againſt him. Arceſilaus and Carneades, the founders of the Middle and New Academy, were his profeſſed opponents. Towards the latter end of his life[c], he found another powerful adverſary in Epicurus, whoſe temper and doctrines were alike inimical to the ſevere gravity and philoſophical pride of the Stoic ſect. Hence mutual invectives paſſed between the Stoics and other ſects, to which little credit is due. At leaſt, it may be fairly preſumed, that Zeno, whoſe perſonal character was ſo exemplary, never countenanced groſs immorality in his doctrine.

[a] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. ii. p. 413. Conf. Laert. § 25.
[b] Laert. Sen. Conſol. c. 12. [c] Suidas. A. Gell. l. xvii. c. 21.

Zeno lived to the extreme age of ninety-eight[a], and at laſt, in conſequence of an accident, voluntarily put an end to his life. As he was walking out of his ſchool he fell down, and in the fall broke one of his fingers; upon which, he was ſo affected with a conſciouſneſs of infirmity, that, ſtriking the earth, he ſaid, "Why am I thus importuned? I obey thy ſummons;" and immediately went home, and ſtrangled himſelf. He died in the firſt year of the hundred and twenty-ninth Olympiad[b]. The Athenians, at the requeſt of Antigonus, erected a monument to his memory in the Ceramicum[c].

From the particulars which have been related concerning Zeno, it will not be difficult to perceive what kind of influence his circumſtances and character muſt have had upon his philoſophical ſyſtem. If his doctrines be diligently compared with the hiſtory of his life, it will appear, that having attended upon many eminent preceptors, and been intimately converſant with their opinions, he compiled, out of their various tenets, an heterogeneous ſyſtem, on the credit of which he aſſumed to himſelf the title of the founder of a new ſect. When he reſolved, for the ſake of eſtabliſhing a ſchool, to deſert the philoſophy of Pythagoras and Plato, in which he had been perfectly inſtructed by Xenocrates and Polemo, it became neceſſary, either to invent opinions entirely new, or to give an air of novelty to old ſyſtems by the introduction of new terms and definitions. Of theſe two undertakings Zeno prudently made choice of the eaſier. Cicero ſays, concerning Zeno[d], that he had little reaſon for deſerting his maſters, eſpecially thoſe of the Platonic ſchool, and that he was not ſo much an inventor of new opinions, as of new terms. The thorny logomachies of Zeno and his followers are thus ridiculed by a comic poet quoted by Athenæus[e]:

Ακέσαι' ὦ Στοάκες ἔμποροι λήρε
Λόγων ὑποκριτῆρες[f].

[a] Laert. Luc. Longev. t. ii. p. 821. [b] B. C. 264.
[c] Laert. [d] De Fin. l. iii. Tuſc. Q. l. v. [e] L. xiii.

[f] Ye ſages of the Porch, loquacious tribe,
Traders in trifles, arbiters of words,
And cenſors! hear!

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That this was the real character of the Porch will fully appear, from an attentive peruſal of the clear and accurate compariſon, which Cicero has drawn between the doctrines of the Old Academy and thoſe of the Stoics, in his Academic Queſtions. The dialectic arts which Zeno learned in the ſchool of Diodorus Chronus, he did not fail to apply to the ſupport of his own ſyſtem, and to communicate to his followers. As to the moral doctrine of the Cynic ſect, to which Zeno ſtrictly adhered to the laſt, there can be no doubt that he transferred it, almoſt without alloy, into his own ſchool.

Et qui nec Cynicos, nec Stoica dogmata legit
A Cynicis tunica diſtantia* .*

In morals, the principal difference between the Cynics and the Stoics was, that the former diſdained the cultivation of nature, the latter affected to riſe above it. On the ſubject of phyſics, Zeno received his doctrine from Pythagoras and Heraclitus, through the channel of the Platonic ſchool [b], as will fully appear from a careful compariſon of their reſpective ſyſtems.

The Stoic philoſophy, being in this manner of heterogeneous origin, it neceſſarily partook of the ſeveral ſyſtems of which it was compoſed. The idle quibbles, jejune reaſonings, and impoſing ſophiſms, which ſo juſtly expoſed the ſchools of the dialectic philoſophers to ridicule, found their way into the Porch, where much time was waſted, and much ingenuity thrown away, upon queſtions of no importance. Cicero cenſures the Stoics [c] for encouraging in their ſchools a barren kind of diſputation, and employing themſelves in determining trifling queſtions, in which the diſputants can have no intereſt, and which, at the cloſe, leave them neither wiſer nor better. And that this cenſure is not, as ſome modern advocates for Stoiciſm have maintained, a mere calumny, but grounded upon fact, ſufficiently appears from what is ſaid by

* Juv. Sat. xiii. v. 121.

* Not fetch'd from Cynic or from Stoic ſchools;
In habit different, but alike in rules. OWEN.

[b] Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. iii. c. 14. [c] De Fin. l. iii. c. 1. l. iv. c. 3.

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the antients, particularly by Sextus Empiricus, concerning the logic of the Stoics. Seneca, who was himſelf a Stoic, candidly acknowledges this[a].

It may perhaps be thought ſurpriſing that philoſophers, who affected ſo much gravity and wiſdom, ſhould condeſcend to ſuch trifling occupations. But it muſt be conſidered, that, at this time, a fondneſs for ſubtle diſputations ſo generally prevailed in Greece, that excellence in the arts of reaſoning and ſophiſtry was a ſure path to fame. The Stoics, with whom vanity was unqueſtionably a ruling paſſion, were ambitious of this kind of reputation. Hence it was, that they engaged with ſo much vehemence in verbal conteſts, and that they largely contributed towards the confuſion, inſtead of the improvement, of ſcience, by ſubſtituting vague and ill defined terms in the room of accurate conceptions. The moral part of the Stoical philoſophy, in like manner, partook of the defects of its origin. It may be as juſtly objected againſt the Stoics as the Cynics, that they aſſumed an artificial ſeverity of manners, and a tone of virtue above the condition of man. Their doctrine of moral wiſdom was an oſtentatious diſplay of words, in which little regard was paid to nature and reaſon. It profeſſed to raiſe human nature to a degree of perfection before unknown; but its real effect was, merely to amuſe the ear, and captivate the fancy, with fictions which can never be realiſed. Laſtly, the phyſical and theoretical ſyſtem of the Stoics, like thoſe from which it had been borrowed, had, in its principles, a ſtrong bias towards enthuſiaſm. If, as we have before ſhewn, the doctrine of Plato, which derives the human mind from the ſoul of the world, has this tendency; much more muſt this be the caſe with the Stoical doctrine, which ſuppoſes, as we ſhall afterwards ſee, that all human ſouls have immediately proceeded from, and will at laſt return into, the divine nature.

The extravagancies and abſurdities of the Stoical philoſophy may alſo be in ſome meaſure aſcribed to the vehement conteſts which ſubſiſted between Zeno and the Academics on the one hand, and between him and Epicurus on the other. For, not only did theſe

[a] Ep. 48. 82. 113.

diſputes

diſputes give riſe to many of the dogmas of Stoiciſm, but led Zeno and his followers, in the warmth of controverſy, to drive their arguments to the utmoſt extremity, and to expreſs themſelves with much greater confidence, than they would probably otherwiſe have done. This is perhaps the true reaſon why ſo many extravagant notions are aſcribed to the Stoics, particularly upon the ſubject of morals. Whilſt Epicurus taught his followers to ſeek happineſs in tranquillity, or a freedom from labour and pain, Zeno imagined his wiſe man, not only free from all ſenſe of pleaſure, but void of all paſſions and emotions, and capable of being happy in the midſt of torture. That he might avoid the torpid indolence of the Epicureans, he had recourſe to a moral inſtitution, which bore indeed the lofty front of wiſdom, but which was elevated far above the condition and powers of human nature.

The natural diſpoſition of Zeno, and his manner of life, had, moreover, no inconſiderable influence in fixing the peculiar character of his philoſophy. By nature ſevere and moroſe, and conſtitutionally inclined to reſerve and melancholy, he early cheriſhed this habit by ſubmitting to the auſtere and rigid diſcipline of the Cynics. Thoſe qualities, which he conceived to be meritorious in himſelf, and which he found to conciliate the admiration of mankind, he naturally transferred to his imaginary character of a wiſe or perfect man. His followers, ambitious of acquiring reputation in the ſame way, put on an appearance of gravity and dignity, which they were more careful to ſupport by external ſhow, than by the real practice of ſublime or uſeful virtues. Hence it happened, that the more eminent Stoics themſelves ſaw reaſon to complain of the inconſiſtency of many of their own ſect, who were philoſophers in words, rather than in actions; and that their adverſaries found ſo much room for ſatirical ridicule and invective againſt Stoical pride and hypocriſy[a]. Nor is it ſurpriſing, that this ſhould have happened. For a ſyſtem of philoſophy, which attempts to raiſe men above their nature, muſt commonly produce, either wretched fanatics, or artful hypo-

[a] Arr. Epic. Diſſ. l. iv. c. 9. l. iii. c. 23. A. Gell. l. vii. c. 19. Juv. Sat. ii. Horat. Serm. l. ii. Sat. 2. Lucian in Hermotim. t. ii. p. 287.

crites.

crites. It is no proof of the perfection, which ſome have been willing to aſcribe to the Stoic philoſophy[a], that there were among its profeſſors many perſons highly diſtinguiſhed by genuine wiſdom and virtue. For their uncommon merit was rather the effect of a happy temperament, or of fortunate circumſtances, in concurrence with thoſe moral principles which are common to all mankind, than to the peculiarities of the Stoical ſyſtem, which, as we ſhall preſently ſee, were not adapted to cheriſh the genuine ſentiments either of virtue or piety.

In order to form an accurate judgment concerning the doctrine of the Stoics, beſides a careful attention to the particulars already enumerated, it will be neceſſary to guard with the utmoſt caution againſt two errors, into which ſeveral writers, who have beſtowed unlimited praiſe upon the Stoical philoſophy, have fallen.

Great care ſhould be taken, in the firſt place, not to judge of the doctrine of the Stoics from words and ſentiments, detached from the general ſyſtem, but to conſider them as they ſtand related to the whole train of premiſes and concluſions. For want of this caution, many moderns, dazzled by the ſplendid expreſſions which they have met with in the writings of the Stoics concerning God, the ſoul, and other ſubjects, have imagined that they have diſcovered an invaluable treaſure: whereas, if they had taken the pains to reſtore theſe brilliants to their proper places in the general maſs, it would ſoon have appeared, that a great part of their value was imaginary. They who would not aſcribe to the Stoics tenets which they never held, and affix to their language a modern meaning which they never conceived, muſt diligently examine their whole ſyſtem, and explain detached paſſages in ſuch a ſenſe, as ſhall be moſt conſiſtent with their general doctrine, and their fundamental principles.

The ſecond caution is, not to confound the genuine doctrines of Zeno, and other antient fathers of this ſect, with the gloſſes, or improvements, of the later Stoics. Any one who attentively

[a] Lipſii Manud. ad Phil. Stoic. Gataker in Antonin.

examines the writings of the philoſophers after the promulgation of the Chriſtian doctrine, will perceive that the Stoics, in order to ſupport the credit of their ſyſtem, artfully accommodated their language, and even their tenets as far as they were able, to the Chriſtian model. Out of the many proofs of this change, which might be adduced, we ſhall ſelect one, which is the more worthy of notice, as it has occaſioned many diſputes among the learned. The doctrine we mean is that concerning Fate. This doctrine, according to Zeno and Chryſippus (who herein meant to combat Epicurus's doctrine of the fortuitous concourſe of atoms) implies an eternal and immutable ſeries of cauſes and effects, within which all events are included, and to which the Deity himſelf is ſubject: whereas, the later Stoics, changing the term Fate, into The Providence of God, diſcourſed with great plauſibility on this ſubject, but ſtill in reality retained the antient doctrine of univerſal fate. From this example, a judgment may be formed concerning the neceſſity of uſing ſome caution, in appealing to the writings of Seneca, Antoninus, and Epictetus, as authorities, in determining what were the original doctrines of the Stoic philoſophers.

If the remains of the Stoic philoſophy, preſerved by Cicero, Plutarch, Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Simplicius, and Stobæus, be diligently and cautiouſly compared with the writings of Seneca, Antoninus, and Epictetus, the following will perhaps appear to be a faithful repreſentation of the leading tenets of this celebrated ſect, under the diſtinct heads of Philoſophy in general, Logic, Phyſics, Metaphyſics, and Morals.

Concerning Philosophy in general, the doctrine of the Stoics was[a], that wiſdom conſiſts in the knowledge of things divine and human; that philoſophy is ſuch an exerciſe of the mind as produces wiſdom; that in this exerciſe conſiſts the nature of virtue; and conſequently, that virtue is a term of extenſive meaning, comprehending the right employment of the mind in reaſoning, in the ſtudy of nature, and in morals. The wiſdom of the Stoics is either progreſſive, through ſeveral ſtages; or perfect, when every weakneſs

[a] Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 1. t. ii. p. 3. Sen. Ep. 89.

is ſubdued, and every error corrected, without the poſſibility of a relapſe into folly, or vice, or of being again enſlaved by any paſſion, or afflicted by any calamity[a]. With Socrates and the Cynics, Zeno repreſented virtue as the only true wiſdom; but being diſpoſed to extend the purſuits of his wiſe man into the regions of ſpeculation and ſcience, he gave, after his uſual manner, a new ſignification to an old term, and comprehended the exerciſe of the underſtanding in the ſearch of truth, as well as the government of the appetites and paſſions, under the general term, Virtue[b]. The propriety of this extenſive definition of virtue, and the great importance of the united exerciſe of the intellectual and active powers of the mind, are thus beautifully aſſerted by the philoſophical emperor[c]. "Let every one endeavour ſo to think and act, that his contemplative and active faculties may at the ſame time be going on towards perfection. His clear conceptions, and certain knowledge, will then produce within him an entire confidence in himſelf, unperceived perhaps by others, though not affectedly concealed, which will give a ſimplicity and dignity to his character; for he will at all times be able to judge, concerning the ſeveral objects which come before him, what is their real nature, what place they hold in the univerſe, how long they are by nature fitted to laſt, of what materials they are compoſed, by whom they may be poſſeſſed, and who is able to beſtow them, or take them away."

The ſum of the definitions and rules given by the Stoics concerning LOGIC is this:

Logic is either rhetorical or dialectic. Rhetorical logic is the art of reaſoning and diſcourſing on thoſe ſubjects which require a diffuſe kind of declamation. Dialectic, is the art of cloſe argumentation in the form of diſputation or dialogue. The former reſembles an open, the latter a cloſed hand. Rhetoric is of three kinds, deliberative, judicial, and demonſtrative. The dialectic art is the inſtrument of knowledge, as it enables a man to diſtinguiſh truth from error, and cer-

[a] Sen. Ep. 71. 72. 75.

[b] Plut. Sen. l. c. Laert. l. vii. § 40. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. § 17.

[c] Antonin. l. x. § 9.

tainty from bare probability. This art conſiders things as expreſſed by words, and words themſelves [a].

External things are perceived by a certain impreſſion made either upon ſome parts of the brain, or upon the percipient faculty, which may be called an image, φαντασία, ſince it is impreſſed upon the mind, like the image of a ſeal upon wax [b]. This image is commonly accompanied with a belief of the reality of the thing perceived; but not neceſſarily, ſince it does not accompany every image, but thoſe only which are not attended with any evidence of deception. Where only the image is perceived by itſelf, the thing is apprehenſible; where it is acknowledged and approved as the image of ſome real thing, the impreſſion is called Apprehenſion, καταλήψις, becauſe the object is apprehended by the mind, as a body is graſped by the hand. Such apprehenſion, if it will bear the examination of reaſon, is Knowledge; if it is not examined, it is mere Opinion; if it will not bear this examination, it is Miſapprehenſion. The ſenſes, corrected by reaſon, give a faithful report; not by affording a perfect apprehenſion of the entire nature of things, but by leaving no room to doubt of their reality. Nature has furniſhed us with theſe apprehenſions, as the elements of knowledge, whence further conceptions are raiſed in the mind, and a way is opened for the inveſtigations of reaſon [c].

Some images are Senſible, or received immediately through the ſenſes, others Rational, which are perceived only in the mind. Theſe latter are called ἔννοιαι, notions or ideas. Some images are Probable, to which the mind aſſents without heſitation; others Improbable, to which it does not readily aſſent; and others Doubtful, where it is not entirely perceived, whether they are true or falſe. True images are thoſe which ariſe from things really exiſting, and agree with them. Falſe images, or phantaſms, are immediately derived from

[a] Sen. Ep. 48. Lucian. Herm. t. ii. p. 390. Laert. l. vii. § 42. 47. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. ii. § 6, 7. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 6. De Orat. c. 32. Quintil. l. ii. c. 20.

[b] Laert. l. vii. § 45. Cic. Acad. Q. l. i. c. 11. Boethius de Conſol. l. v. Met. 3.

[c] Laert. § 45—52. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. § 29. 163. 228. Cic. Ac. Q. l. ii. c. 6. l. iv. c. 47.

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no real object. Images are apprehended by Immediate Perception, through the senses, as when we see a man; Consequentially, by likeness, as when from a portrait we apprehend the original; by Composition, as when, by compounding a horse and man, we acquire the image of a Centaur; by Augmentation, as in the image of a Cyclops; or by Diminution, as in that of a pigmy[a].

Judgment is employed either in determining concerning particular things, or concerning general propositions. In judging of things, we make use of some one of our senses, as a common criterion or measure of apprehension, by which we judge whether a thing is, or is not; or whether, or not, it exists with certain properties; or we apply to the thing, concerning which a judgment is to be formed, some artifical measure, as a balance, a rule, &c.; or we call in other peculiar measures to determine things not perceptible by the senses. In judging of general propositions, we make use of our pre-conceptions, or universal principles, as *criteria* or measures of judgment[b].

The first impressions from the senses produce in the mind an involuntary emotion; but a wise man afterwards deliberately examines them, that he may know whether the image be true or false, and assents to or rejects them, as the evidence which offers itself to his understanding appears sufficient or insufficient. This assent or approbation (συνκαταθέσεις) will indeed be as necessarily given, or withheld, according to the ultimate state of the proofs which are adduced, as the scale of a balance will sink or rise, according to the weights which are placed upon them; but while the vulgar give immediate credit to the reports of the senses, wise men suspend their assent, till they have deliberately examined the nature of things, and carefully estimated the weight of evidence[c].

The mind of man is originally like a blank leaf, wholly without characters, but capable of receiving any. The impressions which are made upon it, by means of the senses, remain in the memory, after the objects which occasioned them are removed; a succession of

[a] Laert. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. ii. Plut. Plac. l. iv. c. 12.
[b] Cic. Acad. Q. l. i. Laert. Sext. Emp. adv. Log.
[c] Cic. Ac. Q. l. iv. A. Gellius, l. xix. c. 1.

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theſe continued impreſſions, made by ſimilar objects, produces experience; and hence ariſes permanent notions, opinions, and knowledge. Even univerſal principles, προλήψεις, are originally formed, by experience, from ſenſible images. All men agree in their common notions or pre-conceptions; diſputes only ariſe concerning the application of theſe to particular caſes[a].

Theſe three things are mutually related; the expreſſion, the notion or image in the mind which is expreſſed, and the external object. Under the head of expreſſion, dialectics conſider vocal ſound, as expreſſed by letters; the ſeveral parts of ſpeech; the etymology, analogy, or anomaly of ſyntax; the ſignification of words, and other properties of language. The notion or image expreſſed is the φαντασια, phantaſy, already explained[b].

Dialectics conſider things as capable of being claſſed under *ſpecies* and *genera*. The moſt comprehenſive genus is that which includes all beings both real and imaginary. Things are ſubdivided into four kinds: 1. Subſtance. 2. Qualities, which are the differences of ſubſtances, not taken individually, but collected into one notion in the mind. 3. Modes, reſpecting quantity, place, time, &c. 4. Relations, as thoſe of father and ſon, right and left. Things conſidered with reſpect to ſpeech are ſaid to be λεκτα, capable of being expreſſed in words. This character includes what is imaginary, as well as what is real. All notions reſiding in the mind, ready for expreſſion, come under this deſcription[c].

Predicates are thoſe things which are predicated, or declared, concerning another. When theſe are connected with the perſon, or thing, to whom the predicate is applied in a direct aſſertion, the ſentence is called an axiom. An axiom may be either ſimple or compound; ſimple, which does not conſiſt of ſeveral different axioms, or of one axiom twice taken; compound, conſiſting of one axiom diverſified, or of more than one. In compound axioms, that which immediately follows the conjunction *if, ſince,* &c. is called the ante-

[a] Plut. Plac. l. iv. c. 11, 12. Arrian, l. i. Diſſ. 22. Cic. Ac. Q. l. i. c. 11.
[b] Sext. Emp. adv. Log. Laert.
[c] Laert. l. vii. § 60—3. Sext. Emp. ib. Simplic. in Categ.

cedent,

cedent, the reſt the conſequent. Complex axioms are of various kinds, according to the nature of the conjunction which connects them, whence they are connective, conjunctive, disjunctive, caſual, comparative, &c. Axioms admit of various other characters, as poſſible, probable, neceſſary, paradoxical, contrary. An argument (λόγος) commonly conſiſts of a general truth admitted (λῆμμα); a particular caſe ſuppoſed (προσλῆμμα); and a concluſion (ἐπιφορά). For example: If it be day it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light. An argument admits of more variety in its form than a ſyllogiſm. It may conſiſt of one complex propoſition, as, Thou liveſt, therefore thou breatheſt; or, the concluſion may be ſuch, as neceſſarily to follow from the premiſes, though there be not a major and minor. For example; The firſt is equal to the ſecond, and the ſecond is equal to the third, therefore the firſt is equal to the third. This argument, though concluſive, is not ſyllogiſtical, for want of this univerſal propoſition, things which are equal to the ſame thing are equal to one another[a].

Beſides theſe, and other technical modes of arguing, the Stoics amuſed themſelves with quibbles, and fallacies, of the ſame kind with thoſe which we have before noticed in the Megaric School; but of this ridiculous method of trifling one example[b] ſhall ſuffice. Protagoras the Sophiſt agreed to inſtruct a young man in eloquence, for a large ſum, one half of which was to be paid in hand, the other half, upon his firſt ſucceſsful pleading in the courts. Neglecting to plead for a long time after Protagoras had completely inſtructed him in the art of rhetoric, the Sophiſt ſued him for the remaining moiety of his ſtipend. Each pleaded his own cauſe. Protagoras urged, that which way ſoever the cauſe was determined the young man muſt complete the payment; for if the cauſe was determined *againſt* the defendant, the payment would be granted him by judgment; if *for* him, the payment would be due according to agreement. The young man, on the contrary, pleaded, that if the cauſe was determined in *his favour*, he ſhould be excuſed from the pay-

[a] Laert. Alex. Aphrod. in Analyt. prior. [b] A. Gell. l. v. c. 10.

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ment by the deciſion of the court; if *againſt* him, Protagoras, by his own agreement, could have no demand upon him. The ſubtlety of theſe pleas perplexed the judges; and, without coming to any determination, they diſmiſſed the court.

Such vagaries of human ingenuity, however trifling and ridiculous in themſelves, afford an inſtructive example of the folly of attempting to excel in trifles, and of the miſchief ariſing from philoſophical vanity: they well illuſtrate the poet's doctrine,

——— Sapientia prima eſt
Stultitiâ caruiſſe[a].

What can we ſay concerning the whole buſineſs of dialectics, as it appears to have been conducted by the Stoics, but exclaim with Seneca; "O pueriles ineptias! in hoc, ſupercilia ſubduximus? "in hoc, barbam demiſſimus? hoc eſt, quod triſtes docemus, et "pallidi[b]?"

Let us paſs on to the Stoical doctrine concerning nature.

According to Zeno and his followers[c], there exiſted from eternity a dark and confuſed chaos, in which was contained the firſt principles of all future beings. This chaos, being at length arranged, and emerging into variable forms, became the world, as it now ſubſiſts. The world, or nature, is that whole, which comprehends all things, and of which all things are parts and members. The univerſe, though one whole, contains two principles, diſtinct from elements, one paſſive, the other active. The paſſive principle is pure matter without qualities; the active principle is reaſon or God. This is the fundamental doctrine of the Stoics concerning nature. In order to underſtand clearly wherein it differs

[a] The beginning of wiſdom is, to be free from folly.

[b] Childiſh trifling! Is it for this we contract our brows, and let our beards grow? Are theſe the leſſons we teach with ſuch pale and diſmal looks?

[c] Laert. l. v. § 150. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. c. 14. Senec. Conſol. ad Pol. c. 20.

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from other ſyſtems, a brief review of the antient doctrines upon this ſubject will be neceſſary*.

It appears from the preceding parts of this work, that almoſt all antient philoſophers agreed in admitting two principles in nature, one active and the other paſſive, but that they differed in the manner in which they conceived theſe principles to ſubſiſt. Some held God and Matter to be two principles, which are eternally oppoſite, not only differing in their eſſence, but having no common principle by which they can be united. This was the doctrine taught by Anaxagoras, and, after him, by Plato, and the whole Old Academy. This ſyſtem, for the ſake of perſpicuity, we will call THE DUALISTIC SYSTEM. Others were convinced, that nature, conſiſts of theſe two principles; but finding themſelves perplexed by the difficulty with which they ſaw the Dualiſtic Syſtem to be encumbered, that of ſuppoſing two independent and oppoſite principles, they ſuppoſed both theſe to be comprehended in one univerſe, and conceived them to be united by a neceſſary and eſſential bond. To effect this, two different hypotheſes were propoſed. Some thought God to have been eternally united to matter in one whole, which they called Chaos, whence it was ſent forth, and at a certain time brought into form, by the energy of the divine inhabiting mind. This was the SYSTEM OF EMANATION, commonly embraced by the antient barbaric philoſophers, and afterwards admitted into the early theogonies of the Greeks. Others attempted to explain the ſubject more philoſophically, and to avoid the abſurdity which they conceived to attend both the former ſyſtems, aſſerted, that God, the rational and efficient principle, is as intimately connected with the univerſe, as the human mind with the body, and is a forming power, ſo originally and neceſſarily inherent in matter, that it is to be conceived as a natural part of the original chaos. This ſyſtem ſeems not only to have been received by the Ionic philoſophers, Thales and Anaximander,

* Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. ii. Senec. Conſol. ad Helv. c. 8. Lactant. Inſt. l. vii. c. 3. Sext. ad Math. l. ix. § 332. Suidas in v. πᾶν. Stobæus Ecl. Phyſ. c. 13. 25. Plut. Plac. Ph. l. ii. c. 1. Laert. l. vii. § 143. Senec. Ep. 65. 97. Antonin. l. ii. § 2. l. iv. § 40. 21. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 16.

but by the Pythagoreans, the followers of Heraclitus, and others. Zeno, determining to innovate upon the doctrine of the Academy, and neither chuſing to adopt the Dualiſtic, nor the Emanative Syſtem, embraced the third hypotheſis, which, though not originally his own, we ſhall diſtinguiſh by the name of the STOICAL SYSTEM. Unwilling to admit, on the one hand, two oppoſite principles, both primary and independent, and both abſolute and infinite, or, on the other, to ſuppoſe matter, which is in its nature diametrically oppoſite to that of God, the active efficient cauſe, to have been derived by emanation from him; yet finding himſelf wholly unable to derive theſe two principles from any common ſource; he confounded their eſſence, and maintained that they were ſo eſſentially united, that their nature was one and the ſame. That this was the real doctrine of the Stoics will appear from the ſequel.

The Stoical ſyſtem teaches, that both the active and paſſive principles in nature are corporeal, ſince whatever acts or ſuffers muſt be ſo. The efficient cauſe, or God, is pure ether, or fire, inhabiting the exterior ſurface of the heavens, where every thing which is divine is placed. This ethereal ſubſtance, or divine fire, comprehends all the vital principles by which individual beings are neceſſarily produced, and contains the forms of things, which, from the higheſt regions of the univerſe, are diffuſed through every other part of nature[a].

Seneca, indeed, calls God Incorporeal Reaſon: but by this term he can only mean to diſtinguiſh the divine ethereal ſubſtance from groſs bodies; for, according to the Stoics, whatever has a ſubſtantial exiſtence is corporeal; nothing is incorporeal, except that infinite vacuum which ſurrounds the univerſe; even mind and voice are corporeal, and, in like manner, Deity.

Matter, or the paſſive principle, in the Stoical ſyſtem, is deſtitute of all qualities, but ready to receive any form; inactive, and without motion, unleſs moved by ſome external cauſe. The contrary principle, or the ethereal operative fire, being active, and capable of producing

[a] Laert. l. vii. § 55. Plut. de Stoic Repugn. Senec. Ep. 89. 102. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 7. Orig. Philoſophum. c. 21. p. 143.

all things from matter, with conſummate ſkill, according to the forms which it contains, although in its nature corporeal, conſidered in oppoſition to groſs and ſluggiſh matter, or to the elements, is ſaid to be immaterial and ſpiritual [a].

For want of carefully attending to the preceding diſtinction, ſome writers have been ſo far impoſed upon, by the bold innovations of the Stoics in the uſe of terms, as to infer from the appellations which they ſometimes apply to the deity, that they conceived him to be ſtrictly and properly incorporeal. The truth appears to be, that, as they ſometimes ſpoke of the ſoul of man, a portion of the divinity, as an exceedingly rare and ſubtle body, σωμα αραιότερον και λεπτομερέστερον, and ſometimes as a warm or fiery ſpirit, πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον [b], ſo they ſpoke of the deity as corporeal, conſidered as diſtinct from the incorporeal vacuum, or infinite ſpace, but as ſpiritual, conſidered in oppoſition to groſs and inactive matter. They taught, indeed, that God is underived, incorruptible, and eternal; poſſeſſed of intelligence; good and perfect; the efficient cauſe of all the peculiar qualities or forms of things; and the conſtant preſerver and governor of the world: and they deſcribed the deity under many noble images, and in the moſt elevated language. The hymn of Cleanthes [c], in particular, is juſtly admired for the grandeur of its ſentiments, and the ſublimity of its diction. But if, in reading theſe deſcriptions, we haſtily aſſociate with them modern conceptions of deity, and neglect to recur to the leading principles of the ſect, we ſhall be led into fundamental miſapprehenſions of the true doctrine of Stoiciſm. For, according to this ſect, God and Matter are alike underived and eternal, and God is the former of the univerſe in no other ſenſe, than as he has been the neceſſary efficient cauſe, by which motion and form have been impreſſed upon matter. What unworthy notions the Stoics entertained of God, ſufficiently appears from the ſingle opinion of his finite nature; an opinion which neceſſarily followed

[a] Laert. l. v. § 147. 150. Sen. Ep. 65. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. c. 14. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 3. 6.

[b] Plut. de Repugn. Stoic. t. iii. p. 3. Laert. l. vii. § 140.

[c] Clem. Alex. ad Gent. p. 47. Stob. H. Stephan. Poeſ. Phil. p. 49. Cudworth Int. Syſt. c. iv. § 25.

from the notion, that he is only a part of a ſpherical, and therefore a finite univerſe.

On the doctrine of divine providence, which was one of the chief points upon which the Stoics diſputed with the Epicureans, much is written, and with great ſtrength and elegance, by Seneca, Epictetus, and other later Stoics. But we are not to judge of the genuine and original doctrine of this ſect, from the diſcourſes of writers, who had probably improved their notions, or at leaſt corrected their language, on this ſubject, by viſiting the Chriſtian ſchool[a]. The only way to form an accurate judgment of their opinions concerning providence is, to compare their popular language upon this head with their general ſyſtem, and explain the former conſiſtently with the fundamental principles of the latter. If this be fairly done, it will appear, that the agency of deity is, according to the Stoics, nothing more than the active motion of a celeſtial ether or fire, poſſeſſed of intelligence, which at firſt gave form to the ſhapeleſs maſs of groſs matter, and being always eſſentially united to the viſible world, by the ſame neceſſary agency, preſerves its order and harmony. The Stoic idea of providence is, not that of an infinitely wiſe and good being, wholly independent of matter, freely directing and governing all things, but that of a neceſſary chain of cauſes and effects, ariſing from the action of a power, which is itſelf a part of the machine which it regulates, and which, equally with that machine, is ſubject to the immutable law of neceſſity. Providence, in the Stoic creed, is only another name for abſolute neceſſity, or fate, to which God and Matter, or the univerſe which conſiſts of both, is immutably ſubject[b].

The rational, efficient, and active principle in nature, the Stoics called by various names; Nature, Fate, Jupiter, God. "What is nature," ſays Seneca[c], "but God; the divine reaſon, inherent in the whole univerſe, and in all its parts; or you may call him, if you pleaſe, the author of all things." And again, "Whatever appella-

[a] Arrian. Epict. l. i. Diſſ. 12.
[b] Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. i. Antonin. l. vii. § 9.
[c] De Benef. l. iv. c. 7. Quæſt. Nat. l. i. c. 45. Lactant. l. ii. § 148.

tions

tions imply celeſtial power and energy, may be juſtly applied to God; his names may properly be as numerous as his offices." The term Nature, when it is at all diſtinguiſhed in the Stoic ſyſtem from God, denotes, not a ſeparate agent, but that order of things which is neceſſarily produced by his perpetual agency.

Since the active principle of nature is comprehended within the world, and with matter makes one whole, it neceſſarily follows, that God penetrates, pervades, and animates matter, and the things which are formed from it, or, in other words, that he is the Soul of the Univerſe. In this manner he is deſcribed by Manilius[a]:

—— Vivere mundum
Et rationis agi motu, cum ſpiritus unus
Per cunctas habitet partes, atque irriget orbem,
Omnia pervolitans corpuſque animale figuret[b].

The univerſe is, according to Zeno and his followers, οὐσία ἔμψυχος καὶ αἰσθητική[c], "a ſentient and animated being." Nor was this a new tenet, but, in ſome ſort, the doctrine of all antiquity. Zeno, however, underſtood this doctrine in a ſenſe different from that in which it was conceived by many former philoſophers. Plato, and other advocates of the Dualiſtic ſyſtem, ſuppoſed the world to be endued with a ſoul, but conceived this ſoul to have been derived from the deity, of an inferior nature, and united by the will and power of God, at a certain time, to matter, which till then had been without this animating principle. Thoſe philoſophers, who held the Syſtem of Emanation, conceived God to have been eternally the ſource of matter, from whom it proceeded, and on whom it is inſeparably dependent for motion and animation. But Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and after theſe Zeno, taking it for granted that there is no real exiſtence which is not corporeal, conceived nature to be One

[a] Lib. ii.

[b] One ſource of life, one animating ſoul,
Dwells in each part, and forms and guides the whole.

[c] Laert. l. vii. § 139.

Whole,

Whole, conſiſting of a ſubtle ether and groſs matter, the former the active, the latter the paſſive principle, as eſſentially united as the ſoul and body of man: that is, they ſuppoſed God, with reſpect to nature, to be, not a co-exiſting but an informing principle.

In fine, although the Deity of the Stoics is the efficient and intelligent cauſe of all the effects which are produced in the world, yet his nature and attributes are much leſs perfect than many admirers of this ſyſtem have repreſented. Reſiding primarily in the ſuperior celeſtial region, and being thence diffuſed, as a ſubtle fire, through a finite world, his univerſal preſence falls far ſhort of the attribute of immenſity, as it belongs to the divine nature [a]. United to matter by the immutable chain of neceſſity, he wants that freedom of action, which appears to be one of the moſt eſſential characters of the Supreme Being. The original communication, and the perpetual preſervation of forms and qualities, by the neceſſary action of a ſubtle fire upon matter, though this principle be ſuppoſed to be poſſeſſed of reaſon and intelligence as well as energy, is certainly an idea of deity, which falls far ſhort of that pure and ſublime doctrine, which repreſents God as creating and governing the world by voluntary agency, and with wiſe deſign. That the Deity is, according to the Stoic doctrine, ſubject to the law of neceſſity no leſs than matter and all ſubordinate beings, Seneca, and other writers of this ſect, expreſsly aſſert. "Both gods and men are bound," ſays he, by the ſame chain of neceſſity. Divine and human affairs are alike borne along in an irreſiſtible current; cauſe depends upon cauſe; effects ariſe in a long ſucceſſion; nothing happens by accident, but every thing comes to paſs in the eſtabliſhed order of nature [b]." "

Portions of the ethereal ſoul of the world being diſtributed throughout all the parts of the univerſe, and animating all bodies, hence ariſe, in the ſyſtem of the Stoics, inferior Gods or Demons, with which all nature is peopled. All theſe divinities they conſidered as derived from the ſoul of nature, and as limited in their duration.

[a] Seneca Præf. Qu. Nat. A. Gellius, l. vi. c. 11.

[b] Seneca de Providentia, c. 5. Anton. l. iv. § 10. 24. 34. A. Gell. l. vi. c. 2.

" Chryſippus

"Chryſippus and Cleanthes," ſays Plutarch[a], "taught, that the heavens, the earth, the air, and the ſea, are full of gods; but that none of them are immortal, except Jupiter, to whom all the reſt will at length return, and in whom they will loſe their ſeparate exiſtence." Demons were divided by the Stoics into ſuperior and inferior; the ſuperior, thoſe which inhabited the ſun and ſtars, which they conſidered as οὐσίας ψυχικὰς, animated ſubſtances; the inferior, human ſouls ſeparated from the body, or heroes. "Illuſtrious men," ſays Cicero[b], "whoſe ſouls ſurvive and enjoy immortality, are juſtly eſteemed to be gods, ſince they are of an excellent and immortal nature." Beſides this, there ſeems little reaſon to doubt, that the Stoics acknowledged the exiſtence of other inferior divinities, portions of the ſoul of the world, and taught that they are endued with human paſſions, and therefore are proper objects of ſacrifice and worſhip[c].

As the Stoics held, that all the inferior divinities are portions ſeparated from the ſoul of the world; ſo they conceived, that a period would arrive, when they would return into the firſt celeſtial fire, and ſuppoſed that, at the ſame time, the whole viſible world would be conſumed in one general conflagration[d].

The Stoics, as well as all other antient philoſophers, were much perplexed with the great queſtion concerning the Origin of Evil. Some of them adopted the notion of the Platoniſts, and aſcribed it to the defective nature of matter, which it was not in the power of the Great Artificer to change; aſſerting, that imperfections appear in the world, not through any defect of ſkill in its author, but becauſe matter will not admit of the accompliſhment of his deſigns[e]. But it was perceived by others, that this hypotheſis was inconſiſtent with the fundamental doctrine of Stoiciſm concerning nature. For ſince, according to this ſyſtem, matter itſelf receives all its qualities from God, if its defects be the cauſe of evil, theſe defects muſt be

[a] De Repugn. Stoic. t. iii. p. 29, &c. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 8.
[b] Nat. D. l. ii. c. 24. Laert. l. vii. § 151.
[c] Plut. ib. Senec. Ep. 110. Q. Nat. l. vii. c. 31. Plin. l. ii. c. 7. Arrian. l. i. Diſſ. 14. Laert. l. vii. § 147.
[d] Plut. Rep. Stoic. t. iii. p. 29. Senec. Ep. 9. [e] Senec. de Provid. c. 5.

ultimately

ultimately aſcribed to him. No other way of relieving this difficulty remained, but to have recourſe to fate, and ſay, that evil was the neceſſary conſequence of that eternal neceſſity, to which the great Whole, comprehending both God and Matter, is ſubject. Thus, when Chryſippus was aſked[a], whether diſeaſes were to be aſcribed to Divine Providence, he replied, that it was not the intention of nature, that thoſe things ſhould happen; nor were they conformable to the will of the author of nature and parent of all good things; but that, in framing the world, ſome inconveniences had adhered, by neceſſary conſequence, to his wiſe and uſeful plan.

Concerning the Second Principle in the univerſe, Matter, and concerning the viſible world, the doctrine of the Stoics is briefly this: Matter is the firſt eſſence of all things, deſtitute of, but capable of receiving, qualities. Conſidered univerſally it is an eternal whole, which neither increaſes nor decreaſes. Conſidered with reſpect to its parts, it is capable of increaſe and diminution, of colliſion and ſeparation, and is perpetually changing. Bodies are continually tending towards diſſolution; matter always remains the ſame. Matter is not infinite, but finite, being circumſcribed by the limits of the world; but its parts are infinitely diviſible[b].

The world is ſpherical in its form, and is ſurrounded by an infinite vacuum. The action of the divine nature upon matter, firſt produced the element of moiſture, and then the other elements, fire, air, and earth, of which all bodies are compoſed. Air and fire have eſſential levity, or tend towards the exterior ſurface of the world; earth and water have eſſential gravity, or tend towards the center. All the elements are capable of reciprocal converſion; air paſſing into fire, or into water; earth into air and water; but there is this eſſential difference among the elements, that fire and air have within themſelves a principle of motion, while water and earth are merely paſſive[c].

[a] A. Gell. l. vi. c. 1.

[b] Laert. l. vii. § 150. Ant. l. iv. § 4. Sen. Ep. 36, 38, 58. Stob. Ecl. Ph. c. 14.

[c] Plut. Plac. Phil. l. ii. c. 1, 2, 18. Laert. l. vii. § 136, 141, 142. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. c. 17. 24. Sen. Nat. Qu. l. iii. c. 20. Lucret. l. i. v. 781.

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The ſun is a ſphere larger than the earth, conſiſting of fire of the pureſt kind: it is therefore an animated being, and the firſt of the derived divinities. The ſtars too are of the ſame kind, fiery bodies endued with perception and intelligence, and therefore to be ranked among the gods. They are nouriſhed by exhalations from the ſeas and rivers [a].

Becauſe the heavenly bodies are animated, they are capable of foreſeeing future events, and of declaring to mankind, by certain ſigns, the appointments of fate. Manilius expreſſes the doctrine of his ſect, when he ſays,

——— Conſcia fati
Sidera diverſos hominum variantia caſus [b].

The foundation of this notion is, that the ſtars, being pure and perfect portions of the divine nature, muſt be acquainted with the decrees of fate [c].

The celeſtial bodies move, in their orbits, in the following order: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, the Moon. The moon, which occupies the loweſt part of the ethereal region, is, like the reſt, a fiery luminary poſſeſſed of intelligence; but the fire is mixed with air; whence the ſpots upon its ſurface. Its form is ſpherical, and its motion ſpiral, and of two kinds; the one, from Eaſt to Weſt, with the heavens; the other, from Weſt to Eaſt, through the ſigns of the Zodiac [d].

Below the ſphere of the moon is the region of the air. The earth is the moſt denſe part of the world, and is the main ſupport of na-

[a] Laert. l. vii. § 142. 144. Anton. l. iii. § 26. Arrian, l. i. c. 14. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. ii. c. 15. Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 15.

[b] The conſcious ſtars, vers'd in the will of fate,
Unfold what good, or ill, on mortals wait.

[c] Sen. Nat. Q. l. ii. c. 32. Ep. 80.

[d] Cic. Nat. D. l. ii. c. 20. Laert. l. vii. § 145. Stob. p. 59. Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. ii. c. 25. De Fac. Lun. t. iii. p. 353.

ture, like the bones of an animated body. The earth, with its waters, forms a globe, which is the center of the world: it always remains immoveable [a].

The world, including the whole of nature, God and Matter, ſubſiſted from eternity, and will for ever ſubſiſt; but the preſent regular frame of nature had a beginning, and will have an end. The parts tend towards a diſſolution, but the whole remains immutably the ſame. The world is liable to deſtruction from the prevalence of moiſture, or of dryneſs; the former producing an univerſal inundation, the latter an univerſal conflagration. Theſe ſucceed each other in nature as regularly as winter and ſummer. When the univerſal inundation takes place, the whole ſurface of the earth is covered with water, and all animal life is deſtroyed; after which, nature is renewed and ſubſiſts as before, till the element of fire, becoming prevalent in its turn, dries up all the moiſture, converts every ſubſtance into its own nature, and at laſt, by an univerſal conflagration, reduces the world to its priſtine ſtate. At this period, all material forms are loſt in one chaotic maſs: all animated nature is re-united to the deity, and nature again exiſts in its original form, as one whole, conſiſting of God and Matter. From this chaotic ſtate, however, it again emerges, by the energy of the Efficient Principle, and gods and men, and all the forms of regulated nature, are renewed, to be diſſolved and renewed in endleſs ſucceſſion [b].

The general inundation, which is admitted into the Stoic ſyſtem, however ſimilar in terms to the antient tradition concerning the deluge, differs from it in this material reſpect, that it happens at regular intervals by the ſame neceſſary law which produces the ſucceſſion of the ſeaſons. The doctrine of conflagration is a natural conſequence of the general ſyſtem of Stoiciſm. For ſince, according to this ſyſtem, the whole proceſs of nature is carried on in a neceſſary ſeries of cauſes and effects, when that operative fire which at firſt,

[a] Stob. l. c. p. 48. Laert. l. vii. § 140. 155. Plut. l. c. c. 9, 10.

[b] Laert. Philo de Mund. incorr. p. 940. Euſeb. Prep. l. iv. p. 816. Cic. de N. Deor. l. iii. c. 46. Stob. Ecl. Ph. c. 24. Sen. Qu. Nat. l. iii. c. 27, 29. Ep. 9. 36. 71. Anton. l. v. § 13. l. x. § 7. l. xi. § 1.

burſting from chaos, gave form to all things, and which has ſince pervaded and animated all nature, ſhall have conſumed its nutriment, that is, when the vapours which are the food of the celeſtial fires ſhall be exhauſted, a deficiency of moiſture muſt produce an univerſal conflagration. This grand revolution in nature is, after the doctrine of the Stoics, thus elegantly deſcribed by Ovid[a]:

Eſſe quoque in fatis reminiſcitur affore tempus
Quo mare, quo tellus, correptaque regio cœli
Ardeat, et mundi moles operoſa laboret [b].

Seneca, ſpeaking of the ſame event, ſays[c], the' time will come when the world will be conſumed, that it may be again renewed; when the powers of nature will be turned againſt herſelf; when ſtars will ruſh upon ſtars, and the whole material world, which now appears reſplendent with beauty and harmony, will be deſtroyed in one general conflagration. In this grand cataſtrophe of nature, all animated beings (excepting the univerſal intelligence) men, heroes, demons, and gods, ſhall periſh together. Seneca the tragedian, who 'was of the ſame ſchool with the philoſopher, writes[d]:

Cœli regia concidet,
Certos atque obitus trahet,
Atque omnes pariter deos
Perdet mors aliqua et chaos [e].

[a] Metam. l. i. v. 256.

[b] Rememb'ring in the fates a time when fire
Should to the battlements of heaven aſpire,
When all his blazing worlds above ſhould burn,
And all th' inferior globe to cinders turn. DRYDEN.

[c] Ad Marciam, c. ult. [d] Herc. Oct. v. 1112.

[e] The mighty palace of the ſky,
In ruin fall'n is doom'd to lie,
And all the gods, its wreck beneath,
Shall ſink in chaos and in death.

During the courſe of this vaſt conflagration, the Stoics conceived that the world would expand, and in its chaotic ſtate continue, to fill a much larger portion of infinite ſpace than it had required, or would again require, in a ſtate of orderly arrangment[a]. After an interval of reſt, ſays Seneca[b], in which the deity will be intent upon his own conceptions, the world will be entirely renewed; every animal will be reproduced; and a race of men, free from guilt, and born under happier ſtars, will re-people the earth. Degeneracy and corruption will, however, again creep into the world; for it is only whilſt the human race is young, that innocence remains upon the earth. The grand courſe of things, from the birth to the deſtruction of the world, which, according to the Stoics, is to be repeated in endleſs ſucceſſion, is accompliſhed within a certain period. This period, or fated round of nature, is probably what the antients meant by the Great Year.

From this brief account of the Stoic doctrine of the final conflagration, it evidently appears, that it differs in ſeveral eſſential particulars from the Chriſtian doctrine on this head. It is the work of fate, performed by natural and mechanical laws, and repeated eternally at certain periods, without any good reaſon, ſince with every revolution the ſame diſorders and vices return. Philo juſtly ridicules this dogma; remarking[c], that the Stoics make their deities act like children, who raiſe up piles of ſand only for the pleaſure of beating them down. Several of the Stoics themſelves were aware of the abſurdity of this ſyſtem, and rejected it; particularly Boethius, Poſidonius, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Panætius.

It is a neceſſary conſequence of this doctrine, of the conflagration and ſubſequent reſtoration of all things, that the race of men will return to life. Whence it appears in what ſenſe we are to underſtand the Stoic doctrine of a reſurrection, upon which Seneca has written with ſo much elegance; and what meaning we are to annex to his words, when he ſays[d], "Death, of which we are ſo much afraid, and which we are ſo deſirous to avoid, is only the interrup-

[a] Plut. Repug. t. iii. p. 462. [b] Ep. 9. Qu. Nat. c. ult.
[c] L. c. [d] Ep. 36.

tion,

tion, not the deſtruction, of our exiſtence; the day will come, which will reſtore us to life." This tenet is not to be confounded with the Chriſtian doctrine of the reſurrection of the body; for, according to the Stoics, men return to life, not by the voluntary appointment of a wiſe and merciful God, but by the law of fate; and are not renewed for the enjoyment of a better and happier condition, but drawn back into their former ſtate of imperfection and miſery. Accordingly Seneca ſays, "This reſtoration many would reject, were it not that their renovated life is accompanied with a total oblivion of paſt events[a]."

Man, according to the Stoics, is an image of the world; one whole, compoſed of body and mind. The mind of man is a ſpark of that divine fire, which is the ſoul of the world. That Eternal Reaſon, by which all nature is animated, and which, by its productive power, communicates eſſential qualities to every thing that exiſts, impreſſed the forms, qualities, and powers of man upon certain portions of matter. The ſoul of man, being a portion of the deity, is then of the ſame nature; a ſubtle fiery ſubſtance, endued with intelligence and reaſon: but the energy of this principle is confined and reſtrained, in the birth of man, by its union with groſſer matter[b].

Concerning the duration of the ſoul of man, the Stoics entertained very different opinions. Cleanthes thought, that all ſouls would remain till the final conflagration. Chryſippus was of opinion, that this would only be the lot of the wiſe and good[c]; and Seneca[d] ſeems to have entertained the ſame notion. Epictetus and Antoninus[e] aſſerted, that as ſoon as the ſoul is releaſed from the body, it returns to the ſoul of the world, or is loſt in the univerſal principle of fire. Some were ſo abſurd as to believe, that the human ſoul,

[a] L. c.

[b] Manil. l. ii. Cic. de Leg. l. i. Sen. Ep. 90. Qu. Nat. l. ii. c. 6. l. iii. c. 29. ad Helv. c. 6. Plut. de Repug. Stoic. t. iii. p. 31. Cic. in Somn. Scip. Plin. l. ii. c. 26. Arrian. l. i. Diſſ. 14. iii. 24. Anton. l. iv. § 4. l. ii. § 4. l. ix. § 8. Laert. l. vii. § 158.

[c] Laert. l. vii. § 157. Plut. Plac. l. iv. c. 7. [d] Senec. Conſ. ad Marc. c. ult. Ep. 63. [e] Arr. l. iii. Diſſ. 13. Ant. l. iv. § 13, 21.

conſiſting

conſiſting of a fiery ſpirit condenſed by its union with air, is capable of being extinguiſhed[a]. Whilſt others, with equal abſurdity, conceived that the human ſoul, ſhut up within the groſs body, could not, at death, find a free paſſage, but remained with the body till it was entirely deſtroyed. The only idea of the immortality of the ſoul, which ſeems to have been entertained by the Stoics, was that of a renovation of being, in that fated circuit of things which we have ſeen to be one of their fundamental doctrines. In the univerſal reſtoration of nature, ſome imagined that each individual would return to its former body; whilſt others conceived, that, after a revolution of the Great Year, ſimilar ſouls would be placed in ſimilar bodies.

The ſoul, which, as appears from what has been ſaid concerning its origin, was conceived by the Stoics to have been material, they repreſented as conſiſting of eight diſtinct parts; namely, the five ſenſes, the productive faculty, the power of ſpeech, and the ruling part, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, or reaſon[b]. Thoſe who held the exiſtence of the ſoul after death, ſuppoſed it to be removed into the celeſtial regions of the gods, where it remains, till, at the general conflagration, all ſouls, both human and divine, ſhall be loſt in the deity. But many ſuppoſed, that before they were admitted among the divinities, they muſt purge away their inherent vices and imperfections, by a temporary reſidence in the aerial region between the earth and the moon, or in the moon itſelf[c]. With reſpect to depraved and ignoble ſouls, it was a common opinion, that after death they were agitated in the lower region of the air, till the fiery parts were ſeparated from the groſſer, and roſe by their natural levity to the orbit of the moon, where they were ſtill further purified and refined: a kind of mechanical purgatory, which very well agreed with the mechanical principles of the Stoic philoſophy. Theſe fancies are treated with ridicule by Epictetus and Seneca[d], who frequently ſpeak of the happineſs of good men after death in terms, which might have

[a] Sen. Ep. 57. Thomaſius de Morte. [b] Laert. l. v. § 157. Plut. Plac. l. iv. c. 2—4.

[c] Sen. ad Marc. c. 25. Plut. de Fac. Lun. t. iii. 383. Lact. l. vii. c. 7.

[d] Arr. l. iii. Diſſ. 13. Sen. ad Marc. c. 19. Ep. 117.

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ſuited a better ſyſtem. Seneca, conſoling Marcia under the loſs of her ſon, ſays[a], "The ſacred aſſembly of the Scipios and Catos, who have themſelves deſpiſed life, and obtained freedom by death, ſhall welcome the youth to the region of happy ſouls. Your father himſelf (for all are there known to all) ſhall embrace his grandſon, and ſhall direct his eyes, now furniſhed with new light, along the courſes of the neighbouring ſtars, with delight explaining to him the myſteries of nature, not from conjecture, but from certain knowledge. Like a welcome guide in an unknown city, he will unfold to the inquiring ſtranger the cauſes of the celeſtial appearances."

Upon the preceding principles of phyſics depends the whole Stoic doctrine of MORALS. Conceiving God to be the principal part of nature, by whoſe energy all bodies are formed, moved, and arranged, and human reaſon to be a portion of the divinity, it was their fundamental doctrine in ethics, that in human life, one ultimate end ought for its own ſake to be purſued; and that this end is, to live agreeably to nature, that is, to be conformed to the law of fate by which the world is governed, and to the reaſon of that divine and celeſtial fire which animates all things. Since man is himſelf a microcoſm, compoſed, like the world, of matter and a rational principle, it becomes him to live as a part of the great whole, and to accommodate all his deſires and purſuits to the general arrangement of nature[b].

Various terms were made uſe of, by different philoſophers of the Porch, to expreſs this doctrine. Chryſippus taught, that we ought to live according to our experience of natural events; Cleanthes, that we ſhould follow the nature common to all men; Diogenes the Babylonian, that we ſhould conform to the reaſon and law of life, chuſing thoſe things which are naturally eligible, and rejecting thoſe things which nature inſtructs us to reject; Panætius, that we ſhould yield to the impreſſions of nature; and Poſidonius, that we ſhould contemplate truth, follow nature, and imitate God, by making the eter-

[a] Ad Marc. c. 25.

[b] Laert. l. vii. § 84, &c. Stob. Ecl. Eth. l. ii. c. 3. p. 172. edit. Canteri. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 11. Sen. Ep. 41. Anton. l. vi. § 15. Hor. Ep. i. 18.

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nal reaſon, and immutable law of the univerſe, the rule of our actions.

Thus to live according to nature, as the Stoics teach, is virtue[a]; and virtue is itſelf happineſs; for the Supreme Good is, to live according to a juſt conception of the real nature of things, chuſing that which is in itſelf eligible, and rejecting the contrary. Every man, having within himſelf a capacity of diſcerning and following the law of nature, hath his happineſs in his own power, and is a divinity to himſelf. Horace ſeems to have adopted this notion when he ſays[b];

> Sed ſatis eſt orare Jovem quæ ponit et aufert:
> Det vitam, det opes; æquum mî animum ipſe parabo[c].

Wiſdom conſiſts in diſtinguiſhing good from evil[d]. Good is that which produces happineſs according to the nature of a rational being. As the order of the world conſiſts in an invariable conformity to the law of fate, ſo the happineſs of man is εὐροια[e], that courſe of life which flows in an uninterrupted current according to the law of nature. Since thoſe things only are truly good, which are becoming and virtuous, and virtue, which is ſeated in the mind, is alone ſufficient for happineſs, external things contribute nothing towards happineſs, and therefore are not in themſelves good. The wiſe man will only value riches, honour, beauty, and other external enjoyments, as means and inſtruments of virtue; for, in every condition,

[a] Stob. l. c. Anton. l. vi. § 15. Arr. l. i. Diſſ. 1. l. iii. Diſſ. 24. Epict. Enchir. c. 1. 2. Sen. Ep. 16, 31, 41, 74, 76. Vit. Beat. c. 15.

[b] Ep. l. i. 18. ult.

[c] For life and wealth to Jove I'll pray;
These Jove can give or take away:
But for a firm and equal mind,
This bleſſing in myſelf I'll find. FRANCIS.

[d] Sen. Ep. 71. 118. Laert. l. vii. § 88. 102. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 10. Anton. l. ii. § 3.

[e] Epict. Ench. c. 13. Anton. l. x. Sext. Emp. Pyr. l. iii. c. 21.

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he is happy in the poſſeſſion of a mind accommodated to nature[a]. Pain, which does not belong to the mind, is no evil. The wiſe man will be happy in the midſt of torture. All external things are indifferent, ſince they cannot affect the happineſs of man: nevertheleſs, ſome of theſe are conducive, others unfavourable, to the life which is according to nature, and as ſuch are proper objects of preference or rejection, προηγμένα ἢ ἀποπροηγμένα[b]. Every virtue being a conformity to nature, and every vice a deviation from it, all virtues and vices are equal[c]. One act of beneficence, or juſtice, is not more truly ſo than another; one fraud is not more a fraud than another; therefore there is no other difference in the eſſential nature of moral actions, than that ſome are vicious, and others virtuous. This is the doctrine to which Horace refers, when he ſays[d];

> Nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque
> Qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti,
> Et qui nocturnus ſacra divum legerit[e].

The Stoics advanced many extravagant aſſertions concerning their wiſe man[f]. For example, that he feels neither pain nor pleaſure; that he exerciſes no pity; that he is free from faults; that he is divine; that he can neither deceive, nor be deceived; that he does all things well; that he alone is great, noble, ingenuous; that he is the only friend; that he alone is free; that he is a prophet, a prieſt, and a king; and the like. Theſe paradoxical vauntings are humorouſly ridiculed by Horace[g]:

[a] Laert. § 92—102. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 10. 34. Sext. Emp. ib. c. 20—24. Stob. Ecl. Eth. c. 4. p. 166, &c.

[b] De Fin. l. iii. c. 12. 15. 16. Senec. Ep. 74.

[c] Laert. § 120. Cic. Parad. 3. Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 174.

[d] Serm. l. i. Sat. 4.

[e] Nor can we judge, compared by reaſon's eye,
Pilf'ring and ſacrilege of equal die.

[f] Ciceron. Paradoxa. Laert. l. vii. § 117, &c. Stob. l. c.

[g] Serm. l. i. Sat. iii. apud fin.

——— Si dives, qui ſapiens eſt,
Et ſutor bonus, et ſolus formoſus, et eſt rex,
Cur optas quod habes[a] ?.

In order to conceive the true notion of the Stoics concerning their wiſe man, it muſt be clearly underſtood, that they did not ſuppoſe ſuch a man actually to exiſt, but that they framed in their imagination an image of perfection, towards which every man ſhould continually aſpire. All the extravagant things which are to be met with in their writings on this ſubject, may be referred to their general principle of the entire ſufficiency of virtue to happineſs, and the conſequent indifference of all external circumſtances. Or they may, perhaps, be placed to the account of mere logomachy[b]; for nothing was more common, with the philoſophers of the Porch, than to depart from the uſual definition of terms, that they might excite admiration by poſitions, which, when fairly explained, appeared either perfectly obvious, or exceedingly trifling. Seneca himſelf honeſtly confeſſes this: "You boaſt that you are capable of great attainments, far beyond what is commonly to be deſired, or even credited. In your vaunting, you aſſert, that a wiſe man cannot be poor; and yet you do not deny that he is often deſtitute of attendants, clothing, and habitation. Remove the maſk of your ſwelling words, by reſtoring to things their proper names; and you are immediately brought down to a level with others."

It is one of the boaſts of the Stoics, that their wiſe man is perfectly free, and can do whatever he pleaſes without reſtraint or compulſion[c]: and yet, nothing is more certain, than that they underſtood this freedom to conſiſt merely in the ſuperiority of virtue to all external circumſtances. For, according to the fundamental doctrine of the Porch, the human mind is bound by the indiſſoluble chain of nature, and ſubject to the eternal law of fate; and all human actions

[a] Is not the wiſe a ſhoemaker profeſs'd,
Handſome and rich, of monarchy poſſeſs'd?
Why wiſh for what you have? Francis.

[b] Εις τὴν τῶν εἰώλων καὶ ψυχρῶν ἀγορὰν. Plut. Logom. [c] Sen. Ep. 41. 51.

are a neceſſary conſequence of that order, by which all beings in nature are irreſiſtibly impelled. Notwithſtanding the lofty things which Seneca ſometimes ſays in praiſe of human liberty, he acknowledges[a], that man is ſubject to the law of neceſſity. "Whatever happens, think that it ought to happen, and caſt no reproach upon nature. It is beſt to endure patiently what you cannot mend, and to concur with the Divine Being, by whom all things are directed, without murmuring. He is a bad ſoldier who follows his commander reluctantly; let us receive the orders of our leader with cheerfulneſs, and execute them with alacrity; and let us never deſert the path marked out for us in the courſe of nature, becauſe it is perplexed with difficulties. That man poſſeſſes a truly great mind, who delivers himſelf up entirely to God."

Concerning the progreſs of virtue, and the ſeveral ſpecies of virtuous actions, the doctrine of the Stoics is as follows:

Nature impels every man to purſue whatever appears to him to be good. Self-preſervation and defence is the firſt law of animated nature. All animals neceſſarily derive pleaſure from thoſe things which are ſuited to them; but the firſt object of purſuit is, not pleaſure, but conformity to nature. Every one, therefore, who has a right diſcernment of what is good, will be chiefly concerned to conform to nature in all his actions and purſuits. This is the origin of moral obligation. Falſe conceptions of good produce violent emotions and paſſions, which are contrary to right reaſon and nature. Of theſe the principal are, animal deſires, joy, fear, and ſorrow. Paſſions are the deſires of the mind, which it is the office of reaſon to prevent or cure. Wiſdom ſubjects the mind to the controul of reaſon, and thus produces a conformity to nature and virtue[b]."

Of virtues, ſome are contemplative, others practical; ſome primary, others ſubordinate. The contemplative or ſcientific virtues are thoſe which conſiſt in juſt conceptions and principles;

[a] Ep. 107. Conf. Arr. l. iii. Diſſ. 26. Anton. l. vii. § 31. l. viii. § 41. l. x. § 32. l. iv. § 32. l. v. § 3.

[b] Laert. l. vii. § 85—90. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. iv. c. 6. De Fin. l. iv. c. 5, 6, 9, 10, 20, 23. Stob. l. c. p. 175, 6.

the practical, thoſe which concern the conduct of life. The primary virtues are, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and juſtice. Prudence reſpects the choice and purſuit of goods; temperance, the government of the appetites; fortitude, the endurance of that which is commonly eſteemed evil; and juſtice, the offices of ſocial life [a].

All virtues, being the ſame in their origin and end, are mutually related and dependant; ſo that he who poſſeſſes one poſſeſſes all. As there is no medium between a right and a curve line, ſo there is no mean between virtue and vice; virtue and vice admit of no degrees, either of exceſs or defect. Virtue may be taught, and bad men may become good men. Virtue is to be ſought for its own ſake; not through the fear of puniſhment, or the hope of reward; for virtue, being a conformity to nature, is in itſelf happineſs [b].

Of actions which proceed from deſire, ſome are good, ſome are bad, and others indifferent. Good actions are either, κατορθωματα, actions in themſelves right, or, καθηκοντα, thoſe concerning which it may be aſſerted with probability, that they are convenient, and conducive to happineſs. Bad actions are thoſe which nature and reaſon teach us to avoid. Indifferent actions are ſuch as reaſon neither preſcribes nor prohibits [c].

Duties may be divided into three claſſes, as they reſpect God, ourſelves, and our neighbour [d].

The duties of religion are, to think juſtly concerning God, and to worſhip him piouſly. He thinks juſtly of God, who believes him to be the ſupreme director of human affairs, and the author of all that is good and fitting in human life. He worſhips God piouſly, who reveres him above all beings; who perceives and acknowledges him in all events; who is in every thing reſigned and obedient to his will; who patiently receives whatever befals him, from a perſuaſion, that whatever God appoints muſt be right; and in fine, who

[a] Laert. § 92. 3. Stob. p. 167.
[b] Laert. § 125—7. Stob. l. c. Plut. de Stoic. Rep. t. v. p. 10. De Fin. l. iv.
[c] Laert. § 108. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 17. de Offic. l. i. c. 3. Stob. l. c.
[d] Epict. Ench. c. 37. Arrian, l. ii. Diſſ. 14. l. iii. Diſſ. 2. Simplic. ad Enchir. Anton. l. i. § 12. viii. 27. ix. 22.

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cheerfully follows, wherever divine providence leads him, even though it be to ſuffering and death[a].

The ſum of a man's duty with reſpect to Himſelf is, to ſubdue his paſſions, of joy and ſorrow, hope and fear, and even pity. He who is, in this reſpect, perfectly maſter of himſelf, is a wiſe man; and in proportion as we approach towards a ſtate of apathy, we advance towards perfection. Virtuous ſelf-command conſiſts, not in preventing the caſual impreſſions of external objects upon the ſenſes, in which the mind is rather paſſive than active; but in not giving a voluntary aſſent to thoſe paſſions, which external objects excite. A wiſe man may juſtly and reaſonably withdraw from life, whenever he finds it expedient; not only becauſe life and death are among thoſe things which are in their nature indifferent, but alſo becauſe life may be leſs conſiſtent with virtue than death. Since all duty ariſes from a conformity to nature, it may happen, that a man may be in ſuch circumſtances, that to remain in life may be more contrary to nature than to depart. A wiſe man will, at the cloſe of every day, take a retroſpect of his words and actions, that he may confeſs his errors and amend. The firſt and nobleſt office of wiſdom is, to examine ourſelves, and regulate our diſpoſitions and actions by the law of virtue. Hence will ariſe ſelf-denial, and a contempt of pleaſure. A wiſe man will never ſuffer himſelf to be diverted from his duty by any proſpect of indulgence, or any fear of loſs, pain, or death[b].

The duty we owe towards Others, is to love all men, even our enemies. A good man will love his neighbour from his heart, will refrain from injuring, and take pleaſure in protecting and ſerving him. He will not think himſelf born for himſelf alone, but for the common good of mankind, and will ſhew himſelf kind to all according to his ability. He will think himſelf ſufficiently re-

[a] Epict. l. c. Arr. l. i. Diſſ. xii. 14. 16. Anton. l. ii. § 11. l. vi. § 43. Seneca de Tranquil. Animi, &c. paſſim.

[b] Senec. de Ira, l. i. c. 8. iii. 37. Arr. l. iii. Diſſ. 2. 22. 25. Cic. Ac. Q. l. i. Laert. § 130, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 17. Stob. l. c. Anton. l. iii. § 1. 37. vii. 44. Plut. Rep. Stoic. l. c. Sen. Ep. 16. 17. 55. 58. 60. 68. 70. 77. 80.

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warded by the conſciouſneſs of well doing, and will never ceaſe to do good, although he has no witneſs of his good deeds, nor is ever likely to receive any applauſe or recompence for his beneficence. The wiſe man never remits the puniſhment due to a criminal through pity, which is a weakneſs not to be indulged: nevertheleſs, in caſes where reaſon ſuggeſts ſufficient grounds for clemency, he will not treat a delinquent with rigour. He will relieve the ſick, aſſiſt the ſhipwrecked, afford protection to the exile, or ſupply the hungry with food, but with an undiſturbed mind, and a cheerful countenance; diſdaining all ſorrow ariſing from ſympathy, as well as from perſonal ſufferings. No one is more ready, than the wiſe man, to exerciſe lenity and benignity, and to attend to the welfare of other individuals, and to the general intereſt of mankind[a].

Concerning the whole moral ſyſtem of the Stoics, it muſt be remarked, that, although it be highly deſerving of praiſe for the purity, extent, and variety of its doctrines, and although it muſt be confeſſed, that in many ſelect paſſages of the Stoic writings it appears exceedingly brilliant, it is nevertheleſs founded in falſe notions of nature and of man, and is raiſed to a degree of refinement, which is extravagant and impracticable. The piety which it teaches, is nothing more than a quiet ſubmiſſion to irreſiſtible fate. The ſelf-command which it enjoins, annihilates the beſt affections of the human heart. The indulgence which it grants to ſuicide is inconſiſtent, not only with the genuine principles of piety, but even with that conſtancy which was the heighth of Stoic perfection. And even its moral doctrine of benevolence is tinctured with the fanciful principle, which lay at the foundation of the whole Stoic ſyſtem, that every being is a portion of one Great Whole, from which it would be unnatural and impious to attempt a ſeparation.

We muſt then conclude, that the Ethics of Zeno and his followers, however ſplendid, and in many particulars well-founded, deviated, as a ſyſtem, from the true principles of nature, and had a

[a] Anton. l. iv. § 37. vii. 26. 44. ix. 28. xi. 8. 9. 13. Sen. de Clem. l. ii. c. 6. 7. Conf. Gataker. Præloq. ad. Anton. et Lipſii Manud. et Diſſ.

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tendency to produce artificial characters, and to encourage moral affectation and hypocriſy *.

* Vidend. Jonſ. l. ii. c. 1. 18. Burnet. Arch. l. i. c. 13. Heuman. Act. Ph. v. i. p. 741. v. ii. p. 168. Lipſii Manuductio ad Phil. Stoic. et Diſſ. de Phyſ. Stoic. Ludg. Bat. 1644. Scioppii Manud. ad Phil. Mor. Stoic. Gataker in Antonin. Heinſii Orat. de Phil. Stoic. Meurſiii Athen. l. ii. c. 29. Bochart. Sac. Geog. p. ii. l. i. c. 3. Voſſ. de Sect. c. xix. Morhoff. Polyhiſtor. t. ii. l. ii. p. i. c. 8. Crophii Diſſ. de Gymn. Lit. p. 49. Parker de Deo, Diſp. vi. Fabricii Diſſ. de Cavillationibus Stoicorum in Syllog. Diſſ. Werenfels. de Meteor. Orat. Morini Diſſ. de Stoicis hirciſcundiis. Voſſ. de Theol. Gent. l. ii. c. 49. Otium Vindel. Mel. i. 11. Thomas de Exuſt. Mund. Stoic. De Stoicis ſubdolis Chriſt. imit. Temp. Helvet. t. iii. Buddæi Diſſ. de Error. Stoic. Ot. Vind. Diſſ. ii. De Fat. Stoic. ap Amœn. Lit. t. viii. Wolf. de Manich. ante Manich. § 36. Cudworth, c. iv. § 25. Zimmerman. Muſ. Hiſt. Brem. v. i. Budd. Ann. Hiſt. Ph. p. 147. Epiſt. ad Schelhorn. Amœn. Lit. t. viii. Burgmann. Diſſ. de Stoa a Spinoz. Exculp. Windet de Vit. Funct. Statu. ſ. 3. Thomas Diſſ. de Morte. Obſ. Hal. t. vii. Diſſ. de Sect. Elp. Hiſt. Miſc. Berol. t. v. Thomas de Loco Anim. Sap. t. i. p. 70. Roetenbecchii Diſſ. de Stoic. et Ariſt. Moral. Werenfels. de Logomach. Erudit. Op. p. 461. Centner de Meteor Phil. Dantz. 1744. 8vo.

SECT. 2.

OF THE DISCIPLES AND SUCCESSORS OF ZENO IN THE STOIC SCHOOL.

AFTER having inſiſted ſo largely upon the life of Zeno, and the doctrines of his ſchool, a brief account of his diſciples and ſucceſſors will ſuffice.

During his life, Zeno had many diſciples, among whom may be particularly mentioned Perſæus, Ariſto the Chian, Herillus, and Sphærus.

PERSÆUS,

PERSÆUS[a], the ſon of Demetrius, flouriſhed in the hundred and thirtieth Olympiad[b]. He was ſent by Antigonus Gonata to Zeno, for the purpoſe of copying his writings, and for a long time remained with him, as his companion and friend. On his return to Antigonus, he was entruſted with the charge of the citadel of Corinth; but he was probably more attentive to philoſophy, than to civil or military affairs; for he ſuffered this important fortreſs to be taken by Aratus.

ARISTO[c] of Chios, the ſon of Miltiades, was an intimate aſſociate of Perſæus, and with him attended upon the lectures of Zeno; but he diſcovered a diſpoſition to loquacity, and a propenſity to pleaſure, which were diſpleaſing to his maſter, whom he left, and went over to the ſchool of Polemon. He ſoon after attempted, but with little ſucceſs, to inſtitute a ſchool of his own. He was a violent opponent of the Academic philoſophers, and particularly of Arceſilaus. The chief points in which he innovated upon the Stoic philoſophy were, that there is a certain limit between virtue and vice, in which conſiſts indifference; that all phyſical and logical ſtudies are to be rejected; the former, as above all human comprehenſion, the latter as not intereſting to human nature; that a wiſe man will not ſpeculate on opinions; that the nature of the deity is unknown; and that it is doubtful whether he is a percipient being. This laſt opinion ſeems rather to have been advanced in oppoſition to the Stoic idea of deity, than to imply a general denial of the exiſtence of God. Ariſto probably conceived the queſtions concerning the nature of the univerſe, and of God, to be above the human underſtanding, and maintained, that the doctrine of Zeno, who aſſerted God to be a ſubtle ether, or fire, diffuſed through the world, was inconſiſtent with the notion of an intelligent nature. Eratoſthenes, a Cyrenian, born in the firſt year of the hundred and twenty-ſixth Olympiad[d], a man highly diſtinguiſhed by his logical, mathematical, and philoſophical learn-

[a] Laert. l. vii. § 36. Suidas. Athæn. l. iv. p. 162. A. Gell. l. ii. c. 18. Pauſan. Corinth. c. 8, p. 130. Ach. c. 8. p. 511. Plut. Vit. Arati, t. vi. p. 296.
[b] B. C. 260 [c] Laert. l. vii. § 160—2. [d] B. C. 276.

ing,

ing, was his pupil. He was appointed by Ptolemy Philopater, keeper of the Alexandrian library [a].

HERILLUS, the Carthaginian, ſubmitted the correction of his morals to Zeno, and, deſerting the ſchool of pleaſure, became his diſciple. His peculiar tenet was, that ſcience is the end of life; which he probably underſtood not, as Cicero every where interprets his opinion, the mere knowledge of abſtract truth, but, as Laertius and Suidas explain it, that the conduct of life ought always to be conformable to truth. His followers are mentioned by Cicero as a diſtinct ſect; but, if it exiſted at all, it was of ſhort duration, and has left nothing worthy of remembrance [b].

SPHÆRUS of Boriſthenes was at firſt a follower of Zeno, and afterwards of Cleanthes. He taught philoſophy at Sparta, and had among his pupils the illuſtrious Cleomenes. He afterwards removed to Alexandria, where he enjoyed the protection of Ptolemy Philopater [c].

After the death of Zeno, his ſchool was continued by CLEANTHES [d] of Aſſus, in Lydia. His firſt appearance was in the character of a wreſtler. In this capacity he viſited Athens, where the love of philoſophy was diffuſed through all ranks of people. He ſoon caught the general ſpirit; and though he was poſſeſſed of no more than four drachmas, he determined to put himſelf under the tuition of ſome eminent philoſopher. His firſt maſter was Crates the Academic. He afterwards became a diſciple of Zeno, and a celebrated advocate for his doctrines.

The patient induſtry with which Cleanthes applied himſelf to labour, that he might procure himſelf the neceſſary ſupports of life without interrupting his philoſophical ſtudies, was highly meritorious. By night he drew water as a common labourer, in the public gardens, that he might have leiſure, in the day time, to attend the ſchools of philoſophy. The Athenian citizens obſerving that,

[a] Laert. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 30. 41. Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 14. Tuſc. Qu. l. v. c. 30. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. Suidas in Eratoſthene. Sen. Ep. 89.

[b] Laert. l. vii. 165—7. Suidas in τέλος. Tuſc. Qu. l. iv

[c] Ib. § 177. Athen. l. viii. c. 13. p. 354. [d] Laert. l. vii. § 168. Suidas.

though he appeared ſtrong and healthy, he had no viſible means of ſubſiſtence, ſummoned him before the court of Areopagus, according to the cuſtom of the city, to give an account of his manner of living. Upon this he produced the gardener for whom he drew water, and a woman for whom he ground meal, as witneſſes to prove that he ſubſiſted by the honeſt labour of his hands. The judges of the court were ſo much ſtruck with admiration of this ſingular example of induſtry and perſeverance, that they ordered ten *minæ* to be paid him out of the public treaſury; which, however, Zeno would not ſuffer him to accept[a]. Antigonus afterwards preſented him with three thouſand *minæ*. From the manner in which this philoſopher ſupported himſelf, he was called φρεάντλος, the well-drawer.

Cleanthes was for many years ſo poor, that he was obliged to write the heads of his maſter's lectures upon ſhells and bones, for want of money to buy paper[b]. But, notwithſtanding all his poverty, he perſevered in the ſtudy of philoſophy, and remained a pupil of Zeno nineteen years. His natural faculties were ſlow; but reſolution and perſeverance enabled him to overcome every difficulty; and he at laſt became ſo complete a maſter of the Stoic ſyſtem, that he was perfectly qualified to ſucceed Zeno in his ſchool. His fellow diſciples often ridiculed him for his dullneſs, by calling him an aſs; but he took no other notice of the ſarcaſm, than by ſaying in his defence, that if he was an aſs, he was the better able to bear the burthen of Zeno's doctrine. Being reproved for his timidity, he replied, "It is to this quality that I am indebted for my innocence." Though he was not of the ſchool of Arceſilaus, when he heard him condemned for undermining by his doctrine the foundations of virtue, he candidly apologized for him, by remarking, that though he might ſeem an enemy to virtue in his diſcourſes, he ſhowed himſelf her friend in his conduct. Arceſilaus being informed of the handſome apology which Cleanthes had made for him, ſaid to him, "You know how much I diſlike flattery; why will you flatter me?" "Is it then flattery," replied Cleanthes, "to ſay of you, that you ſpeak one thing,

[a] Laert. Val. Max. l. viii. c. 7. Sen. Ep. 44.
[b] Laert. § 170.

and

and do another [a]?" Cleanthes frequently adviſed his pupils to conceive of pleaſure, as a deity ſitting on her throne, attended by the virtues, who are ready on every occaſion to whiſper in her ear, "Do nothing which will occaſion pain or grief to yourſelf or others [b]." A friend, obſerving him ſilent in company, ſaid, "One would think, Cleanthes, from your ſilence, that you took no pleaſure in converſing with your friends:" Cleanthes replied, "It is becauſe I know the value of this pleaſure, that I am ſilent; for I wiſh my friends to enjoy it as well as myſelf [c]." The reaſon which he aſſigned for the ſuperiority of former philoſophers above the preſent was, that formerly philoſophers ſtudied Things, whereas now they ſtudy only Words. When he was old, he ſtill retained the entire uſe of his faculties, and often ſaid, that he ſhould always think life worth preſerving, as long as he ſhould be able to write and ſtudy. He wrote much, but none of his writings remain, except the hymn already mentioned. Long after his death the Roman Senate paid reſpect to his memory, by ordering a ſtatue to be erected in honour of him at Aſſus [d].

After Zeno, no philoſopher more truly exhibited the character, or more illuſtriouſly diſplayed the doctrine, of the Stoic ſect, than CHRYSIPPUS [e]. He was a native of Solis, a town of Cilicia, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. His father, Apollonius, was of Tarſus. Having ſpent his paternal fortune (as ſome writers ſay, in the public ſervice) he devoted himſelf to philoſophy, and fixing his reſidence at Athens, became a diſciple of Cleanthes; from whom, however, even during his life, he in many particulars diſſented. The natural powers of his mind ſoon enabled him to diſtinguiſh himſelf above his brethren of the Porch. The antients agree in aſcribing to Chryſippus an uncommon ſhare of acuteneſs and penetration [f]. At the ſame time, he was indefatigably induſtrious. It is ſaid, that he ſeldom ſuffered a day to paſs without writing five hundred lines [g].

[a] Laert.
[b] Cic. de Fin. l. ii. [c] Stob. Serm. 126. [d] Strabo. l. xiii. p. 610.
[e] Laert. l. vii. 179, &c. Suidas. Strabo. l. xii. p. 462. Solin. c. 42. Orig. cont. Celſ. l. iv. p. 202.
[f] Cic. de Nat. D. l. iii. c. 10. [g] Laert.

In diſputation, in which he ſpent the greateſt part of his life, he diſcovered a degree of promptitude and confidence which approached towards audacity. He often ſaid to his preceptor, "Give me doctrines, and I will find arguments to ſupport them." It was a ſingular proof of his haughty ſpirit, that when a certain perſon aſked him, What preceptor he would adviſe him to chuſe for his ſon, he ſaid, "Me; for if I thought any philoſopher excelled me, I would myſelf become his pupil." With ſo much contempt did he look down upon the diſtinctions of rank, that he would never, as other philoſophers did, pay his court to princes or great men, by dedicating to them any of his writings. The vehemence and arrogance with which he ſupported his tenets, created him many adverſaries, particularly in the Academic and Epicurean ſects. Even his friends of the Stoic ſchool complained, that in the warmth of diſpute, whilſt he was attempting to load his adverſary with the reproach of obſcurity and abſurdity, his own ingenuity often failed him, and he adopted ſuch unuſual and illogical modes of reaſoning, as gave his opponents great advantage againſt him[a]. It was alſo a common practice with Chryſippus, at different times, to take the oppoſite ſides of the ſame queſtion, and thus furniſh his antagoniſts with weapons, which might eaſily be turned, as occaſions offered, againſt himſelf. Carneades, who was one of his moſt able and ſkilful adverſaries, frequently availed himſelf of this circumſtance, and refuted Chryſippus by convicting him of inconſiſtency. Plutarch, in his piece, "On Stoic Contradictions," has collected many examples of inconſiſtent opinions, moſt of which are aſcribed to Chryſippus. His ſkill in the arts of ſophiſtry, and particularly his frequent uſe of the figure *ſorites*, is noticed by the ſatiriſt Perſius, who, on this account, alluding to the *ſorites*, calls it the heap of Chryſippus:

Inventus, Chryſippe, tui finitor acervi[b].

[a] Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 27. Plut. Repugn. Stoic. t. iii. p. 7.

[b] Thou who couldſt once ſo happily aſſign
Bounds to *thy heap*, now limit this of mine. Brewster.

Although

Although it cannot be queſtioned that this philoſopher poſſeſſed great ingenuity and extenſive learning, ſo that, after Zeno, he might juſtly be conſidered as the main pillar of the Stoic Porch, it muſt nevertheleſs be acknowledged, that, as far as we are able at preſent to form a judgment of them, his diſcourſes abounded more in curious ſubtleties, and nice diſtinctions, than in ſolid arguments. It was the prejudice of party, or the pride of Stoiciſm, rather than ſound judgment and juſt criticiſm, which dictated the encomium that was paſſed upon him, that, if the gods themſelves were to hold diſputations, they would adopt the manner of Chryſippus [a].

Some writers have charged this philoſopher with indecent freedom of language. But it is not improbable, that what he advanced of this kind, was merely in the way of paradoxical aſſertion, thrown out in the courſe of diſputation, for the ſake of diſplaying his ingenuity. It has been ſaid too, that Chryſippus taught doctrines entirely ſubverſive of religion. Plutarch aſſerts [b], concerning Chryſippus and Cleanthes, that when they had filled heaven, earth, the air, and the ſea, with divinities, they allowed none of them to be exempt from death, except Jupiter alone, into whom they thought that all the other deities would at laſt be reſolved. From this paſſage it has been inferred, that it was a doctrine of the Stoics, that the divine nature is mutable and corruptible. But it appears from the Stoic ſyſtem of nature, as it has been already explained, that this concluſion from the paſſage in queſtion is without foundation. According to this ſyſtem, the inferior deities, which are portions of that divine fire by which all nature is animated, will, in the general conflagration of the univerſe, return to the ſource from which they were originally derived, till a general renovation ſhall take place. That Chryſippus did not recede from the idea of the Stoic ſchool concerning nature, the following paſſage from Cicero [c] fully proves: "Chryſippus, who is eſteemed the moſt ingenious interpreter of Stoic dreams, has aſſembled a numerous band of unknown gods; indeed ſo perfectly unknown, that the human mind, though it be

[a] Laert. § 180. [b] De comm. notionibus, t. iii. p. 459.
[c] De Nat. D. l. i. c. 15.

capable

capable of forming conceptions of every kind, is unable to frame a conjecture concerning their nature. He ſays, that the divine energy is placed in reaſon, and in the ſoul or mind of the univerſe. The world itſelf he maintains to be God, or a univerſal effuſion of his ſpirit, and aſſerts, that the ſuperior part of this ſpirit, which conſiſts in mind and reaſon, is the common nature of things, containing the whole, and every part. Sometimes he ſpeaks of God as the power of fate, and the neceſſary chain of events; ſometimes he calls him fire, or the ether which I mentioned above; and ſometimes he deifies the fluid parts[a] of nature, as water and air; and again, the earth, the ſun, the moon, and ſtars, and the univerſe, in which theſe are comprehended, and even thoſe men, who have obtained immortality." There is nothing in this account which is not perfectly conſonant to the phyſics and theology of the Stoic ſyſtem, in the ſenſe in which they have been already explained. It ſeems, therefore, reaſonable to exculpate Chryſippus from any other kind of impiety, than that which may be charged upon the ſect, of which he was one of the chief ſupporters.

Chryſippus wrote about ſeven hundred books, three hundred of which were upon logical ſubjects; but in all his works he made large and numerous quotations from the writings of others. Of theſe nothing remains, except a few extracts, which are preſerved in the works of Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and Aulus Gellius. He died in the hundred and forty-third Olympiad[b], eighty-three years of age. A ſtatue was erected to his memory by Ptolemy[c].

The immediate ſucceſſor of Chryſippus, in the Stoic ſchool, was Zeno of Tarsus[d], or, as ſome ſay, of Sidon. He does not appear to have receded in any reſpect from the Stoic tenets, except that he withheld his aſſent to the doctrine of the final conflagration.

Diogenes of Seleucia, called alſo the Babylonian[e], from the

[a] Vid. loc. Daviſii edit. p. 37. n. 8.
[b] B. C. 208.
[c] Laert. l. vii. § 189. 202. Val. Max. l. viii. c. 10. Cic. Fin. l. i. c. 11.
[d] Laert. l. vii. § 38. Suidas. Euſeb. Prep. l. xv. c. 18.
[e] Laert. l. vi. § 81.

vicinity

vicinity of Babylon to his native place, next aſſumed the chair, and applied himſelf ſo diligently to the ſtudy and propagation of the Stoic doctrine, that Cicero[a] calls him a great and reſpectable Stoic. This was unqueſtionably the reaſon, for which he was ſent with Carneades and Critolaus on the celebrated embaſſy from Athens to Rome, of which we have already taken notice in our account of the life of Carneades. Seneca relates[b], that as he was one day diſcourſing upon anger, a fooliſh youth, in hopes of raiſing a laugh againſt the philoſopher by making him angry, ſpit in his face; upon which Diogenes meekly and prudently ſaid, "I am not angry, but I am in doubt whether I ought not to be ſo." He lived to the age of eighty-eight years[c]. ANTIPATER of Tarſus[d], the diſciple and ſucceſſor of Diogenes the Babylonian, is applauded, both by Cicero and Seneca, as an able ſupporter of the Stoic ſect. His chief opponent was Carneades.

PANÆTIUS, a Rhodian, was a polite and reſpectable philoſopher. He enjoyed an intimate acquaintance with ſeveral eminent Romans, particularly Scipio and Lælius; and Cicero ſays[e], that his abilities and accompliſhments rendered him highly worthy of their friendſhip. He diſliked the Stoic doctrine of apathy[f]; was a great admirer of Plato, and freely borrowed opinions and ſentiments from philoſophers of every ſect. His moral doctrines were, doubtleſs, excellent, ſince they are ſo highly extolled by Cicero, in his admirable treatiſe *De Officiis*. He paſſed a conſiderable part of his life at Rome, where he had many illuſtrious diſciples; but towards the latter end of his days he removed to Athens, where he died. He treated aſtrological predictions, and divinations of every kind, with contempt, and ſeems to have rejected the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul[g].

POSIDONIUS[h], a native of Apama in Syria, the laſt of that ſeries

[a] Tuſc. Qu. l. iii. c. 12. [b] De Ira. [c] Lucian. Longev. t. ii. p. 829.
[d] Cic. de Offic. l. iii. c. 12. Sen. Ep. 92. Plut. de Garrul. t. ii. p. 319.
[e] De Off. l. iv. c. 9. [f] A. Gell. l. xii. c. 5.
[g] Cic. De Off. l. ii. c. 14. Ac. Q. l. iv. 33. De Fin. l. i. c. 2. l. iv. c. ult. Tuſc. Q. l. i. c. 32. De Div. l. i. c. 3. 7. l. ii. c. 42.
[h] Laert. l. vii. § 38. Strabo. l. vii. p. 316. l. xiv. p. 655.

of Stoics which belongs to the hiſtory of the Greek philoſophy, taught at Rhodes with ſuch reputation, that Pompey came thither, on his return from Syria, to attend his lectures. When he arrived at his houſe, he forbade his lictor to knock, as was uſual, at the door. The hero, who had ſubdued the eaſtern and weſtern world, paid homage to philoſophy, by lowering the *faſces* at the gate of Poſidonius. When he was informed, that he was at that time ſick of the gout, he viſited him in his confinement, and expreſſed great regret that he could not attend upon his ſchool. Upon this, Poſidonius, forgetting his pain, gratified his gueſt, by delivering a diſcourſe in his preſence, the ſubject of which was to prove, that nothing is good which is not honourable [a]. He ſtudied natural as well as moral ſcience; and in order to repreſent the celeſtial *phenomena*, he conſtructed a kind of *planetarium* [b], by means of which he exhibited the apparent motions of the ſun, moon, and planets round the earth. Cicero ſays [c], that he himſelf attended upon this philoſopher; and a later writer [d] aſſerts, that he was brought to Rome by Marcellus, in the ſeven hundred and ſecond year from the building of the city [e].

Thus much concerning the Stoic ſect, the laſt branch of the Ionic School *.

[a] Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. ii. c. 25. Plin. l. vi. Ep. 30.
[b] Cic. De Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 34. [c] De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 3.
[d] Suidas in Poſid. [e] B. C. 52.

* Videnda. Cudworth. c. iv. § 25. Bayle. Sciopp. Elem. Phil. Mor. p. 165. Zwinger. Theatr. Vit. Hum. v. 19. § 3560. Thomaſ. de Plagio Lit. § 388. Euſeb. Prep. Ev. l. vi. c. 6. Gaſſend. Vit. Epic. l. iii. c. 2. Schmid. de Chryſip. Log. Jonſ. l. i. c. 13. l. ii. c. 8. Meurſ. de Ceramic. Voſſ. de Nat. Log. c. viii. § 18. Hiſt. Gr. l. iii. p. 324. Weidler. Hiſt. Aſtr. c. vi. § 18.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

OF THE ITALIC OR PYTHAGORIC SECT.

SECT. I.

OF THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF PYTHAGORAS.

IN tracing the progreſs of the IONIC ſchool, from Thales its founder, through all its branches, the Ionic, Socratic, Cyrenaic, Megaric, Eliac, Eretriac, Academic, Peripatetic, Cynic, and Stoic Sects, we have completed one principal part of the hiſtory of the Grecian philoſophy. Another main branch of this philoſophy, namely, that which ſprung from Pythagoras, and afterwards ſprouted out into the ELEATIC, HERACLITEAN, EPICUREAN, and SCEPTIC Sects, yet remains to be conſidered. This ſchool, having been firſt inſtituted in that part of Italy, which, from the Grecian Colonies which had been ſettled there, was called *Magna Grecia*, has taken the appellation of the ITALIC SCHOOL[a].

Before we enter upon the hiſtory of the celebrated founder of the Italic School, ſome notice muſt be taken of Pherecydes, one of the wiſe men of Greece, who, though he himſelf inſtituted no ſect, is diſtinguiſhed as the firſt preceptor of Pythagoras.

PHERECYDES[b], a native of the iſland of Scyrus, one of the Cyclades near Delos, flouriſhed about the forty-fifth Olympiad[c]. It has

[a] Laert. l. i. § 13. Ariſt. de Cælo. c. 1. [b] Laert. l. i. Suidas.
[c] B. C. 600.

been maintained, with great erudition, that Pherecydes derived his principles of philoſophy and theogony from the ſacred books of the Phenicians; but little dependance is to be placed, in a queſtion of this kind, upon the authorities by which this opinion is ſupported; and it will appear, upon enquiry, that the tenets of this philoſopher were not leſs ſimilar to thoſe of the moſt antient Grecian and Barbaric philoſophers, than to the doctrine of the Phenicians. The opinion of Joſephus[a], that Pherecydes ſtudied philoſophy in Egypt, ſeems more probable; for Egypt was, at that time, univerſally reſorted to as the ſeat of learning; the ſymbolical method of teaching, which was made uſe of by Pherecydes, was perfectly after the Egyptian manner; and the general aſpect of his doctrine bears a ſtrong reſemblance to the dogmas of the Egyptian ſchool.

The particulars, which remain, of the life of Pherecydes are few and imperfect. Marvellous circumſtances have been related of him, which only deſerve to be mentioned, in order to ſhew, that what has been deemed ſupernatural by ignorant ſpectators, may be eaſily conceived to have happened from natural cauſes. A ſhip in full ſail was at a diſtance approaching its harbour; Pherecydes predicted, that it would never come into the haven, and it happened accordingly; for a ſtorm aroſe, which ſunk the veſſel. After drinking water from a well, he predicted an earthquake, which happened three days afterwards[b]. It is eaſy to ſuppoſe, that theſe predictions might have been the reſult of a careful obſervation of thoſe *phænomena*, which commonly precede ſtorms, or earthquakes, in a climate where they frequently happen. This is the more probable, as it is well known to have been a uſual practice with the antients, and particularly with Pythagoras, the pupil of Pherecydes, to impoſe upon the ignorant multitude, by pretending to powers which they did not poſſeſs, and particularly, by applying their knowledge of nature to the purpoſes of impoſture. Pherecydes is ſaid to have been the firſt, among the Grecians, who wrote concerning the nature of the gods; but this can only mean, that he was the firſt who ventured to write upon theſe ſubjects in proſe. For, before his time, Or-

[a] Contr. Apion. l. i. [b] Laert.

pheus, Muſæus, and others, had written theogonies in verſe. Some have aſcribed to him the invention of the ſun-dial; but the invention was of more antient date; for this inſtrument is mentioned in the Jewiſh hiſtory of Hezekiah king of Judea[a]. Concerning the manner in which Pherecydes died, nothing certain is known; for, as to the ſtory[b] of his having been gradually conſumed for his impiety, by the loathſome diſeaſe called *Morbus pedicularis*, it muſt, doubtleſs, be ſet down in the long liſt of idle tales by which the ignorant and ſuperſtitious have always endeavoured to bring philoſophy into contempt. His diſciple Pythagoras is ſaid to have erected a tomb to his memory. He lived to the age of eighty-five years.

It is difficult to give, in any degree, an accurate account of the doctrines of Pherecydes; both becauſe he delivered them, after the manner of the times, under the concealment of ſymbols; and becauſe very few memoirs of this philoſopher remain. It is moſt probable that Pherecydes taught thoſe opinions concerning the gods, and the origin of the world, which the antient Grecian theogoniſts borrowed from Egypt. On the ground of this opinion, it may perhaps be poſſible to explain the fragment of his book concerning the origin of things, which is preſerved by Laertius[c]. The words are, Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἰς ἀεί, καὶ Χθὼν ἦν. Χθονίη δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο γῆ, ἐπιδὴ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γέρας δίδοῖ.

If by χθὼν we underſtand what the antient philoſophers underſtood by *Mot*, the chaos which was admitted into all the antient theogonies, and by γέρας δίδοῖ, the communication or grant of form to the chaotic maſs, the meaning of the paſſage will be this: "Jupiter, and Duration, and Chaos, are eternal: from the time when Jupiter communicated form to chaos, it was called the Earth:" a doctrine which agrees with that which was commonly received among the Oriential and Egyptian philoſophers. Perfectly conſonant to this doctrine is the tenet which Ariſtotle[d] aſcribes to Pherecydes, τὸ γεννῆσαν ἄριστον εἶναι, that the firſt cauſe of all things is moſt excellent.

Another tenet which is, by the univerſal conſent of the antients,

[a] 2 Kings, c. xx. v. 11. [b] Ælian. l. iv. c. 28.
[c] Laert. l. i. § 119. [d] Metaph. l. xii. c. 4.

aſcribed to Pherecydes, is that of the Immortality of the Soul, for which he was, perhaps, indebted to the Egyptians. Cicero ſays [a], that he was the firſt philoſopher in whoſe writings this doctrine appeared. He is alſo ſaid, and not improbably [b], to have taught the doctrine of the tranſmigration of the ſoul; for this was a tenet commonly received among the Egyptians, and afterwards taught by Pythagoras. Whether it was, that Pherecydes inſtituted no ſect; or that his writings fell into diſuſe through their obſcurity; or that Pythagoras deſignedly ſuppreſſed them, that he might appear the original author of the doctrines which he had learned from his maſter; or whatever elſe might be the cauſe; we are left without further information concerning his philoſophy. We therefore proceed to the hiſtory of the life and opinions of his celebrated pupil, the founder of the Italic School.

The hiſtory of Pythagoras, beyond that of any other antient philoſopher, abounds with difficulties and contradictions, and is inveloped in fable and myſtery. Pythagoras himſelf, and his followers through a long ſucceſſion, were ſo far from committing their doctrines to writing, for the information of poſterity, that they made uſe of every expedient to conceal them from their contemporaries. Hence the firſt records of the life and doctrines of this philoſopher, which were only ſuch as could be caſually gathered up from tradition, were not leſs defective in probable and well authenticated facts, than they were abundant in abſurd fictions. It was not till many ages after the time in which Pythagoras flouriſhed, that Porphyry and Jamblichus undertook to digeſt theſe ſcattered materials into a regular narrative. And theſe writers themſelves were too credulous, too careleſs, and too much biaſſed by prejudice, to be capable of giving a judicious and impartial repreſentation of what was at that time known concerning Pythagoras. They were of the ſchool of Ammonius and Plotinus; in which, as we ſhall afterwards find, it was the common practice to miſrepreſent and falſify every thing, and to obtrude upon the world marvellous tales, inſtead of real facts, for the ſake of ſupporting the credit of their ſect and religion in op-

[a] Tuſc. Qu. l. i. c. 16. [b] Suidas in Phor.

poſition

poſition to Chriſtianity. In order to be convinced that Jamblichus was nothing better than an impudent trifler, the reader needs only peruſe the introduction to his life of Pythagoras. The labours of ſubſequent writers, though ſufficiently numerous, caſt little new light upon this part of the hiſtory of philoſophy. Notwithſtanding all that has been done, it reſembles a wood, which after many trees are cut down, and many thickets cleared away, ſtill remains dark, rugged, and pathleſs. We ſhall therefore hope for indulgence, if, in this part of our work, the reader ſhould frequently find it neceſſary to ſuſpend, and ſometimes even to withhold, his aſſent.

The antients are by no means agreed concerning the birth-place of PYTHAGORAS[a]: but the more common opinion is, that he was a native of the iſland of Samos. Of his extraction nothing further is known, than that his father's name was Mneſarchus, probably a merchant of Tyre, or ſome other maritime city, who, trading to Samos, was admitted to the rights of citizenſhip, and ſettled his family in this iſland. As to the tale of Jamblichus[b], which makes him a deſcendant of Jupiter, and relates a prediction of his birth and character from the Delphian prieſt, barely to mention, is to refute it.

The time of the birth of Pythagoras is covered with inextricable obſcurity. Three Engliſh critics of great eminence have employed their profound erudition in endeavouring to ſettle this point. Bentley, in his diſpute with Boyle[c] concerning the age of Phalaris, inveſtigates with his uſual induſtry the time of the birth of Pythagoras, and (chiefly on the teſtimony of Eratoſthenes, who relates, that whilſt he was young he was a victor at the Olympic games, in the forty-eighth Olympiad[d]) determines the date to be the fourth year of the forty-third Olympiad[e]. Lloyd, in his diſſertation concerning the chronology of Pythagoras[f], endeavours to prove, that the Olympic victor was not the ſame perſon with the philoſopher; and inſiſts upon ſeveral particulars, which make it probable, that he was

[a] Laert. l. viii. § 1. Conf. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 300. Plut. Qu. Conv. l. viii. c. 7. t. iii. p. 286. [b] Vit Pyth. c. 2. Porph. n. 1.

[c] Diſſertation on the Epiſtles of Phalaris.

[d] B. C. 588. [e] B. C. 608. [f] Ed. Lond. 1699.

born

born about the third year of the forty-eighth Olympiad[a]. Dodwell diſcuſſes the ſame ſubject at large, in two diſſertations on the age of Phalereus and Pythagoras[b], and places the birth of Pythagoras in the fourth year of the fifty-ſecond Olympiad[c]. His opinion chiefly reſts on the authority of Porphyry and Jamblichus. Le Clerc has given a ſummary of their arguments[d]. We muſt content ourſelves with obſerving, that, after carefully examining what has been written upon this queſtion, we find the authorities ſo feeble and inconſiſtent, that we dare not give a deciſive judgment; for where we cannot arrive at certain proof, we think it better honeſtly to confeſs our ignorance, than to impoſe an unſupported opinion upon our readers. We are however inclined to think, that the preponderancy of argument is in favour of Lloyd, whoſe opinion is, that Pythagoras was born about the third year of the forty-eighth Olympiad[e], and died about the third year of the ſixty-eighth Olympiad[f]. It ſeems pretty certain, that he was not born earlier than the fourth year of the forty-third Olympiad[g], nor later than the fourth year of the fifty-ſecond[h].

If we diſmiſs the tales of Jamblichus concerning the early wiſdom, gravity, and temperance of Pythagoras, which are ſaid to have been ſuch as to have filled all men with admiration, to have commanded reſpect and reverence from grey hairs, and even to have led many to aſſert that he was the Son of God[i], we meet with no other credible particulars of his childhood and early education, but that he was firſt inſtructed in his own country by Creophilus, and afterwards by Pherecydes in the iſland of Scyrus[k]. When he had paid the laſt honours to his preceptor, for whom he appears to have entertained a high reſpect, he returned to Samos, and again ſtudied under the direction of his firſt maſter.

Much is ſaid by Jamblichus, and other later biographers, of Pythagoras's early journey into Ionia, and his viſits to Thales and Anaximander; but we find no antient record of this journey, nor any traces of its effects on his doctrine, which differs eſſentially from that

[a] B. C. 586. [b] London, 1704. 8. [c] B. C. 569.
[d] Bibliotheque Choiſie, t. x. p. 81, &c. [e] B. C. 586. [f] B. C. 506.
[g] B. C. 605. [h] B. C. 569. [i] Jamb. Vit. P. n. 6. [k] Laert.

of

of the Ionic ſchool. It is probable, that his firſt journey from the Grecian iſlands was to Egypt, the country at that time celebrated, above all others, for that kind of wiſdom which beſt ſuited the genius and temper of Pythagoras.

On his way to Egypt, Jamblichus aſſerts[a], that he viſited Phenicia, and converſed with the deſcendants of Mochus, and other prieſts of that country, and was initiated into their peculiar myſteries. And it may ſeem not entirely improbable, that he might wiſh to be further acquainted with the Phenician philoſophy, of which he had, doubtleſs, heard a general report from his father, and other merchants who traded to this coaſt. But it is certainly a fiction of the Alexandrian ſchool, that Pythagoras received his doctrine of numbers from the Phenicians; for we have already ſeen, that their knowledge of numbers extended no further than to the practical ſcience of arithmetic. Whatever be thought of this journey to the eaſt (which, by the way, Le Clerc diſcredits[b]) we muſt diſmiſs, as wholly incredible, the ſtories of his viſiting the temple on Mount Carmel, and remaining there ſeveral days without food, paſſing among the inhabitants for a good dæmon, and obtaining from them religious honours; and of his proceeding into the country of Judea, and there going through ſeveral ceremonies of the Moſaic law.

In Egypt[c], Pythagoras was introduced, by the recommendation of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, to Amaſis, king of Egypt, a great patron of learned men, particularly thoſe of Greece, that he might the more eaſily obtain acceſs to the colleges of the prieſts. The king himſelf could ſcarcely, with all his authority, prevail upon the prieſts to admit a ſtranger to the knowledge of their ſacred myſteries[d]. The college of Heliopolis, to whom the king's inſtructions were ſent, referred Pythagoras to the college of Memphis, as of greater antiquity; from Memphis he was diſmiſſed, under the ſame pretence, to Thebes. The Theban prieſts, not daring to reject the royal mandate, yet loth to comply with it, preſcribed Pythagoras

[a] L. ii. n. 13. [b] L. c. p. 98. [c] Laert. l. viii. § 3. Porphyr. n. 5.
[d] Herodot. l. ii. c. 172. Diodor. Sic. l. i. c. 2.

many

many ſevere and troubleſome preliminary ceremonies, among which was that of circumciſion[a], hoping hereby to diſcourage him from proſecuting his deſign. Pythagoras, however, executed all their injunctions with ſuch wonderful patience and perſeverance, that he obtained their entire confidence, and was inſtructed in their moſt recondite doctrines. He paſſed twenty-two years in Egypt[b]. During this time he made himſelf perfectly maſter of the three kinds of writing, which were in uſe in Egypt, the epiſtolary, the hieroglyphical, and the ſymbolical; and, having obtained acceſs to the moſt learned men in every celebrated college of prieſts, he became intimately converſant with their antient records[c], and gained an accurate acquaintance with their doctrine concerning the origin of things, with their aſtronomy and geometry, and, in ſhort, with Egyptian learning in its whole extent.

Many writers, who flouriſhed after the commencement of the Chriſtian æra, both Pagan and Chriſtian, have related that Pythagoras, immediately after he left Egypt, viſited the Perſian and Chaldean Magi, and travelled ſo far into the Eaſt as to converſe with the Indian Gymnoſophiſts. The occaſion of this journey is thus related by Jamblichus[d]: "After ſpending twenty-two years in Egypt, he was conveyed by the victorious army of Cambyſes, among a numerous train of captives, to Babylon, where he made himſelf perfectly acquainted with the learning and philoſophy of the Eaſt; and after the expiration of twelve years, when he was in the ſixtieth year of his age, he returned to Samos." Cicero[e], Euſebius[f], Lactantius[g], and Valerius Maximus[h], though they ſay nothing of the captivity, agree that he viſited the Perſian Magi. Some have maintained, that in this journey he attended upon the inſtructions of the celebrated Perſian ſage, Zoroaſter[i]; whilſt others, who have placed the life of

[a] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 302. [b] Jamblich. c. 4. n. 18.
[c] Valer. Max. l. viii. c. 7. [d] Vit. Pyth. c. iv. n. 19.
[e] De Fin. l. v. c. 9. [f] Prep. Ev. l. viii. c. 6. l. x. c. 4. [g] L. iv. c. 2.
[h] L. viii. c. 7. Conf. Apul. Flor. l. i. p. 357. Lact. l. iv. c. 7.
[i] Porph. n. 10. 12. Suidas in Pyth. Cyril. contr. Jul. l. iv. p. 133. Beauſobre Hiſt. Manich. p. 1. l. i. c. 2. § 2.

Zoroaſter

Zoroaſter in an earlier period than that of Pythagoras, have aſſerted that he converſed with certain Jewiſh prophets, who were at that time in captivity at Babylon, and by this means became intimately converſant with the Jewiſh laws and cuſtoms[a]. After all, however, we muſt confeſs, that we ſee much reaſon to ſuſpect the truth of the whole narrative of Pythagoras's journey into the Eaſt; for the relation is encumbered with inextricable chronological difficulties. It is unanimouſly agreed by chronologiſts, that Cambyſes invaded Egypt in the fifth year of his reign, or the third year of the ſixty-third Olympiad. According to Jamblichus[b], Pythagoras, after ſtaying twelve years in Babylon, and viſiting ſeveral other countries, went into Italy in the ſixty-ſecond Olympiad. Diodorus[c] and Clemens Alexandrinus[d] affix nearly the ſame date to this journey; and others place it fourteen years earlier. Now, it is evident, that if Pythagoras left the Eaſt before the ſixty-ſecond Olympiad, after remaining there twelve years, he could not have been carried thither by Cambyſes in the ſixty-third Olympiad. The whole narration of Pythagoras's journey into the Eaſt is alſo contradicted by the expreſs authority of Antiphon (quoted by Porphyry[e]) who ſays, that Pythagoras, after his reſidence in Egypt, returned into Ionia, and opened a ſchool in his own country; and that, *at the age of forty years*, finding himſelf harraſſed by the tyranny of Polycrates, he withdrew into Italy; an account which evidently leaves no interval for the ſuppoſed eaſtern expedition. The whole proof of the reality of this expedition reſts either upon the evidence of certain Alexandrian Platoniſts, who were deſirous of exalting as much as poſſible the reputation of thoſe antient philoſophers, to whom they looked back as the firſt oracles of wiſdom, or upon that of certain Jewiſh and Chriſtian writers[f], who were willing to credit every tale, which

[a] Clem. Alex. Str. l. i. p. 304. Huet. Dem. Pr. iv. p. 54, 83, 186, 224.
[b] C. vii. n. 35. [c] Excerpt. Peireſc. p. 241.
[d] Strom. l. i. p. 302. 330. [e] N. 8. 9. p. 12. 13.
[f] Hermipp. ap. Joſeph. cont. Ap. l. i. p. 1046. et Orig. cont. Celſ. l. i. p. 13. Ariſtobul. ap. Clem. Al. Str. l. i. p. 342. Euſeb. Prep. Ev. l. ix. c. 6.

might ſeem to render it probable, that the Pythagorean doctrine was derived from the Oriental philoſophers, and ultimately from the Hebrew ſcriptures. There is, therefore, ſome reaſon to ſuſpect that theſe writers admitted a ſtory ſo favourable to their reſpective views, without ſcrupulouſly enquiring into its authenticity. The relation concerning Pythagoras's preceptor in the Eaſt, under the ſeveral names of Zabratus, Nazaratus, and Zares or Zoroaſter, reſts upon uncertain rumour. Nor is there any probable argument to prove, that he received inſtruction from any prophet of the Hebrew nation during his ſuppoſed reſidence in Babylon. It ſeems, therefore, on the whole, moſt reaſonable, to look upon the ſtory of this eaſtern journey as a mere fiction, and to conclude, that Pythagoras never paſſed over from Egypt to the Eaſt, but returned thence immediately to Samos[a]. The ſtory of his having viſited the Northern Druids is ſo improbable in itſelf, and ſo ill ſupported by evidence, that it may be confidently diſmiſſed without particular examination.

Pythagoras, returning from Egypt to his native iſland, after an abſence of more than twenty years, was deſirous that his fellow citizens ſhould reap the benefit of his travels and ſtudies, and, for this purpoſe, attempted to inſtitute a ſchool for their inſtruction in the elements of ſcience[b], but choſe to adopt the Egyptian method of teaching, and communicate his doctrines under a ſymbolical form. The Samians were either too indolent, or too ſtupid, to profit by his inſtructions. The number of his followers was ſo inconſiderable, that he was obliged for the preſent to relinquiſh his deſign. Loth, however, entirely to abandon the project, he determined, if poſſible, to find other means of engaging the attention of his countrymen. With this idea he repaired to Delos, and after preſenting an offering of cakes to Apollo, there received, or pretended to receive, moral dogmas from the prieſteſs[c], which he afterwards delivered to his

[a] Lloyd, Bentley, Le Clerc, Fabricius, L'Enfant, &c. gave no credit to the tale of this eaſtern journey.

[b] Jamb. c. v. n. 20. 25. Laert. l. viii. § 13.

[c] Porphyr. n. 41. Laert. § 8.

diſciples under the character of divine precepts. With the ſame deſign he alſo viſited the iſland of Crete, ſo celebrated in mythological hiſtory; where he was conducted by the Corybantes, or prieſts of Cybele, into the cave of Mount Ida, in which Jupiter is ſaid to have been buried[a]. Here he converſed with Epimenides, an eminent pretender to prophetic powers, and was by him initiated into the moſt ſacred myſteries of Greece. About the ſame time he viſited Sparta and Elis, and was preſent during the celebration of the Olympic games[b], where he is ſaid to have exhibited a golden thigh to Abaris, in order to convince him that he was Apollo. Amongſt the places which he viſited during his ſtay in Greece, was Phlius, the reſidence of Leon, king of the Phliaſians. Here he firſt aſſumed the appellation of philoſopher[c] *.

Thus furniſhed, not only with freſh ſtores of learning, but with a kind of authority which was ſtill more likely to procure him reſpect, he returned to Samos, and made a ſecond more ſucceſsful attempt to inſtitute among his countrymen a ſchool of philoſophy[d]. The place which he choſe for his purpoſe was a ſemicircular building, in which the Samians had been accuſtomed to meet for public buſineſs. Here he chiefly employed himſelf in delivering, with an air of ſacred authority, popular precepts of morality, which might contribute to the general benefit of the people. Beſides this, he provided himſelf with a ſecret cave, into which he retired with his intimate friends and profeſſed diſciples, and here, not without a wonderful parade of myſtery, gave them daily inſtructions in the more abſtruſe parts of philoſophy[e]. Theſe arts, which unqueſtionably rank this celebrated philoſopher among impoſtors, proved ſucceſsful, and procured him a great multitude of followers. What he had been unable to effect by the mere force of learning and ability, he ſoon accompliſhed by concealing his doctrines under the veil of

[a] Porph. n. 17. Laert. § 3. [b] Val. Max. l. viii. c. 7.
[c] Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. v. c. 3. Conf. Laert. l. i. § 12. Jamb. c. viii. n. 44. xii. 58.
* See Introduction to this work, p. 2.
[d] Jamb. c. v. n. 26. Porph. n. 9. [e] Jamb. c. v. n. 27.

myſterious ſymbols, and by iſſuing forth his precepts as reſponſes from a divine oracle[a].

Having for ſome time ſucceſsfully executed his plan of inſtruction in Samos, whether the Samians began to detect his frauds, or to be apprehenſive of his increaſing popularity, or whether Pythagoras wiſhed to eſcape the tyranny of the governor, Syloſon, the brother of Polycrates, he ſuddenly left Samos, and paſſing over into Italy, attempted to eſtabliſh his ſchool among the colonies of *Magna Græcia*[b]. The time of this expedition is uncertain; but it ſeems moſt probable, that it happened about the beginning of the fifty-ninth Olympiad[c]. It is more certain, that when Pythagoras arrived in this country, in order to obtain credit with the populace, he pretended to a power of performing miracles, and practiſed many arts of impoſture.

The firſt place at which Pythagoras arrived was Crotona[d], a city in the bay of Tarentum, whoſe inhabitants were at this time exceedingly corrupted in their manners. Upon his firſt arrival, Plutarch and Apuleius relate[e], that obſerving a large draught of fiſh, which had juſt been taken, he bought the whole capture of the fiſhermen, and ordered them to throw them again into the water, as a leſſon to the ſpectators to ſpare the lives of fiſhes, and to refrain from this, as well as every other kind of animal food. Porphyry and Jamblichus relate the ſame ſtory, with the addition of this marvellous circumſtance, that Pythagoras, while the fiſhermen were drawing up the net, told them the exact number of fiſhes which it contained.

By theſe and other arts, Pythagoras obtained ſuch a degree of reſpect and influence in Crotona, that people of all claſſes aſſembled to hear his diſcourſes. The effect was, that an entire change was produced in the manners of the citizens; ſo that, from great luxury and licentiouſneſs, they were converted to ſtrict ſobriety and frugality of manners[f]. It is aſſerted, that in Crotona there were not leſs

[a] Vid. Van Dale de Oraculis Gent. Diſſ. ii.
[b] Jambl. c. v. n. 18. [c] Comp. Dodwell and Stanley.
[d] Ib. n. 36. Porph. n. 25.
[e] Plut. Symp. l. viii. qu. 8. Apul. Apolog. p. 209.
[f] Juſtin. l. xx. c. 4. Jambl. c. v. n. 29. Porphyr. n. 20.

than

than ſix hundred perſons (ſome ſay two thouſand) who were prevailed upon to ſubmit to the ſtrict diſcipline which he required, and to throw their effects into a common ſtock for the benefit of the whole fraternity.

Pythagoras did not confine the influence of his philoſophy to Crotona. He taught his doctrine in many other cities of *Magna Græcia* with ſo much energy and effect, that he eſtabliſhed a large and extenſive intereſt through the country, and obtained from his followers a degree of reſpect little ſhort of adoration [a].

Had Pythagoras contented himſelf with iſſuing forth oracular precepts of wiſdom, and inſtructing his ſelect diſciples in the ſpeculative doctrines of philoſophy, it is probable he might have continued his labours, without moleſtation, to the end of his life. But he diſcovered, on many occaſions, a ſtrong propenſity towards political innovations. Not only at Crotona, but at Metapontus, Rhegium, Agrigentum, and many other places, he obtained great influence over the people, and employed it in urging them to the ſtrenuous aſſertion of their rights, againſt the encroachments of their tyrannical governors [b].

Theſe attempts, together with the ſingularities of his ſchool, excited a general ſpirit of jealouſy, and raiſed a powerful oppoſition againſt him. At the head of this oppoſition was Cylo, a man of wealth and diſtinction in Crotona, who had been refuſed admiſſion into the ſociety of the Pythagoreans, and whoſe temper was too haughty, and violent, to endure with patience ſuch an indignity. The party thus raiſed againſt the Pythagoreans hearing that they were aſſembled in a large body at the houſe of Milo, one of their chief friends, ſurrounded the houſe, and ſet it on fire. About forty perſons periſhed in the flames. Archippus and Lyſis, two natives of Tarentum, alone eſcaped: the former withdrew to his own city; the latter fled to Thebes.

Pythagoras himſelf, if he was not preſent at the aſſembly, was probably in Crotona at the time when this fatal attack was

[a] Jamb. n. 33.

[b] Porph. n. 20. Jamb. c. 31. n. 214. Conf. Diodor. l. xii.

made

made upon his ſchool; for the report of his having been then upon a journey to Delos, to viſit his maſter Pherecydes is inconſiſtent with chronology, that philoſopher having died before Pythagoras left Samos. He was, however, wholly incapable of reſiſting the torrent of jealouſy and enmity which ruſhed upon him. His remaining friends fled to Rhegium; and he was himſelf obliged to retire to Metapontum, after having in vain ſought for protection from the Locrians. At Metapontum, Pythagoras found himſelf ſtill ſurrounded with enemies, and was obliged to take refuge in the temple of the Muſes, where, not being able to procure from his friends the neceſſary ſupply of food, he periſhed with hunger [a]. This is the moſt probable account we are able to collect of the laſt incidents in the life of Pythagoras. The time of his death is uncertain. According to the Chronicon of Euſebius, which we are inclined to follow, he died in the third year of the ſixty-eighth Olympiad [b], after having lived, according to the moſt probable ſtatement of his birth, to the age of eighty years. After his death his diſciples paid a ſuperſtitious reſpect to his memory. They erected ſtatues in honour of him, converted his houſe in Crotona into a temple of Ceres, and appealed to him as a divinity, ſwearing by his name [c].

Many tales are related of Pythagoras, which carry with them their own refutation. That, by ſpeaking a word, he tamed a Daunian bear which had laid waſte the country; that he prevented an ox from eating beans, by whiſpering in its ear; that he called down an eagle from the ſky; that he was, on the ſame day, preſent, and diſcourſed in public, at Metapontum in Italy, and at Tauromenium in Sicily; that he predicted earthquakes, ſtorms, and other future events; and that a river, as he paſſed over it with his friends, cried out, Hail, Pythagoras! are wonders [d], which would require much clearer and better evidence to gain them credit, than the teſtimony of Apollonius, Porphyry, and Jamblichus, or even of Laertius and

[a] Jambl. c. xxxv. n. 248, &c. Porphyr. n. 54, &c. Laert. l. viii. § 39, &c.

[b] B. C. 506.

[c] Laert. § 44, &c. Juſtin. l. xx. c. 4. Porph. n. 4. 20. Hierocl. in Aur. Carm. p. 225. 230. Jambl. n. 28.

[d] Porph. n. 23. Jamb. c. 28. n. 134. Laert. l. viii. § 11. &c. Apollon. Hiſt. c. 6. Philoſt. l. iv. c. 10. Plin. l. xxiv. c. 17. l. xxx. c. 1.

Pliny.

Pliny. It appears, upon the face of the hiſtory of this philoſopher, that he owed much of his celebrity and authority to impoſture. Why did he ſo ſtudiouſly court the ſociety of Egyptian prieſts, ſo famous in antient times for their arts of deception; why did he take ſo much pains to be initiated in religious myſteries; why did he retire into a ſubterraneous cavern in Crete; why did he aſſume the character of Apollo, at the Olympic games; why did he boaſt that his ſoul had lived in former bodies, and that he had been firſt Æthalides the ſon of Mercury, then Euphorbus, then Pyrrhus of Delos, and at laſt Pythagoras[a], but that he might the more eaſily impoſe upon the credulity of an ignorant and ſuperſtitious people? His whole manner of life, as far as it is known, confirms this opinion. Clothed in a long white robe, with a flowing beard, and, as ſome relate, with a golden crown on his head[b], he preſerved among the people, and in the preſence of his diſciples, a commanding gravity and majeſty of aſpect. He made uſe of muſic to promote the tranquillity of his mind, frequently ſinging, for this purpoſe, hymns of Thales, Heſiod, and Homer[c]. He had ſuch an entire command of himſelf, that he was never ſeen to expreſs, in his countenance, grief, or joy, or anger. He refrained from animal food, and confined himſelf to a frugal vegetable diet[d], excluding from his ſimple bill of fare, for ſundry myſtical reaſons, pulſe or beans. By this artificial demeanour, Pythagoras paſſed himſelf upon the vulgar as a being of an order ſuperior to the common condition of humanity, and perſuaded them that he had received his doctrine from heaven.

Pythagoras married Theano[e] of Crotona, or, as ſome relate, of Crete[f], by whom he had two ſons, Telauges and Mneſarchus, who, after his death, took the charge of his ſchool.

Whether Pythagoras left behind him any writings, is a point much diſputed. Laertius[g] enumerates many pieces which appeared under his name; and Jamblichus[h] and Pliny[i] increaſe the liſt. But

[a] Laert. l. viii. § 4. Porphyr. l. c. Lucian in Gallo. t. ii. p. 613.
[b] Laert. § 19. Jamb. c. 21. n. 100. Ælian. l. xii. c. 32.
[c] Porph. [d] Laert. Jamb. Porph. l. c.
[e] Suidas in Thean. Laert. § 11. [f] Porphyr. n. 4. [g] L. viii. § 7.
[h] C. 19. n. 96. [i] L. xxiv. c. 17. Conf. l. xix. c. 5.

Plutarch,

Plutarch[a], Joſephus[b], Lucian[c], and others, confeſs that there were no genuine works of Pythagoras extant; and, from the pains which Pythagoras took to confine his doctrine to his own ſchool during his life, it appears highly probable, that he never committed his philoſophical ſyſtem to writing, and that thoſe pieces to which his name was early affixed were written by ſome of his followers, according to the principles and tenets which they had learned in his ſchool. Among the pieces attributed to Pythagoras, no one is more famous than the Golden Verſes, which Hierocles has illuſtrated with a Commentary. It is generally agreed that they were not written by Pythagoras: perhaps they are to be aſcribed to Epicharmus, or Empedocles[d]. They may be conſidered as a brief ſummary of his popular doctrines.

The Method of Instruction adopted by Pythagoras was two-fold, exoteric and eſoteric[e], or public and private. This diſtinction he had ſeen introduced with great advantage by the Egyptian prieſts, who found it admirably adapted to ſtrengthen their authority, and increaſe their emolument. He therefore determined, as far as circumſtances would admit, to form his ſchool upon the Egyptian model. For the general benefit of the people, he held public aſſemblies, in which he delivered diſcourſes in praiſe of virtue, and againſt vice; and in theſe he gave particular inſtructions, in different claſſes, to huſbands and wives, parents and children, and others who filled the ſeveral relations of ſociety. The auditors, who attended theſe public lectures did not properly belong to his ſchool, but continued to follow their uſual mode of living. Beſides theſe he had a ſelect body of diſciples, whom he called his companions and friends[f], who ſubmitted to a peculiar plan of diſcipline, and were admitted by a long courſe of inſtruction into all the myſteries of his eſoteric doctrine.

Before any one could be admitted into this fraternity, Pythagoras

[a] De Fort. Alex. t. ii. [b] Contr. Apian. t. i. p. 1046.
[c] De Lapſu, t. iii. p. 198.
[d] Stanley's Lives of Phil. p. viii, Fabric. Bib. Gr. vol. i. p. 129. 460.
[e] Jamb. c. viii. xxxii. Juſtin. l. xx. c. 4.
[f] Jambl. c. xxxv. n. 257. Suidas εταῖρες.

examined

examined his features and external appearance[a]; enquired in what manner he had been accuſtomed to behave towards his parents and friends[b]; remarked his manner of converſing, laughing, and keeping ſilence; and obſerved what paſſions he was moſt inclined to indulge, with what kind of company he choſe to aſſociate, how he paſſed his leiſure moments, and what incidents appeared to excite in him the ſtrongeſt emotions of joy or ſorrow. From theſe and other circumſtances, Pythagoras formed an accurate judgment of the qualifications of the candidate; and he admitted no one into his ſociety, till he was fully perſuaded of the docility of his diſpoſitions, the gentleneſs of his manners, his power of retaining in ſilence what he was taught, and, in fine, his capacity of becoming a true philoſopher.

Upon the firſt probationary admiſſion, the fortitude and ſelf-command of the candidate was put to the trial by a long courſe of ſevere abſtinence and rigorous exerciſe[c]. In order to ſubdue every inclination towards luxurious enjoyment, Pythagoras accuſtomed thoſe who were admitted to this initiatory diſcipline to abſtain from animal food, except the remains of the ſacrifices, and to drink nothing but water, unleſs in the evening, when they were allowed a ſmall portion of wine. That he might effectually inure them to ſelf-denial, he ſometimes ordered a table richly covered with dainties to be ſpread before them, and, when they were impatiently expecting to gratify their appetites, commanded the whole entertainment to be taken away, and diſmiſſed them without any refreſhment[d]. He ſuffered them to wear no other garments, but ſuch as were ſuited to expreſs the utmoſt purity and ſimplicity of manners. Of ſleep he required them to be exceedingly frugal; and, in ſhort, indulged them in nothing which could be ſuppoſed to inflame their paſſions, or cheriſh voluptuous deſires. To correct an effeminate dread of labour or ſuffering, he preſcribed them exerciſes which could not be

[a] Ἐφυσιογνωμόνει, A. Gell. l. i. c. 9.
[b] Jambl. l. c. c. xx. n. 94. Porphyr. n. 33.
[c] Jambl. c. xxiv. n. 106. Porph. n. 34. Laert. l. viii. § 19.
[d] Jambl. n. 108. Diodor. in Excerpt. Valeſ. p. 245.

performed without pain and fatigue. To teach them humility and induſtry, he expoſed them, for three years, to a continued courſe of contradiction, ridicule, and contempt, among their fellows[a]. The powerful paſſion of avarice he oppoſed, by requiring his diſciples to ſubmit to voluntary poverty. He not only taught them to be contented with a little, but even deprived them of all command over their own property, by caſting the poſſeſſions of each individual into a common ſtock, to be diſtributed by proper officers, as occaſion ſhould require. From the time of this ſequeſtration of their goods, as long as they continued members of this ſociety, they lived upon the footing of perfect equality, and ſat down together daily at a common table. If any one, however, repented of the connection, he was at liberty to depart, and might reclaim, from the general fund, his whole contribution[b].

That he might give his diſciples an habit of entire docility, Pythagoras alſo enjoined upon them, from their firſt admiſſion, a long term of ſilence, called ἐχεμυθία. This exoteric ſilence is not to be confounded with that ſacred reſerve[c], with which all the diſciples of Pythagoras were bound, upon oath, to receive the doctrines of their maſter, that they might, from no inducement whatever, ſuffer them to paſs beyond the limits of the ſect. The initiatory ſilence, probably, conſiſted in refraining from ſpeech, not only during the hours of inſtruction, but through the whole term of initiation. It continued from two to five years, according to the degree of propenſity which the pupil diſcovered towards conceit and loquacity[d]. The reſtraint which Pythagoras thus put upon the ἔπεα πτερόεντα, "winged words," of his pupils, might poſſibly be of great uſe to them; it was certainly a judicious expedient with reſpect to himſelf, as it reſtrained impertinent curioſity, and prevented every inconvenience of contra-

[a] Jambl. c. xvi. n. 68. c. xvii. n. 72. c. xxviii. n. 149. c. xxxi. n. 204, &c. c. xxxii. n. 225. Porph. n. 8. Athen. l. iv. p. 161.

[b] Jambl. c. v. n. 29. c. vi. n. 30. c. xvii. n. 72. c. xviii. n. 81. c. xxx. n. 168. A. Gell. l. c. Porph. n. 20.

[c] Jambl. c. xxxi. n. 188. c. xxxii. n. 226. Porph. n. 19.

[d] Jambl. c. xvi. n. 68. A. Gell. l. c. Ælian. l. iv. c. 6. Lucian. Vit. Auct. Laert. l. viii. § 10.

diction. Accordingly we find, that his disciples silenced all doubts, and refuted all objections, by appealing to his authority. Αὐτος ἔφα, *ipse dixit*, decided every dispute [a]. Nor was this preparatory discipline deemed sufficiently severe, without adding, during the years of initiation, an entire prohibition of seeing their master, or hearing his lectures, except from behind a curtain [b]. And even this privilege was too great to be commonly allowed; for in this stage of tuition they were usually instructed by some inferior preceptor, who barely recited the doctrine of Pythagoras, without assigning the reasonings or demonstrations upon which they were grounded, and required the obedient pupil to receive them as unquestionable truths, upon their master's word [c]. Those who had sufficient perseverance to pass these several steps of probation were at last admitted among the Esoterics, and allowed to hear and see Pythagoras behind the curtain. But if it happened that any one, through impatience of such rigid discipline, chose to withdraw from the society before the expiration of his term of trial, he was dismissed with a share of the common stock, the double of that which he had advanced; a tomb was erected for him as for a dead man, and he was to be as much forgotten by the brethren as if he had been actually dead [d].

It was the peculiar privilege of the members of the Esoteric school (who were called γνήσιοι ὁμιλέται [e], genuine disciples) to receive a full explanation of the whole doctrine of Pythagoras, which to others was delivered in brief precepts and dogmas, under the concealment of symbols. They were also permitted to take minutes of their master's lectures, in writing, and to propose questions, and offer remarks, upon every subject of discourse [f]. These disciples were particularly distinguished by the appellation of the Pythagoreans; they were also called Mathematicians, from the studies upon which they entered immediately after their initiation. After they had made a sufficient progress in geometrical science, they were conducted to

[a] Jambl. c. xviii. n. 81. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. ii. Val. Max. l. viii. c. 6.
[b] Jambl. c. xvii. n. 72. [c] Jambl. c. xviii. n. 81. 82. Porph. n. 37.
[d] Jambl. c. xvii. n. 37. n. 75. [e] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 575.
[f] A. Gell. l. i. c. 9. Anon. Photii, p. 56. Porphyr. n. 56.

the ſtudy of nature, the inveſtigation of primary principles, and the knowledge of God. Thoſe who purſued theſe ſublime ſpeculations were called Theoriſts; and ſuch as more particularly devoted themſelves to theology were ſtyled σεβασικοὶ, Religious. Others, according to their reſpective abilities and inclinations, were engaged in the ſtudy of Morals, Oeconomics and Policy; and were afterwards employed in managing the affairs of the fraternity, or ſent into the cities of Greece, to inſtruct them in the principles of government, or aſſiſt them in the inſtitution of laws[a].

The brethren of the Pythagorean college at Crotona, who were about ſix hundred in number, lived together, as in one family, with their wives and children, in a public building called ὁμακόιον, the common auditory. The whole buſineſs of the ſociety was conducted with the moſt perfect regularity[b]. Every day was begun with a diſtinct deliberation upon the manner in which it ſhould be ſpent, and concluded with a careful retroſpect of the events which had occurred, and the buſineſs which had been tranſacted[c]. They roſe before the ſun, that they might pay him homage[d]; after which they repeated ſelect verſes from Homer, and other poets, and made uſe of muſic, both vocal and inſtrumental, to enliven their ſpirits and fit them for the duties of the day[e]. They then employed ſeveral hours in the ſtudy of ſcience. Theſe were ſucceeded by an interval of leiſure, which was commonly ſpent in a ſolitary walk for the purpoſe of contemplation. The next portion of the day was allotted to converſation. The hour immediately before dinner was filled up with various kinds of athletic exercíſes. Their dinner conſiſted chiefly of bread, honey, and water; for after they were perfectly initiated, they wholly denied themſelves the uſe of wine. The remainder of the day was devoted to civil and domeſtic affairs, converſation, bathing, and religious ceremonies[f].

[a] Jambl. c. xvii. n. 72. c. xix. n. 90. c. xxiv. n. 108. c. xxx. n. 172.
[b] Jambl. c. vi. n. 30. Porph. n. 20. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i.
[c] Jambl. c. xxix. n. 165. [d] Ib. n. 256. Porph. n. 40.
[e] Ib. c. xxv. n. 20. Senec. de Ira, l. iii. c. 9. Æl. Var. Hiſt. l. xiv. c. 23.
[f] Jambl. c. xxi. n. 96. c. xxiv. 106. c. xxviii. n. 153. xxxi. 209. Anon. Photii. l. c. Plut. de Eſu Carn. t. ii. p. 371. Sen. Ep. 108. Porph. de Abſtin. l. i. c. 24. 27. Vit. Pyth. n. 34. Jambl. n. 98. Laert. l. viii. § 35. Athen. l. iv. c. 17.

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The Exoteric diſciples of Pythagoras were taught, after the Egyptian manner, by images and ſymbols, which muſt have been exceedingly obſcure to thoſe who were not initiated into the myſteries of the ſchool. And they, who were admitted to this privilege, were trained, from their firſt admiſſion, to obſerve invariable ſilence with reſpect to the recondite doctrines of their maſter. That the wiſdom of Pythagoras might not paſs into the ears of the vulgar, they committed it chiefly to memory, and where they found it neceſſary to make uſe of writing, they were careful not to ſuffer their minutes to paſs beyond the limits of the ſchool[a].

After the diſſolution of their aſſembly by Cylo's faction, Lyſis and Archippus thought it neceſſary, in order to preſerve the Pythagorean doctrine from total oblivion, to reduce it to a ſyſtematic ſummary; at the ſame time, however, ſtrongly enjoining their children to preſerve theſe memoirs ſecret, and to tranſmit them in confidence to their poſterity. From this time books began to multiply among the followers of Pythagoras, till at length, in the time of Plato, Philolaus expoſed the Pythagorean records to ſale, and Archytas of Tarentum[b] gave Plato a copy of his commentaries upon the aphoriſms and precepts of his maſter.

It is ſufficiently evident, from this account of the manner in which Pythagoras taught his followers, that the ſources of information concerning his doctrine muſt be very uncertain. Inſtructions, deſignedly concealed under the veil of ſymbols, and chiefly tranſmitted by oral tradition, muſt always have been liable to miſrepreſentation. Of the imperfect records of the Pythagorean philoſophy left by Lyſis, Archytas, and others, nothing has eſcaped the wreck of time, except perhaps ſundry fragments collected by the diligence of Stobæus, concerning the authenticity of which there are ſome grounds for ſuſpicion[c]; and which, if admitted as genuine, will only exhibit an imperfect view of the moral and political doctrine of Py-

[a] Jambl. c. xxii. n. 101, &c. c. xxxv. 252. Porph. n. 57. 58.
[b] Plat. Ep. 12.
[c] Conf. Herm. Conring. in Propol. c. xv. p. 104. Fabric. Bib. Gr. vol. i. p. 513.

thagoras

thagoras under the diſguiſe of ſymbolical and enigmatical language. The ſtrict injunction of ſecrecy, which was given by oath to the initiated Pythagoreans, has effectually prevented any original records of their doctrine concerning nature and God from paſſing down to poſterity. We are entirely to rely for information on this head, and indeed concerning the whole doctrine of Pythagoras, upon Plato and his followers. Plato himſelf, whilſt he enriched his ſyſtem with ſtores from the magazine of Pythagoras, accommodated the Pythagorean doctrines, as he alſo did thoſe of his maſter Socrates, to his own ſyſtem, and thus gave an imperfect, and, we may ſuppoſe, in many particulars, a falſe repreſentation of the doctrines of the Samian philoſopher. It was further corrupted by the followers of Plato, even in the Old Academy, and afterwards in the Alexandrian ſchool. The latter, eſpecially, made no ſcruple of obtruding their own dogmas upon the world, under the ſanction of Pythagoras, or any other antient ſage, and were chiefly employed in attempting to reconcile, or rather confound, the doctrines of the antient philoſophers with later ſyſtems. What confidence can be placed in ſuch authorities? What ſatisfactory information can we expect from ſuch ſources? eſpecially when it is added, that the doctrine of Pythagoras itſelf, probably in its original ſtate, certainly in every form in which it has been tranſmitted to us, was obſcured, not only by ſymbolical, but by mathematical language, which is rather adapted to perplex than to illuſtrate metaphyſical conceptions. In this fault Pythagoras was afterwards imitated by Plato, Ariſtotle, and others[a].

If the unconnected and doubtful records which remain can enable us to form any judgment upon this ſubject, the following may perhaps be conſidered as a faint delineation of the Pythagorean philoſophy.

The end of philoſophy is to free the mind from thoſe incumbrances, which hinder its progreſs towards perfection, and to raiſe it to the contemplation of immutable truth, and the knowledge of divine and ſpiritual objects. This effect muſt be produced by eaſy ſteps,

[a] Burnet. Archæol. l. i. c. 11. Ariſt. Metaph. l. xiii. c. 4.

leſt

leſt the mind, hitherto converſant only with ſenſible things, ſhould revolt at the change. The firſt ſtep towards wiſdom is the ſtudy of mathematics, a ſcience which contemplates objects that lie in the middle way between corporeal and incorporeal beings, and as it were on the confines of both, and which moſt advantageouſly inures the mind to contemplation. The whole courſe of mathematical ſcience may be divided into four parts; two reſpecting numbers, and two reſpecting magnitude. Number may be conſidered either abſtractedly in itſelf, or as applied to ſome object. The former ſcience is arithmetic; of the latter kind is muſic. Magnitude may be conſidered as at reſt, or as in motion; the ſcience which treats of the former is Geometry, that which treats of the latter is Aſtronomy[a].

Arithmetic is the nobleſt ſcience; numbers the firſt object of ſtudy, and a perfect acquaintance with numbers, the higheſt good[b]. Numbers are either ſcientific or intelligible.

Scientific number is the production of the powers involved in unity, or the progreſſion of multitude from the monad or unity, and its return to the ſame[c]. *Unity* and *one* are to be diſtinguiſhed from each other; the former being an abſtract conception, the latter belonging to things capable of being numbered. Number is not infinite, but is the ſource of that infinite diviſibility into equal parts, which is the property of all bodies[d].

Intelligible numbers are thoſe which ſubſiſted in the divine mind before all things, from which every thing hath received its form, and which always remain immutably the ſame. It is the model, or archetype, after which the world, in all its parts, is framed[e]. Numbers are the Cauſe of Eſſence to Beings: τὰς ἀριθμὰς αἰτίας εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας[f].

[a] Porph. n. 46. Proclus in Euclid. l. i. p. 13.

[b] Laert. l. viii. § 8. 12. Pſeudo Orig. c. ii. p. 30. Theodoret. Therap. l. xi. p. 152. Ælian, l. iv. c. 17. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. c. 2.

[c] Jambl. ad Nicom. p. 5. Stob. ib.

[d] Anon. Photii, l. c. Nicomach. apud Phot. Themiſt. in Phyſ. l. iii. § 25. p. 67.

[e] Jambl. ad Nic. p. 11. Porph.

[f] Ariſt. Metaph. l. i. c. 6. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 3. Athenag. Apol. p. 49. Hierocl. in Aur. Carm. p. 224.

The

The Monad, or unity, is that quantity, which, being deprived of all number, remains fixed; whence called Monad, from τὸ μένειν. It is the fountain of all number. The Duad is imperfect and paſſive, and the cauſe of increaſe and diviſion. The Triad, compoſed of the Monad and Duad, partakes of the nature of both. The Tetrad, Tetractys, or quaternion number, is the moſt perfect. The Decad, which is the ſum of the four former, comprehends all arithmetical and muſical proportions[a].

According to ſome writers, the Monad denotes the active principle in nature, or God; the Duad, the paſſive principle, or matter; the Triad, the world formed by the union of the two former; and the Tetractys, the perfection of nature. Some have underſtood by this myſterious number, the four elements; others, the four faculties of the human mind; others, the four cardinal virtues; and others have been ſo abſurd as to ſuppoſe that Pythagoras made uſe of this number to expreſs the name of God, in reference to the word יהוה, by which that name is expreſſed in the Hebrew language. But every attempt to unfold this myſtery has hitherto been unſucceſsful.

The moſt probable explanation of the Pythagoric doctrine of numbers is, that they were uſed as ſymbolical or emblematical repreſentations of the firſt principles and forms of nature, and particularly of thoſe eternal and immutable eſſences, to which Plato afterwards gave the appellation of Ideas. Not being able, or not chuſing, to explain in ſimple language the abſtract notions of principles and forms, Pythagoras ſeems to have made uſe of numbers, as geometricians make uſe of diagrams, to aſſiſt the conceptions of ſcholars. More particularly, conceiving ſome analogy between numbers and the Intelligent Forms which ſubſiſt in the divine mind, he made the former a ſymbol of the latter. As numbers proceed from unity, or the Monad, as a ſimple root, whence they branch out into various combinations, and aſſume

[a] Jambl. ad Nic. p. 13. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. c. 2. Jambl. Vit. Pyth. c. xxviii. A. Gell. l. i. c. 10. Orig. Philoſ. p. 33. Hieroc. ad Aur. Carm. v. 47. p. 227. Iren. l. i. c. 1. Fabric. Bib. Gr. vol. i. p. 457. Athenag. Leg. p. 6.

new

new properties in their progreſs, ſo he conceived the different forms of nature to recede, at different diſtances, from their common ſource, the pure and ſimple eſſence of deity, and at every degree of diſtance to aſſume certain properties in ſome meaſure analogous to thoſe of number; and hence he concluded, that the origin of things, their emanation from the firſt being, and their ſubſequent progreſſion through various orders, if not capable of a perfectly clear explanation, might however be illuſtrated by ſymbols and reſemblances borrowed from numbers[a].

Next to numbers, muſic had the chief place in the preparatory exerciſes of the Pythagorean ſchool, by means of which the mind was to be raiſed above the dominion of the paſſions, and inured to contemplation. Pythagoras conſidered muſic, not only as an art to be judged of by the ear, but as a ſcience to be reduced to mathematical principles and proportions[b]. The muſical chords are ſaid to have been firſt diſcovered by Pythagoras in the following manner: as he was one day reflecting upon this ſubject, happening to paſs by a ſmith's forge, where ſeveral men were ſucceſſively ſtriking with their hammers a piece of heated iron upon an anvil, he remarked, that all the ſounds produced by their ſtrokes were harmonious except one. The ſounds, which he obſerved to be chords, were the octave, the fifth, and the third; but that ſound which he perceived to lie between the third and the fifth he found to be diſcordant. Going into the work-ſhop, he obſerved, that the diverſity of ſounds aroſe, not from the form of the hammers, nor from the force with which they were ſtruck, nor from the poſition of the iron, but merely from the difference of weight in the hammers. Taking therefore the exact

[a] Conf. Meurſii Theolog. Arithm. Nicomach. apud Phot. Alexand. in Metaph. c. 5. Macrob. Somn. Scip. l. i. c. 6. Anon. Vit. Pyth. apud Phot. Cudworth. Syſt. Int. c. iv. § 20. Weigelius in Tetract. Pyth. p. 350. Huet. Dem. Pr. iv. c. ii. § 8. Selden de Diis Syriis, l. ii. c. 1. Burnet. Arch. l. i. c. 11. Hen. More de Cabb. Phil. c. ii. p. 125, &c. Plut. Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 3. Gaſſend. Phyſ. l. i. c. 5.

[b] Jambl. c. xxv. n. 110. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 257. Theon. Smyrn Math. c. i. p. 15. Ptolom. Harm. c. 2. Porphyr. in Harm. Ptol. Nicom. Manual. Harm. l. i. c. 2.

weight of the ſeveral hammers, he went home, and ſuſpended four ſtrings of the ſame ſubſtance, length, and thickneſs, and twiſted in the ſame degree, and hung a weight at the lower end of each, reſpectively equal to the weight of the hammers; upon ſtriking the ſtrings, he found, that the muſical chords of the ſtrings correſponded with thoſe of the hammers. Hence it is ſaid, that he proceeded to form a muſical ſcale, and to conſtruct ſtringed inſtruments. His ſcale was, after his death, engraved in braſs, and preſerved in the temple of Juno at Samos* *.

Pythagoras conceived that the celeſtial ſpheres in which the planets move, ſtriking upon the æther through which they paſs, muſt produce a ſound; and that this ſound muſt vary according to the diverſity of their magnitude, velocity, and relative diſtance. Taking it for granted, that every thing reſpecting the heavenly bodies is adjuſted with perfect regularity, he further imagined, that all the circumſtances neceſſary to render the ſounds produced by their motion harmonious, were fixed in ſuch exact proportions, that the moſt perfect harmony is produced by their revolutions. This fanciful doctrine reſpecting the muſic of the ſpheres gave riſe to the names which Pythagoras applied to muſical tones. The laſt note in the muſical octave he called *Hypate*, becauſe he ſuppoſed the ſphere of Saturn, the higheſt planet, to give the deepeſt tone; and the higheſt note he called *Neate*, from the ſphere of the moon,

* Jambl. c. xxvi. n. 115. Nicom. c. vi. n. 10. Boeth. de Muſic. c. 10. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. l. ii. c. 6. Cenſorin. de Die Nat. c. 10.

* Dr. Burney diſcredits the whole of this ſtory, and humorouſly ſays: "Though both hammers and anvil have been ſwallowed by antients and moderns, and have paſſed through them from one to another with an oſtrich-like digeſtion, upon examination and experiment it appears, that hammers of different ſize and weight will no more produce different tones upon the ſame anvil, than bows or clappers of different ſize will, from the ſame ſtring or bell." He adds, however, that though modern incredulity and experiment have robbed Pythagoras of the glory of diſcovering muſical ratios by accident, he has been allowed the ſuperior merit of arriving at them by meditation and deſign. At leaſt the invention of the Harmonical Canon, or Monochord (an inſtrument of a ſingle ſtring furniſhed with moveable bridges, and contrived for the meaſuring and adjuſting the ratios of muſical intervals by accurate diviſions) has been aſcribed to him both by antient and modern writers. See Burney's Hiſtory of Muſic, vol. i. p. 441.

which

which being the loweſt, or neareſt the earth, he imagined, produced the ſhrilleſt ſound. In like manner of the reſt. It was ſaid of Pythagoras by his followers, who heſitated at no aſſertion, however improbable, which might ſeem to exalt their maſter's fame, that he was the only mortal ſo far favoured by the gods as to be permitted to hear the celeſtial muſic of the ſpheres[a]. Pythagoras applied muſic to the cure of diſeaſes both bodily and mental[b]. It was, as we have ſeen, the cuſtom of his ſchool, to compoſe their minds for reſt in the evening, and to prepare themſelves for action in the morning, by ſuitable airs, which they performed upon the lute, or other ſtringed inſtruments. The muſic was, however, always accompanied with verſe, ſo that it may be doubted, whether the effect was to be aſcribed more to the muſician or to the poet. It is ſaid of Clinius[c], a Pythagorean, that whenever he perceived himſelf inclined to anger, ſpleen, or other reſtleſs paſſions, he took up his lute, and that it never failed to reſtore the tranquillity of his mind. Of Pythagoras himſelf it is related[d], that he checked a young man, who, in the midſt of his revels, was meditating ſome act of Bacchanalian madneſs, by ordering the muſician, who had inflamed his paſſions by Phrygian airs, to change the muſic on a ſudden into the ſlow and ſolemn Doric mood. If the ſtories which are related by the antients concerning the wonderful effects of their muſic are to be credited, we muſt acknowledge we are ſtrangers to the method by which theſe effects were produced.

Beſides arithmetic and muſic, Pythagoras cultivated geometry, which he had learned in Egypt; but he greatly improved it by inveſtigating many new theorems, and by digeſting its principles, in an order more perfectly ſyſtematical than had before been done. Several Grecians, about the time of Pythagoras, applied themſelves to mathematical learning, particularly Thales in Ionia. But Pythagoras ſeems to have done more than any other philoſopher

[a] Jambl. Vit. Pyth. c. xiv. n. 65. Voſſ. de Mathem. c. xx. p. 81. Gebhard de Harm. Cæl. Pythag. Macrob. l. ii. c. 6.

[b] Porph. n. 30. Jambl. c. xxv. n. 65.

[c] Ælian, l. xiv. c. 23.

[d] Boeth. de Muſ. l. iv. c. 14.

of this period towards reducing geometry to a regular ſcience[a]. His definition of a point is, a monad or unity with poſition. He taught that a geometrical point correſponds to unity in arithmetic, a line to two, a ſuperficies to three, a ſolid to four. Of the geometrical theorems aſcribed to Pythagoras, the following are the principal; that the interior angles of every triangle are together equal to two right angles; that the only polygons which will fill up the whole ſpace about a given point, are the equilateral triangle, the ſquare, and the hexagon; the firſt to be taken ſix times, the ſecond four times, and the third three times; and that, in rectangular triangles, the ſquare of the ſide which ſubtends the right angle is equal to the two ſquares of the ſides which contain the right angle. Upon the invention of this latter propoſition (Euclid, l. i. Prop. 47.) Plutarch ſays, that Pythagoras offered an ox, others, an hecatomb, to the gods. But this ſtory is thought by Cicero[b] inconſiſtent with the inſtitutions of Pythagoras, which, as he ſuppoſes, did not admit of animal ſacrifices. Pythagoras inferred the ſtature of Hercules from the length of the Olympic courſe[c], which meaſured ſix hundred of his feet. Obſerving how much ſhorter a courſe ſix hundred times the length of the foot of an ordinary-ſized man was than the Olympic courſe, he inferred, by the law of proportion, the length of Hercules's foot; whence the uſual proportion of the length of the foot to the heighth of a man enabled him to determine the problem. Pythagoras alſo applied geometrical ideas as ſymbolical expreſſions of bodies, and of natural principles; but nothing certain, or intelligible, is preſerved on this head.

On aſtronomy, the doctrine of Pythagoras, or, however, of the antient Pythagoreans, was as follows:

The term Heaven either denotes the ſphere of the fixed ſtars, or the whole ſpace between the fixed ſtars and the moon, or the whole world, including both the celeſtial ſpheres and the earth[d]. There are ten celeſtial ſpheres, nine of which are viſible to us; namely,

[a] Proclus in Euclid. l. ii. iii. Laert. [b] De Nat. Deor. l. iii.
[c] A. Gell. l. i. c. 1. [d] Anon. Photii. l. c.

that

that of the fixed ſtars, thoſe of the ſeven planets, and that of the earth; the tenth is the Antichthon, or an inviſible ſphere oppoſite to the earth, which is neceſſary to complete the harmony of nature, as the Decad is the completion of numerical harmony. And this Antichthon may be the cauſe of the greater number of the eclipſes of the ſun than of the moon[a]. Fire holds the middle place in the univerſe[b]; or, in the midſt of the four elements is placed the fiery globe of unity; the earth is not without motion, nor ſituated in the center of the ſpheres, but is one of thoſe planets which make their revolution about the ſphere of fire. The revolution of Saturn is completed in thirty years, that of Jupiter in twenty, that of Mars in two, that of the Sun, and of Mercury and Venus, in one year. The diſtance of the ſeveral celeſtial ſpheres from the earth correſpond to the proportion of notes in the muſical ſcale. The moon and other planetary globes are habitable. The earth is a globe, which admits of Antipodes[c].

From ſeveral of theſe particulars reſpecting the aſtronomical doctrine of Pythagoras, it has been inferred, that he was poſſeſſed of the true idea of the ſolar ſyſtem, which was revived by Copernicus, and has ſince been fully eſtabliſhed by Newton.

The pupils of the Pythagorean ſchool were conducted from this preparatory ſtudy to the knowledge of natural, theological, and moral ſcience.

Concerning Wiſdom in general, Pythagoras taught, that it is the ſcience which is converſant with thoſe objects, which are in their nature immutable, eternal, and incorruptible, and therefore alone can properly be ſaid to exiſt. The man who applies himſelf to this kind of ſtudy is a philoſopher. The end of philoſophy is, that the human mind may, by ſuch contemplation, be aſſimilated to the di-

[a] Plut. de an. Procr. t. iii. p. 98. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 614. Simplic. ad Ariſt. de Cælo, l. ii. c. 13.

[b] Stob. Ecl. Ph. l. i. c. 25. Plut. in Num. x. t. i. p. 123. Plac. Ph. l. ii. c. 12. Laert. l. viii. § 85. Plut. Plat. Qu. et in Num. Clem. Alex. p. 556. Ariſt. t. i. p. 363.

[c] Jambl. c. vi. n. 31. Plin. l. ix. c. 21. 21. Cenſorin. de Die Nat. c. 13. Laert. l. viii. § 14. 26. Plin. l. ii. c. 8.

vine,

vine, and at length be qualified to join the assembly of the gods. In the pursuit of wisdom, the utmost care must be taken to raise the mind above the dominion of the passions, and the influence of sensible objects, and to disengage it from all corporeal impressions, that it may be inured to converse with itself, and to contemplate things spiritual and divine [a]. For this purpose the assistance of God, and of good dæmons, must be invoked by prayer [b]. Philosophy, as it is conversant with speculative truth, or with the rules of human conduct, is either theoretical or practical. Practical philosophy is only to be studied so far as may be necessary for the purposes of life [c]; theoretical philosophy is the perfection of wisdom. Contemplative wisdom cannot be completely attained, without a total abstraction from the ordinary affairs of life, and a perfect tranquillity and freedom of mind. Hence the necessity of instituting a society, separated from the world, for the purpose of contemplation and study [d].

Active or moral philosophy, which prescribes rules and precepts for the conduct of life, according to Aristotle [e], was first taught by Pythagoras, and after his death by Socrates. Among the moral maxims and precepts ascribed to Pythagoras are the following:

Virtue is divided into two branches, private and public. Private virtue respects education, silence, abstinence from animal food, fortitude, sobriety, and prudence. The powers of the mind are, reason and passion; and when the latter is preserved in subjection to the former, virtue is prevalent. Young persons should be inured to subjection, that they may always find it easy to submit to the authority of reason. Let them be conducted into the best course of life, and habit will soon render it the most pleasant. Silence is better than idle words. A wise man will prepare himself for every thing which is not in his own power. Do what you judge to be

[a] Jambl. c. xii. n. 59. c. xxix. n. 159, 160. c. xxxii. n. 228. Porph. n. 46, 53. Jambl. Intr. in Nicom. Stob. Serm. i. p. 7. Hierocl. in fin. Aur. Carm.

[b] Aur. Carm. v. 61, 62. Hieroc. Jamblic. Protrept. c. 3. 9. 14. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. vi. § 50.

[c] Hieroc. l. c. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. ii. p. 417. Stob. Eth. c. 3. p. 164. Jambl. Vit. P. c. xxii. n. 101. [d] Magna Mor. l. i. c. 2.

right,

right, whatever the vulgar may think of you; if you deſpiſe their praiſe, deſpiſe alſo their cenſure. It is inconſiſtent with fortitude to relinquiſh the ſtation appointed by the Supreme Lord, before we obtain his permiſſion. Sobriety is the ſtrength of the ſoul, for it preſerves its reaſon unclouded by paſſion. No man ought to be eſteemed free, who has not the perfect command of himſelf. Drunkenneſs is a temporary phrenſy. That which is good and becoming, is rather to be purſued, than that which is pleaſant. The deſire of ſuperfluity is fooliſh, becauſe it knows no limits. All animal pleaſures ſhould rather be poſtponed, than enjoyed before their time; and ſhould only be enjoyed according to nature, and with ſobriety. Much forethought and diſcretion is neceſſary in the production and education of children. Wiſdom and virtue are our beſt defence; every other guard is weak and unſtable. It requires much wiſdom to give right names to things*.

Concerning public virtue, the doctrine of Pythagoras, as it is tranſmitted to the preſent time, reſpects converſation, friendſhip, religious worſhip, reverence to the dead, and legiſlation. Upon theſe heads he is ſaid to have taught thus:

Converſation ſhould be adapted to the characters and condition of the perſons with whom we converſe: that diſcourſe and behaviour which might be proper among young perſons, may be exceedingly improper between the young and aged. Propriety and ſeaſonableneſs are the firſt things to be regarded in converſation. In all ſociety a due regard muſt be had to ſubordination. Reſpect is due to a worthy ſtranger, ſometimes in preference even to countrymen or relations. It is better that thoſe who converſe with you ſhould reſpect you, than that they ſhould fear you; for reſpect produces admiration, but fear produces hatred. It is an evident proof of a good education, to be able to endure the want of it in others. Between friends, the utmoſt care ſhould be taken to avoid contention, which can only be done by ſhunning as much as poſſible all occaſions of

* Stobæi Serm. 5, 17, 18, 37, 39, 66, 99. Jambl. Vit. Pyth. c. xxxi. n. 224. xxxii. Protrept. c. 6. Diod. Excerpt. Valeſ. p. 247. Cic. de Senect. c. 20. Tuſc. Q. l. i.

ſtrife, ſuppreſſing reſentment, and exerciſing mutual forbearance. Reproof and correction are uſeful and becoming from the elder to the younger; eſpecially when they are accompanied, on the part of the reprover, with evident tokens of affection[a].

Mutual confidence is never for a moment to be interrupted between friends, whether in jeſt or earneſt; for nothing can heal the wounds which are made by deceit. A friend muſt never be forſaken in adverſity, nor for any infirmity in human nature, excepting only invincible obſtinacy and depravity. Before we abandon a friend, we ſhould endeavour, by actions as well as words, to reclaim him. True friendſhip is a kind of union which is immortal[b].

The deſign and object of all moral precepts, is to lead men to the imitation of God. Since the Deity directs all things, every good thing is to be ſought for from him alone; and nothing is to be done which is contrary to his pleaſure. Whilſt we are performing divine rites, piety ſhould dwell in the mind. The gods are to be worſhipped not under ſuch images as repreſent the forms of men, but by ſuch ſymbols as are ſuitable to their nature, by ſimple luſtrations and offerings, and with purity of heart. Gods and heroes are to be worſhipped with different degrees of homage, according to their nature. Oaths are in no caſe to be violated[c].

The bodies of the dead are not to be burned. Next to gods and dæmons, the higheſt reverence is due to parents and legiſlators; and the laws and cuſtoms of our country are to be religiouſly obſerved[d]. —Thus much concerning the Active or Moral philoſophy of Pythagoras.

Theoretical Philoſophy, which treats of Nature and its Origin, was the higheſt object of ſtudy of the Pythagorean ſchool, and included all thoſe profound myſteries, which thoſe, who have been

[a] Jambl. c. vi. n. 32. c. xxx. n. 180, 182. Stob.

[b] Jambl. c. xvi. n. 69. c. xxvii. n. 162. c. xxx. n. 181. c. xxxiii. n. 229—232. Cic. de Off. l. iii. Val. Max. l. iv. c. 7. Lactant. l. v. c. 18.

[c] Jamb. n. 86. c. xxviii. n. 149. 151. c. xxx. n. 174. Diod. Exc. Cic. de Leg. l. ii. c. 11. Laert. l. viii. § 32, 35.

[d] Jambl. c. xxviii. n. 154. c. xxx. n. 175. Porph. n. 38. Plin. l. xxxv. c. 5.

ambitious

ambitious to report what Pythagoras ſaid behind the curtain, have endeavoured to unfold. Upon this ſubject, nothing can be advanced with certainty, eſpecially reſpecting theology, the doctrine of which, Pythagoras, after the manner of the Egyptian prieſts, was peculiarly careful to hide under the veil of ſymbols, probably through fear of diſturbing the popular ſuperſtitions[a]. The antients have not, however, left us without ſome grounds of conjecture.

With reſpect to God, Pythagoras appears to have taught, that he is the Univerſal Mind; diffuſed through all things; the ſource of all animal life; the proper and intrinſic cauſe of all motion; in ſubſtance ſimilar to light; in nature like truth; the firſt principle of the univerſe; incapable of pain; inviſible; incorruptible, and only to be comprehended by the mind[b].

The phraſe made uſe of by Theophilus Antiochenus, who, in repreſenting the Pythagorean doctrine concerning the Deity, calls him *αυτομάτισμὸς τῶν παντῶν*[c], "the ſelf-moving principle of all things," has been underſtood to imply the doctrine of the fortuitous formation of the world, afterwards taught by Epicurus; but the phraſe, when applied to God, may as properly denote, that he is the original intrinſic cauſe of all motion; and this is the only ſenſe which can be affixed to the words, conſiſtently with the general voice of antiquity concerning the theology of Pythagoras.

An obſcure paſſage in Ariſtotle[d], where he relates, that, "among the Pythagoreans, ſome aſſert Soul to be of the nature of *ξύσματα*, the motes which float in the air, and others maintain it to be, that by which they are moved," has alſo been adduced to prove, that Pythagoras ought to be ranked among the Atomic philoſophers. But theſe *ξύσματα*, though themſelves material, are by the Pythagoreans ſuppoſed, prior to the exiſtence of bodies, to have been portions of that eternal fire or ether, which is active and intelligent, and from that cauſe to have a principle of motion within themſelves.

The account, which we have given of the Pythagoric doctrine

[a] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. iv. p. 477. Joſeph. contra Apion. l. ii. p. 1077.

[b] Lactant. l. i. c. 5. Theoph. Antiochen. ad Autolyc. l. i. c. 5. Porphyr. n. 41. Plut. Num. t. iv. p. 117.

[c] l. c. [d] De Cælo. c. iii. § 14.

concerning the Divine Nature, is confirmed by Cicero, who aſſerts[a], that Pythagoras conceived God to be a ſoul pervading all nature, of which every human ſoul is a portion: a doctrine perfectly conſonant to the opinions received in the countries which Pythagoras viſited, and where he learned theology. Clemens Alexandrinus, ſpeaking of the tenets of the Pythagoreans, ſays, that they held God to be ψύχωσις τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ[b], the animating principle of the univerſal ſphere. And Juſtin Martyr (in a paſſage which deſerves the more attention, becauſe, being in the Doric dialect, it is probably a quotation from ſome antient Pythagorean) expreſsly ranks Pythagoras among the Theiſtical philoſophers. "If any one[c]," ſays he, "wiſhes to be informed more accurately concerning the doctrine of Pythagoras with reſpect to One God, let him hear his opinion, for he ſays: God is one; he is not, as ſome conjecture, exterior to the world, but, in himſelf entire, pervades the univerſal ſphere, ſuperintends all productions, is the ſupport of all nature, eternal, the ſource of all power, the firſt ſimple principle of all things, the origin of celeſtial light, the father of all, the mind and animating principle of the univerſe, the firſt mover of all the ſpheres." From comparing this paſſage with others before cited, it may be concluded, with much appearance of probability, that Pythagoras conceived the deity to be the informing ſoul of the world, animating it in a manner ſimilar to that in which the human ſoul animates the body: the doctrine which Zeno afterwards adopted as the foundation of the Stoic ſyſtem. It may alſo be conjectured, from the phraſe, φωσφόρα ἐν οὐρανῷ, "heavenly light," that Pythagoras, after the oriental philoſophers, conceived of the deity as a ſubtle fire, eternal, active, and intelligent. Though he does not ſeem to have had the idea of a pure ſpirit, he nevertheleſs appears to have conceived of him as incorporeal, in the ſenſe in which that term was commonly underſtood by the antients; that is, as free from all the properties of groſs matter, and as poſſeſſing a power of communicating motion, and of forming and directing the univerſe, with which he is intimately connected as its animating principle.

[a] Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 12. de Senect. c. 21. [b] L. c.
[c] Orat. ad Gentes, p. 18. ed Paris.

Pythagoras, probably, did not admit two primary principles, but conſidered nature, in its original ſtate, as one whole, animated by an intelligent, but material principle, which at length ſeparated itſelf from the chaotic maſs, or detached paſſive matter from itſelf; after which the ſubtle active fire and the paſſive matter remained diſtinct principles.

This explanation of the doctrine of Pythagoras may ſerve to caſt ſome light upon the myſterious ſymbols, under which his theory of nature was concealed. Upon this ſuppoſition, the Monad, or Unity, will denote the primary chaotic ſtate of nature exiſting as one whole, which comprehended an active principle, and a paſſive maſs capable of undergoing alterations, and receiving forms. When God is conſidered as acting upon matter, the forming and animating power in nature becomes the Monad, the paſſive maſs is the Duad, and the whole univerſe, perfectly framed, is the Triad; whence all ſubſequent forms ariſe, as the remaining numbers, by the combination of the firſt three, till the whole ſyſtem, or Decad, is completed. But, leſt we ſhould bewilder ourſelves and our readers in the mazes of conjecture, we deſiſt.

Subordinate to the Deity, it was taught in the Italic ſchool, that there are three orders of Intelligence, Gods, Dæmons, Heroes, who are diſtinguiſhed by their reſpective degrees of excellence and dignity, and by the nature of the homage which is due to them; gods being to be preferred in honour to demi-gods or dæmons, and dæmons to heroes, or men [a]. Theſe three orders, in the Pythagorean ſyſtem, were emanations, at different degrees of proximity, from the ſupreme intelligence, the particles of ſubtle ether aſſuming a groſſer clothing the farther they receded from the fountain [b]. The third order, or heroes, were ſuppoſed to be inveſted with a ſubtle material clothing. Hierocles defines a hero to be [c], A rational mind united with a luminous body. If to theſe three ſpecies we add a fourth, the human mind, we have the whole ſcale of

[a] Laert. l. viii. § 23. Aur. Carm. v. 1. Hierocl. Jambl. c. vi. n. 31. Porphyr. περὶ αποχῆς, l. ii. § 38.

[b] Plut. Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 8. t. ii. p. 14. [c] L. c. § 67. p. 212.

divine emanation, as it was conceived by this ſect of philoſophers. All theſe they imagined to proceed from God, as the firſt ſource of intelligence, and to have received from him a pure, ſimple, immutable nature. God, being himſelf one, and the origin of all diverſity, they repreſented him under the notion of Monad, and ſubordinate intelligences, as numbers derived and included in Unity. Thus the Numbers or derived intelligences of Pythagoras agree with the Ideas of Plato, except, perhaps, that the latter were of a nature perfectly ſpiritual, but the former were clothed with a ſubtle etherial body.

The region of the air was ſuppoſed by the Pythagoreans[a] to be full of ſpirits, dæmons, or heroes, who cauſe ſickneſs or health to man or beaſt, and communicate, at their pleaſure, by means of dreams, and other inſtruments of divination, the knowledge of future events. That Pythagoras himſelf held this opinion cannot be doubted, if it be true, as his biographers relate, that he profeſſed to cure diſeaſes by incantations. It is probable that he derived it from the Egyptians[b], among whom it was believed that many diſeaſes were cauſed by demoniacal poſſeſſions.

The MATERIAL WORLD, according to Pythagoras, was produced by the energy of the divine intelligence[c]. It is an animated ſphere, beyond which is a perfect vacuum. It contains ſpheres, which revolve with muſical harmony[d]. The atmoſphere of the earth is a groſs, immutable, and morbid maſs; but the air, or ether, which ſurrounds it is pure, healthful, ſerene, perpetually moving, the region of all divine and immortal natures[e]. The ſun, moon, and ſtars, are inhabited by portions of the divinity, or gods. The ſun is a ſpherical body[f]. Its eclipſes are cauſed by the paſſing of the moon between it and the earth; thoſe of the moon by the intervention of the *antichthon* before explained. The moon is inhabited by dæmons.

[a] Laert. l. viii. § 32. [b] Jambl. de Myſt. Egypt.
[c] Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 25.
[d] Laert. l. viii. § 27. Ariſt. de Cælo, l. ii. c. 1. Plut. Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 10. 25. Sext. Emp. l. vii. c. 95.
[e] Hierocl. l. c. [f] Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 15. Stob. l. c. p. 55.

Comets

Comets are ſtars, which are not always ſeen, but riſe at ſtated periods [a].

Concerning MAN, the Pythagoreans taught, that, conſiſting of an elementary nature, and a divine or rational principle, he is a microcoſm, or compendium of the univerſe; that his ſoul is a ſelf-moving principle, compoſed of two parts, the rational, which is a portion of the ſoul of the world, ſeated in the brain, and the irrational, which includes the paſſions, and is ſeated in the heart [b]; that man participates in both theſe with the brutes, which from the temperament of their body, and their want of the power of ſpeech, are incapable of acting rationally; that the ſenſitive ſoul, θυμος, periſhes, but the rational mind, φρην, is immortal, becauſe the ſource whence it is derived is immortal [c]; that after the rational mind is freed from the chains of the body, it aſſumes an ethereal vehicle, and paſſes into the regions of the dead, where it remains till it is ſent back to this world, to be the inhabitant of ſome other body, brutal or human; and that after ſuffering ſucceſſive purgations, when it is ſufficiently purified, it is received among the gods, and returns to the eternal ſource from which it firſt proceeded [d].

The doctrine of the Pythagoreans, reſpecting the nature of brute animals, and μετεμψυχωσις, the TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS, were the foundation of their abſtinence from animal food, and of the excluſion of animal ſacrifices from their religious ceremonies. The latter doctrine is thus beautifully repreſented by Ovid [e], who introduces Pythagoras as ſaying:

> Morte carent animæ: ſemperque priore relicta
> Sede, novis domibus habitant, vivuntque receptæ.
> Omnia mutantur; nihil interit; errat et illinc,
> Huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoſlibet occupet artus
> Spiritus, eque feris humana in corpora tranſit,

[a] Plut. l. c. c. 28. Jambl. c. vi. n. 30. [b] Laert. l. viii. § 28—31. Plut. l. c. l. iv. c. 2, 4, 7, 20. [c] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 590. Cic. l. c.
[d] Laert. Hieroc. in Aur. Carm. Porph. Vit. Pyth. n. 19.
[e] Metam. l. xv. v. 158, &c.

Inque

Inque feras noſter: nec tempore deperit ullo,
Utque novis fragilis ſignatur cera figuris,
Nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas ſervat eaſdem,
Sed tamen ipſa eadem eſt, animam ſic ſemper eandem
Eſſe, ſed in varias doceo migrare figuras [a].

This doctrine Pythagoras probably learned in Egypt, where it was commonly taught [b]. Nor is there any ſufficient reaſon for underſtanding it, as ſome have done, ſymbolically.

We muſt not take our leave of Pythagoras, without adding a few ſpecimens of his SYMBOLS, which, though they were at firſt made uſe of for the purpoſe of concealment, and though their meaning has always been religiouſly kept ſecret by the Pythagoreans themſelves, have awakened much curioſity, and given occaſion to many ingenious conjectures, which, however, unleſs they were more ſatisfactory, it would anſwer no purpoſe to repeat.

Among the ſymbols of Pythagoras, recited by Jamblichus and others [c], are the following. Adore the ſound of the whiſpering

[a] What then is death, but antient matter dreſt
In ſome new figure, and a varied veſt:
Thus all things are but altered, nothing dies;
And here and there th'unbodied ſpirit flies,
By time, or force, or ſickneſs diſpoſſeſs'd,
And lodges where it lights, in man or beaſt;
Or hunts without, till ready limbs it find,
And actuates thoſe according to their kind;
From tenement to tenement is toſt,
The ſoul is ſtill the ſame, the figure only loſt:
And as the ſoftened wax new ſeals receives,
This face aſſumes, and that impreſſion leaves;
Now call'd by one, now by another name,
The form is only chang'd, the wax is ſtill the ſame:
So death, thus call'd, can but the form deface,
The immortal ſoul flies out in empty ſpace,
To ſeek her fortune in ſome other place. DRYDEN.

[b] Herodot. l. ii. c. 123. Diod. Sic. apud Euſeb. Pr. l. x. c. 8.
[c] Ch. xxxii. n. 227. Protrept. c. ult. Laert. l. viii. Plut. Iſ. et Oſ.

wind.

wind. Stir not the fire with a ſword. Turn aſide from an edged tool. Paſs not over a balance. Setting out on a journey, turn not back, for the furies will return with you. Breed nothing that hath crooked talons. Receive not a ſwallow into your houſe. Look not in a mirror by the light of a candle. At a ſacrifice, pare not your nails. Eat not the heart, or brain. Taſte not that which hath fallen from the table. Break not bread. Sleep not at noon. When it thunders, touch the earth. Pluck not a crown. Roaſt not that which has been boiled. Sail not on the ground. Plant not a palm. Breed a cock, but do not ſacrifice it, for it is ſacred to the ſun and moon. Plant mallows in thy garden, but eat them not. Abſtain from beans [a].

The precept prohibiting the uſe of beans, is one of the myſteries which the antient Pythagoreans never diſcloſed, and which modern ingenuity has in vain attempted to diſcover. Its meaning was probably rather diætetic, than phyſical, or moral. But enough of theſe enigmatical trifles. Pythagorean precepts of more value are ſuch as theſe: Diſcourſe not of Pythagorean doctrines without light. Above all things govern your tongue. Engrave not the image of God in a ring. Quit not your ſtation without the command of your general. Remember that the paths of virtue and of vice reſemble the letter Y. To this ſymbol Perſius refers, when he ſays [b],

> Et tibi quæ Samios diduxit litera ramos,
> Surgentem dextro monſtravit limite collem [c] *. †.

[a] Adjicienda hæc: Ad ſolem converſus, ne meieto. Facula ſedem ne extergito. Cum eâ, quæ aurum habet, non congreditor.

[b] Sat. iii. 56.

[c] See Pythagoras's Golden Verſes with the Commentary of Hierocles; and compare Rowe's Paraphraſe.

> * There has the Samian Y's inſtructive make
> Pointed the road thy doubtful foot ſhould take;
> There warn'd thy raw and yet unpractis'd youth,
> To tread the riſing right-hand path of truth.

† Videnda. Jonſ. l. i. c. 3. ii. 3. iv. ult. Vit. Pythag. a Porphyrio et a Jamblicho; Ritterhuſio, Altdorf. 1610. Holſtenio, Rom. 1630; Kuſtero, Amſt. 1707. Anon. ap.

ap. Phot. Cod. 259. Scheffer de Nat. et Conſtit. Phil. Ital. Wittenb. 1701. Gerdilii Introd. ad Stud. Theol. Ploucquet de Speculat. Pyth. Tubing. 1758. Burnet Archæol. l. i. c. 11. Huet. Dem. Ev. Prop. iv. c. 54. 83. 186. 224. Pr. ix. c. 147. Voſſ. de Sect. p. 19. Budd. Ann. Hiſt. Ph. p. 8. Le Clerc Biblioth. Choiſ. t. x. p. 81—90. t. xxvii. p. 424. Voſſ. de Math. p. 149. Horn. Hiſt. Phil. p. 173. Petav. Rat. Temp. p. i. p. 135. Amœnit. Lit. t. vii. p. 188. Selden de Jure, l. i. c. 2. Grot. Epiſt. 552. L'Enfant Bibl. Germ. t. ii. art. 5. Budd. Hiſt. Eccl. V. T. t. ii. p. 1077. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 450. v. ii. p. 257. Baſnage Hiſt. des Juifs, t. ii. p. 592. Meurſ. in Cret. c. 111. Naude Apologie, c. x. p. 136. Stoll. Hiſt. Phil. Mor. Gent. § 119. Bayle. Schulter de Diſciplina Pyth. Schraderus de Pythag. Diſſ. 1. Crugerus de Aureo Femore Pyth. Budd. Diſſ. de ἀσκησει Phil. Ann. p. 109. Deulengii Obſ. Sac. t. iii. p. 443. Koeler Diſſ. de Pædantiſmo Pyth. Windet de Vit. Funct. Statu. § 5. p. 88. Nicomach. Intr. ad Arithm. Budd. Diſſ. de καθαρσει Pyth. in Ann. Lud. Boye Diſſ. 10. Weinreich de Abſtin. carn. Pyth. Miſc. Lipſ. t. iv. Obſ. 85. Dodwel. de Ætat. Pyth. p. 125. Mourgues Plan. Theol. de Pythag. Herbert Rel. Gent. c. x. Cudworth. c. iv. § 20, 21. cum not. Moſhem. Geraſen. Arithm. ap. Phot. Cod. 187. Diſſ. de Num. Pyth. Amœn. Lit. t. vii. p. 173. Morhoff Polyhiſt. Lit. t. ii. l. i. c. 2. Beauſob. Hiſt. Manich. t. i. p. ii. l. i. c. 6. Wallis Op. t. i. p. 65. Sturm. Math. p. 6. H. More Defenſ. Cabb. Ph. c. 11. p. 125. Bapt. Dous de Præſtant. Muſ. Vet. Rom. 1635. Fell on Ant. Muſ. Oxon. 1672. Hanſch. de Enthuſ. Plat. ſ. v. D. Omeis in Ethic. Pyth. Altdorf. 1693. Syrbius Introd. in Phyſ. Pyth. Kepler de Harm. Mundi. Rhodius de Tranſmigratione.

SECT. 2.

OF THE DISCIPLES AND FOLLOWERS OF PYTHAGORAS.

IN the preceding hiſtory of Pythagoras we have ſeen, that diſciples flocked to him from various parts of Italy, and that his popularity created him numerous enemies, and, during his life, brought upon his followers a ſevere perſecution, which drove many of them into exile.

After the death of the celebrated founder of the Italic ſect, the care

care and education of his children, and the charge of the ſchool, devolved upon ARISTÆUS of Crotonia. He was particularly eminent in the mathematical ſciences, and wrote a treatiſe concerning ſolids, which is mentioned with applauſe by the antients. Having taught the doctrine of Pythagoras thirty-nine years, he was ſucceeded by MNESARCHUS, the ſon of Pythagoras. Pythagorean ſchools were afterwards conducted, in Heraclia, by Clinias and Philolaus; at Metapontum, by Theorides and Eurytus; and at Tarentum, by Archytas. Stobæus profeſſes to have collected fragments of Hippodamus, Hipparchus, and ſeveral other philoſophers, who are ſaid to have belonged to this ſect, but the authenticity of theſe fragments is doubtful[a].

It will be neceſſary to give a more particular account of thoſe, who, though they ranked themſelves among the Pythagoreans, departed in different degrees from the genuine doctrine of their maſter. Among theſe were Alcmæon, Ecphantus, Hippo, Empedocles, Epicharmus, Ocellus Lucanus, Timæus Locrus, Archytas, Hippaſus, Philolaus, and Eudoxus.

ALCMÆON, of Crotonia, one of Pythagoras's diſciples, acquired a high degree of reputation in the Italic ſchool by his knowledge of nature and his ſkill in medicine. He is ſaid to have been the firſt perſon who attempted the diſſection of a dead body. The SUM of his tenets, as far as they can be collected from ſcattered fragments, is this[b]:

Natural objects, which appear multiform to men, are in reality two-fold; intelligible natures, which are immutable; and material forms, which are infinitely variable. The ſun, moon, and ſtars are eternal, and are inhabited by portions of that divine fire, which is the firſt principle in nature. The moon is in the form of a boat, and when the bottom of the boat is turned towards the earth, it is

[a] Jambl. c. ult. n. 265. Laert. l. viii. § 45, 46. Porph. n. 22. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 486.

[b] Laert. l. viii. § 83, &c. Clem. Alex. Str. l. i. p. 305. Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 5. l. v. c. 1. Jambl. Vit. P. c. xxiii. n. 104. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 11. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. p. 54. 60. 93. Plut. Plac. Ph. l. ii. c. 16, 27. l. iv. c. 17, 18.

inviſible. The brain is the chief ſeat of the ſoul. Health conſiſts in preſerving a due mean between the extremes of heat and cold, dryneſs and moiſture.

Ecphantus, who was a native of Syracuſe, taught, that it is impoſſible to arrive at the certain knowledge of nature, which is perpetually liable to change; that the firſt principles of ſenſible things are inviſible atoms, which differ in ſize, form, and power; that the number of theſe is infinite; that they are moved in a perfect void, by the immediate energy of the divine mind, by which the world is animated and governed; and that the earth, placed in the middle of the world, is moved about its center towards the eaſt [a].

The peculiar tenets of Hippo, of Rhegium, were; that the firſt principles in nature are cold and heat, or water and fire; that fire ſeparated itſelf from water, and produced the world; that animal life proceeds from moiſture; and that nothing is free from decay [b]. On account of this latter opinion, Hippo has been ranked among atheiſts. Perhaps the truth is, that, with ſeveral philoſophers of the Ionic ſchool, he paid attention, in his doctrine of phyſics, to material principles alone, taking for granted the exiſtence of an intelligent Efficient Cauſe.

Empedocles, of Agrigentum in Sicily, who flouriſhed about the eighty-fourth Olympiad [c], appears from his doctrine to have been of the Italic ſchool; but under what maſter he ſtudied philoſophy is uncertain. It is not probable, that he was born ſo early as to have had an opportunity of hearing Pythagoras himſelf. After the death of his father Meto, who was a wealthy citizen of Agrigentum, he acquired great weight among his fellow-citizens, by eſpouſing the popular party, and favouring democratic meaſures. He employed a large ſhare of his paternal eſtate in giving dowries to young women, and marrying them to men of ſuperior rank. His conſequence in the ſtate became at length ſo great, that he ventured to aſſume ſeveral of the diſtinctions of royalty, particularly a purple robe, a

[a] Stobæi Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 13. 25. Pſeudo-Orig. Philoſophum, c. xv. Jambl. c. ult.

[b] Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 3. Ælian, l. ii. c. 31. Plut. adv. Colot. t. iii. p. 459. Arnob. l. iv. p 145. Clem. Alex. Adhort. ad Gent. p. 15. Pſ. Orig. Philoſ. c. xvi. Simplicii Phyſ. l. i. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. iii. c. 4. § 30. adv. Math. l. ix. § 361.

[c] B. C. 444.

golden

golden girdle, a Delphic crown, and a train of attendants; always retaining a grave and commanding aſpect. He was a determined enemy to tyranny, and is ſaid to have employed his influence in eſtabliſhing and defending the rights of his countrymen[a].

The ſkill which Empedocles poſſeſſed in medicine and natural philoſophy enabled him to perform many wonders, which he paſſed upon the ſuperſtitious and credulous multitude for miracles. He pretended to drive away noxious winds from his country, and hereby put a ſtop to epidemical diſeaſes. He is ſaid to have checked, by the power of muſic, the madneſs of a young man, who was threatening his enemy with inſtant death; to have cured Pantha, a woman of Agrigentum, whom all the phyſicians had declared incurable; to have reſtored a woman to life, who had lain breathleſs for thirty days; and to have done many other things equally aſtoniſhing, after the manner of Pythagoras: on account of which he was an object of univerſal admiration, ſo that when he came to the Olympic games, the eyes of all the people were fixed upon him[b].

Beſides medical ſkill, Empedocles poſſeſſed poetical talents. The fragments of his verſes, which are diſperſed through various antient writers, have been in part collected by Henry Stephens[c]. This circumſtance affords ſome ground for the opinion of Fabricius[d], that Empedocles was the real author of that antient fragment which bears the name of "The Golden Verſes of Pythagoras." He is ſaid alſo to have been a dramatic poet; but Empedocles the tragedian[e] was another perſon; Suidas, upon ſome unknown authority, calls him the grandſon of the philoſopher. Georgias Leontinus, a celebrated orator, was his pupil; whence it may ſeem reaſonable to infer, that he was an eminent maſter of the art of eloquence. The particulars of his death are variouſly related. Some report, that during the night, after a ſacred feſtival, he was conveyed away towards

[a] Laert. l. viii. § 54—73. Jambl. c. xxiii. n. 4. Porph. Vit. P. n. 29. Philoſtr. Vit. Apoll. l. i. c. 1, l. vii. c. 7. § 6. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. i. § 302.

[b] Jamb. c. xxv. 110. c. xxviii. n. 143. Porph. n. 30. Suidas. Laert. Plin. l. vii. c. 51. Plut. de Curioſ. t. i. p. 237.

[c] In Poeſi Phil. 1574. 8vo. [d] Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 466. [e] Ib. p. 646.

the heavens, amidſt the ſplendour of celeſtial light. Others ſay, that, on the ſame night, he aſcended Mount Etna, and threw himſelf into the burning crater, that the manner of his death not being known, he might afterwards paſs for a god; but that the ſecret was diſcovered by means of one of his brazen ſandals, which was thrown out from the mountain in a ſubſequent eruption of the volcano:

Deus immortalis haberi
Dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Ætnam
Inſiluit [a] *.

The former ſtory is unworthy of the leaſt attention; and the latter is rejected as fictitious by Strabo, and other judicious writers. The truth probably was, as Timæus relates, that, towards the cloſe of his life, Empedocles went into Greece, and never returned; whence the exact time and manner of his death remains unknown. According to Ariſtotle, he died at ſixty years of age. A ſtatue was erected to his memory at Agrigentum, which was afterwards carried to Rome [b].

The Substance of his Philosophy, as may be collected from his fragments, is this:

It is impoſſible to judge of truth by the ſenſes without the aſſiſtance of reaſon, which is led, by the intervention of the ſenſes, to the contemplation of the real nature, and immutable eſſences, of things [c]. The firſt principles of nature are of two kinds, active and paſſive; the active is unity, or God; the paſſive, matter. The active principle is a ſubtle ethereal fire, intelligent and divine. This principle gives being to all things, animates all things, and into this all things will at laſt be reſolved. Many dæmons, portions of the di-

[a] Hor. Ars Poet. v. 465.

* Empedocles, ambitious to be deemed
A god, leaped coolly into Ætna's flames.

[b] Laert. Lucian. Vet. Hiſt. l. ii. t. ii. p. 495. Ovid. in Ibin. Strabo, l. vi.

[c] Cic. Lucull. c. 8. Claudian. de Conſ. v. 71. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 120. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. iv. c. 9. Ariſt. de Anim. l. iii. c. 3.

vine

vine nature, wander through the region of the air, and adminiſter human affairs. Not only man, but brute animals are allied to the divinity; for that one ſpirit which pervades the univerſe unites all animated beings to itſelf, and to one another. It is therefore unlawful to kill or eat animals, which are allied to us in their principle of life[a]. The world is one whole, circumſcribed by the revolution of the ſun, and ſurrounded, not by a vacuum, but by a maſs of inactive matter. The firſt material principles of the four elements are ſimilar atoms, indefinitely ſmall, and of a round form. Matter, thus divided into corpuſcles, poſſeſſed the primary qualities of friendſhip and diſcord, by means of which, upon the firſt agitation of the original chaotic maſs, homogeneous parts were united, and heterogeneous ſeparated, and the four elements compoſed, of which all bodies are generated. The motion of the corpuſcles, which excites the qualities of friendſhip and diſcord, is produced by the energy of the intellectual fire, or divine mind: all motion, and conſequently all life and being, muſt therefore be aſcribed to God. The firſt principles of the elements are eternal; nothing can begin to exiſt, or be annihilated; but all the varieties of nature are produced by combination or ſeparation[b].

In the formation of the world, ether was firſt ſecreted from chaos; then, fire; then, earth; by the agitation of which were produced water and air. The heavens are a ſolid body of air cryſtallized by fire. The ſtars are bodies compoſed of that fiery ſubſtance, which the ether ſent forth in its firſt ſecretion. The ſtars are fixed in the cryſtal of heaven, the planets wander freely beneath it. The ſun is a fiery maſs, larger than the moon. The moon is in the form of a hollow plate, and is twice as far from the ſun as from the earth[c].

[a] Sext. Emp. ib. l. ix. § 4. 64. 303. Ariſt. Met. l. ii. c. 4. De Mund. c. 6. Pſ. Orig. Phil. c. iii. p. 49. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. v. p. 599. Porphyr. de Abſt. l. ii. c. 21. Ovid. Met. l. xv. v. 13.

[b] Sext. adv. Math. l. viii. § 287. Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 4. De Plant. l. i. c. 1. Laert. l. viii. § 76. Stob. Ecl. Ph. c. 13. 17. 25. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 3. 5. 17. 30. Ad Coloten. Clem. Alex. Adm. ad Gent. c. 5.

[c] Plut. Pl. Ph. l. ii. c. 1. 6—13. 20. 24. 27. 31.

The

The ſoul of man conſiſts of two parts; the ſenſitive, produced from the ſame firſt principles with the elements; and the rational, a dæmon ſprung from the divine ſoul of the world, and ſent down into the body as a puniſhment for its crimes in a former ſtate, to remain there till it is ſufficiently purified to return to God. In the courſe of the tranſmigration to which human ſouls are liable, they may inhabit not only different human bodies, but the body of any animal or plant. All nature is ſubject to the immutable and eternal law of neceſſity[a].

Epicharmus, of the iſland of Coos, was early removed by his father to Megara, and afterwards to Syracuſe, where he became a diſciple in the Pythagorean ſchool. The tyranny of Hiero preventing him from aſſuming the public profeſſion of philoſophy, he chiefly applied himſelf to the ſtudy of dramatic poetry, and offended the Pythagoreans by introducing the doctrines and precepts of Pythagoras upon the ſtage. No accurate account of his philoſophical tenets remains. Among the apothegms aſcribed to him are theſe: To die is an evil; but to be dead is no evil. Every man's natural diſpoſition is his good or evil dæmon. He who is naturally inclined to good is noble, though his mother were an Ethiopian[b].

Ocellus the Lucanian, who lived in the age preceding that of Plato (for Archytas informed Plato, in a letter preſerved by Laertius[c], that he had received ſeveral pieces written by Ocellus from his grandſon) wrote a book, *On the Univerſe*, which is ſtill extant[d], and from which Ariſtotle ſeems to have borrowed freely, in his treatiſe on Generation and Corruption. This work, in the ſtate in which it now appears, is not indeed written, after the uſual

[a] Plut. l. c. c. 32. l. iv. c. 25. adv. Colot. Stob. Ecl. Ph. l. i. p. 112. Plut. de Exilio, & de Vit. t. ii. p. 475. 531. & de Iſid. p. 144. Hierocles in Aur. Carm. p. 186. Laert. § 77. Clem. Strom. l. v. p. 607. Ælian. de Nat. Anim. l. xvi. c. 29. Ariſt. Phyſ. l. ii. c. 4. Rhetor. l. i. c. 13.

[b] Laert. l. viii. § 78. Suidas. Jambl. Vit. P. c. xxxv. n. 241. xxxvi. 266. Plut. in Apothegm. t. iii. p. 326. De Adul. ib. p. 172. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 645. Stob. Serm. 36. 218. 228. Lucian. in Longæv. t. ii. p. 835. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. i. § 273. Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. i. c. 8. [c] L. viii. § 80.

[d] Edit. D'Argens, Berolin. 1762. en Grec et en Francois.

manner of the Pythagoreans, in the Doric dialect; but it is probable, that it has undergone a change which was not uncommon, and, at the period when the writings of the Pythagoreans became obſcure on account of the dialect in which they were written, was converted, by the induſtry of ſome learned grammarian, from the Doric to the Attic dialect. That it was originally written in the Doric, appears from ſeveral fragments preſerved by Stobæus [a]. Little attention therefore is due to the opinion [b], that this book was compiled from the writings of Ariſtotle, and is to be conſidered only as an epitome of the Peripatetic doctrine concerning nature. Whatever Ariſtotelian appearance the treatiſe in its preſent form may bear, is to be aſcribed to the pains taken by tranſcribers to elucidate the work. If its doctrine be carefully compared with what has been advanced concerning the Pythagorean ſyſtem, there will be little room left to doubt, that it was written by a diſciple of Pythagoras. The fundamental dogmas of Ocellus perfectly agree with thoſe of the Italic ſchool. His ſubtle ſpeculations concerning the changes of the elements are conſonant to the manner of the Pythagoreans, after they exchanged the obſcure method of philoſophiſing by numbers into a leſs diſguiſed explanation of the cauſes of natural phænomena. As this book paſſed out of the hands of Archytas into thoſe of Plato, it is evident that it was in being before the time of Ariſtotle; and it becomes probable that the Stagyrite, after his uſual manner, borrowed many things from Ocellus, but in a ſenſe very different from that of their firſt author. This remnant of philoſophical antiquity is therefore to be received as a curious ſpecimen of the Pythagorean doctrine, mixed, however, with ſome tenets peculiar to the author. But that the reader may be able to form a judgment for himſelf, we ſubjoin the following brief SUMMARY of the DOCTRINE of Ocellus.

Some things are known by the certain evidence of nature, others are learned by probable reaſoning and conjecture. The univerſe never had a beginning, and will never have an end. The world, in

[a] Conf. Ocell. Luc. ap Gale Opuſc. Myth. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 24.
[b] Burnet Archæol. Phil. l. i. c. 11. Parker de Deo, Diſp. iv. § 3.

its

its preſent beautiful form, is to be diſtinguiſhed from the univerſe from which it is framed. That collection of all beings which forms the world is in itſelf perfect and entire, and has no connection with any thing extrinſic; but the ſeveral parts of the world, conſiſting of natures which are not in themſelves perfect, are connected with other parts, as animals with the air, viſion with light, and plants with the earth. There are certain eſſences, natures, or principles of things, which are not objects of ſight, which are themſelves immutable and perfect, and which are the cauſe of the permanent exiſtence of other things, and of their mutual relation and harmony. Since there is nothing exterior to the univerſe, it is impoſſible that any thing which now exiſts ſhould ever have been produced from, or ſhould ever be reduced to, nothing: individual beings, however, are of limited duration, being ſubject to the changes of birth, increaſe, and decay, in perpetual ſucceſſion. Fire condenſed becomes air; air, water; and water, earth: by an inverſion of the proceſs, the other elements again return to fire; and thus a perpetual circuit of nature is preſerved. Human beings do not undergo this kind of circuitous change, but at death ſuffer entire diſſolution. The form of the world is ſpherical, and it continues perpetually to revolve, without increaſe or diminution. Two things exiſt, production, and its cauſe; the former the paſſive, the latter the active, principle. The world is divided, by the appointment of fate, into the region above the moon, which is liable to no change, and is the habitation of the gods, and the region below the moon, which is ſubject to perpetual variation. In the variable world, the primary active cauſes of things are heat and cold; the paſſive, dryneſs and moiſture. Of the elements, fire and earth are the extremes, water and air the means. Fire is hot and dry; air, hot and moiſt; water, moiſt and cold; earth, cold and dry. All changes, in the variable region of the world are produced by the ſun, who, as he approaches to, or recedes from the earth, produces a continual change in the air, and thence in all ſublunary things. Every region of nature is filled with inhabitants; the heavens with gods, the air with dæmons, and the earth with men. The race of man is perpetual. The parts of the earth, and

its

its inhabitants, are changed and periſh; the earth itſelf always remains.

It ſeems to have been the idea of Ocellus, that the firſt cauſe of the univerſe having always exiſted, things immutable in their nature have exiſted from eternity, and the variable world has from eternity ſuffered a perpetually revolving ſucceſſion of changes. A doctrine not inconſiſtent with the Pythagorean dogma, concerning the production of all things from one eternal ſource, obſcurely expreſſed under the image of the Monad, the fountain of all numbers. The immutable eſſences of Ocellus are the ſame with the intelligible natures of Pythagoras. The doctrine of Ocellus concerning dæmons, that they inhabit the ſublunar regions, is eſſentially different from that of Ariſtotle, who ſuppoſed no ſuch intelligences, except in the celeſtial ſphere. On the whole, we think there is little room to doubt, that Ocellus's work, "Concerning the Univerſe," ought to be ranked among the remains of the Pythagorean, rather than the Peripatetic philoſophy.

TIMÆUS, the Locrian*, flouriſhed in the Italic ſchool, during the time of Plato, who was indebted to him, among other Pythagoreans, for his acquaintance with the doctrine of Pythagoras, and who wrote his dialogue, entitled *Timæus*, on the ground of his book, "On the Nature of Things." A ſmall piece, which he wrote concerning the Soul of the World, is preſerved by Proclus, and is in ſome editions prefixed to Plato's Timæus. In this treatiſe, though he for the moſt part treads in the footſteps of Pythagoras, he departs from him in two particulars; the firſt, that inſtead of one whole, or Monad, he ſuppoſes two independent cauſes of nature, God, or Mind, the fountain of intelligent nature, and Neceſſity, or Matter, the ſource of bodies; the ſecond, that he explains the cauſe of the formation of the world, from the *external* action of God upon matter, after the pattern or ideas exiſting in his own mind. From comparing this piece with Plato's dialogue, it will be found that the Athenian philoſopher has obſcured the ſimple doctrine of the Locrian with

* Cic. de Fin. l. v. Tuſc. Qu. l. i. Macrob. Sat. l. i. c. 1. Chalcidius in Tim. p. 75. Fabric. Bib. Gr. vol. viii. p. 523.

fancies drawn from his own imagination, or from the Egyptian ſchools.

Among the Pythagoric preceptors of Plato, beſides Timæus, was ARCHYTAS, of Tarentum. He is ſaid to have been the eighth in ſucceſſion from Pythagoras; and this account deſerves more credit than the aſſertion of Jamblichus, that he heard Pythagoras in perſon; for the father of this ſect flouriſhed, as we have ſeen, about the ſixtieth Olympiad [a], but Archytas converſed with Plato upon his
3 firſt viſit to Sicily, which was in the ninety-ſixth Olympiad [b]; whence it appears, that there was an interval of above a century between the time of Pythagoras and that of Archytas [c].

Such was the celebrity of this philoſopher, that many illuſtrious names appear in the train of his diſciples, particularly Philolaus, Eudoxus, and Plato [d]. To theſe, Suidas, and after him Eraſmus [e], add Empedocles; but Empedocles certainly flouriſhed about the eighty-fourth Olympiad [f], near fifty years before Archytas. He excelled, not only in ſpeculative philoſophy, but in geometry and mechanics [g]. He is ſaid to have invented a kind of winged automaton, and ſeveral curious hydraulic machines. He was in ſuch high reputation for moral and political wiſdom, that, contrary to the uſual cuſtom, he was appointed ſeven different times to the ſupreme magiſtracy in Tarentum. He exerciſed his authority with moderation, and endeared himſelf to his countrymen by his affability and condeſcenſion. He never chaſtized a ſervant, or puniſhed an inferior, in wrath. To one of his dependants who had offended him, he ſaid, "It is well for you that I am angry; otherwiſe, I know not what you might expect [h]." Of his writings none remain except a metaphyſical work, "On the Nature of the Univerſe," in which he has explained the predicaments; and ſundry fragments, "On Wiſdom," and "On the Good and Happy Man," preſerved by

[a] B. C. 540. [b] B. C. 396.
[c] Laert. l. viii. § 79—86. Suidas. Val. Max. l. iv. c. 1. Strabo, l. vi. Jambl. c. xxiii. n. 103.
[d] Laert. Suid. Cic. [e] Chiliad. p. 550. [f] B. C. 444.
[g] Vitruv. l. ix. c. 3. A. Gell. l. x. c. 12. Ælian, l. vii. c. 14.
[h] Æl. l. xii. c. 19. l. xiii. c. 15. l. xiv. c. 19. Jambl. c. xxxi. n. 197. Plut. de Inſt. Puer. t. i. p. 14.

Stobæus,

Stobæus, and edited from him by Gale[a]. His death, which is ſaid to have been occaſioned by a ſhipwreck, is made a ſubject of poetical deſcription by Horace, who celebrates him as an eminent geographer and aſtronomer[b].

Te maris et terræ, numeroque carentis arenæ
Menſorem cohibent, Archyta,
Pulveris exigui prope litus parva Matinum
Munera: nec quidquam prodeſt
Aerias tentaſſe domos, animoque rotundum
Percurriſſe polum, morituro[c].

Concerning the philoſophical tenets of Archytas the antients are ſilent; except that Ariſtotle, who was an induſtrious collector from the Pythagoreans, borrowed from him the general arrangements which are uſually called his ten categories. The ſum of his moral doctrine is; that virtue is to be purſued for its own ſake in every condition of life; that all exceſs is inconſiſtent with virtue; that the mind is more injured by proſperity than by adverſity; and that there is no peſtilence ſo deſtructive to human happineſs as pleaſure[d]. It is probable that Ariſtotle was indebted to Archytas for many of his moral ideas; particularly for the notion which runs through his ethical pieces, that virtue conſiſts in avoiding extremes.

Hippasus, of Metapontum, is mentioned as having excelled in the application of mathematical principles to muſic, ſtatics, and

[a] Opuſcul. Myth. p. 673. [b] L. i. Od. 28.

[c] Archytas, what avails thy nice ſurvey
Of ocean's countleſs ſands, of earth and ſea?
In vain thy mighty ſpirit once could ſoar
To orbs celeſtial, and their courſe explore;
If here upon the tempeſt-beaten ſtrand
You lie confin'd, till ſome more liberal hand
Shall ſtrew the pious duſt in funeral rite,
And wing thee to the boundleſs realms of light. Francis.

[d] Fragm. de vero bono, ap. Gale. Cic. de Senect. c. 12.

menſuration. He appears to have been an enemy to the concealed method of philoſophiſing adopted by Pythagoras, and to have expreſſed himſelf more plainly concerning the nature of things, than was uſual in the Italic ſchool[a]. In common with other Pythagoreans he held, that fire is the firſt principle of all things, whence they ſpring, and into which they are reſolved in certain periodical revolutions; that this firſt principle is intellectual, and the ſource of all mind; but that when it is extinguiſhed or condenſed, it is converted into the groſſer elements[b]. In this doctrine he approached near to the ſyſtem of Heraclitus, afterwards to be explained. He alſo taught, that the univerſe is finite, is always changing, and undergoes a periodical conflagration.

The firſt philoſopher, who divulged the Pythagoric doctrine, was Philolaus, a native of Crotonia, who afterwards lived at Heraclea. He was a diſciple of Archytas, and flouriſhed in the time of Plato[c]. It was from him that Plato, as we have before related, purchaſed the written records of the Pythagorean ſyſtem, contrary to an expreſs oath taken by the ſociety of Pythagoreans, pledging themſelves to keep ſecret the myſteries of their ſect. It is probable, that among theſe books were the writings of Timæus, upon which Plato formed the dialogue which bore his name. Plutarch relates, that Philolaus was one of the perſons who eſcaped from the houſe which was burned by Cylon, during the life of Pythagoras; but this account cannot be correct. Philolaus was contemporary with Plato, and therefore certainly not with Pythagoras. Interfering in affairs of ſtate, he fell a ſacrifice to political jealouſy.

Philolaus treated the doctrine of nature with great ſubtlety, but at the ſame time with great obſcurity; referring every thing that exiſts to mathematical principles. He taught, that reaſon, im-

[a] Jambl. Vit. Pyth. c. xviii. n. 81. 88. Laert. l. viii. § 84. Jamb. Intr. Nic. p. 11. Smyrnæus de Muſic. c. 12.

[b] Laert. Clem. Al. Protrept. Euſeb. Pr. l. xiv. c. 14. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. iii. c. 4. adv. Math. l. ix. § 361. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 3. Stob. Ecl. Ph. c. 13.

[c] Laert. l. viii. § 15. A. Gell. l. iii. c. 17. Cic. de Orat. l. iii. Jambl. c. xxxvi. n. 266. xxxi. n. 199. Tzetzes Chil. x. Hiſt. 355. Plut. de Gen. Soc. Porph. Vit. Pyth. n. 57.

proved

proved by mathematical learning, is alone capable of judging concerning the nature of things; that the whole world conſiſts of infinite and finite; that number ſubſiſts by itſelf, and is the chain which by its power ſuſtains the eternal frame of things; that the Monad is not the ſole principle of all things, but that the Binary is neceſſary to furniſh materials from which all ſubſequent numbers may be produced; that the world is one whole, which has a fiery center, about which the ten celeſtial ſpheres revolve, heaven, the ſun, the planets, the earth, and the moon; that the ſun has a vitreous ſurface, whence the fire diffuſed through the world is reflected, rendering the mirror from which it is reflected viſible; that all things are preſerved in harmony by the law of neceſſity; and that the world is liable to deſtruction, both by fire and by water[a].

From this ſummary of the doctrine of Philolaus it appears probable, that, following Timæus, whoſe writings he poſſeſſed, he ſo far departed from the Pythagorean ſyſtem as to conceive two independent principles in nature, God and Matter, and that it was from the ſame ſource that Plato derived his doctrine upon this ſubject.

The laſt celebrated name, which remains to be added to the liſt of Pythagoreans is EUDOXUS, of Gnidus. His firſt preceptor was Archytas, by whom he was inſtructed in the principles of geometry and philoſophy. About the age of twenty-three he came to Athens; and though his patrimony was ſmall, by the generous aſſiſtance of Theomedon, a phyſician, he was enabled to attend the ſchools of the philoſophers, particularly that of Plato. The liberality of his friends afterwards ſupported him during a viſit to Egypt, where he was introduced by Ageſilaus to king Nectanebis II. and by him to the Egyptian prieſts. It has been ſaid, that he accompanied Plato into Egypt; but this is inconſiſtent with chronology; for Nectanebis II. reigned in Egypt from the ſecond year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad[b], to the ſecond year of the hundred

[a] Laert. l. viii. § 85, &c. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 92. Jambl. ad Nic. p. 7, 11. Claud. Mamertus de Statu Animæ, l. ii. c. 2, 3. Stob. Ecl. Ph. c. 18. 25. Plut. de Plac. Ph. l. ii. c. 1. 20. l. iii. c. 13. [b] B. C. 363.

and

and ſeventh[a]; and it was before Plato opened his ſchool, that is, before the ninety-eighth Olympiad[b], about the fortieth year of his age, that he viſited Egypt. Eudoxus is highly celebrated by the antients for his ſkill in aſtronomy; but none of his writings on this or any other ſubject are extant. Aratus, who has deſcribed the celeſtial phenomena in verſe, is ſaid to have followed Eudoxus. He flouriſhed about the ninety-ſeventh Olympiad[c], and died in the fifty-third year of his age[d] *.

[a] B. C. 351. [b] B. C. 388. [c] B. C. 392.

[d] Plut. de vivend. ſec. Epic. t. ii. p. 95. Cic. de Div. l. ii. c. 42. A. Gell. l. xvii. c. 21. Laert. l. viii. § 86. Suidas. Athæn. l. vii. p. 276. l. vi. p. 288. 395. Strabo, l. ii. p. 100. l. xvii. Euſeb. Chron. Ol. 89. 3. 97. 1. Ælian, l. vii. c. 17. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. i. § 301.

* Vidend. Fabric. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 466. 486. 501. 508. 645, 6. Obſ. Hal. Lat. t. ii. Obſ. 19. p. 433. t. iv. Obſ. 18, 19. Bayle. Amœnit. Lit. t. vii. p. 247. Le Clerc. Hiſt. Med. p. i. l. ii. c. 5. Otium Vindel. Mel. iii. p. 265. Scip. Aquilianus de Plac. Phil. ante Ariſt. c. 20. 22. Cudworth, c. iv. § 21, &c. cum Not. Moſh. De Antichthon. Pythag. Obſ. Hal. t. iv. Ob. 19. § 25. Stoll. Hiſt. Ph. Mor. Gent. § 136. 138. Burnet Arch. l. i. c. 11. Parker de Deo, Diſp. iv. ſect. 3. Reimmann. Hiſt. Ath. c. 20. § 3. Jonſ. l. i. c. 6. 11. Gale præf. ad Tim. Opuſc. Myth. Schmidii Diſſ. de Archyta. Jenæ. 1683. Voſſ. de Scient. Math. c. 48. § 1. c. 33. § 13. Lipſii Manud. ad Phil. Stoic. l. iii. Diſſ. vii. Thomaſ. de loc. Anim. et Scapha Lunæ, c. 5. § 11. in Hiſt. Sap. et Stult. t. i. p. 72. Cariſt. Hiſt. Mirab. c. 95. Bentleii Ep. Phal. p. 87. Mamertus de Statu Animæ, l. ii. c. 2, 3.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

OF THE ELEATIC SECT.

ALTHOUGH the founder of the ſect, whoſe hiſtory now comes under our conſideration, was an Ionian, three of its moſt celebrated preceptors, Parmenides, Zeno, and Leucippus, having been natives of Elea, or Velia (a town in Magna Græcia, built by a colony of Phoceans in the time of Cyrus) the ſect has derived its name from this place, and is called the ELEATIC[a]. It muſt be divided into two claſſes; one of which treated concerning the nature and origin of things upon *metaphyſical*, the other upon *phyſical*, principles. To the former claſs belong Xenophanes, Parmenides, Meliſſus, and Zeno of Elea; to the latter, Leucippus, Democritus, Protagoras, Diagoras, and Anaxarchus. Concerning each of theſe we ſhall treat diſtinctly.

XENOPHANES[b], the author of the Eleatic ſect, was a native of Colophon. The great length of his life has led different writers to fix different dates to the time in which he flouriſhed; but if the ſeveral chronological accounts of this philoſopher be compared, it will appear probable that he was born, as Euſebius aſſerts, about the fifty-ſixth Olympiad[c]. From ſome cauſe which is not related, Xenophanes early left his country, and took refuge in Sicily, where he ſupported himſelf by reciting, in the court of Hiero, elegiac and iambic verſes, which he had written in reprehenſion of the theogonies of Heſiod and Homer. From Sicily he paſſed over into *Magna Græcia*, where he took up the profeſſion of philoſophy, and became a celebrated preceptor in the Pythagorean ſchool. Indulging however

[a] Strabo, l. vi. p. 252.

[b] Laert. l. viii. § 18. l. i. § 16. Clem. Al. Strom. l. i. p. 301. Plut. Apoth. t. i. p. 327. Pſ. Orig. Phil. c. xiv. p. 94. [c] B. C. 556.

a greater freedom of thought, than was uſual among the diſciples of Pythagoras, he ventured to introduce new opinions of his own, and in many particulars to oppoſe the doctrines of Epimenides, Thales, and Pythagoras. This gave occaſion to Timon, who was a ſevere ſatiriſt, to introduce him in ridicule as one of the characters in his dialogues. Xenophanes poſſeſſed the Pythagorean chair of philoſophy about ſeventy years, and lived to the extreme age of an hundred years, that is, according to Euſebius, till the eighty-firſt Olympiad [a] *.

Of the writings of the Eleatic ſchool nothing remains except a few fragments collected by Henry Stephens. We chiefly rely for our information concerning this ſect upon the authority of Plato and Ariſtotle; the former of whom, while he profeſſed to explain the doctrines of Parmenides, in the dialogues which bear his name, is acknowledged to have adulterated them with opinions of his own; and the latter, in a particular treatiſe concerning Xenophanes, Zeno, and Gorgias, has not ſcrupled to miſrepreſent their tenets, that he might the more eaſily refute them. Theſe and other circumſtances render it extremely difficult to relate, with accuracy, the tenets of the Eleatic ſect. As far as reſpects Xenophanes, after a careful compariſon of the accounts which are given by Ariſtotle and others, the following is the beſt SUMMARY we are able to collect of his doctrine.

In METAPHYSICS, Xenophanes taught [b], that if ever there had been a time when nothing exiſted, nothing could ever have exiſted. That whatever is, always has been from eternity, without deriving its exiſtence from any prior principle; that nature is one and without limit; that what is one is ſimilar in all its parts, elſe it would be many; that the one infinite, eternal, and homogeneous univerſe, is immutable and incapable of change; that God is one incorporeal

[a] Laert. Plut. l. c. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. i. c. 33. § 224. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 557. * B. C. 456.

[b] Ariſt. Phyſ. acroaſ. l. i. c. 2. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 37. Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 5. Pſ. Orig. Ph. c. xi. p. 95. Laert. l. ix. § 19. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. l. i. c. 33. Cic. in Lucull. Ac. Q. l. iv. c. 37.

eternal being, and, like the univerſe, ſpherical in form; that he is of the ſame nature with the univerſe, comprehending all things within himſelf; is intelligent, and pervades all things; but bears no reſemblance to human nature either in body or mind[a].

In PHYSICS, he taught[b], that there are innumerable worlds; that there is in nature no real production, decay, or change; that there are four elements, and that the earth is the baſis of all things; that the ſtars ariſe from vapours, which are extinguiſhed by day and ignited by night; that the ſun conſiſts of fiery particles collected by humid exhalations, and daily renewed; that the courſe of the ſun is rectilinear, and only appears curvilinear from its great diſtance; that there are as many ſuns as there are different climates of the earth; that the moon is an inhabited world; that the earth, as appears from marine ſhells, which are found at the tops of mountains, and in caverns, far from the ſea, was once a general maſs of waters; and that it will at length return into the ſame ſtate, and paſs through an endleſs ſeries of ſimilar revolutions.

The doctrine of Xenophanes concerning nature is ſo imperfectly preſerved, and obſcurely expreſſed, that it is no wonder that it has been differently repreſented by different writers. Some have confounded it with the modern impiety of Spinoza, who ſuppoſed all the appearances in nature to be only modifications of one material ſubſtance. Others have endeavoured to accommodate it to the antient ſyſtem of emanation; and others, to the Pythagoric and Stoic notions of the ſoul of the world. But none of theſe explanations accord with the terms, in which the tenets of Xenophanes are expreſſed. Perhaps the truth is, that he held the univerſe to be one in nature and ſubſtance, but diſtinguiſhed in his conception between the matter of which all things conſiſt, and that latent divine force, which though not a diſtinct ſubſtance, but an attribute, is neceſ-

[a] Clem. Alex. Str. l. v. p. 601. l. vii. p. 701.

[b] Ariſt. Orig. Laert. l. c. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. p. 52. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 49. Plut. de aud. Poet. t. ii. p. 24. 25. Pl. Ph. l. ii. c. 20. Euſeb. Pr. l. i. c. 8. l. xiv. c. 17. Stob. Ecl. Ph. l. i. p. 55, 56. Cic. de Div. l. i. c. 3. Plin. l. ii. c. 103.

ſarily inherent in the univerſe, and is the cauſe of all its perfection. This view of his doctrine ſeems to give conſiſtency to the language aſcribed to him, and is particularly ſuitable to his doctrine, preſerved by Sextus Empiricus, that God is of the ſame nature with the univerſe; τὸν Θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσι.

What Xenophanes maintained concerning the immobility and immutability of nature, is to be underſtood of the univerſe conſidered as one whole, and not of its ſeveral parts, which his phyſical tenets ſuppoſed to be liable to change. If he aſſerted, that there is no motion in nature, he probably underſtood the term motion metaphyſically, and only meant that there is no ſuch thing in nature as paſſing from nonentity to entity, or the reverſe. Perhaps the diſputes among the antients concerning motion, like many other metaphyſical conteſts, were mere combats in the dark, for want of ſettling, at the beginning of the diſpute, the meaning of terms. By the term motion they ſeem more commonly to have meant change of nature, than change of place.

The notion aſcribed to Xenophanes concerning the nature and origin of the celeſtial bodies, as meteors daily renewed, is ſo abſurd, that we are inclined to think it muſt have been defectively or unfairly ſtated. It is not unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, that many of the fancies, aſcribed to philoſophers, are nothing more than the miſconceptions of ignorant or careleſs biographers.

Equally diſtinguiſhed in the Eleatic ſchool with Xenophanes was his diſciple PARMENIDES[a], who continued the ſect at Elea, his native city. He flouriſhed about the ſixty-ninth Olympiad[b]. He is ſaid to have attended upon the inſtructions of Anaximander; but if this be true, it muſt have been whilſt he was very young. His patrimony was large, his early manner of life was ſplendid, and his influence in the civil affairs of life conſiderable, till he formed an intimacy with Diochetas, a Pythagorean, by whom he was perſuaded to withdraw from the buſineſs of public life, to the ſilence and leiſure of the ſchools. He thought himſelf ſo much indebted

[a] Laert. l. ix. § 21, &c. Suidas. Plato in Parmen. Athenæus, l. xi. p. 505. Jambl. Vit. Pyth. c. xxix. n. 166. [b] B.C. 504.

to this poor but honeſt Pythagorean, for having introduced him into the receſſes of philoſophy, that after his death he conſecrated a temple to his memory. Cebes, in his allegorical table, ſpeaks of Parmenides as an eminent pattern of virtue. He wrote the doctrines of his ſchool in verſes [a], of which a few fragments ſtill remain, but in ſo mutilated a ſtate, that they afford little help in explaining his ſyſtem of philoſophy. Plato, in the dialogue which bears the name of Parmenides, profeſſes to repreſent his tenets, but confounds them with his own. From the ſcattered reports of the antients, we gather up the following ABSTRACT [b] of the PHILOSOPHY of PARMENIDES.

Philoſophy is two-fold, that which follows the report of the ſenſes, and that which is according to reaſon and truth. The former treats of the appearances of ſenſible objects, the latter conſiders the abſtract nature of things, and enquires into the conſtitution of the univerſe. Abſtract philoſophy teaches, that from nothing nothing can proceed. The univerſe is one, immoveable, immutable, eternal, and of a ſpherical form. Whatever is not comprehended in the univerſe has no real exiſtence. Nothing in nature is either produced or deſtroyed, but merely appears to be ſo to the ſenſes [c]. Phyſical philoſophy teaches, that the principles of things are heat and cold, or fire and earth, of which the former is the efficient, the latter the material cauſe; that the earth is ſpherical, and placed in the center, being exactly balanced by its diſtance from the heavens, ſo that there is no cauſe why it ſhould move one way rather than another; that the firſt men were produced from mud, by the action of heat upon cold; that the frame of the world is liable to decay, but the univerſe itſelf remains the ſame; and that the chief ſeat of the ſoul is the heart [d].

[a] Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 481. 489.

[b] Laert. l. ix. § 22. Euſeb. Pr. l. i. c. 8. l. xiv. c. 17. Plut. adv. Colot. t. iii. p. 416. 434. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 111. Simplic. in Phyſ. Ariſt. § 7. 17. 31.

[c] Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 2, 3. Pſ. Orig. l. c. c. xi. p. 86. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 24. & adv. Colot. l. c.

[d] Laert. l. c. Plut. adv. Colot. l. c. Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. iv. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. ix. § 9. l. vii. § 6. Stob. Ecl. Ph. c. 12. 24. Plat. in Conv. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. iii. c. 15. l. iv. c. 5.

There is ſo near a reſemblance between the metaphyſical doctrine of Parmenides and Xenophanes, that it appears reaſonable to explain both in the ſame way; excepting, perhaps, that while Xenophanes conſidered the univerſe as poſſeſſing within itſelf a divine force, Parmenides adhered more ſtrictly to the Pythagorean doctrine, and ſuppoſed the Deity to be an informing principle, or intellectual fire, diffuſed throughout the univerſe, but more eſpecially reſiding in the extreme ſphere of the world; on which account he is metaphorically repreſented by this philoſopher as a crown of light, incloſing within its circumference the celeſtial orb [a].

Melissus, of Samos, was a diſciple of Parmenides, and adhered cloſely to his doctrines. As was uſual with the Pythagorean philoſophers, he acquired influence among his countrymen in affairs of ſtate. Plutarch relates, that he was entruſted with the command of a fleet, and gained a victory in a naval engagement with the Athenians. He flouriſhed about the eighty-fourth Olympiad [b]. Like Parmenides, he held that the principle of all things is one and immutable; that this one being includes all things, and is infinite, without beginning or end; that there is neither vacuum, nor motion, in the univerſe, nor any ſuch thing as production or decay [c]: doctrines, which admit of the ſame explanation, which has been given of the tenets of Xenophanes and Parmenides.

About the ſame time flouriſhed Zeno, called the Eleatic, to diſtinguiſh him from Zeno the Stoic, and others. He was a zealous friend of civil liberty, and is celebrated for his courageous and ſucceſsful oppoſition to tyrants; but the inconſiſtency of the ſtories related by different writers concerning him, in a great meaſure deſtroys their credit. He choſe to reſide in his ſmall native city of Elea, rather than at Athens, becauſe it afforded freer ſcope to his independent and generous ſpirit, which could not eaſily ſubmit to the reſtraints of authority. It is related, that he vindicated the warmth

[a] Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 11. [b] B. C. 444.

[c] Laert. l. ix. § 24. Plut. adv. Colot. t. iii. p. 434. Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 7. l. iv. c. 8. Plat. in Theæt. Sext. Emp. Pyr. Hyp. l. iii. c. 7. § 65. Simplic. ad Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 3. Ariſt. de Cælo, l. iii. c. 1.

with

with which he reſented reproach, by ſaying, "If I were indifferent to cenſure, I ſhould alſo be indifferent to praiſe[a]." The invention of the dialectic art has been improperly aſcribed to Zeno; but there can be no doubt that this philoſopher, and other metaphyſical diſputants in the Eleatic ſect, employed much ingenuity and ſubtlety in exhibiting examples of moſt of the logical arts which were afterwards reduced to rule by Ariſtotle and others[b].

According to Ariſtotle[c], Zeno of Elea taught, that nothing can be produced either from that which is ſimilar or diſſimilar; that there is only one being, and that is God; that this being is eternal, homogeneous, and ſpherical, neither finite nor infinite, neither quieſcent nor moveable; that there are many worlds; that there is in nature no vacuum; that all bodies are compoſed of four elements, heat and moiſture, cold and dryneſs; and that the body of man is from the earth, and his ſoul an equal mixture of theſe four elements. He argued with great ſubtlety againſt the poſſibility of motion. If Seneca's[d] account of this philoſopher deſerves credit, he reached the higheſt point of ſcepticiſm, and denied the real exiſtence of external objects. The truth is, that after all that has been advanced by different writers, it is impoſſible to determine whether Zeno underſtood the term *One*, metaphyſically, logically, or phyſically; or whether he admitted or denied a nature properly divine. It is with equal judgment and modeſty, that Moſheim[e] applies to the doctrine of Zeno the words of Terence:

Incerta hæc, ſi tu poſtules
Ratione certa facere, nihilo plus agas,
Quam ſi des operam, ut cum ratione inſanias[f].

[a] Laert. l. ix. § 25, &c. Suidas. Val. Max. l. iii. c. 3.

[b] Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. vii. § 7. Plut. in Pericle, t. iii. p. 178. Plat. in Phædro.

[c] De Xenoph. Zeno. Gorgia, c. 3. t. i. p. 942. Phyſ. l. vi. c. 9.

[d] Ep. 58. [e] Ad Cudw. c. iv. § 21.

[f] Things thus uncertain, if by reaſon's rules
You'd certain make; it were as wiſe a taſk
To try with reaſon to run mad. COLMAN.

Thus

Thus much concerning that branch of the Eleatic ſect, which explained the nature and origin of the univerſe METAPHYSICALLY. A ſecond ſet of philoſophers aroſe in this ſchool, who treated the ſubject PHYSICALLY; and who, giving up all metaphyſical explanations of the cauſe of things, attempted to account for the *phenomena* of nature from the known laws of matter and motion.

The author of this eſſential innovation was LEUCIPPUS[a], who is ſaid by Laertius to have been a native of Elea, and who was a diſciple of Zeno the Eleatic philoſopher. He wrote a treatiſe concerning nature[b], now loſt, from which the antients probably collected what they relate concerning his tenets. Diſſatisfied with the metaphyſical ſubtleties, by which the former philoſophers of this ſchool had confounded all evidence from the ſenſes, Leucippus, and his follower Democritus, determined, if poſſible, to diſcover a ſyſtem more conſonant to nature and reaſon. Leaving behind them the whole train of fanciful conceptions, numbers, ideas, proportions, qualities, and elementary forms, in which philoſophers had hitherto taken refuge, as the aſylum of ignorance, they reſolved to examine the real conſtitution of the material world, and enquire into the mechanical properties of bodies; that from theſe they might, if poſſible, deduce ſome certain knowledge of natural cauſes, and hence be able to account for natural appearances. Their great object was, to reſtore the alliance between reaſon and the ſenſes, which metaphyſical ſubtleties had diſſolved. For this purpoſe they introduced the doctrine of indiviſible atoms, poſſeſſing within themſelves a principle of motion. Several other philoſophers, before their time, had indeed conſidered matter as diviſible into indefinitely ſmall particles, particularly Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Heraclitus. But Leucippus and Democritus were the firſt who taught, that theſe particles were originally deſtitute of all qualities except figure and motion, and therefore may juſtly be reckoned the authors of the Atomic Syſtem of Philoſophy. They looked upon the qua-

[a] Laert. l. ix. § 30. Tzetz. Chil. v. 980.

[b] Pſeud. Orig. Phil. c. xii. p. 88. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 778.

lities,

lities, which preceding philoſophers had aſcribed to matter, as the mere creatures of abſtraction; and they determined to admit nothing into their ſyſtem, which they could not eſtabliſh upon the ſure teſtimony of the ſenſes. They were, moreover, of opinion, that both the Eleatic philoſophers, and thoſe of other ſects, had unneceſſarily encumbered their reſpective ſyſtems, by aſſigning ſome external or internal cauſe of motion, of a nature not to be diſcovered by the ſenſes. They therefore reſolved to reject all metaphyſical principles, and, in their explanation of the *phenomena* of nature, to proceed upon no other ground than the ſenſible and mechanical properties of bodies. By the help of the internal principle of motion, which they attributed to the indiviſible particles of matter, they made a feeble and fanciful effort to account for the production of all natural bodies from phyſical cauſes, without the intervention of Deity. But, whether they meant entirely to diſcard the notion of a divine nature from the univerſe is uncertain. The firſt idea of the atomic ſyſtem was ſuggeſted by Leucippus; it was improved by Democritus, and afterwards carried to all the perfection which a ſyſtem ſo fundamentally defective would admit of, by Epicurus. The following SUMMARY of the DOCTRINE of LEUCIPPUS will exhibit the infant ſtate of the Atomic Philoſophy, and at the ſame time ſufficiently expoſe its abſurdity.

The Univerſe, which is infinite, is in part a *plenum*, and in part a *vacuum*. The *plenum* contains innumerable corpuſcles or atoms, of various figures, which falling into the *vacuum*, ſtruck againſt each other; and hence aroſe a variety of curvilinear motions, which continued till, at length, atoms of ſimilar forms met together, and bodies were produced. The primary atoms being ſpecifically of equal weight, and not being able, on account of their multitude, to move in circles, the ſmaller roſe to the exterior parts of the vacuum, whilſt the larger, entangling themſelves, formed a ſpherical ſhell, which revolved about its center, and which included within itſelf all kinds of bodies. This central maſs was gradually increaſed by a perpetual acceſſion of particles from the ſurrounding ſhell, till at laſt

laſt the earth was formed[a]. In the mean time, the ſpherical ſhell was continually ſupplied with new bodies, which, in its revolution, it gathered up from without. Of the particles thus collected in the ſpherical ſhell, ſome in their combination formed humid maſſes, which, by their circular motion, gradually became dry, and were at length ignited, and became ſtars. The ſun was formed in the ſame manner, in the exterior ſurface of the ſhell; and the moon, in its interior ſurface. In this manner the world was formed; and, by an inverſion of the proceſs, it will at length be diſſolved[b].

Democritus[c], the ſucceſſor of Leucippus, was a native of Abdera[d], a town in Thrace, the ſtupidity of whoſe inhabitants became proverbial. He was of noble deſcent. Laertius, after Apollonius, fixes the time of his birth in the firſt year of the eightieth Olympiad[e]. Ælian[f] muſt therefore have been miſtaken in making him contemporary with Alexander, and could have no good authority for the ſtory which he relates, that Democritus laughed at Alexander, who complained that he had only one world to conquer. Democritus was contemporary with Socrates, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, Zeno, and Protagoras[g]. The father of Democritus, with his fellow citizens, is ſaid[h] to have contributed largely towards the entertainment of the army of Xerxes, on his return to Aſia; in reward of which ſervice, the Perſian king made the Abderites rich preſents, and left among them ſeveral Chaldean Magi. Democritus, according to Laertius, was inſtructed by ſome of theſe eaſtern ſages in aſtronomy and theology. After the death of his father, Democritus determined to travel in ſearch of wiſdom; and therefore, in the diſtribution of his father's eſtates among him and his three brothers, he made choice of that part, which, though leaſt in value, conſiſted of money. His portion is ſaid to have amounted to one hundred talents.

[a] Laert. l. c. Theodoret. Therapeut. Serm. iv. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. i. Plut. de Plac. Ph. l. ii. c. 7. l. iii. c. 12. [b] Laert. et Pſ. Orig. l. c.

[c] Laert. l. ix. § 34. [d] Pomp. Mela, l. ii. c. 2. Solin, c. 10. Cic. ad Attic, l. iv. Ep. 16. Juv. Sat. ix. v. 49. Mart. l. ix. Ep. 25. [e] B. C. 460.

[f] L. iv. c. 20.

[g] A. Gell. l. xvii. c. 21. Plin. l. xxx. c. 1. Euſeb. Chron. Diod. Sic. l. xiv. c. 11. Val. Max. l. viii. c. 7. [h] Herod. l. viii. Laert. § 34, &c.

lents. Little ſtreſs is therefore to be laid upon the inconſiſtent ſtory of his leaving his fields untilled, and giving up his patrimony to his country[a]. Amply provided with money to defray the expences of travelling, after the manner of the age, in which it was cuſtomary to viſit diſtant countries in purſuit of knowledge, he went firſt into Egypt, for the ſake of learning geometry from the Egyptian prieſts; and then turned aſide into Ethiopia, to converſe with the Gymnoſophiſts of that country; after which he paſſed over into Aſia, reſided ſome time among the Perſian Magi, for the purpoſe of learning magical philoſophy, and, as ſome aſſert, travelled into India[b]. Whether, in the courſe of his travels, Democritus viſited Athens, or attended upon Anaxagoras, is uncertain[c]. There can be little doubt, however, that, during ſome part of his life, he was inſtructed in the Pythagorean ſchool, and particularly that he was a diſciple of Leucippus.

After a long courſe of years ſpent in travelling Democritus returned to Abdera, richly ſtored with the treaſures of philoſophy, which he had ſpared neither labour nor expence to procure, but deſtitute of the neceſſary means of ſubſiſtence. His brother Damaſis, however, received him kindly, and liberally ſupplied his exigencies. It was a law in Abdera, that whoever ſhould waſte all his patrimony ſhould be deprived of the rites of ſepulture. Democritus, deſirous of avoiding the diſgrace to which this law ſubjected him, gave public inſtructions to the people, chiefly from his larger *Diacoſmus*, the moſt valuable of his writings: in return he received from his hearers many valuable preſents, and other teſtimonies of reſpect, which relieved him from all apprehenſion of ſuffering public cenſure as a ſpendthrift[d]. Laertius aſſerts, that his countrymen loaded him with riches, to the amount of five hundred talents; but it is wholly incredible that a ſum, which few royal treaſuries were at that time able to furniſh, ſhould have been raiſed in an obſcure town as a

[a] Val. Max. & Æl. l. c. Hor. Ep. l. i. Ep. 12. v. 12. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 29.
[b] Laert. Æl. Suid. Clem. Al. Strom. l. i. p. 304. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xxx. proem. xxiv. c. 17. [c] Laert. Val. Max. l. viii. c. 7.
[d] Laert. Suid. Plin. Hiſt. N. l. xviii. c. 35. Athen. l. iv. p. 168.

gratuity to any individual. There can be no doubt, however, that Democritus, by his learning and wiſdom, and eſpecially by his acquaintance with nature, acquired great fame, and excited much admiration among the ignorant Abderites. By giving previous notice of unexpected changes in the weather, and by other artifices, he had the addreſs to make them believe that he poſſeſſed a power of predicting future events; and by this means he gained ſuch an aſcendency over them, that they not only gave him the appellation of Wisdom, and looked upon him as ſomething more than mortal, but propoſed to entruſt him with the direction of their public affairs. From inclination and habit he, however, preferred a contemplative to an active life, and therefore declined theſe public honours, and paſſed the remainder of his days in ſolitude[a].

It is ſaid, that, from this time, Democritus ſpent his days and nights in caverns and ſepulchres; and that in one of theſe gloomy retreats, whilſt he ſat by his midnight lamp buſily engaged in writing, he was on a ſudden viſited by ſeveral young men, who, in order to terrify him, had clothed themſelves in black garments, and put on maſks, pretending to be ghoſts; but that, upon their appearance, he cooly requeſted them not to play the fool, and went on with the ſtudies in which they found him employed[b]. Others relate[c], that Democritus, in order to be more perfectly maſter of his intellectual faculties, by means of a burning glaſs deprived himſelf of the organs of ſight. But the former of theſe ſtories has the air of fable; and the latter is wholly incredible, ſince the writers who relate it affirm, that Democritus employed his leiſure in writing books, and in diſſecting the bodies of animals, neither of which could very well have been effected without eyes. Cicero, who was not deſtitute of credulity, mentions the ſtory, but at the ſame time intimates his own doubts concerning its truth. Nor is greater credit due to the tale[d], that Democritus ſpent his leiſure hours in chemical reſearches

[a] Clem. Alex. Strom. l. vi. p. 631. Laert. Suidas.

[b] Lucian Philopſeud. t. iii. p. 595.

[c] A. Gell. l. x. c. 17. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. v. c. 39. Plut. de Polypragm. Tertull. Apol. c. 46. [d] Borrich. de Art. Chem. p. 69. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 766.

after

after the philoſopher's ſtone, the dream of a later age; or to the ſtory of his converſation with Hippocrates, grounded upon letters[a], which are ſaid to have paſſed between that father of medicine and the people of Abdera, on the ſuppoſed madneſs of Democritus, but which are ſo evidently ſpurious, that it would require the credulity of the Abderites themſelves to ſuppoſe them genuine. All that is probable concerning this converſation, ſo circumſtantially and eloquently related in the Epiſtles aſcribed to Hippocrates, is, that Hippocrates, who was contemporary with Democritus, admired his extenſive knowledge of nature, and reprobated the ſtupidity of the Abderites, who imputed his wonderful operations to a ſupernatural intercourſe with dæmons, or to madneſs.

The only reaſonable concluſion, which can be drawn from theſe marvellous tales, is, that Democritus was, what he is commonly repreſented to have been, a man of ſublime genius and penetrating judgment, who, by a long courſe of ſtudy and obſervation, became an eminent maſter of ſpeculative and phyſical ſcience; the natural conſequence of which was, that, like Roger Bacon in a later period, he aſtoniſhed and impoſed upon his ignorant and credulous countrymen. Petronius relates, that he was perfectly acquainted with the virtues of herbs, plants, and ſtones, and that he ſpent his life in making experiments upon natural bodies.

Democritus has been commonly known under the appellation of The Laughing Philoſopher; and it is gravely related by Seneca[b], that he never appeared in public, without expreſſing his contempt of the follies of mankind by laughter. But this account is wholly inconſiſtent with what has been related concerning his fondneſs for a life of gloomy ſolitude and profound contemplation; and with that ſtrength and elevation of mind, which his philoſophical reſearches muſt have required, and which are aſcribed to him by the general voice of antiquity. Thus much, however, may be eaſily admitted, on the credit of Ælian[c] and Lucian[d], that a man ſo ſuperior to the

[a] Hippocr. Op. t. ii. p. 901. ed. Lind. Laert. § 42. Æl. l. iv. c. 20.
[b] De Ira, l. ii. c. 10. De Tranq. c. 15.
[c] Var. H. l. iv. c. 20. [d] Vit. Auct. t. iii. p. 112.

generality of his contemporaries, and whoſe lot it was to live among a race of men who were ſtupid to a proverb, might frequently treat their follies with ridicule and contempt. Accordingly we find that, among his fellow citizens, he obtained the appellation of γελάσινος, The Derider.

Democritus appears to have been in his manners chaſte and temperate[a]; and his ſobriety was repaid by a healthy old age. He lived, and enjoyed the uſe of his faculties, to the term of a hundred years (ſome ſay ſeveral years longer) and at laſt died through mere decay[b]. The following ſingular circumſtance is ſaid to have happened juſt before his death. His ſiſter, who had the care of him, obſerving him to be near his end, expreſſed great regret that his immediate death would prevent her celebrating the approaching feſtival of Ceres; upon which Democritus, who was now unable to receive any nouriſhment, that he might if poſſible gratify her wiſh by living a few days longer, deſired her often to bring hot bread near his noſtrils; the experiment ſucceeded, and he was preſerved alive without food for three days. His death was exceedingly lamented by his countrymen; and the charge of his funeral was defrayed from the public treaſury. He wrote much, but none of his works are extant.

Concerning Truth Democritus taught[c], that there are two kinds of knowledge; one, obſcure; the other, genuine; the former, that which is derived from the ſenſes; the latter, that which is derived from the exerciſe of thought upon the nature of things. This exerciſe of the reaſon, to produce certain knowledge, he confeſſed to be exceedingly difficult; and therefore ſaid, that truth lay in a deep well, from which it is the office of reaſon to draw it up.

Concerning Physics, the doctrine of Democritus was as follows[d]:

[a] Plin. N. H. l. xxviii. c. 6. Tertull. de Anim. c. 27. Clem. Al. Pædag. l. ii. p. 193.

[b] Laert. § 39—43. Diodor. Sic. lib. xiv. Cic. de Senect. c. 7. Luc. de Longev. t. ii. p. 829. Athen. l. ii. p. 46. Suidas.

[c] Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 135, 6. l. viii. § 139. 327. Laert. l. ix. § 44—46. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. i. c. 12. l. iv. c. 10.

[d] Laert. l. c. Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 6. l. iii. c. 4. Cic. Acad Qu. l. iv. c. 37.

Nothing

Nothing can ever be produced from that which has no exiſtence; nor can any thing which exiſts be ever annihilated. Whatever exiſts muſt therefore owe its being to neceſſary and ſelf exiſtent principles. The firſt principles of all things are two, atoms and vacuum. For bodies muſt conſiſt of both theſe, ſince they cannot be divided till they are reduced to nothing. Neither of theſe principles is produced from the other. They are both infinite, atoms in number, vacuum in magnitude. Atoms[a] are ſolid, and the only beings; vacuum, or entire ſpace, can neither be ſaid to be exiſtent nor non-exiſtent, being neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Atoms have the properties of figure, magnitude, motion, and weight; being heavy in proportion to their bulk. In figure, they are various; ſome are angular, others not ſo; ſome circular, others curved, others plain; ſome ſmooth, others rough; ſome hooked, others pointed. With reſpect to magnitude, they are too ſmall to be ſingly viſible, but are of different ſizes; they are perfectly ſolid, indiviſible, and unalterable.

Theſe atoms, or firſt corpuſcles, have been eternally moving in infinite vacuum or ſpace, where there is neither high nor low, middle nor end[b]. Their motion is of one kind, that which perpetually deviates from a right line. By their continual and rapid motion, colliſions are produced which occaſion innumerable combinations of particles, whence ariſe the various form of things. The natural neceſſity, by which the primary particles are thus moved and united, is the only fate by which the world is created or governed. The ſyſtem of nature is one, conſiſting of parts, which differ only in their figure, order, and ſituation. The production of an organized body takes place, when thoſe atoms, which are in their nature fitted to form that body, happen to be ſuitably arranged: if this arrangement be diverſified, alteration takes place; if it be entirely deſtroyed,

[a] Ariſt. Metaph. l. i. c. 4. Laert. Ariſt. de Gener. l. i. c. 1. l. v. c. 8. Phyſ. l. i. c. 6. l. viii. c. 1. De Cælo, l. iii. c. 4. Pſeud. Or. c. xiii. p. 91. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 24. De Fin. l. i. c. 6. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 16. l. iv. c. 4.

[b] Ariſt. de Cælo, l. iii. c. 4. Cic. de Fin. l. i. c. 6. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. l. i. c. 23. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 38. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. ix. § 113.

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diſſolution. The qualities of bodies are not eſſential to their nature, but the caſual effect of arrangement; and to this cauſe is to be aſcribed the different impreſſions which they make upon the ſenſes. Bitterneſs and ſweetneſs, for example, are not properties eſſential to bodies, but effects produced upon the ſenſes in conſequence of the various arrangement of atoms[a].

In infinite ſpace there are innumerable worlds, ſome of which are perfectly ſimilar, others diſſimilar; but all ſubject to growth, decay, and deſtruction[b]. The world has no animating principle, but all things are moved by the rapid agitation of atoms, as by an univerſally penetrating fire. The ſun and moon are compoſed of light particles, which revolve about a common centre. The order of the heavenly bodies is, firſt, the fixed ſtars, then the planets, then the ſun, then the moon. All the heavenly bodies move from eaſt to weſt, and thoſe which are neareſt revolve with the leaſt velocity; whence the ſun, the inferior planets, and the moon, move ſlower than the reſt. A comet is a combination of planets which, approaching near each other, appear as one body. The earth at the firſt was ſo ſmall and light, as to wander about in the regions of ſpace; but at length increaſing in denſity, it became immoveable. The ſea is continually decreaſing, and will at length be dried up[c].

Men were at firſt produced from water and earth. Our knowledge of the exiſtence of man ariſes from conſciouſneſs. The ſoul, or principle of animal life and motion, is the reſult of a combination of round or fiery particles: it conſiſts of two parts, the one ſeated in the breaſt, which is the rational, the other diffuſed through the whole body, which is the irrational. The ſoul is mortal, and periſhes with the body; but human bodies, which periſh, will revive. Different animal beings poſſeſs different ſenſes. Perception

[a] Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 4. De Gener. l. i. c. 2. 7. 8. De Cælo, l. i. c. 4. Laert. l. ix. § 45. 72. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. i. c. 30. Adv. Log. l. i. c. 135. 368. l. ii. § 6. 184. Adv. Muſ. § 53.

[b] Laert. l. ix. § 44. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. ii. c. 1. 3. Orig. Pl. Ph. c. xiii. p. 91.

[c] Cic. Ac. Q. l. iv. c. 17. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. iv. c. 4. l. ii. c. 20. 25. 15. l. iii. c. 12, 13. [d] Ariſt. de Cælo, l. iii. c. 4. 13. Cic. de Fin. l. i. c. 6. Ariſt. de Meteor. l. i. c. 6. l. ii. c. 3. Senec. Qu. Nat. l. v. c. 2.

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is produced by εἴδωλα, images, which flow from bodies according to their reſpective figures, and ſtrike upon the organ of ſenſe[a].

The vacuum of Democritus is not to be confounded, as it has ſometimes been, with air; it is unqueſtionably the ſame with that infinite ſpace which gives locality to all bodies. The fundamental difference between the doctrine of Democritus, and that of former philoſophers, concerning atoms, is, that the latter conceived ſmall particles endued with various qualities; whereas this philoſopher conceived the qualities of bodies, not to ariſe from any eſſential difference in the nature of primary particles, but to be the mere effect of arrangement. It is evident, from the whole tenos of the Democratic ſyſtem, that it pays no regard to an external Efficient Cauſe, but abſurdly ſuppoſes, that the intrinſic neceſſity, which is conceived to give motion to atoms, is alone ſufficient to account for the *phenomena* of nature. This philoſopher admitted no other ſoul of the world, than one ſimilar to that which he allowed to man, a blind force reſulting from the combination of certain ſubtle atoms, of a round form, which produce fire. Whatever, therefore, he is ſaid to have taught concerning nature, fate, or providence, he can only be underſtood as aſſerting, that this fire is a mechanical agent in nature whoſe rapid motion is the chief cauſe of the changes which take place in the univerſe. According to Plutarch[b], Democritus thought the ſun and moon to be ignited plates of ſtone; but this is inconſiſtent with his general ſyſtem, and with that knowledge of nature which this philoſopher appears to have poſſeſſed. The belief of the natural materiality of the ſoul was a neceſſary conſequence of the atomic ſyſtem; for if the ſoul be a compoſition of atoms, when theſe are diſperſed it muſt periſh. The notion of Democritus concerning the reviviſcence of human bodies ſeems to have been miſunderſtood by Pliny[c]. This philoſopher can only be ſuppoſed, conſiſtently with his ſyſtem, to have meant, that the atoms of which

[a] Cenſorin. de Die Nat. c. 4. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 4. 8. 10. l. iv. c. 4. 7. l. v. c. 16. Sext. Emp. Pyrr. Hyp. l. ii. c. 5. § 23. Adv. M. l. vii. § 265. Ariſt. de Anim. l. i. c. 10. Laert. § 44. Plin. H. N. l. vii. c. 55. Cic. ad Att. l. ii. Ep. 4. Fam. l. xv. Ep. 16. Lucret. l. iv. v. 238. [b] L. c. 20.

[c] Hiſt. N. l. vii. c. 55.

any human ſoul had conſiſted, after being ſeparated and diſperſed through infinite ſpace, would in ſome diſtant period meet again, and recover their former life. The term εἴδωλον, image, appears to have been uſed by Democritus in two different ſignifications; firſt, for thoſe images which he ſuppoſed to flow from external objects, and ſtrike upon the ſenſes, and to create notions or ideas in the mind; and ſecondly, for divine beings exiſting in the air, which he called gods. For want of attending to this diſtinction, ſeveral writers have been led into miſtakes concerning the tenets of Democritus.

Although Democritus either entirely rejected the notion of Deity, or allowed him no ſhare in the creation or government of the world, yet he endeavoured to conceal his impiety, by admitting the popular belief of divinities inhabiting the aerial regions, and teaching that they make themſelves viſible to favoured mortals, and enable them to predict future events. His doctrine concerning them was [a], that they are in form like men, but of a larger ſize, and ſuperior nature; that they are compoſed of the moſt ſubtle atoms, and leſs liable to diſſolution than human beings, but are nevertheleſs mortal; and that they have a power of ſerving or injuring mankind, and of communicating their thoughts to them by vocal ſounds, and often give them information concerning futurity.

The moral doctrine of Democritus [b], like that of Epicurus, afterwards to be conſidered, makes the enjoyment of a tranquil ſtate of mind, εὐθυμία, the great end of life, and conſequently teaches moderation as the firſt law of wiſdom. At the ſame time this philoſopher held, that there is nothing naturally becoming or baſe in human actions, but that every diſtinction of this nature ariſes from cuſtom or civil inſtitutions, and that laws are framed to curb the natural propenſity of mankind to injure one another. This latter tenet nearly coincides with the modern doctrine of Hobbes. The ſimilarity between the ethics of Democritus and Epicurus renders it unneceſſary to enter into further particulars on this head at preſent.

[a] Laert. l. i. § 7. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 43. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. ix. § 19. 42.

[b] Laert. l. ix. § 45, &c. Stob. Serm. 28. 37. 39. 44. 48. 117. 136. 139. 147. 249. Plut. de Inſt. Lib. t. i. p. 12.

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We ſhall therefore only add a few of the moſt valuable MAXIMS which have been aſcribed to Democritus [a]:

HE who ſubdues his paſſions is more heroic than he who vanquiſhes an enemy; yet there are men, who, whilſt they command nations, are ſlaves to pleaſure. It is criminal, not only to do miſchief, but to wiſh it. He who enjoys what he has, without regretting the want of what he has not, is a happy man. We are moſt delighted with thoſe pleaſures, which we have the fulleſt opportunity of enjoying. The ſweeteſt things become the moſt bitter by exceſs. Do nothing ſhameful, though you are alone; reyere yourſelf more than all other men. A man muſt either be good, or ſeem to be ſo. Every country is open to a wiſe man, for he is a citizen of the world. It is better for fools to be governed, than to govern. Rulers are choſen, not to do ill, but good. By deſiring little, a poor man makes himſelf rich. A cheerful man is happy, though he poſſeſſes little; a fretful man is unhappy in the midſt of affluence. One great difference between a wiſe man and a fool is, that the former only wiſhes for what he may poſſibly obtain, the latter deſires impoſſibilities. It is the office of prudence, where it is poſſible, to prevent injuries; but where this cannot be done, a wiſe regard to our own tranquillity will preſerve us from revenging them.

Democritus had many diſciples. Of theſe the moſt celebrated was PROTAGORAS, of Abdera [b]. In his youth, his poverty obliged him to perform the ſervile offices of a porter; and he was frequently employed in carrying logs of wood from the neighbouring fields to Abdera. It happened, that as he was one day going on briſkly towards the city under one of theſe loads, he was met by Democritus, who was particularly ſtruck with the neatneſs and regularity of the bundle. Deſiring him to ſtop and reſt himſelf, Democritus examined more cloſely the ſtructure of the load, and found that it was put together with mathematical exactneſs; upon which he aſked the youth whether he himſelf had made it up. The youth aſſured him, that he had, and immediately took it to pieces, and

[a] Laert. Stob. [b] Laert. Suid.

with great eaſe replaced every log in the ſame exact order as before. Democritus expreſſed much admiration of his ingenuity, and ſaid to him, "Young man, follow me, and your talents ſhall be employed upon greater and better things." The youth conſented, and Democritus took him home, maintained him at his own expence, and taught him philoſophy[a].

Protagoras afterwards acquired reputation at Athens, among the ſophiſts for his eloquence, and among the philoſophers for his wiſdom. His public lectures were much frequented, and he had many diſciples, from whom he received the moſt liberal rewards; ſo that, as Plato relates, he became exceedingly rich[b]. At length, however, he brought upon himſelf the diſpleaſure of the Athenian ſtate, by teaching doctrines favourable to impiety. In one of his books, he ſaid, "Concerning the gods, I am wholly unable to determine whether they have any exiſtence or not; for the weakneſs of the human underſtanding, and the ſhortneſs of human life, with many other cauſes, prevent us from attaining this knowledge." On account of this and ſeveral other ſimilar expreſſions, his writings were ordered to be diligently collected by the common crier, and burnt in the market place, and he himſelf was baniſhed from Attica[c]. He wrote many pieces upon logic, metaphyſics, ethics, and politics, none of which are at preſent extant. After having lived many years in Epirus, he was loſt by ſea on his paſſage from that country to Sicily[d].

The Tenets of Protagoras, as far as they can be diſcovered, appear to have leaned towards ſcepticiſm. He is ſaid to have taught, that contradictory arguments may be advanced upon every ſubject; that all natural objects are perpetually varying; that the ſenſes convey different reports to different perſons, and even to the ſame perſon at different times; and that, nevertheleſs, we have no other criterion of truth than our own perception, and cannot know that any

[a] A. Gell. l. v. c. 3.
[b] Laert. l. ix. §. 50. Suid. Gell. Plat. in Theæteto. conf. ejuſdem Protag.
[c] Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. Sext. adv. Math. l. ix. §. 18. Min. Fel. c. 8.
[d] Laert. Philoſtr. Vit. Soph. l. i. p. 496.

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thing is otherwiſe than it appears to our ſenſes, which are the eſſence of the ſoul[a]. Adopting the doctrine of Democritus, that the atoms of which bodies are compoſed are in perpetual motion, Protagoras conceived, that external objects are liable to ſuch continual fluctuation, that nothing can be certainly known concerning them; and therefore concluded, that nothing can be pronounced to exiſt, but that which is at any inſtant perceived by the ſenſes; and that, ſince theſe are perpetually or inceſſantly varying, things themſelves vary accordingly; ſo that, upon the ſame evidence, that of the ſenſes, contradictory opinions may be advanced. This ſeems to be the true explanation of the fundamental maxim of Protagoras, that man himſelf is the only meaſure, or criterion, of all things.

DIAGORAS[b], a native of the iſland of Melos, was another follower of Democritus. Having been ſold as a captive in his youth, he was redeemed by Democritus, and trained up in the ſtudy of philoſophy. At the ſame time he cultivated polite learning, and diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the art of lyric poetry, which was ſo ſucceſsfully practiſed about that period by Pindar, Bacchylis, and others. His name has been tranſmitted to poſterity with infamy, as an avowed advocate for the entire rejection of all religious belief. And, though Clemens Alexandrinus[c], and others, have taken pains to exculpate him, by pleading that his only intention was to ridicule heathen ſuperſtitions, the general voice of antiquity has ſo ſtrongly aſſerted his atheiſtical principles, that we cannot refuſe credit to the report, without allowing too much indulgence to hiſtorical ſcepticiſm. It is eaſy to conceive, that one who had ſtudied philoſophy in the ſchool of Democritus, who admitted no other principles in nature than atoms and a vacuum, would reject the whole doctrine of Deity, as inconſiſtent with the ſyſtem which he had embraced. And it is expreſsly aſſerted by antient writers, that when, in a particular

[a] Laert. § 51. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. i. c. 32. § 216. Plato in Theæt. Ariſt. Met. l. iii. c. 5. l. x. c. 6. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 42. Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. xiv. c. 20.

[b] Suidas. Heſychius. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 554. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. ix. § 53. Tatian contr. Græc. p. 164. Athenag. Legat. pro Chr. p. 5. ed. Par.

[c] Adm. ad Gent. p. 13.

inſtance, he ſaw a perjured perſon eſcape puniſhment, he publicly declared his diſbelief of divine providence, and from that time ſpoke of the gods, and of all religious ceremonies, with ridicule and contempt. He even attempted to lay open the ſacred myſteries, and to diſſuade the people from ſubmitting to the rites of initiation. Theſe public inſults offered to religion brought upon him the general hatred of the Athenians; who, upon his refuſing to obey a ſummons to appear in the courts of judicature, iſſued forth a decree, which was inſcribed upon a brazen column, offering the reward of a talent to any one who ſhould kill him, or two talents to any one who ſhould bring him alive before the judges. This happened in the ninety-firſt Olympiad [a]. From that time, Diagoras became a fugitive in Attica, and at laſt fled to Corinth, where he died [b]. It is ſaid, that being on board a ſhip during a ſtorm, the terrified ſailors began to accuſe themſelves for having received into their ſhip a man ſo infamous for his impiety; upon which Diagoras pointed out to them other veſſels, which were near them on the ſea in equal danger, and aſked them, whether they thought that each of theſe ſhips alſo carried a Diagoras; and that afterwards, when a friend, in order to convince him that the gods are not indifferent to human affairs, deſired him to obſerve how many conſecrated tablets were hung up in the temples in grateful acknowledgment of the eſcapes from the dangers of the ſea, he ſaid, in reply, "True; but here are no tablets of thoſe who have ſuffered ſhipwreck, and periſhed in the ſea." But there is reaſon to ſuſpect that theſe tales are mere inventions; for ſimilar ſtories have been told of Diogenes the Cynic, and others.

From the ſchool of Democritus alſo aroſe ANAXARCHUS [c], of Abdera, who flouriſhed about the hundred and tenth Olympiad. He is chiefly celebrated for having lived with Alexander, and enjoyed his confidence [d]. It reflects no credit, however, upon his philoſophy, that, when the mind of this prince was torn with regret for having

[a] B. C. 416. [b] Laert. Suid. Cic. de Nat. D. l. iii. c. 37.

[c] Laert. l. ix. § 58. Plut. Symp. l. vii. c. 5.

[d] Ælian. l. ix. c. 3, 30. Arrian. Exp. Alex. l. iv. p. 84. Plut. ad Princ. indoct. Luc. Paraſit. t. iii. p. 250. Athen. l. vi. p. 250. l. xii. p. 548. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. ii. c. 22. Nat. D. l. iii. c. 33. Laert. Ov. in Ibin.

killed

killed his faithful Clitus, he adminiſtered the balm of flattery, ſaying, "that kings, like the gods, could do no wrong." This philoſopher addicted himſelf to pleaſure; and it was on this account, and not, as ſome ſuppoſed, on account of the apathy and tranquillity of his life, that he obtained the ſurname of Εὐδαιμονικὸς, The Fortunate. A marvellous ſtory is related, of his having been pounded in an iron mortar by Nicocreon king of Cyprus, in revenge for the advice which he had given to Alexander, to ſerve up the head of that prince at an entertainment; and of his enduring the torture with invincible hardineſs. But the tale, for which there is no authority prior to the time of Cicero, is wholly inconſiſtent with the character of a man who had through his life been ſoftened by effeminate pleaſure. The ſame ſtory is alſo related of Zeno the Eleatic. We therefore think ourſelves at liberty to ſet it down among the numerous fables which ſome of the Grecian writers diſcovered ſo much ingenuity in inventing, and which ſo well juſtify the ſarcaſm of Juvenal [a]:

—— Quicquid Græcia mendax
Audet in hiſtoria [b]. *

[a] Sat. x. 174.

[b] What e'er in ſtory lying Greece dares tell.

* Videnda. Budd. Ann. Hiſt. Phil. p. 320—3. Bayle. Reimmann. Hiſt. Ath. c. 17. 20. 30. Burnet. Arch. l. i. c. 12. Waltheri Sepulchra Eleatica, c. 3. § 5. 6. Cudworth, c. i. § 8. c. iv. § 20. 21. cum Not. Moſh. Gundling. p. xv. Diſſ. 1. Lipſ. Manud. ad Phil. Stoic. l. ii. Diſſ. 4. Gaſſendi Phil. Ep. ſect. ii. c. 5. Mourgues Plan. Pyth. p. 16. Parker de Deo, Diſp. vi. § 2. Scipio Aquilian. de Plac. Phil. ante Ariſt. c. 8—17. Jonſius, l. i. c. 14. l. ii. c. 5. Magnenus de Vita Democ. Hag. Comit. 1658. 12°. Morhoff. Polyhiſt. t. ii. p. 183—5. Stollii Hiſt. Ph. Mor. § 10. 103. Heuman. Act. Ph. v. i. p. 671. Obſ. Hal. t. ii. Obſ. 15. Naude Apolog. c. 12. Thomas. Hiſt. Sap. et Stult. t. ii. p. 8. Clerici Hiſt. Med. p. i. l. iii. c. 31. Potter. Arch. Gr. l. ii. c. 20. Zimmerman. Epiſt. de Ath. Eumeri et Diag. ap. Muſ. Brem. v. i. p. iv. art. 3.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

OF THE HERACLITEAN SECT.

ANOTHER ſect, derived from Pythagoras, the founder of the Italic ſchool, was that which was inſtituted at Epheſus by Heraclitus; a ſect, which, though it has been almoſt entirely overlooked by the moderns, obtained among the antients no ſmall ſhare of celebrity.

HERACLITUS[a], by birth an Epheſian, diſcovered an early propenſity to the ſtudy of wiſdom, and, by a diligent attention to the operations of his own mind, ſoon became ſenſible of his ignorance, and deſirous of inſtruction. He was initiated into the myſteries of the Pythagorean doctrine by Xenophanes and Hippaſus, and afterwards incorporated them into his own ſyſtem. His fellow citizens ſolicited him to undertake the ſupreme magiſtracy; but, on account of their diſſolute manners, he declined it in favour of his brother. When he was, ſoon afterwards, ſeen playing with the boys in the court of the temple of Diana, he ſaid to thoſe who expreſſed their ſurprize that he was not better employed, "Why are you ſurpriſed that I paſs my time with children? It is ſurely better than governing the corrupt Epheſians." He was diſpleaſed with them for baniſhing from their city ſo wiſe and able a man as Hermodorus[b]; and plainly told them, that he perceived they were determined not to keep among them any man who had more merit than the reſt. His natural temper being ſplenetic and melancholy, he deſpiſed the ignorance and follies of mankind, ſhunned all public intercourſe

[a] Leart. l. ix. § 1, &c. Suidas. Clem. Al. Strom. l. i. p. 302. Stob. Serm. 102. Plut. adv. Col. t. iii. p. 423.

[b] An eminent lawyer, of whom ſee Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. v. c. 36. Strabo, l. xiii. p. 642. Plin. l. xxxiv. c. 5.

with the world, and devoted himſelf to retirement and contemplation. He made choice of a mountainous retreat for his place of reſidence, and lived upon the natural produce of the earth. Darius, king of Perſia, having heard of his fame, invited him to his court; but he treated the invitation with contempt[a]. His diet, and manner of life, at length brought him into a dropſy; upon which this philoſopher, who was always fond of enigmatical language, returning into the city, propoſed to the phyſicians the following queſtion; "Is it poſſible to bring dryneſs out of moiſture?" Receiving no relief from them, he attempted to cure himſelf, by ſhutting himſelf up in a cloſe ſtable of oxen; but it is doubtful how far he ſucceeded, for the cauſe and manner of his death are differently related by different writers. He flouriſhed, as appears from his preceptors and contemporaries, about the ſixty-ninth Olympiad[b]. Sixty years are ſaid to have been the term of his life[c].

It has been a tale commonly received[d], that Heraclitus was perpetually ſhedding tears, on account of the vices of mankind, and particularly of his countrymen. But the ſtory, which probably took its riſe from the gloomy ſeverity of his temper, ought to be ranked, like that of the perpetual laughing of Democritus, among the Greek fables; and it muſt be left to the poet to ſay concerning theſe two philoſophers;

> —— De ſapientibus, alter
> Ridebat, quoties a limine moverat unum
> Protuleratque pedem; flebat contrarius alter[e]. JUV.[f]

Heraclitus wrote a treatiſe "On Nature," of which only a few fragments remain. Through the natural caſt of his mind, and perhaps

[a] Ib. l. vii. c. 19. [b] B. C. 504. [c] Laert. l. ix. §. 1. &c.
[d] Æl. l. viii. c. 13. Senec. de Tranq. c. 4. de Ira, l. ii. c. 10. Lucian Vit. Auct. t. iii. p. 123.

[e] Will you not now the pair of ſages praiſe
Who the ſame end purſued by different ways?
One pitied, one contemn'd the woeful times;
One laugh'd at follies, and one wept o'er crimes. DRYDEN.

[f] Sat. x. v. 34.

too

too through a deſire of concealing unpopular tenets under the diſguiſe of a figurative and intricate diction, his diſcourſes were ſo incomprehenſible, that he obtained the name of Σκοτεινος, The Obſcure Philoſopher; a title given him by the unanimous conſent of the antients. Neither critics nor philoſophers were able to explain his writings; and they remained in the temple of Diana, where he himſelf had depoſited them for the uſe of the learned, till they were made public by Crates, or, as Tatian relates the matter, till the poet Euripides, who frequented the temple of Diana, committing the doctrines and precepts of Heraclitus to memory, accurately repeated them[a]. From the fragments of this work, which are preſerved by Sextus Empiricus, it appears to have been written in proſe, which makes Tatian's account the leſs credible.

After what has already been ſaid concerning the original obſcurity of this philoſopher, and the preſent deficient ſtate of his remains, it will not be expected that we ſhould lay before our readers a perfectly clear and full account of his ſyſtem. The following brief HEADS of his DOCTRINE are all that we have been able to collect[b]:

REASON, by means of the ſenſes, is the judge of truth. This common and divine principle is derived by inſpiration from that which ſurrounds us. In dreaming, the paſſages of the ſenſes are obſtructed, and the connection of the human mind with that which ſurrounds us, is interrupted; on waking, this connection is reſtored, and the power of reaſon returns. All common maxims, being comprehended by common and divine reaſon, are to be received as true.

FIRE, or an ethereal exhalation, ἀναθυμιάσις, is the principle from which all things in nature are produced[c]. This principle conſiſts

[a] Laert. Fab. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 760, 1. Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 33. Tatian adv. Græc. p. 143.

[b] Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 126. Tert. de An. c. 15. Philoſt. Op. p. 391. Clem. Alex. Str. l. v. 602.

[c] Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 3. De Anim. l. i. c. 2. Cic. Ac. Qu. l. iv. c. 37. De Nat D. l. iii. c. 14. Plut. de Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 3. 13. 23. —Laert. l. ix. §. 5. 7. Clem. Alex. Str. l. v. p. 599. Lucr. l. i. v. 636. Tat. p. 143. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. ix. § 131. Stob. Ecl. p. 17. 40.

of

of ſmall indiviſible parts, ψίγματα, or atoms, which are ſimple in their natures, and eternal. There is in the univerſe no ſuch thing as reſt; the particles which compoſe the fiery or ethereal principle being perpetually in motion. From the combination of thoſe minute particles, which are imperceptible by the ſenſes, is produced elementary fire, and all the forms of nature; and into theſe they are all, at certain periods, reſolved. The world comprehends the eternal, living, or ſelf-moving fire, which was neither made by gods nor men, but always was and will be, and the various bodies which are produced from it, and which have both beginning and end. The primary fire has within itſelf eternal and neceſſary motion, by the force of which the ſyſtem of nature was produced. This eternal and neceſſary intrinſic motion is cauſed by fate; the rational principle which animates the eternal fire, pervades the univerſe, and forms, preſerves, and diſſolves, in perpetual ſucceſſion, the viſible world. This principle or ſoul of the world, by its eternal, neceſſary, and rational motion, is God, δημιουργὸς, the maker of all things[a]. The minute particles, which compoſe the primary fire, move in different directions, whence they are variouſly agitated and impelled; and the conteſts or colliſions, which theſe motions produce, collect into various maſſes the firſt principles of things, and thus produce natural bodies. Fire condenſed becomes water; water, ſtill further condenſed, is converted into earth; and the reverſe. When the primary particles are thus formed into elements, they are purſuing their upward courſe, ὁδὸς ἄνω; when the elements are again diſſolved, they are purſuing their downward courſe, ὁδὸς κάτω. The elements of bodies being collected into one unformed maſs, or chaos, this maſs is at length, by the action of the animating fire, diſſolved, the parts are diffuſed, χεῖνται, and the various forms of nature appear.

The heavenly bodies are in the form of boats, having the hollow ſide towards us; and they become luminous when certain fiery exhalations from the earth are collected within them. The ſun is no

[a] Clem. Alex. Protr. p. 42. Tertull. contr. Marcion. Stob. c. 23. 17. 27. Laert. l. ix. § 7, 8, 9.

larger than he appears to the ſight; and becomes eclipſed when its convex ſurface happens to be turned towards the earth. The moon is of the ſame form and nature; and its monthly variations are cauſed by the gradual changes of its poſition towards the earth, from concave to convex, and the reverſe. All the ſtars are nouriſhed by exhalations from the earth, and theſe, as they are more or leſs ſplendid and warm, cauſe the varieties of day and night, of the ſeaſons, and of weather[a].

No certain account can be given of the nature of the ſoul; but the moſt probable notion is, that it is an exhalation from that fiery ſubſtance, which pervades all things, and is the ſoul of the world, paſſing into human bodies through the ſenſes. All nature is full of ſouls, or dæmons. Of theſe the beſt are ſuch as have in their nature the leaſt moiſture, or approach neareſt to the primary fire. Human ſouls are liable to perpetual changes; and when they are loaded with moiſt vapours, they paſs into the watery maſs and periſh: but if they are purified from theſe they return into the ſoul of the univerſe[b].

Ariſtotle ranks Heraclitus among thoſe philoſophers, who ſuppoſed only one material principle in nature, and provided no efficient cauſe, and aſſerts the firſt principle in his ſyſtem to have been eſſentially endued with motion. And it evidently appears, from his whole doctrine, that Heraclitus conceived the particles of matter to have been eternally moving from an intrinſic neceſſity. What he ſays, therefore, concerning fate, as an intelligent and rational principle in nature, the cauſe of motion, and conſequently of production and diſſolution, muſt be underſtood, not of a ſubſtance or being diſtinct from the primary fire, but of the intrinſic power of this firſt principle; the neceſſary energy by which all things are produced. Although this philoſopher introduced into his ſyſtem the term God, he ſeems to have made uſe of it to expreſs, not a diſtinct being of a peculiar nature, but merely that innate force in the primary fire, by means of which its particles have been in eternal

[a] Laert. § 9, 10. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. ii. c. 22. 25. Stob. p. 53. 55. 60.
[b] Laert. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. iv. c. 3. Stob. S. 17.

motion,

motion, and have at length united to form the preſent regular ſyſtem of nature. To this force, conſidered as diſtinct from the matter to which it belongs, he gave the appellation of God; and he called it rational and divine, becauſe the effects, of which he conceived it to be the cauſe, were produced in a regular ſeries, and according to a certain and immutable law[a].

On the ſubject of MORALS, Heraclitus taught; that the end of life is to enjoy happineſs; that for this purpoſe it is neceſſary to repoſe the body, and confine its wants within as narrow limits as poſſible; that it is of more importance for men to know themſelves, than to acquire extenſive learning; that human life is in fact the death of the ſoul, as, whilſt it continues in the body, it is confined and depreſſed, and never gains its true freedom and activity, till it returns to the divine nature from which it comes; that the firſt virtue is to be temperate, and the firſt wiſdom, to follow nature; and that all human laws are founded upon one divine law of neceſſity, which governs all things[b].

Theſe moral principles of Heraclitus have a reference to his phyſical ſyſtem, as will be eaſily ſeen by comparing them. The Stoics were indebted to this philoſopher for many parts of their phyſical and moral doctrine.

Although Heraclitus took great pains to conceal his doctrines, he may properly be conſidered as the father of a ſect[c]. For after he had depoſited his writings in the temple of Diana, they were read by many philoſophers, who afterwards taught his ſyſtem, or incorporated it with their own. Plato himſelf, when he was young, learned the Heraclitean philoſophy from Cratylus, and adopted that part which treated of the nature and motion of matter. This ſect muſt, however, very ſoon have become extinct; for we find no traces of its exiſtence after the death of Socrates; which may be

[a] Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. Cic. Ac. Q. l. i. c. 7.

[b] Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 7. Theodoret. Ther. l. xi. p. 152. Suidas. Laert. Stob. Serm. 4. 28. 250. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. l. i. c. 30. § 210. l. ii. c. 6. § 63. l. iii. c. 24. § 230. Cl. Alex. St. l. iv. p. 532. l. v. p. 615.

[c] Ariſt. Met. l. i. c. 6. l. xiii. c. 4. Laert. l. ix. § 6. 15, Sext. Emp. Pyrr. l. i. c. 29.

 aſcribed,

aſcribed, in part, to the inſuperable obſcurity of the writings of Heraclitus, but chiefly to the ſuperior ſplendour of the Platonic ſyſtem, by which it was ſuperſeded. That Heraclitus, however, was long held in great eſtimation among the philoſophers at Athens, may be juſtly concluded from the great pains, which Zeno took to transfer ſeveral tenets of the Heraclitean ſyſtem into his own.

Among the admirers of Heraclitus are to be ranked thoſe who, though they did not entirely approve his ſyſtem, paid ſo much attention to it, as to obtain among the antients the name of Heraclitiſts. The only one of theſe, whom it is neceſſary diſtinctly to notice, is the celebrated father of medicine, Hippocrates; a name, which alſo merits no mean place among philoſophers. Without attempting to explain his ſyſtem of medicine, which would be foreign from our deſign [a], we ſhall mention a few particulars reſpecting his opinions concerning nature, which may ſerve to caſt further light upon the Heraclitean philoſophy.

HIPPOCRATES is not to be ranked among the followers of Democritus or Heraclitus, or any other philoſopher; for he expreſsly rejects the uſe of hypothetic philoſophy in medicine, and particularly oppoſes, by arguments not unworthy of attention, the ſyſtem which ſuppoſed four primary principles in nature, dryneſs and moiſture, heat and cold [b]. His natural philoſophy conſiſted of a collection of obſervations drawn from experience, from which he formed his judgment concerning the cauſes of diſeaſes, and their remedies. For though he diſapproved of the Empirical method of relying wholly upon experience, without any attention to general rules or principles, and took pains to digeſt the art of healing into a ſyſtematic form, he did not derive his theory of medicine from any philoſophical ſyſtem, or hypotheſis, but rather choſe to raiſe it upon the foundation of the moſt accurate knowledge he was able to attain of the ſtructure of the human body, and the nature of diſeaſes. It is not therefore to be concluded, that, becauſe Hippocrates was a

[a] Galen de Nat. Facultat. l. i. 11. De Decret. Hipp. et Pl. l. v. Le Clerc Hiſt. Med. p. i. l. iii. c. 2. Fab. Bib. Gr. v. xii. p. 675.

[b] De priſca Med. p. 8. ed. Foeſii.

phyſician

phyſician upon rational principles, he therefore profeſſed any particular ſyſtem of philoſophy. What his ideas upon philoſophical ſubjects were, may be in part concluded from the following SPECIMEN [a]:

Concerning the ſublime and divine ſubject of philoſophy, it is unneceſſary to ſay more, than may ſerve to improve our knowledge of the nature and cauſes of the diſeaſes incident to the human body. That which we call heat ſeems to be an immortal principle, which underſtands, ſees, hears, and perceives all things preſent and future. The pureſt part of this fire, in the original commotion of nature, retired into the ſuperior region, which the antients call the ether; a ſecond part, taking the lower region, which is called the earth, is mixed by continual agitation with the principles of cold, moiſture, and dryneſs. A third part has obtained the middle region of the air, and produces elementary heat. All nature is ſubject to certain laws. Nothing in nature entirely periſhes, nor is any thing ever produced from nothing, but all the appearances of production, or diſſolution, are merely changes in the form of bodies. By the neceſſary law of nature the elements are reſolvable into each other, and all things are ſubject to a perpetual and reciprocal commixture. A portion of the primary principle of heat, uniting itſelf to the human body, forms the ſoul. The gods have eſtabliſhed all nature in a certain order, and always conduct it well [b].

The reader will eaſily perceive a ſtrong reſemblance between the notions of Hippocrates and thoſe of Heraclitus; but the expreſſions of the former are ſo vague and obſcure, as to have occaſioned a diſpute among the learned concerning his theological principles, which, for want of ſufficient data, we ſhall not attempt to decide [*].

[a] De Principiis. Op. t. i. ſect. III. tr. 4. p. 248.
[b] De Genit. t. i. ſect. III. p. 231. De Diæta, ib. p. 342.

[*] Viderid. Jonſ. . ii. c. 3. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. i. p. 760. H. Steph. Poeſ. Phil. p. 129. Cudworth. c. i. § 16. c. iii. § 8. c. iv. § 13. Olearius de Heracliti Princip. ap. Stanley, p. ix. Hippocr. Vit. a Sorano. Schulz. Hiſt. Med. Per. i. ſ. iii. c. i. J. Stephan. Hipp. Theolog. Venet. 1638. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. xiii. p. 192. Schmidii Diſſ. de Theol. Hipp. Treller. in Hipp. falſo Atheiſmi accuſ. Rud. 1719. Geſner. Diſſ. de ψυχαῖς Hippoc. Goetting. 1737.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

OF THE EPICUREAN SECT.

THE EPICUREAN SECT, a branch of the Eleatic, appeared with great diſtinction upon the theatre of Antient Philoſophy, and was ſtrongly marked by its peculiar tenets and character. Whilſt it has obtained the higheſt applauſe from ſome writers, it has met with the ſevereſt cenſure from others, and its real merit ſtill remains undetermined. That the reader may be enabled to form a judgment for himſelf, on this much controverted queſtion, it will therefore be neceſſary that we trace its riſe and progreſs, and unfold its doctrines, with all the accuracy and diligence in our power. In this part of our undertaking our chief guides among the antients are, Laertius, who has induſtriouſly collected many particulars concerning Epicurus and his philoſophy from writings which are no longer extant; the fragments collected by Suidas, Pſeudo-Origen, and others; and the poem of Lucretius, *De Natura Rerum*, "On the Nature of Things," in which the doctrines of Epicurus are at once faithfully repreſented, and clothed in all the ornaments of poetic diction. As to the accounts which Plutarch, the Chriſtian Fathers, and other later writers, have given of the Epicureans, it is evident that they were written too much under the bias of partiality to merit implicit confidence.

EPICURUS[a], an Athenian, of the Egean tribe, was born at Gargettus, in the vicinity of Athens, at the beginning of the third year of the hundred and ninth Olympiad[b]. His father, Neocles, and his mother, Chæreſtrata, were of honourable deſcent; but being reduced to poverty, they were ſent, with a colony of two thouſand Athenian citizens, to the iſland of Samos, which Pericles had ſubdued, to di-

[a] Laert. l. x. § 1, &c. Suidas. Lucr. l. vi. v. 1. Strabo, l. xiv. p. 589. 638. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 26. Euſeb. Chron. Plut. de Amore Frat. t. ii. p. 294.

[b] B. C. 344.

vide the lands among them by lot. The little farm, which fell to their ſhare, not proving ſufficient for their ſubſiſtence, Neocles took up the profeſſion of a ſchool-maſter. Chæreſtratá, in the mean time, is ſaid to have found her advantage in employing, among a ſuperſtitious populace, the arts of incantation and luſtration, for the purpoſes of curing diſeaſes, and driving away ſpectres, and in other equally marvellous ſervices. It is added, that her ſon, whilſt he was very young, furniſhed her with luſtral ſongs for theſe ſolemn rites. At Samos, and the neighbouring iſland of Teos, Epicurus remained till he was eighteen years of age; when, for the ſake of enjoying greater literary advantages, he removed to Athens. Upon the death of Alexander, when commotions roſe in Athens through the tyranny of Perdiccas, Epicurus left the city, and went to his father at Colophon. Soon afterwards he removed to Mitylene, and, after paſſing one year in that city, took up his reſidence, four years, in Lampſacus. At the expiration of this term, when he was in the thirty-ſixth year of his age, he returned to Athens[a].

From his fourteenth year to this time, he appears to have been induſtriouſly employed in the ſtudy of philoſophy. The circumſtance which firſt turned his attention to this ſtudy is ſaid to have been, that, on reading the works of Heſiod, he conſulted his maſter concerning the meaning of the word *Chaos*, who, not being able to explain it, referred him to the philoſophers[b]. At Samos, according to Cicero[c], he was inſtructed in the Platonic philoſophy by Pamphilus; and Clement of Alexandria relates[d], that in his early years he attended upon Nauſiphanes a Pythagorean, and Pyrrho the Sceptic. At Athens, the public mart of learning, where at this time Xenocrates taught in the Academy, and Theophraſtus in the Lyceum, it cannot be ſuppoſed that he would neglect to improve the advantages of his ſituation. When therefore it is related by Cicero and others, that Epicurus boaſted that he was αὐτοδίδακτος, a Self-taught Philoſopher, we are not to underſtand that he was never inſtructed in the tenets of other maſters, but that his ſyſtem of philo-

[a] Laert. Suid. [b] Sext. Emp. adv. Ph. l. ii. § 18, 19. Laert.
[c] De Nat. D. l. i. c. 26. [d] Strom. l. i. p. 302.

ſophy

ſophy was the reſult of his own reflections, after comparing the doctrines of other ſects.

The new edifice of philoſophy, which Epicurus had thus raiſed, he was deſirous to lay open for the benefit of others. About the thirty-ſecond year of his age he opened a ſchool at Mitylene, which he ſoon removed to Lampſacus, where he had diſciples from Colophon. Not ſatisfied, however, with the narrow ſphere of philoſophical fame which this obſcure ſituation afforded him, he determined to make his appearance on the more public theatre of Athens. Upon his return thither, he found the public places in the city, proper for this purpoſe, already occupied by other ſects; the Academy, by the Platoniſts; the Lyceum, by the Peripatetics; the Cynoſarges, by the Cynics; and the Porch, by the Stoics. He therefore purchaſed for his own uſe, at the expence of eighty *minæ*, a pleaſant garden [a], where he took up his conſtant reſidence, and taught his ſyſtem of philoſophy. Hence the Epicureans were called the Philoſophers of the Garden [b]. Beſides this garden, Epicurus had a houſe in Melite, a village of the Cecropian tribe, to which he frequently retreated with his friends. From this time to his death, notwithſtanding all the diſturbances of the ſtate, Epicurus never deſerted Athens, except that he made two or three excurſions into Ionia to viſit his friends. During the ſiege of Athens by Demetrius, which happened when Epicurus was forty-four years of age, while the city was ſeverely harraſſed by famine, Epicurus is ſaid to have ſupported himſelf and his friends on a ſmall quantity of beans, which he ſhared equally with them [c].

The period in which Epicurus opened his ſchool was peculiarly favourable to his deſign. In the room of the ſimplicity of the Socratic doctrine, nothing now remained but the ſubtlety and affectation of Stoiciſm, the unnatural ſeverity of the Cynics, or the debaſing doctrine of indulgence, taught and practiſed by the followers of Ariſtippus. The luxurious refinement which now prevailed in Athens, while it rendered every rigid ſcheme of philoſophy, as well as all groſſneſs of manners, unpopular, inclined the younger citizens to

[a] Laert. Plin. l. xix. c. 4. [b] Cic. ad Att. l. ii. Ep. 24. Juv. Sat. xiv.
[c] Laert. Plut. in Demet. t. iii. p. 96.

liſten

liſten to a preceptor, who ſmoothed the ſtern and wrinkled brow of philoſophy, and, under the notion of conducting his followers to enjoyment in the bower of tranquillity, led them, unawares, into the paths of moderation and virtue. Hence his ſchool became exceedingly popular, and diſciples flocked into the garden, not only from different parts of Greece, but from Egypt and Aſia. Seneca, though a Stoic philoſopher, bears this teſtimony to Epicurus[a]: "I the more freely quote the excellent maxims of Epicurus, in order to convince thoſe who become his followers from the hope of ſcreening their vices, that to whatever ſect they attach themſelves, they muſt live virtuouſly. Even at the entrance of the garden, they will find this inſcription: "The hoſpitable keeper of this manſion, where you will find pleaſure the higheſt good, will preſent you liberally with barley cakes, and water from the ſpring. Theſe gardens will not provoke your appetite by artificial dainties, but ſatisfy it with natural ſupplies. Will you not then be well entertained?"

Thoſe diſciples, who were regularly admitted into the ſchool of Epicurus, lived together, not in the manner of the Pythagoreans, who caſt their poſſeſſions into a common ſtock; for this, in his opinion, implied mutual diſtruſt rather than friendſhip; but upon ſuch a footing of friendly attachment, that each individual cheerfully ſupplied the neceſſities of his brother[b]. And this was no difficult taſk, not only on account of the ſmallneſs of the expences attending their frugal manner of living, but becauſe the moſt cordial affection ſubſiſted among them. The friendſhip of the Epicurean fraternity is deſcribed by Cicero[c] as unequalled in the hiſtory of mankind; and Valerius Maximus[d] relates a memorable example of indiſſoluble friendſhip between Polycrates and Hippoclides, two philoſophers of the garden.

Epicurus, that he might proſecute his philoſophical labours with the leſs interruption, lived in a ſtate of celibacy[e]. In his own conduct he was exemplary for temperance and continence; and he in-

[a] Ep. 21. [b] Laert. l. x. § 11, &c. [c] De Fin. l. i. c. 20.
[d] L. i. c. 8. Chryſippus apud Stob. Serm. 117. Conf. Laert. l. x. § 119. Epict. Arr. l. i. c. 23. iii. 7. [e] Theodoret. Serm. 14. Clem. Al. Strom. l. ii.

culcated upon his followers ſeverity of manners, and the ſtrict government of the paſſions, as the beſt means of paſſing a tranquil and happy life. Notwithſtanding his regular manner of living, towards the cloſe of his days, probably in conſequence of intenſe application to ſtudy, his conſtitution became infirm, and he was afflicted with the ſtone. Perceiving, from theſe marks of decay, that his end was approaching, he wrote a will, in which he bequeathed his garden, and the buildings belonging to it, to Hermachus, and through him to the future profeſſors of his philoſophy. On the laſt day of his life, he wrote to his friend Hermachus, informing him, that his diſeaſe had, for fourteen days, tormented him with anguiſh, which nothing could exceed: at the ſame time he adds; "All this is counterbalanced by the ſatisfaction of mind, which I derive from the recollection of my diſcourſes and diſcoveries." He concluded with entreating his friend, by the affection which he had always ſhewn to him and to philoſophy, to take care of the children of Metrodorus. The Emperor Marcus Antoninus confirms this account, atteſting, that Epicurus, in his ſickneſs, relied more upon the recollection of his excellent life, than upon the aid of phyſicians, and inſtead of complaining of his pain, converſed with his friends upon thoſe principles of philoſophy which he had before maintained. At length, finding nature juſt exhauſted, he ordered himſelf to be put into a warm bath, where, after refreſhing himſelf with wine, and exhorting his friends not to forget his doctrines, he expired. His death happened in the ſecond year of the hundred and twenty-ſeventh Olympiad[a], and the ſeventy-third of his age[b].

Epicurus is ſaid to have written a greater number of works, from his own invention, than any other Grecian philoſopher; but none of his writings have eſcaped the deſtroying hand of time, except a compendium of his doctrine preſerved by Laertius, and a few fragments, diſperſed among antient authors[c].

Not only did the immediate followers of Epicurus adorn the memory of their maſter with the higheſt honours[d], but many eminent

[a] B. C. 273.

[b] Laert. l. x. § 24, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 30. De Fato, c. 9. Anton. de ſeipſo, l. ix. § 42.

[c] Laert. § 139. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 7. Fabr. Bib. Gr. vol. ii. p. 505. [d] Laert.

writers, who have diſapproved his philoſophy, have expreſſed great reſpect for his perſonal merit. Nevertheleſs, it cannot be denied, that from the time when this philoſopher appeared to the preſent day, an uninterrupted courſe of cenſure has fallen upon his memory; ſo that the name of his ſect has almoſt become a proverbial expreſſion for every thing corrupt in principle, and infamous in character. The charges brought againſt Epicurus are, that he ſuperſeded all religious principles, by diſmiſſing the gods from the care of the world[a]; that, if he acknowledged their exiſtence, it was only in conformity to popular prejudice, ſince, according to his ſyſtem, nothing exiſts in nature but material atoms; that he diſcovered great inſolence and vanity in the diſreſpect with which he treated the memory of former philoſophers, and the characters and perſons of his contemporaries[b]; that both the maſter and the whole fraternity were addicted to the vileſt and moſt infamous vices[c], ſo that the ſchool ought not to have been called a garden, but a ſty; and, in ſhort, that this philoſopher, and his followers, relinquiſhed all liberal ſtudies and manly purſuits, that they might devote themſelves to the groſſeſt impieties and debaucheries. Theſe accuſations againſt the Epicurean ſchool have been not only the voice of common rumour, but have been more or leſs confirmed by men diſtinguiſhed for their wiſdom and virtue; Zeno, Cicero, Plutarch, Galen, and a long train of Chriſtian Fathers[d]. So that if the queſtion were to be determined by the number of accuſers, there can be no doubt that Epicurus and his followers muſt be condemned. But if the cauſe be examined with impartiality; if the credit of the witneſſes againſt Epicurus be thoroughly canvaſſed; if the cauſes of the ſpirit of invective raiſed againſt him be duly conſidered; and if the evidences on the other ſide be allowed a fair hearing, it will perhaps be found, that this philoſopher, though in ſome reſpects highly cenſurable, has been, in ſeveral others, ſeverely and unjuſtly condemned.

With reſpect to the firſt charge, that of impiety, it certainly ad-

[a] Plut. adv. Colot. Senec. de Benef. l. iv. c. 19. [b] Cic. de Nat. l. i.
[c] Athen. l. iii. p. 101. l. vii. p. 278. l. x. p. 546. Suidas.
[d] Vid. Gaſſend. Vit. Ep. l. iii. c. 6.

mits of no refutation. The doctrine of Epicurus concerning nature not only militated againſt the ſuperſtitions of the Athenians, but againſt the agency of a Supreme Deity in the formation and government of the world; and his miſconceptions, with reſpect to mechanical motion, and the nature of divine happineſs, led him in his ſyſtem to diveſt the Deity of ſome of his primary attributes. It doth not indeed appear, that he entirely denied the exiſtence of ſuperior powers. Cicero, who is unqueſtionably to be ranked among his opponents, relates[a], that Epicurus wrote books concerning piety, and the reverence due to the gods, expreſſed in terms which might have become a prieſt; and he charges him[b] with inconſiſtency, in maintaining that the gods ought to be worſhipped, whilſt he aſſerted, that they had no concern in human affairs; herein admitting, that he revered the gods, but neither through hope nor fear, merely on account of the majeſty and excellence of their nature[c]. But if, with the utmoſt contempt for popular ſuperſtitions, Epicurus retained ſome belief in, and reſpect for, Inviſible Natures, it is evident that his gods were deſtitute of many of the eſſential characters of divinity, and that his piety was of a kind very different from that which is inſpired by juſt notions of Deity. Not to urge, that there is ſome reaſon to ſuſpect, that what he taught concerning the gods might have been artfully deſigned to ſcreen him from the odium and hazard, which would have attended a direct avowal of atheiſm.

The ſecond charge againſt Epicurus, that of inſolence and contempt towards other philoſophers, ſeems ſcarcely compatible with the general air of gentleneſs and civility which appears in his character. If he claimed to himſelf the credit of his own ſyſtem, he did no more than Zeno, Plato, and Ariſtotle, after availing themſelves of every poſſible aid from former philoſophers, had done before him.

Calumny never appeared with greater effrontery, than in accuſing Epicurus of intemperance and incontinence. That his character

[a] De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 41. [b] Ib. c. 8.
[c] Senec. de Benef. l. iv. c. 19.

was

was diſtinguiſhed by the contrary virtues, appears not only from the numerous atteſtations adduced by Laertius [a], but even from the confeſſion of the more reſpectable opponents of his doctrine, particularly Cicero [b], Plutarch [c], and Seneca [d]. And indeed, without any external evidence, this is ſufficiently clear, from the particulars which are related concerning his uſual manner of living. Chryſippus himſelf, one of his moſt violent enemies among the Stoics, acknowledged that Epicurus diſcovered little inclination towards ſexual pleaſures [e]. Nothing can be a greater proof that his adverſaries had little to alledge againſt his innocence, than that they were obliged to have recourſe to forgery. The infamous letters which Diotimus, or, according to Athenæus, Theotimus, aſcribed to him [f], were proved, in a public court, to have been fraudulently impoſed upon the world, and the author of the impoſition was puniſhed. Whatever might be the caſe afterwards, there is little reaſon to doubt that, during the life of Epicurus, his garden was rather a ſchool of temperance, than a ſcene of riot and debauchery.

That Epicurus did not renounce every kind of learning, as inſignificant and uſeleſs, will more fully appear in the ſequel. For the preſent we ſhall content ourſelves with the remarks which Cicero puts into the mouth of Torquatus, in other reſpects ſufficiently ſevere againſt Epicurus. "The reaſon," ſays he [g], "why Epicurus appears to you deficient in learning is, that he thought nothing deſerved the name of learning, which was not conducive to the happineſs of life." And afterwards, "Epicurus therefore was not uninſtructed, but they are unlearned who think that thoſe ſtudies, with which it would be diſgraceful for youth not to be converſant, ſhould be continued to old age." Whence it appears, that Epicurus was an enemy to liberal ſcience no further than Socrates himſelf had been. Stobæus [h] aſcribes to Epicurus the following ſentiment: We ought to be thankful to Nature for having made thoſe things which are neceſſary eaſy to be diſcovered, and thoſe things which are difficult to be known, not neceſſary.

[a] L. x. § 11. [b] Tuſc. Q. l. v. [c] Adv. Colot. [d] Ep. 21. 18.
[e] Stob. l. c. [f] Laert. l. x. § 3. Athen. l. xiii. p. 611.
[g] De Fin. l. i. [h] Serm. 39. p. 137.

If it be aſked, whence it happened, that a character, ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed by ſimplicity and purity as that of Epicurus appears to have been, was loaded with ſo many calumnies; we anſwer, the circumſtances of the times in which he lived will ſufficiently account for the fact.

Zeno, and the Stoic ſect, began to flouriſh about the ſame time with Epicurus and his ſchool, that is, about the hundred and twentieth Olympiad[a]; although the latter is of ſomewhat later date than the former. The father of the Stoics was, as we have ſeen, of a temper naturally ſevere and gloomy; and his character was, under Antiſthenes, formed upon the plan of the Cynic ſchool; ſo that, both by diſpoſition and education, he was inclined to carry his moral ſyſtem beyond the limits of nature, and framed to himſelf a fanciful image of a wiſe man, which could have no archetype in real life. After pillaging the ſchools of other philoſophers, in order to compoſe, from the plundered maſs, a ſyſtem of his own, that he might give it an air of novelty, he introduced new terms, or affixed new ſignifications and definitions to the old; whence aroſe dogmas, which had indeed little originality, but which under a paradoxical form carried the appearance of profound wiſdom. By theſe means, together with the external aid of uncommon gravity in language, dreſs, and demeanour, Zeno and his followers obtained ſuch high reputation among the Athenians, that they were the only perſons deemed worthy of the name of philoſophers.

The temper of Epicurus, and the character under which he choſe to appear, was the reverſe of all this. In his natural diſpoſition lively and cheerful, and accuſtomed, from his infancy, to mix in ſociety with men of all deſcriptions, he had acquired a captivating facility of addreſs, and urbanity of manners. Nothing could be more contrary to his diſpoſition and habitude, than the artificial reſerve, and hypocritical affectation of the Stoics. His averſion to unnatural auſterity, and artificial grimace, induced him to open his garden in direct oppoſition to the Porch. Obſerving that all the Athenians were at this time immerſed either in pleaſures or in ideal and uſeleſs diſputes, he attempted to lead them to ſuch an employment of their

[a] B. C. 300.

rational

rational faculties as would be conducive to the true enjoyment of life; and for this purpoſe introduced among them a ſyſtem of philoſophy, the profeſſed object of which was, to enable men to preſerve themſelves from pain, grief, and ſorrow of every kind, and to ſecure to themſelves the uninterrupted poſſeſſion of tranquillity and happineſs. This great end he aſſured himſelf would be effected, if, by taking off the forbidding maſk with which the Stoics had concealed the fair face of virtue, he could perſuade men to embrace her as the only guide to a happy life[a].

At the ſame time Epicurus was convinced, that the ſubtlety of diſputation would contribute little towards the accompliſhment of his deſign; and therefore endeavoured to divert the public taſte from theſe trifling occupations, and to put an end to the verbal conteſts of the Academics, Dialectics, and Stoics, by inſtituting a ſchool, in which greater caution than had hitherto been cuſtomary ſhould be exerciſed in the aſſumption of principles, and in the uſe of terms. The natural conſequence was, that the Athenian youth willingly committed themſelves to a preceptor, who ſmoothed the path of philoſophy, which others had rendered ſo rugged; and that the ſchool of Epicurus was more frequented than any other: a circumſtance which, it is eaſy to perceive, muſt have excited great jealouſy and envy among his contemporaries. As Epicurus erected his ſchool in direct oppoſition to that of the Stoics, and ſpared no pains to expoſe the futility of their ſyſtem, and the oſtentatious hypocriſy of their conduct, it cannot be queſtioned that this ſect in particular, who were above all others the leaſt able to bear contradiction, would be highly enraged; nor can it be thought ſurpriſing that, in ſuch circumſtances, they ſhould call in the aſſiſtance of detraction and calumny againſt ſo powerful an opponent.

Another cauſe of the diſcredit, into which Epicurus and his followers fell, may be diſcovered in the nature and conſtitution of his philoſophy. Epicurus made pleaſure the end of his doctrine; and only employed wiſdom as a guide to happineſs. *Hinc illæ lacrymæ.* For the Stoics would eaſily perceive, that a preceptor who

[a] Laert. l. x. § 122. 144.

attempted

attempted to correct the falſe and corrupt taſte of the times, and to lead men to true pleaſure, by natural and eaſy ſteps in the path of virtue, would be more likely to command the public attention, than one who reſted his authority and influence upon a rigid ſyſtem of doctrine, and an unnatural ſeverity of manners. In order, therefore, to ſecure their own popularity, they thought it neceſſary to miſrepreſent the principles and character of Epicurus, and held him up to public cenſure as an advocate for infamous pleaſures. That they might gain the greater credit by their miſrepreſentations, they invented and circulated many ſcandalous tales, which would obtain a ready reception among the indolent and credulous Athenians [a]. This might be the more eaſily effected, as Epicurus paſſed his time in his garden, remote from the crowd, and did not ſcruple, in his retirement, to enjoy ſuch pleaſures as he judged to be not inconſiſtent with that virtuous tranquillity, which was the chief end of his philoſophy. The calumnies which were thus ingeniouſly fabricated, and induſtriouſly propagated, againſt the Epicurean ſect, would be the more willingly believed, on account of the contempt with which Epicurus treated the vulgar ſuperſtitions, and his avowed rejection of the doctrine of fate, or providence, ſo ſtrongly maintained by the Stoics; and eſpecially on account of the perverſe abuſe of his doctrine to the encouragement of licentiouſneſs, by which many of his followers brought diſgrace upon their ſect [b]. Theſe abuſes ought not, however, to be imputed to the founder of the ſchool. Seneca himſelf acknowledges [c], that the profligates, who in his time profeſſed themſelves diſciples of Epicurus, were not led into their irregularities by his doctrine; but, being themſelves ſtrongly addicted to vice, ſought to hide their crimes in the boſom of philoſophy, and had recourſe to a maſter who encouraged the purſuit of pleaſure, not becauſe they ſet any value upon that ſober and abſtemious kind of pleaſure, which the doctrine of Epicurus allowed, but

[a] Cic. de Fin. l. ii. Euſeb. Præp. l. vi. c. 6. Athæn. l. iii. p. 103. l. vii. p. 173. 279. l. viii. p. 335. Arrian. l. ii. c. 20.

[b] Ælian. l. ix. c. 12. Cic. Orat. in Piſon. [c] De Vit. Beat. c. 12.

becauſe

becauſe they hoped, in the mere name, to find ſome pretext or apology for their debaucheries.

If theſe circumſtances be duly conſidered and compared, it will no longer appear ſtrange, that many eminent men, who had addicted themſelves to other ſchools, have given an unfavourable judgment concerning Epicurus, whilſt the force of truth has ſometimes led them, at the expence of their own conſiſtency, to atteſt his merit. Others, however, have penetrated through the thick cloud of calumny, which has hung over the character of Epicurus, and, in oppoſition to the general current of cenſure, have ventured to give him that praiſe, which, amidſt all the abſurdities of his ſpeculative ſyſtem, was ſo juſtly due to his perſonal virtues, and to his laudable attempts to conduct men, by innocence and ſobriety, to the tranquil enjoyment of life.

Notwithſtanding the violent oppoſition which Epicurus met with from the Stoics, he had many friends and followers during his life; and after his death a degree of reſpect was paid to his memory, which fell little ſhort of idolatry. His three brothers, Neocles, Chæredemus, and Ariſtobulus, devoted themſelves to the ſtudy of philoſophy, and were ſupported by his liberality. Of his intimate friends the moſt celebrated were, Metrodorus, Polyænus, and Hermachus[a].

METRODORUS firſt attached himſelf to Epicurus at Lampſacus[b], and continued with him till his death. He maintained the cauſe of his friend and maſter with great intrepidity, both by his diſcourſes and writings, againſt the Sophiſts and Dialectics, and conſequently partook largely of the obloquy[c] which fell upon the ſect. Plutarch[d] charges him with having reprobated the folly of his brother Timocrates in aſpiring to the honours of wiſdom, whilſt nothing was of any value but eating and drinking, and indulging the animal appetites. But it is probable that this calumny originated with Timocrates himſelf, who, from a perſonal quarrel with Metrodorus, deſerted the ſect, and therefore can deſerve little credit.

[a] Laert. l. x. § 10, &c. Suidas. [b] Strabo, l. xiii.
[c] Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. iii. [d] Adv. Coloten.

Polyænus[a] is ſaid to have recommended himſelf to Epicurus by his amiable temper, and the modeſty of his manners. Cicero alſo atteſts[b], that he was an eminent mathematician.

Hermachus[c], of Mitylene, left the ſchools of the Rhetoricians to become a diſciple of Epicurus, and obtained ſuch entire poſſeſſion of his confidence and affection, that at his death he entruſted him with the execution of his will, and committed to him the whole charge of his ſchool.

After the death of Epicurus his followers celebrated his birth day as a feſtival. They preſerved his image on their rings or cups, or in pictures, which they either carried about their perſons, or hung up in their chambers. So great was their reverence for his authority, and their regard to his dying advice, that they committed his maxims, and ſome of them the whole body of his inſtructions, to memory. For ſeveral ages they adhered with wonderful unanimity to his ſyſtem, yielding as implicit ſubmiſſion to his deciſions, as the Athenians or Spartans ever yielded to the laws of Solon or Lycurgus. They carried this point ſo far, that it was deemed a kind of impiety to innovate upon his doctrine; ſo that the Epicureans formed a Philoſophical Republic, regulated by one judgment, and animated by one ſoul[d].

Thus much concerning the Life of Epicurus. Our next buſineſs is to ſtate, as accurately as the remaining ſources of information will permit, the Doctrines which he taught. They may be arranged under the diſtinct heads of Philoſophy in General, Canons or Rules of Philoſophiſing, Phyſics, and Ethics.

The Sum of his doctrine concerning Philosophy in General is this[e]:

Philosophy is the exerciſe of reaſon in the purſuit and attainment of a happy life; whence it follows, that thoſe ſtudies which

[a] Laert. l. x. § 24. [b] Acad. Qu. l. iv. c. 33. [c] Laert. § 25.

[d] Laert. l. x. § 21. Plin. H. N. l. xxxv. c. 2. Athen. l. iv. p. 182. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 1. Q. Ac. l. iv. c. 33. Sen. Ep. 33. Themiſt. Orat. iv. Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l. xiv. c. 5.

[e] Laert. l. x. § 30. 120, &c. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. xi. § 169. Senec. Ep. 8. 52. 89. Cic. in Brut. c. 83. Plut. de Aud. Poet. t. i. p. 20.

conduce neither to the acquiſition nor the enjoyment of happineſs are to be diſmiſſed as of no value. The end of all ſpeculation ought to be, to enable men to judge with certainty what is to be choſen, and what to be avoided, to preſerve themſelves free from pain, and to ſecure health of body and tranquillity of mind. True philoſophy is ſo uſeful to every man, that the young ſhould apply to it without delay, and the old ſhould never be weary of the purſuit; for no man is either too young or too old to correct and improve his mind, and to ſtudy the art of happineſs. Happy are they who poſſeſs by nature a free and vigorous intellect, and who are born in a country where they can proſecute their enquiries without reſtraint; for it is philoſophy alone which raiſes a man above vain fears and baſe paſſions, and gives him the perfect command of himſelf. As nothing ought to be dearer to a philoſopher than truth, he ſhould purſue it by the moſt direct means, deviſing no fictions himſelf, nor ſuffering himſelf to be impoſed upon by the fictions of others, neither poets, orators, nor logicians, making no other uſe of the rules of rhetoric or grammar, than to enable him to ſpeak or write with accuracy and perſpicuity, and always preferring a plain and ſimple to an ornamented ſtyle. Whilſt ſome doubt of every thing, and others profeſs to acknowledge every thing, a wiſe man will embrace ſuch tenets, and only ſuch, as are built upon experience, or upon certain and indiſputable axioms. Philoſophy conſiſts of two parts; phyſics, which reſpect the contemplation of nature; and ethics, which are employed in the regulation of manners. Of theſe the latter is the moſt important; the knowledge of nature being only neceſſary as a means of promoting the happineſs of life. Philoſophers have added a third part, dialectics; but this is to be rejected as only productive of thorny diſputes, idle quibbles, and fruitleſs cavilling[a]. In order to facilitate the purſuit of knowledge, a few plain maxims and rules may be uſeful.

TRUTH is of two kinds, that which reſpects real exiſtence, and that which conſiſts in a perfect agreement between the conception of the mind and the nature of things. It is in the nature of things

[a] Lucretius, l. i. v. 63, &c. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 14.

true, that any individual is what he is, and no other. A judgment or enunciation is true, when it agrees with the thing concerning which the judgment is made or declared. In order to judge rightly concerning truth, it is neceſſary to make uſe of ſome criterion, or inſtrument, of judging. This criterion will be different, according to the nature of the object which the mind contemplates. In judging of natural objects external to man, the ſenſes firſt preſent the object to the mind, which perceives it by means of the faculty of ſenſation. Beſides this operation of the mind, by which it becomes ſenſible of things preſent, and a mental image, or phantaſy, is produced, the mind is alſo capable of reaſoning concerning the object which it perceives, and comparing it with a certain preconception, or general idea, which has been formed by frequent ſimilar impreſſions upon the ſenſes. In judging of moral objects which intereſt the affections, the only criterion is the affection or paſſion itſelf, by which we are driven towards, or drawn from, any object, as pleaſure and pain. There are then three inſtruments of judging, ſenſe, preconception, and paſſion [a].

The maxims, or canons, which may be laid down concerning ſenſe are theſe four: Firſt, that the ſenſes can never be deceived, and conſequently, that every perception of an image, or appearance, is true; that is, the perception or ſimple apprehenſion, and its efficient cauſe, the ſpecies or image flowing from the object, really agree [b]. Secondly, opinion or judgment is conſequent upon perception, and admits either of truth or falſehood. Perceptions or ſenſations are the effect of real external *phenomena*; but when the mind judges concerning theſe appearances, the opinion may be either right or wrong. If a tower appears to be ſmall and round, the image which produces this perception of ſmallneſs and roundneſs is really ſuch; but when the mind reaſons upon this appearance, to determine whether the tower from which this image proceeded be in itſelf ſmall or round, it may either conclude according to truth, or be deceived [c].

[a] Laert. l. x. § 31. 121, &c. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vii. § 203. Plut. de Pla. Ph. l. iv. c. 8.

[b] Laert. ib. § 32. 126. Sext. Emp. ib. l. vii. § 126. 211. [c] Laert. § 34.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Every opinion is to be admitted as true, which is atteſted, or not contradicted, by the evidence of the ſenſes, after a careful and deliberate examination of every circumſtance which can be ſuppoſed to affect the queſtion. Opinions may be received as true, either upon the direct report of the ſenſes thus examined, as that the perſon coming towards me is Plato, or by clear inference from ſomething admitted on the teſtimony of the ſenſes, as that becauſe bodies move there is a *Vacuum*, without which it would be impoſſible for a body to paſs out of one place into another. Fourthly, An opinion contradicted, or not atteſted, by the evidence of the ſenſes is falſe. Thus the opinion of a *Plenum* muſt be falſe, becauſe it contradicts the evidence of the ſenſes, which atteſts that there is ſuch a thing as motion [a].

Concerning the ſecond inſtrument of judgment, προλήψις, Preconception, four canons may alſo be laid down [b]. Firſt, That all preconceptions are derived from the ſenſes, either by immediate impreſſion, as of an individual man; by enlargement or diminution, as of a giant or dwarf; by reſemblance, as of an unknown city to one which has been ſeen; or by compoſition, as of a Centaur. Secondly, Preconception is neceſſary to enable us to reaſon, enquire, or judge of any thing. Unleſs, for example, we have in the mind a general idea of the form or ſpecies of a horſe, we cannot determine whether the animal which ſtands by us is a horſe. Thirdly, Preconceptions, or univerſal notions, are the principles of all reaſoning and diſcourſe; and we eaſily refer to theſe in comparing one thing with another. If theſe univerſal notions, καθολικὰς νοήσεις, be agreeable to nature, and diſtinctly conceived, artificial reaſoning will be unneceſſary. Fourthly, Truths, not ſelf-evident, are to be deduced from manifeſt pre-conceptions, or, where the relation of ideas is obſcure, it is to be made evident by the intermediate uſe of ſome acknowledged principle.

The third inſtrument, paſſion or affection, which comprehends

[a] Laert.

[b] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. ii. c. 11. § 107. l. viii. § 316. Laert. l. x. § 32. 33. 108.

pleaſure

pleaſure and pain, admits of theſe four evident maxims[a]. Firſt, All pleaſure, to which no pain is annexed, is for its own ſake to be purſued. Secondly, All pain, to which no pleaſure is annexed, is for its own ſake to be avoided. Thirdly, That pleaſure, which either prevents the enjoyment of a greater pleaſure, or produces a greater pain, is to be ſhunned. Fourthly, That pain, which either removes a greater pain, or procures a greater pleaſure, is to be endured.

With reſpect to the uſe of Words, two Canons may ſuffice[b]. Firſt, In ſpeaking, make choice of terms in common uſe, and employ them in the ſenſe in which they are commonly underſtood. Secondly, In hearing or reading, attend carefully to the ſignification which the ſpeaker or writer affixes to his terms. Theſe ſimple precepts, diligently followed, would prevent much obſcurity and confuſion, and put an end to many diſputes.

By the help of theſe rules for inveſtigating truth, Epicurus undertook to conduct his followers into the ſecrets of nature, and to lay open to them the origin of things. With how little conſiſtency and ſucceſs will appear in the ſequel.

The PHYSICAL DOCTRINE of Epicurus was as follows[c]:

'NOTHING can ever ſpring from nothing, nor can any thing ever return to nothing[d]. The univerſe always exiſted, and will always remain; for there is nothing into which it can be changed. There is nothing in nature, nor can any thing be conceived, beſides body and ſpace. Body is that which poſſeſſes the properties of bulk; figure, reſiſtance, and gravity: it is this alone which can touch or be touched. Space, or *vacuum*, deſtitute of the properties of body, incapable of action or paſſion, is the region which is or may be occupied by body, and which affords it an opportunity of moving freely. That there are bodies in the univerſe is atteſted by the ſenſes. That there is alſo ſpace is evident; ſince otherwiſe body would have no place in which to move or exiſt, and of their exiſtence and motion we have the certain proof of perception. Beſides theſe no third nature can be conceived; for ſuch a nature muſt

[a] Laert. § 118. 129. Sext. Emp. ib. § 316. [b] Laert. § 13. 37.
[c] Laert. l. x. § 35, 36. 38. [d] Epiſt. ad. Herod. ap. Laert. l. c.

either

either have bulk and ſolidity, or want them; that is, it muſt either be body or ſpace: this does not, however, preclude the exiſtence of qualities, which have no ſubſiſtence but in the body to which they belong[a].

The univerſe, conſiſting of body and ſpace, is infinite, for it has no limits. Bodies are infinite in multitude; ſpace is infinite in magnitude. The terms above or beneath, high or low, cannot be properly applied to infinite ſpace. The univerſe is to be conceived as immoveable, ſince beyond it there is no place into which it can move; and as eternal and immutable, ſince it is neither liable to increaſe nor decreaſe, to production nor decay. Nevertheleſs, the parts of the univerſe are in motion, and are ſubject to change[b].

All bodies conſiſt of parts, of which they are compoſed, and into which they may be reſolved; and theſe parts are either themſelves ſimple principles, or may be reſolved into ſuch. Theſe firſt principles, or ſimple Atoms, are diviſible by no force, and therefore muſt be immutable. This may alſo be inferred from the uniformity of nature, which could not be preſerved if its principles were not certain and conſiſtent. The exiſtence of ſuch atoms is evident, ſince it is impoſſible that any thing which exiſts ſhould be reduced to nothing. A finite body cannot conſiſt of parts infinite, either in magnitude or number; diviſibility of bodies *in infinitum* is therefore inconceivable. All atoms are of the ſame nature, or differ in no eſſential qualities. From their different effects upon the ſenſes, it appears, however, that they differ in magnitude, figure, and weight. Atoms exiſt in every poſſible variety of figure, round, oval, conical, cubical, ſharp, hooked, &c. But in every ſhape they are, on account of their ſolidity, infrangible or incapable of actual diviſion[c].

Gravity muſt be an eſſential property of atoms; for ſince they are perpetually in motion, or making an effort to move, they muſt be moved by an internal impulſe, which may be called gravity. Atoms, by this internal force, are carried forward in a direction which

[a] Lucret. l. i. Laert. l. x. § 38. Euſeb. l. i. c. 8.

[b] Laert. l. x. § 39. 42. Lucret. l. i. v. 335. 420. 435. 455. 490. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. ix. § 333.

[c] Laert. l. x. § 38. 42. 44. 54. 55, 56. 58. 59. Lucret. l. i. v. 268. 333. 486. 548, &c. l. ii. v. 729, &c. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 3, 4.

is

is nearly but not exactly rectilineal; and whilſt they paſs through free ſpace, this declination from the right line occaſions a caſual concurrence of corpuſcles of different forms. By this percuſſion atoms will be turned out of their natural courſe, and various kinds of curvilinear motions will be produced. It will alſo happen, that when one atom is reflected from another, and again repelled by a third, within a ſhort interval, it will acquire a kind of vibratory or tremulous motion. Whence, in compound maſſes of atoms, the efforts of ſome of the particles towards motion in different directions being repreſſed by the efforts of others, a univerſal agitation muſt take place [a].

The principle of gravity, that internal energy which is the cauſe of all motion, whether ſimple or complex, being eſſential to the primary corpuſcles or atoms, they muſt have been inceſſantly and from eternity in actual motion. The velocity of the motion of atoms, where they meet with no obſtacle, is ſuch, that they will paſs through the greateſt imaginable ſpace in the ſmalleſt imaginable portion of time. It may alſo be aſſumed, that all atoms paſſing without reſiſtance through the ſame empty ſpace are equal in velocity, and that though the direction be changed, the velocity is not diminiſhed by colliſion. Even in compound bodies the atoms ſtill retain their innate energy; ſo that, though the whole maſs may move ſlowly, or be apparently at reſt, its parts are ſtill moved by repercuſſions too rapid to be perceived by the ſenſes [b].

Atoms are the elements from which all things are compounded, and into which they are ultimately reſolved. Not only are they the materials out of which bodies are made; but that energy, or principle of motion, which eſſentially belongs to them is the ſole agent in the operations of nature. Every compound body poſſeſſes the energy of all the atoms of which it is compoſed, but variouſly modified according to the reſpective figures,

[a] Lucret. l. i. v. 82, &c. l. ii. v. 217. Cic. de Fato, c. 10. 20. De Fin. l. i. c. 6. Laert. l. x. § 43, 44. 134. Plut. de Procr. Anim. t. iii. p 79. De Fac. in Orb. Lun.

[b] Lucret. l. ii. v. 94. Laert. § 46. 61, 62.

and

and relative ſituations, of its component parts. The rugged angular atoms, for example, being more eaſily entangled move leſs freely than thoſe which are of a ſmooth and round form; whence ſome combinations of atoms have more activity than others, ſuch as fire and the vital principle; but all bodies, conſiſting of atoms which have in themſelves a principle of motion, have a certain ſelf-moving power, modified according to the variety of the motion, or tendency to motion, in its component parts. Thus action originates in atoms, and proceeds from theſe to bodies[a].

All the changes which take place in the figure, and other properties of bodies, conſiſt in local motion. If a body from ſweet becomes bitter, or from ſoft becomes hard, it is through ſome change in the ſituation and arrangement of its parts, or through ſome augmentation or diminution of the maſs which forms the body. As different words are formed from the different combinations of the ſame letters, ſo different qualities are produced by the different arrangement of the ſame particles. Bodies are more or leſs rare, in proportion to the magnitude of the vacuities which intercept the ſolid atoms of which they are compoſed. Tranſparency depends partly upon the ſame cauſe, and partly upon the poſition of the vacuities between the particles; for rays of light will paſs eaſily through a denſe body, as glaſs, if its vacuities be placed in a ſtraight line. Hardneſs and ſoftneſs, flexibility, ductility, and other qualities, may be explained in a ſimilar manner. The weight of a body is the reſult of the weight of all its atoms, and ſince gravity is an eſſential property of atoms, all bodies muſt be heavy; and the only reaſon why ſome bodies appear to have the contrary property of levity is, that they are driven upwards by the denſer maſs in which they are placed[b].

From the combination of the properties of atoms, and the quali-

[a] Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 3. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 20. Lucret. l. i. v. 1020, &c. Plut. adv. Colot. Laert. l. x. § 134.

[b] Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. x. § 42. 51. 75. Lucr. l. i. v. 575. l. ii. v. 96. 759. l. iv. v. 605. 444. 266. l. ii. 381. l. i. 187. 360. Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 4. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. iv. c. 19. Laert.

ties of bodies already enumerated, ariſe other properties and faculties, which are likewiſe to be traced up to the principle of motion. Heat, for example, is the influx of certain ſmall, round, ſoft corpuſcles, which inſinuate themſelves into the pores of bodies in continual ſucceſſion, till, by their perpetual action, the parts are ſeparated, and at length the body diſſolved. The ſenſe of heat is the perception of the ſeparation of thoſe parts which were before continuous. Cold is the influx of certain irregular atoms, whoſe motion is ſlower than thoſe which occaſion heat, and their effect the reverſe of the former. Pleaſure and pain, motion and reſt, and even time, are accidents of bodies. Production and diſſolution are nothing more than a change of the poſition of atoms, or an increaſe or diminution of the particles of which bodies are compoſed[a].

The world, or that portion of the univerſe which includes the whole circumference of the heavens, the heavenly bodies, the earth, and all viſible objects, is to be conceived as one whole, on account of the contiguity and relation of its parts: but there is no proof that it is an organized and animated body. Becauſe the world is a finite portion of the univerſe, it muſt be terminated, and have ſome figure; but what this is, it is impoſſible to diſcover. The world is not eternal, but began at a certain time to exiſt; for ſince every thing in the world is liable to the viciſſitudes of production and decay, the world itſelf muſt be ſo too. This may alſo be inferred from the ſhort date of hiſtory, and the late invention of arts[b].

The formation of the world may be conceived to have happened thus: a finite number of that infinite multitude of atoms, which, with infinite ſpace, conſtitutes the univerſe, falling fortuitouſly into the region of the world, were in conſequence of their innate motion collected into one, rude and indigeſted maſs. In this chaos the heavieſt and largeſt atoms, or collections of atoms, firſt ſubſided,

[a] Lucret. l. ii. v. 381. l. iv. v. 527. l. vi. v. 225. l. iii. v. 860. Laert. l. x. § 52. Plut. adv. Col. t. iii. p. 411. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. l. iii. c. 17. § 137. adv. Math. l. x. § 183. 227.

[b] Laert. l. x. § 54. 76. 88. Lucret. l. i. 1020. l. v. v. 166, &c. 319, &c. Cic. de Nat. D. l. i. c. 8, 9, 10. l. ii. c. 17. Lactant. l. vii. c. 5. Plut. Plac. Ph. l. i. c. 4.

whilſt the ſmaller, and thoſe which from their form would move moſt freely, were driven upwards. Theſe latter, after many reverberations, roſe into the outer region of the world, and formed the heavens. Thoſe atoms, which were by their ſize and figure ſuited to form fiery bodies, collected themſelves into ſtars. Thoſe which were not capable of riſing ſo high in the ſphere of the world, being diſturbed by the fiery particles, formed themſelves into air. At length, from thoſe which ſubſided was produced the earth. By the action of air, agitated by heat from the heavenly bodies upon the mixed maſs of the earth, its ſmoother and lighter particles were ſeparated from the reſt, and water was produced, which flowed by its nature into the loweſt places. In the firſt combination of atoms, which formed the chaos, various ſeeds aroſe, which, being preſerved and nouriſhed by moiſture and heat, afterwards ſprung forth in organized bodies of different kinds. Of the animal productions of the earth ſome may be conceived to have been produced imperfect, and therefore incapable of life, but others would come forth more perfect. Theſe, after the earth was exhauſted of its ſeminal virtues, would reſpectively continue their ſpecies[a].

The world is preſerved by the ſame mechanical cauſes by which it was framed; and from the ſame cauſes it will at laſt be diſſolved. The inceſſant motion of atoms, which produced the world, is continually operating towards its diſſolution; for nothing is ſolid and indiſſoluble but atoms. Whence it may be concluded, that the time will come when nothing will remain but ſeparate atoms and infinite ſpace. Atoms being infinite, and capable of moving through infinite ſpace, the number of worlds may be infinite[b].

The earth, which was formed of heavy particles, ſubſiding to the loweſt place, is ſituated in the middle of the world. Not that there

[a] Laert. l. x. § 76. 88. Lucret. l. iv. v. 304, &c. 420, &c. 450, &c. 474, &c. l. v. 166, &c. 319, &c. 799, &c. l. i. 1020. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 4. Cic. de N. D. l. i. c. 8, 9. l. ii. c. 17. Lactant. l. vii. c. 5.

[b] Laert. l. x. § 77, &c. Lucret. l. i. v. 1102, &c. l. ii. v. 1092, &c. 1144, &c. 1144, &c. 1021, &c. l. v. v. 252. 381, &c. Cic. de N. D. l. i. c. 8. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. ii. c. 4. l. i. c. 5. in Brut. t. v. p. 711. Cic. de Divin. l. ii. c. 63.

is any point within the earth which is the center of gravity, for all heavy bodies fall in nearly parallel lines, there being, as in the univerſe ſo in this world, one region above, from which they fall, and another region below, towards which they fall. The doctrine that there are upon the earth antipodes is therefore falſe. The earth is in form a circular plane: it is preſerved from falling towards the lower region by the air, with which it is congenial, and upon which therefore it does not preſs; their mutual action deſtroying the effect of gravity[a].

Earthquakes are cauſed by the agitation of internal winds and water, or by the decay and ſudden fall of columns, by which portions of the earth's ſurface are ſupported. Or the internal winds may be converted into fires, which may cauſe ſudden and violent eruptions, as in Mount Etna[b]. All rivers flow into the ſea, and mingle with a vaſt ocean, which ſurrounds the whole habitable world. The waters paſſing out of the ſea into the crevices of the earth undergo a filtration, by means of which the particles of ſalt which they had received from the bed of the ſea are ſeparated. The overflowing of the Nile may be cauſed, either by winds from the north, or by rain or ſnow from the regions of Ethiopia. Water in wells is cold in ſummer and warm in winter, becauſe in ſummer the earth being rarified exhales the particles of heat, and becoming colder, communicates its coldneſs to the water, and the reverſe in winter. Ice is produced, when the round particles of water, which cauſe heat, are protruded by the condenſing power of the external cold, and other particles, which from their form are more eaſily entangled, are from the ſame cauſe brought nearer together, and at length united[c].

Foſſils and plants are produced by the neceſſary impulſe of nature, that is, by the motion of atoms, cauſing continual tranſpoſition, accretion, or diminution, in individual bodies. They have no vital principle, and therefore can only be ſaid analogically to live or die. The loadſtone or magnet attracts iron, becauſe the particles, which

[a] Lucret. l. i. v. 1051, &c. l. v. v. 538, &c. l. ii. v. 652, &c.
[b] Lucret. l. vi. v. 535. Sen. Qu. Nat. l. vi. c. 20. Laert. l. x. § 105.
[c] Lucret. l. vi. v. 613, &c. 635, &c. 714, &c.

are

are continually flowing from it, as from all other bodies, have ſuch a peculiar fitneſs, in form, to thoſe which flow from iron, that upon colliſion they eaſily unite; ſo that ſome paſſing towards the maſs of iron, and others towards the magnet, and ſtriking upon their ſurfaces, they are reſpectively entangled with the particles of the body upon which they ſtrike, and in rebounding carry back the body along with it. The mutual attraction of amber, and light bodies may be explained in the ſame manner[a].

Animals having been once formed, at the beginning of the world, by the caſual conjunction of ſimilar atoms, the production of animal bodies is ſtill continued in a conſiſtent and determinate order; nature by degrees acquiring an uniformity in her operations, which appears artificial. The parts of animals were not originally framed for the uſes to which they are now applied; but, having been accidentally produced, they were afterwards accidentally employed. The eye, for example, was not made for ſeeing, nor the ear for hearing, but the ſoul, being formed within the body at the ſame time with theſe organs, and connected with them, could not avoid making uſe of them in their reſpective functions[b].

The Soul is a ſubtle corporeal ſubſtance, compoſed of the fineſt atoms; for if it were not corporeal, it could neither touch nor be touched, and conſequently could neither act nor ſuffer. By the extreme tenuity of its particles, it is able to penetrate the whole body, and to adhere to all its parts. Notwithſtanding the ſubtlety of its texture, it is compoſed of four diſtinct parts; fire, which cauſes animal heat; an ethereal principle, which is moiſt vapour; air; and a fourth principle, which is the cauſe of ſenſation. This ſentient principle differs eſſentially from the three former, but is, like the reſt, corporeal, becauſe it is capable both of acting and being acted upon by bodies[c]. Theſe four parts are ſo perfectly combined

[a] Lucret. l. vi. v. 538, &c. Laert. l. x. § 95, 96. Plut. de Pl. Ph. l. v. c. 25.

[b] Lucret. l. iv. v. 816, &c. Lactant. l. iii. c. 17. de Opif. c. 7. Galen de Uſu Part. l. i. c. 21.

[c] Lucret. l. ii. v. 129. 162, &c. l. iii. v. 233, &c. Plut. de Plac. Ph. l. iv. c. 3. adv. Colot. Laert. l. x. § 63, 64.

as

as to form one ſubtle ſubſtance, which whilſt it remains in the body is the cauſe of all its faculties, motions, and paſſions, and which cannot be ſeparated from it without producing the entire diſſolution of the animal ſyſtem. The ſoul is only capable of exerciſing its faculties of ſenſation by means of the bodily organs; and although, whilſt they are united, the body partakes of the ſenſations of the ſoul, upon their ſeparation it becomes wholly inſenſible; whence it appears, that ſenſation is the reſult of their union. That ſenſation is thus produced from the combination of elementary parts in themſelves inſenſible, is to be aſcribed to the peculiar magnitude, figure, motion, and arrangement of thoſe parts; that is, ſenſation is to be conſidered, not as a primary property of atoms, but as the effect of a peculiar combination and contexture of certain atoms diſpoſed by their nature to produce it[a].

Different ſenſations are the caſual effects of the different organs which the ſoul in its union with the body is capable of employing, and of the different properties and qualities of external objects. Theſe become ſenſible by means of certain ſpecies, or images, which are perpetually paſſing, like thin films, from bodies, in form ſimilar to the ſurfaces of the bodies themſelves, and ſtriking upon organs fitted to receive them. Thus the ſpecies, or images, of viſible bodies conſiſt in certain ſmall particles, of a peculiar magnitude, figure, and motion, which having paſſed in a certain ſituation from a body, penetrates the organ of ſight, and affects it in a peculiar manner. Thus alſo, hearing is the effect of an efflux of certain particles from the body which is the cauſe of the ſound, ſo formed and arranged as when they ſtrike upon the ear to become audible. The ſenſations produced by means of the other ſenſes admit of a ſimilar explanation. The ſpecies, or images, which produce theſe effects are inconceivably ſmall, and therefore do not, in paſſing away, perceptibly diminiſh the body; and, from the innate tendency to motion in the atoms of which they are compoſed, they fly with in-

[a] Lucret. l. ii. v. 285. v. 972, &c. l. iii. v. 290. 324. Laert. § 64, 5.

conceivable

conceivable velocity from the object to the organ of ſenſation [a].

The Mind, or Intellect, that nameleſs part of the ſoul in which conſiſts the power of thinking, judging, and determining, is formed of particles moſt ſubtle in their nature, and capable of the moſt rapid motion. In whatever part of the body the intellect reſides, it exiſts as a portion of the ſoul, with which it is ſo conjoined as to form one nature with it; at the ſame time it retains its own diſtinct character, the power of thinking. The intellect has this peculiar property, that when the ſoul or ſentient principle feels pleaſure or pain, the intellect or mind always partakes of it, but the intellect may be affected with paſſions, which are not diffuſed through the whole ſoul. The ſeat of this moſt excellent part of the ſoul ſeems to be in the middle of the breaſt, or the heart, which we perceive to be the region of thoſe affections which are excited by cogitation. Thought is produced by ſubtle images, which find their way through the body, and, when they arrive at the intellect, move it to think [b].

The affections and paſſions of the ſoul may be reduced to two, pleaſure and pain; the former natural and agreeable, the latter unnatural and troubleſome. Whilſt all the parts of the ſoul remain in their natural ſtate, it experiences nothing but pleaſurable tranquillity; but from the various motions which take place either in ourſelves, or in the objects round us, the ſoul is liable either to be dilated by the approach of images ſuitable to its nature, and therefore pleaſant, or to be contracted by contrary impreſſions. Voluntary motion is the effect of images conveyed to the mind, by which pleaſurable or painful conceptions are formed, and ſubſequent deſires or averſions are produced, which become the immediate ſprings of action [c].

[a] Lucret. l. ii. v. 422. 434. l. iv. v. 245, &c. 645, &c. 677, &c. Laert. l. x. § 49. 52. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. iv. c. 19. adv. Colot. t. iii. p. 410. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. i. c. 14. § 94.

[b] Lucret. l. iii. v. 94. 104. 180. 187, &c. l. iii. v. 400. 422, &c. l. iv. 728. Plut. de Pl. Ph. l. iv. c. 8. Cic. de Fin. l. i. c. 6.

[c] Lucret. l. iii. v. 289, &c. l. iv. 856. 879. Laert. l. x. § 34. 127. 139.

Sleep

Sleep is produced when the parts of the ſoul which are at other times diffuſed through the body are repreſſed or ſeparated by the action of the air, or of food. Dreams are the effect of images caſually flying about, which from their extreme tenuity penetrate the body and ſtrike upon the mind, exciting an imaginary perception of thoſe things of which they are images. Death is the privation of ſenſation, in conſequence of the ſeparation of the ſoul from the body. When a man dies, the ſoul is diſperſed into the corpuſcles or atoms of which it was compoſed, and therefore can no longer be capable of thought or perception. It is with the ſoul as with the eye, which, when it is ſeparated from the organized machine to which it belonged, is no longer capable of ſeeing[a].

The knowledge of things which belong to the regions above the earth, whether aerial or celeſtial, is to be purſued for no other purpoſe than to free the mind from imaginary fears, and ſettle it in a ſtate of tranquillity. This end may be accompliſhed in different ways; becauſe theſe *phenomena* admit of different explanations, all however depending upon the ſimple principles upon which the terreſtrial *phenomena* have been explained[b].

In the heavens, or ethereal regions, the ſun, moon, and ſtars appear to be fiery bodies; or they may be ſmooth mirrors, from which bright fiery particles flowing through the ethereal region are reflected to the earth; or they may be deep veſſels, containing fires; or they may be circular plates, heated like mortar, or ſtones in a furnace. The apparent motion of the heavenly bodies may ariſe from the revolution of the whole heaven in which they are fixed, like nails in a ſolid body; or by the revolution of the bodies themſelves through the heaven as a fluid and permeable medium. The cauſe of the motion of heavenly bodies may either be, an internal neceſſity in the natures of the bodies themſelves, or the external preſſure of ſome ethereal fluid; but to aſſert any thing poſitively upon theſe ſubjects,

[a] Lucret. l. iv. 758. 914. 959, &c. l. iii. v. 507. 844. 991. Laert. § 65. Pſ. Orig. Philoſophum, c. 22.

[b] Laert. l. x. § 85. 113. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. ii. c. 13. 20. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. p. 53. 55. 56. Cic. de N. D. l. i. c. 10. l. ii. c. 17.

only becomes thoſe who affect an oſtentatious diſplay of knowledge [a].

It cannot be contradicted, that there are in the univerſe Divine Natures; becauſe nature itſelf has impreſſed the idea of divinity upon the mind of men: for where is the nation or race of men, which has not, without inſtruction, a natural preconception of the exiſtence of the gods? This opinion is not eſtabliſhed by cuſtom, law, or any human inſtitution, but is the effect of an innate principle, producing univerſal conſent; it muſt therefore be true [b]. This univerſal notion has probably ariſen from images of the gods, which have caſually made their way to the minds of men in ſleep, and have afterwards been recollected. But it is inconſiſtent with our natural notions of the gods, as happy and immortal beings, to ſuppoſe that they encumber themſelves with the management of the world, or are ſubject to the cares and paſſions which muſt neceſſarily attend ſo great a charge. We are therefore to conceive, that the gods have no intercourſe with mankind, nor any concern with the affairs of the world. Nevertheleſs, on account of their excellent nature, they are proper objects of reverence and worſhip [c]. Becauſe the human figure is the moſt perfect, and the only form that admits of reaſon and virtue, we muſt conceive that the gods reſemble men in their external ſhape; but we are not to ſuppoſe them to be groſs bodies, conſiſting of fleſh and blood, but thin ethereal ſubſtances, endued with ſenſation and intellect, and, from their peculiar nature, incapable of decay. The place of their reſidence is unknown to mortals; but we may be aſſured that, wherever it be, it is the manſion of perfect purity, tranquillity, and happineſs [d].

It will be impoſſible for an intelligent reader to contemplate the Epicurean Syſtem, as it is ſtated in the preceding ſummary, without

[a] Laert. § 91, &c. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. ii. c. 22. Lucret. l. v. v. 592. 659. 750, &c. l. vi. v. 218. 450. 498, &c.

[b] Lucret. l. v. v. 1182, &c. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. ix. § 25. 26. Cic. de N. D. l. i. c. 17. 30. Tuſc. Q. l. i. c. 13. De Legib. l. i. c. 8.

[c] Lucret. l. v. v. 1168. 1232, &c. Laert. l. x. § 76. 123. 133, 134. Stobæi Serm. 39. p. 137. Cic. de N. D. l. i. c. 17, 18, 19. Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. 10. Plut. Pl. Ph. l. i. c. 6. [d] Cic. l. c. Senec. de Benef. l. iv. c. 19.

perceiving that it is a feeble and unſucceſsful effort to explain the *phenomena* of nature upon mechanical principles. The author of this ſyſtem deſerts, at the outſet, his own principle of advancing nothing which cannot be ſupported by natural appearances; for nothing was ever more perfectly hypothetical, than his doctrine of indiviſible atoms of various forms and magnitude; nor can any thing be more contrary to the known law of nature, than that atoms impelled only by a ſingle force ſhould deviate from the right line. Indeed, Epicurus diſcovers, through the whole detail of his philoſophy, a degree of ignorance with reſpect to the *phenomena* of nature, which proves him to have been ill qualified for the taſk of ſolving the grand problem, concerning the origin and formation of the world. But the greateſt defect in his ſyſtem is, that it attempts to account for all the appearances of nature, even thoſe which reſpect animated and intelligent beings, upon the ſimple principles of matter and motion, without introducing the agency of a Supreme Intelligence, or admitting any other idea of fate, than that of blind neceſſity inherent in every atom, by which it moves in a certain direction. Hence he leaves without explanation thoſe appearances of deſign, which are ſo manifeſt in every part of nature, and falls into the groſs abſurdity of ſuppoſing, that the eye was not made for ſeeing, nor the ear for hearing. And although he profeſſes to admit the exiſtence of gods into his ſyſtem of nature, and this upon the ground of an innate principle common to all mankind; the idea which he gives of their nature, as ſimilar to that of man, and of their condition, as wholly ſeparate from the world, and enjoying no other felicity than that which ariſes from inactive tranquillity, falls infinitely ſhort of the true conception of Deity, as the Intelligent Creator and Governor of the world.

It is difficult to determine preciſely, what was the idea of Epicurus concerning the divine natures which he admitted into his ſyſtem. Finding it wholly inconſiſtent with his fundamental principles to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of immaterial beings, yet wiſhing to aſcribe to the gods an incorporeal nature, he ſeems to have had recourſe to an abſtract notion of a peculiar ſubſtance, in the form of man,

man, of ſuch tenuity as to be intangible, indiviſible, and indiſſoluble; and which he ſuppoſed to be endued with perception and reaſon. What this peculiar nature of Epicurus's divinities was, which was not a body, yet was like a body, we own ourſelves unable to explain. The truth ſeems to have been, that Epicurus, reduced to inextricable difficulties by the abſurdity of his ſyſtem, that he might not wholly diſcard the idea of divinity, had recourſe to the common aſylum of ignorance, words without meaning.

The doctrine of Epicurus concerning nature differs from that of the Stoics chiefly in theſe particulars; that while the latter held God to be the ſoul of the world, diffuſed through univerſal nature, the former admitted no Primary Intelligent Nature into his ſyſtem, but held atoms and ſpace to be the firſt principles of all things; and that, whilſt the Stoics conceived the active and paſſive principles of nature to be connected by the chain of fate, Epicurus aſcribed every appearance in nature to a fortuitous colliſion and combination of atoms.

The ſcience of Phyſics was, in the judgment of Epicurus, ſubordinate to that of Ethics; and his whole doctrine concerning nature was profeſſedly adapted to reſcue men from the dominion of troubleſome paſſions, and lay the foundation of a tranquil and happy life[a]. His MORAL PHILOSOPHY, which is unqueſtionably the leaſt exceptionable part of his ſyſtem, and which, when fairly reſcued from the miſrepreſentations of his adverſaries, will be found, for the moſt part, conſonant to reaſon and nature, may be reduced to the following SUMMARY.

The end of living, or the ultimate good, which is to be ſought for its own ſake, according to the univerſal opinion of mankind, is happineſs; yet men, for the moſt part, fail in the purſuit of this end, either becauſe they do not form a right idea of the nature of happineſs, or becauſe they do not make uſe of proper means to attain it. Since it is every man's intereſt to be happy through the

[a] Epiſt. ad Menæceus, ap. Laert. l. x. § 132.

whole of life, it is the wiſdom of every one to employ philoſophy in the ſearch of felicity without delay; and there cannot be a greater folly, than to be always beginning to live[a].

The happineſs which belongs to man, is that ſtate in which he enjoys as many of the good things, and ſuffers as few of the evils, incident to human nature as poſſible; paſſing his days in a ſmooth courſe of permanent tranquillity[b]. A wiſe man, though deprived of ſight or hearing, may experience happineſs in the enjoyment of the good things which yet remain; and when ſuffering torture, or labouring under ſome painful diſeaſe, can mitigate the anguiſh by patience, and can enjoy, in his afflictions, the conſciouſneſs of his own conſtancy. But it is impoſſible that perfect happineſs can be poſſeſſed without the pleaſure which attends freedom from pain, and the enjoyment of the good things of life. Pleaſure is in its nature good, as pain is in its nature evil; the one is therefore to be purſued, and the other to be avoided, for its own ſake. Pleaſure, or pain, is not only good, or evil, in itſelf, but the meaſure of what is good or evil in every object of deſire or averſion; for the ultimate reaſon why we purſue one thing, and avoid another is, becauſe we expect pleaſure from the former, and apprehend pain from the latter. If we ſometimes decline a preſent pleaſure, it is not becauſe we are averſe to pleaſure itſelf, but becauſe we conceive, that in the preſent inſtance it will be neceſſarily connected with a greater pain. In like manner, if we ſometimes voluntarily ſubmit to a preſent pain, it is becauſe we judge that it is neceſſarily connected with a greater pleaſure. Although all pleaſure is eſſentially good, and all pain eſſentially evil, it doth not thence neceſſarily follow, that in every ſingle inſtance the one ought to be purſued, and the other to be avoided; but reaſon is to be employed in diſtinguiſhing and comparing the nature and degrees of each, that the reſult may be a wiſe choice of that which ſhall appear to be, upon the whole, good. That pleaſure is the firſt good, appears from the inclination which every animal, from its firſt birth, diſcovers to purſue pleaſure and avoid pain;

[a] Laert. l. x. § 118—122. Stob. Serm. 78. p. 281.
[b] Cic. de Fin. l. i. c. 10.

and

and is confirmed by the univerſal experience of mankind, who are incited to action by no other principle, than the deſire of avoiding pain, or obtaining pleaſure[a].

There are two kinds of Pleaſure; one conſiſting in a ſtate of reſt, in which both body and mind are undiſturbed by any kind of pain; the other ariſing from an agreeable agitation of the ſenſes, producing a correſpondent emotion in the ſoul. It is upon the former of theſe, that the enjoyment of life chiefly depends. Happineſs may therefore be ſaid to conſiſt in bodily eaſe, and mental tranquillity. When pleaſure is aſſerted to be the end of living, we are not, then, to underſtand that violent kind of delight, or joy, which ariſes from the gratification of the ſenſes and paſſions, but merely that placid ſtate of mind, which reſults from the abſence of every cauſe of pain or uneaſineſs. Thoſe pleaſures, which ariſe from agitation, are not to be purſued as in themſelves the end of living, but as means of arriving at that ſtable tranquillity, in which true happineſs conſiſts. It is the office of reaſon to confine the purſuit of pleaſure within the limits of nature, in order to the attainment of that happy ſtate, in which the body is free from every kind of pain, and the mind from all perturbation. This ſtate muſt not, however, be conceived to be perfect in proportion as it is inactive and torpid, but in proportion as all the functions of life are quietly and pleaſantly performed. A happy life neither reſembles a rapid torrent, nor a ſtanding pool, but is like a gentle ſtream, that glides ſmoothly and ſilently along[b].

This happy ſtate can only be attained by a prudent care of the body, and a ſteady government of the mind. The diſeaſes of the body are to be prevented by temperance, or cured by medicine, or rendered tolerable by patience. Againſt the diſeaſes of the mind, philoſophy provides ſufficient antidotes. The inſtruments which it employs for this purpoſe are the virtues; the root of which, whence all the reſt proceed, is Prudence. This virtue comprehends the

[a] Laert. § 118—137. Cic. Tuſc. Qu. l. ii. c. 7. l. v. c. 33. De Fin. l. i. c. 9, 10.

[b] Laert. l. x. § 136—139. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. iii. c. 17. De Fin. l. i. c. 9. 11. 17.

whole art of living diſcreetly, juſtly, and honourably, and is in fact the ſame thing with wiſdom [a]. It inſtructs men to free their underſtandings from the clouds of prejudice; to exerciſe temperance and fortitude in the government of themſelves; and to practiſe juſtice towards others. Although pleaſure, or happineſs, which is the end of living, be ſuperior to virtue, which is only the means, it is every one's intereſt to practiſe all the virtues; for in a happy life, pleaſure can never be ſeparated from virtue [b].

A prudent man, in order to ſecure his tranquillity, will conſult his natural diſpoſition in the choice of his plan of life. If, for example, he be perſuaded that he ſhould be happier in a ſtate of marriage than in celibacy, he ought to marry; but if he be convinced, that matrimony would be an impediment to his happineſs, he ought to remain ſingle. In like manner, ſuch perſons as are naturally active, enterpriſing, and ambitious, or ſuch as by the condition of their birth are placed in the way of civil offices, ſhould accommodate themſelves to their nature and ſituation, by engaging in public affairs; while ſuch as are, from natural temper, fond of leiſure and retirement, or, from experience or obſervation, are convinced that a life of public buſineſs would be inconſiſtent with their happineſs, are unqueſtionably at liberty, except where particular circumſtances call them to the ſervice of their country, to paſs their lives in obſcure repoſe [c].

Temperance is that diſcreet regulation of the deſires and paſſions, by which we are enabled to enjoy pleaſures without ſuffering any conſequent inconvenience. They who maintain ſuch a conſtant ſelf-command, as never to be enticed by the proſpect of preſent indulgence to do that which will be productive of evil, obtain the trueſt pleaſure by declining pleaſure. Since, of deſires ſome are natural and neceſſary; others natural, but not neceſſary; and others, neither natural nor neceſſary, but the offſpring of falſe judgment; it muſt be the office of temperance to gratify the firſt claſs, as far as

[a] Laert. § 132. 140. Cic. l. c. c. 14, 15. Tuſc. Q. l. iii. c. 3. Sen. de Benef. l. iv. c. 2.

[b] Laert. § 130. 140. Cic. de Fin. l. i. c. 15. [c] Laert. § 119.

nature

nature requires; to reſtrain the ſecond within the bounds of moderation; and, as to the third, reſolutely to oppoſe, and if poſſible entirely repreſs them[a].

Sobriety, as oppoſed to inebriety and gluttony, is of admirable uſe in teaching men that nature is ſatisfied with a little, and enabling them to content themſelves with ſimple and frugal fare. Such a manner of living is conducive to the preſervation of health; renders a man alert and active in all the offices of life; affords him an exquiſite reliſh of the occaſional varieties of a plentiful board, and prepares him to meet every reverſe of fortune without the fear of want[b].

Continence is a branch of temperance, which prevents the diſeaſes, infamy, remorſe, and puniſhment, to which thoſe are expoſed, who indulge themſelves in unlawful amours. Muſic and poetry, which are often employed as incentives to licentious pleaſures, are to be cautiouſly and ſparingly uſed[c].

Gentleneſs, as oppoſed to an iraſcible temper, greatly contributes to the tranquillity and happineſs of life, by preſerving the mind from perturbation, and arming it againſt the aſſaults of calumny and malice. A wiſe man, who puts himſelf under the government of reaſon, will be able to receive an injury with calmneſs, and to treat the perſon who committed it with lenity; for he will rank injuries among the caſual events of life, and will prudently reflect, that he can no more ſtop the natural current of human paſſions, than he can curb the ſtormy winds[d]. Refractory ſervants in a family ſhould be chaſtiſed, and diſorderly members of a ſtate puniſhed, without wrath.

Moderation, in the purſuit of honours or riches, is the only ſecurity againſt diſappointment and vexation. A wiſe man, therefore, will prefer the ſimplicity of ruſtic life to the magnificence of courts. Future events a wiſe man will conſider as uncertain, and

[a] Cic. de Fin. l. i. c. 13. 19. Tuſc. Q. l. v. c. 33. Laert. § 149.
[b] Laert. § 130, 131. Conf. Sen. Ep. 4.
[c] Laert. § 142. 118, 119. 121. Sext. Emp. adv. M. l. vi. § 19.
[d] Laert. l. c. § 113. Conf. Sen. Ep. 47.

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will therefore neither ſuffer himſelf to be elated with confident expectation, nor to be depreſſed by doubt and deſpair; for both are equally deſtructive of tranquillity. It will contribute to the enjoyment of life, to conſider death as the perfect termination of a happy life, which it becomes us to cloſe like ſatisfied gueſts, neither regretting the paſt, nor anxious for the future [a].

Fortitude, the virtue which enables us to endure pain, and to baniſh fear, is of great uſe in producing tranquillity. Philoſophy inſtructs us to pay homage to the gods, not through hope or fear, but from veneration of their ſuperior nature [b]. It, moreover, enables us to conquer the fear of death, by teaching us, that it is no proper object of terror; ſince whilſt we are, death is not, and when death arrives, we are not; ſo that it neither concerns the living, nor the dead [c]. The only evils to be apprehended are, bodily pain, and diſtreſs of mind. Bodily pain it becomes a wiſe man to endure with patience and firmneſs; becauſe, if it be ſlight, it may eaſily be borne; and if it be intenſe, it cannot laſt long. Mental diſtreſs commonly ariſes, not from nature, but from opinion; a wiſe man will therefore arm himſelf againſt this kind of ſuffering, by reflecting that the gifts of fortune, the loſs of which he may be inclined to deplore, were never his own, but depended upon circumſtances which he could not command. If therefore they happen to leave him, he will endeavour as ſoon as poſſible to obliterate the remembrance of them, by occupying his mind in pleaſant contemplation, and engaging in agreeable avocations [d].

Juſtice reſpects man as living in ſociety, and is the common bond without which no ſociety can ſubſiſt. This virtue, like the reſt, derives its value from its tendency to promote the happineſs of life. Not only is it never injurious to the man who practiſes it, but nouriſhes in his mind calm reflections, and pleaſant hopes; whereas

[a] Laert. § 118—130. 144. 146. Lucret. l. v. v. 1428, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. i. c. 21.

[b] Cic. ib. c. 14. 20. Laert. § 77. 81. 123. Lucret. l. v. v. 1193, &c.

[c] Laert. § 87. 124—126. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. iii. c. 4. § 229. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. v. c. 30. [d] Laert. § 118. 129. 140. Cic. Tuſc. Q. l. iii.

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it is impoſſible that the mind in which injuſtice dwells ſhould not be full of diſquietude[a]. Since it is impoſſible that iniquitous actions ſhould promote the enjoyment of life as much as remorſe of conſcience, legal penalties, and public diſgrace, muſt increaſe its troubles, every one who follows the dictates of ſound reaſon will practiſe the virtues of juſtice, equity, and fidelity[b]. In ſociety, the neceſſity of the mutual exerciſe of juſtice, in order to the common enjoyment of the gifts of nature, is the ground of thoſe laws by which it is preſcribed[c]. It is the intereſt of every individual in a ſtate to conform to the laws of juſtice; for by injuring no one, and rendering to every man his due, he contributes his part towards the preſervation of that ſociety, upon the perpetuity of which his own ſafety depends. Nor ought any one to think, that he is at liberty to violate the rights of his fellow citizens, provided he can do it ſecurely; for he who has committed an unjuſt action can never be certain that it will not be diſcovered; and however ſucceſsfully he may conceal it from others, this will avail him little, ſince he cannot conceal it from himſelf. In different communities, different laws may be inſtituted, according to the circumſtances of the people who compoſe them. Whatever is thus preſcribed is to be conſidered as a rule of juſtice, ſo long as the ſociety ſhall judge the obſervance of it to be for the benefit of the whole. But whenever any rule of conduct is found upon experience not to be conducive to the public good, being no longer uſeful, it ſhould no longer be preſcribed[d].

Nearly allied to juſtice are the virtues of beneficence, compaſſion, gratitude, piety, and friendſhip. He, who confers benefits upon others, procures to himſelf the ſatisfaction of ſeeing the ſtream of plenty ſpreading around him from the fountain of his beneficence; at the ſame time, he enjoys the pleaſure of being eſteemed by others. The exerciſe of gratitude, filial affection, and reverence for the gods, is neceſſary, in order to avoid the hatred and contempt of all men.

[a] Cic. de Fin. l. i. [b] Laert. § 120.
[c] Atque ipſa utilitas juſti prope mater et æqui eſt. HOR.
[d] Laert. § 150—152. Lucret. l. v. 1135. 1197.

Friendſhips are contracted for the ſake of mutual benefit; but by degrees they ripen into ſuch diſintereſted attachment, that they are continued without any proſpect of advantage. Between friends there is a kind of league, that each will love the other as himſelf. A true friend will partake of the wants and ſorrows of his friend, as if they were his own; if he be in want, he will relieve him; if he be in priſon, he will viſit him; if he be ſick, he will come to him; nay, ſituations may occur, in which he would not ſcruple to die for him. It cannot then be doubted, that friendſhip is one of the moſt uſeful means of procuring a ſecure, tranquil, and happy life [a].

The preceding ſummary of the Epicurean Syſtem of Ethics, which is drawn from authentic ſources, cannot but appear to the reader a full refutation of the cenſures which have been paſſed upon Epicurus by many writers, as the preceptor of luxurious and licentious pleaſures. Epicurus, it is true, repreſents pleaſure as the ultimate end of living; but pleaſure is, in his ſyſtem, only another term for happineſs. The truth is, the antient philoſophers, in their diſputes concerning The End of Living, or, The Greateſt Good, differed from each other more in words than in reality. The Stoics maintained, that virtue in itſelf is happineſs; Epicurus taught, that the motive by which men are induced to practiſe virtue is the deſire of happineſs. Both taught, that it is impoſſible to be happy without virtue, and both ſuppoſed virtue to conſiſt in a conformity to nature. The real difference, then, between their moral ſyſtems could not be material. If it be urged, that the phyſical ſyſtem of Epicurus neceſſarily led him to refer all pleaſures to the body; we anſwer, that, although Epicurus conceived the human ſoul to be a compound of atoms, he nevertheleſs aſcribed to it thoſe faculties which other philoſophers termed ſpiritual, and conſidered man as a being capable of intellectual and moral action. He ſuppoſed happineſs to conſiſt in mental tranquillity, as well as in a freedom from bodily pain; herein preſerving the common and natural diſtinctions between body and mind. He alſo conceived ſo intimate

[a] Laert. § 148. 154. Cic. de Fin. l. i. c. 20.

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an union to ſubſiſt between the mind and the body, that whenever the latter is affected with pleaſure or pain, the former neceſſarily receives the impreſſion. It was, therefore, of little conſequence, as far as concerned his moral ſyſtem, to which part of human nature he referred the actions of the man; ſince, on either ſuppoſition, the actions were the ſame, and it was alike true, that a virtuous courſe of conduct was neceſſary to a happy life. Nay, it may be added, that, according to the Epicurean ſyſtem, which made the ſentient principle a part of the ſoul, all pleaſure or pain muſt, ſtrictly ſpeaking, be ſaid to be ſeated in the ſoul, and the body only be conſidered as the inſtrument by means of which the ſoul performs its functions. No objection, therefore, againſt the moral ſyſtem of Epicurus can be fairly deduced from his phyſical doctrine concerning the ſoul.

After the death of Epicurus[a], the charge of his ſchool devolved by will, as was before obſerved, upon his friend Hermachus. It was continued in ſucceſſion by Polyſtratus, Baſilides, Protarchus, and others; concerning whom nothing memorable remains. The ſect ſubſiſted, but in a depraved and degraded ſtate, as will appear in the ſequel, till the decline of the Roman empire *.

[a] Laert. l. x. § 25. Suidas.

* Vidend. Heuman. Act. Phil. v. ii. p. 325. 369. 637. 643. Gaſſendus de Vita et Moribus Epicuri. Lugd. 1647. Op. t. v. Parker de Deo, Diſp. i. ſ. 12. 14. Bayle. Rondelli Vit. Epic. Amſt. 1693. Potter Arch. Gr. l. i. c. 9. Crophius de Gymnaſ. Lit. Ath. p. 55. Jonſ. de Script. l. i. c. 20. l. ii. c. 13. l. iv. p. 513. Morhoff. Polyh. t. ii. l. ii. p. 1. c. 7. § 5—10. Reimmann. Hiſt. Ath. c. 29. Gataker in Præloq. ad Antonin. Gaſſend. Comment. in Lib. decim Laertii; et Syntagma Philoſ. Epic. Thomas. de Exuſtione Mundi Stoica. Diſſ. ii. § 26. Conringiana, p. 65. Malebranche Recherche, p. i. l. i. c. 5. § 2. Crouſaz Logique, t. i. p. i. ſ. i. c. 4. Clerici Ars Crit. p. 2. ſect. 1. c. 9. Werenfels de Logom. Erud. c. 4. 6. Charleton Phyſiol. Epic. Lond. 1654. fol. Lamy de Princip. Paris, 1680. 12°. Scipio Aquilian. de Plac. Phil. ante Ariſt. c. 11. 12. Cudworth. c. v. ſect. 1. § 48. F. Grandis Diſſ. Crit. et Phil. 1. Schwartz. Suppl. ad Germ. Hiſt. Phil. p. 247. Du Hamel Conſenſ. Vet. et Nov. Phil. c. iv. § 6. Burnet. Arch. l. i. c. 13. Feurlin. Diſſ. de Modo Probandi Deum ex Conſenſu Gentium. Fabr. Syll. Scrip. de Ver. Ch. Rel. c. iv. vii. viii. Buddæi Theol. Mor. p. 1. c. 2. § 5. Fab. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 808. 816. 820. Des Coutures ſur le Morale d'Epicure, Par. 1685. La Haye, 1686. Stoll. Hiſt. Phil. Mor. § cxi. Struian. Bibl. Phl. Auct. a Kahlio. p. i. p. 17, &c. Hein. Comm. Acad. Berolin. 1744. p. 1.

CHAP. XVI.

OF THE PYRRHONIC OR SCEPTICAL SECT.

ANOTHER branch of the Italic ſchool of philoſophy yet remains to be noticed, if indeed a ſect which profeſſed no tenets could deſerve to be ranked among philoſophers; the Pyrrhonic, ſo called from Pyrrho its founder. From the leading character of this ſect, which was, that it called in queſtion the truth of every ſyſtem of opinions adopted by other ſects, and held no other ſettled opinion, but that every thing is uncertain, it has alſo been called the Sceptical ſect[a]. On account of the ſimilarity of the opinions of this ſect and thoſe of the Platonic ſchool in the Middle and New Academy, it happened, that many of the real followers of Pyrrho choſe to ſcreen themſelves from the reproach of univerſal ſcepticiſm, by calling themſelves Academics; whence the appellation of Pyrrhoniſts fell into diſuſe, whilſt the doctrine of Pyrrho had ſtill many advocates[b].

PYRRHO[c] was a native of Elea. In his youth he practiſed the art of painting, but either through diſinclination to this art, or becauſe his mind aſpired to higher purſuits, he paſſed over from the ſchool of painting to that of philoſophy. He ſtudied and admired the writings of Democritus, and had, as his firſt preceptor, Bryſon the ſon of Stilpo, a diſciple of Clinomachus. After this he became a diſciple of Anaxarchus, who was contemporary with Alexander, and he accompanied his maſter, in the train of Alexander, into India. Here he converſed with the Brachmans and Gymnoſophiſts, imbibing from their doctrine whatever might ſeem

[a] Laert. l. i. § 17. 20. l. ix. § 61. 69. Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. i. c. 3. 19. A. Gell. l. xi. c. 5. Suidas. [b] Cic. de Fin. l. ii.

[c] Laert. l. ix. § 61. Suidas. Pauſanias Eliac. l. ii. Euſeb. Pr. l. xiv. c. 18.

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favourable to his natural diſpoſition toward doubting; a diſpoſition which was cheriſhed by his maſter, who had formerly been a diſciple of a ſceptical philoſopher, Metrodorus of Chios.

Every advance which Pyrrho made in the ſtudy of philoſophy involving him in freſh uncertainty, he left the ſchools of the Dogmatiſts (ſo thoſe philoſophers were called, who profeſſed to be poſſeſſed of certain knowledge) and eſtabliſhed a new ſchool, in which he taught, that every object of human enquiry is involved in uncertainty, ſo that it is impoſſible ever to arrive at the knowledge of truth[a].

It is related of this philoſopher[b], that he acted upon his own principles, and carried his ſcepticiſm to ſuch a ridiculous extreme, that his friends were obliged to accompany him wherever he went, that he might not be run over by carriages, or fall down precipices. If this was true, it was not without reaſon that he was ranked among thoſe whoſe intellects were diſturbed by intenſe ſtudy. But, if we pay any attention to the reſpect with which he is mentioned by antient writers, or give any credit to the general hiſtory of his life, we muſt conclude theſe reports to have been calumnies invented by the Dogmatiſts, whom he oppoſed. He ſpent a great part of his life in ſolitude; and always preſerved a ſettled compoſure of countenance, undiſturbed by fear, or joy, or grief. He endured bodily pain with great fortitude; and, in the midſt of dangers, diſcovered no ſigns of apprehenſion. In diſputation, he was celebrated for the ſubtlety of his arguments, and the perſpicuity of his language. Epicurus, though no friend to ſcepticiſm, was an admirer of Pyrrho, becauſe he recommended, and practiſed, that ſelf-command which produces undiſturbed tranquillity, the great end, in the judgment of Epicurus, of all phyſical and moral ſcience. So highly was Pyrrho eſteemed by his countrymen, that they honoured him with the office of chief prieſt, and, out of reſpect to him, paſſed a decree by which all philoſophers were indulged with immunity from public taxes. He was a great admirer of the poets, particularly of Homer, and frequently repeated paſſages

[a] Laert. ib. § 58—61. [b] § 62, &c.

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from his poems. Could ſuch a man be ſo fooliſhly enſlaved by an abſurd ſyſtem, as to need a guide to keep him out of danger? Pyrrho flouriſhed about the hundred and tenth Olympiad[a], and died about the ninetieth year of his age, probably in the hundred and twenty-third Olympiad[b]. After his death, the Athenians honoured his memory with a ſtatue, and a monument to him was erected in his own country[c].

From this account of the life of Pyrrho, it is eaſy to perceive in what manner he fell into ſcepticiſm. It is in a great meaſure to be aſcribed to his early acquaintance with the ſyſtem of Democritus[d]. Having learned, from this philoſopher, to deny the real exiſtence of all qualities in bodies, except thoſe which are eſſential to primary atoms, and to refer every thing elſe to the perceptions of the mind produced by external objects, that is, to appearance and opinion, he concluded, that all knowledge depended upon the fallacious report of the ſenſes, and conſequently, that there can be no ſuch thing as certainty. He was encouraged in this notion by the general ſpirit of the Eleatic ſchool, in which he was educated, which was unfavourable to ſcience. But nothing contributed more to confirm him in ſcepticiſm, than the ſubtleties of the Dialectic ſchools, in which he was inſtructed by the ſon of Stilpo. He ſaw no method, by which he could ſo effectually overturn the cavils of ſophiſtry, as by having recourſe to the doctrine of univerſal uncertainty. Being ſtrongly inclined, from his natural temper and habits of life, to look upon immoveable tranquillity as the great end of all philoſophy; obſerving, that nothing tended ſo much to diſturb this tranquillity, as the innumerable diſſentions which agitated the ſchools of the Dogmatiſts; at the ſame time inferring, from their endleſs diſputes, the uncertainty of the queſtions upon which they debated; he determined to ſeek elſewhere for that peace of mind, which he deſpaired of finding in the dogmatic philoſophy. In this manner it happened, in the caſe of Pyrrho, as it has often happened in other inſtances, that controverſy became the parent of ſcepticiſm.

[a] B.C. 340. [b] B.C. 288. [c] Laert. l. ix. § 62—68. 102. Athen. l. x. p. 419. [d] Laert. § 67.

Pyrrho

Pyrrho had ſeveral diſciples; but none, whoſe names are ſufficiently celebrated to merit particular notice, except TIMON[a], the Phliaſian. Timon early viſited Megara, to be inſtructed by Stilpo in dialectics, and afterwards removed to Elea, that he might become a hearer of Pyrrho. He firſt profeſſed philoſophy at Chalcedon, and afterwards at Athens, where he remained till his death. He took ſo little pains to invite diſciples to his ſchool, that it has been ſaid of him[b], that, as the Scythians ſhot flying, Timon gained pupils by running from them. This indifference to the profeſſion which he had aſſumed was probably owing to his love of eaſe and indulgence; for he was fond of rural retirement, and was ſo much addicted to wine, that he held a ſucceſsful conteſt with ſeveral celebrated champions in drinking[c]. It was this diſpoſition, probably, which tempted him to embrace the indolent doctrine of Scepticiſm. Timon appear to have viewed the opinions and diſputes of the philoſophers in the ſame ludicrous point of light, in which Lucian afterwards contemplated them; for, like him, he wrote with ſarcaſtic humour againſt the whole body. His poem, entitled *Silli*, often quoted by the antients, was a keen ſatire, full of bitter invective both againſt men and doctrines. The remaining fragments of this poem have been induſtriouſly collected by Henry Stephens, in his *Poeſis Philoſophica*. This Timon (who is not to be confounded with Timon the Miſanthrope) lived to the age of ninety years, and flouriſhed in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus[d].

The public ſucceſſion of profeſſors in the Pyrrhonic ſchool terminated in Timon. Cicero[e] ſpeaks of this ſchool as in his time extinct: and he himſelf, in contending with the Dogmatic philoſophers, makes uſe of Academical rather than Sceptical weapons. This can only be aſcribed to the odium which fell upon the Pyrrhonic ſect ſoon after its inſtitution, partly through the jealouſy of the Dogmatiſts, and partly through the natural diſinclination of the

[a] Laert. l. ix. § 68. 109. Suidas. [b] Laert. § 112.
[c] Athen. l. x. p. 438.
[d] Laert. Euſeb. Pr. l. xiv. c. 18. Fabr. Bibl. Gr. v. ii. p. 820.
[e] De Fin. l. ii. Conf. Sen. Qu. Nat. l. vii. c. 32.

human

human mind to be left in total darkneſs. The doctrines of this ſchool were, however, profeſſed by the diſciples of Timon, and privately embraced by many other perſons, who choſe to ſcreen their Scepticiſm under the authority of the Academy; and, after ſome interval, the ſchool itſelf was revived by PTOLÆMEUS, a Cyrenian, and continued at Alexandria by ÆNESIDEMUS, a contemporary with Cicero: the latter wrote a Treatiſe "On the Principles of the Pyrrhonic Philoſophy," the heads of which are preſerved by Photius[a]. From his time it was tranſmitted, through a ſeries of preceptors little known[b], to SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, whoſe ſummary of the Sceptical doctrine is our principal authority in this part of our work.

The plan which we have laid down to ourſelves would now require, that we ſhould exhibit before our readers a connected view of the TENETS of the Pyrrhonic ſect. But the truth is, that Pyrrho and his followers rather endeavoured to demoliſh every other philoſophical ſtructure, than to erect one of their own[c]. They aſſerted nothing; but propoſed poſitions merely in the way of enunciation, without attempting to determine on which ſide, in any diſputed queſtion, the truth lay, or even preſuming to aſſert, that one propoſition was more probable than another. The definition of Scepticiſm given by Æneſidemus was this: it is the recollection of opinions embraced upon the teſtimony of the ſenſes, or upon any other evidence, by means of which one dogma is compared with another, and all, upon the compariſon, are found to be uſeleſs and full of confuſion. Seneca, comparing the Megaric and Sceptic philoſophers, ſays[d]; "The former furniſh me with unprofitable ſcience, the latter deprive me of all hope of attaining knowledge. I prefer a man, who teaches me trifles, to one who teaches me nothing. If the Dialectic philoſopher leaves me in the dark, the Sceptic puts out my eyes." The ground of the Sceptical doctrine, if it may deſerve the name, and the method of philoſophiſing which the Pyrrhoniſts purſued, may be clearly underſtood from the following brief HEADS

[a] Cod. 212. p. 280. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. i. c. 29. § 349. Adv. Phyſ. l. i. § 357. l. ii. § 216. Fab. Bib. Gr. vol. ii. p. 818. vol. x. p. 449.
[b] Laert. § 116. [c] Laert. l. ix. § 74. 78. [d] Ep. 88.

OF

OF SCEPTICISM, for which we are chiefly indebted to Sextus Empiricus.

It is the office of the Sceptic Philoſophy to compare external *phenomena* with mental conceptions, and diſcover their inconſiſtency, and the conſequent uncertainty of all reaſoning from appearances. Its end is, to cure that reſtleſſneſs which attends the unſucceſsful ſearch after truth, and, by means of an univerſal ſuſpenſion of judgment, to eſtabliſh mental tranquillity. Its fundamental principle is, that to every argument, an argument of equal weight may, in all caſes, be oppoſed [a].

The Sceptic admits no tenets, not becauſe he diſcredits the immediate teſtimony of the ſenſes, but becauſe he refuſes his aſſent to thoſe doubtful points which ſcience undertakes to determine. He does not deny that he can ſee, hear, or feel; but he maintains, that the inferences which philoſophers have drawn from the reports of the ſenſes are doubtful; and that any general concluſion deduced from appearances may be overturned by reaſonings equally plauſible with thoſe by which it is ſupported. Scepticiſm allows the exiſtence of ſenſible appearances, becauſe the impreſſions which external objects make upon the power of perception, or the phantaſy, produce an irreſiſtible conviction of their reality; but it demurs upon the poſitions which are advanced concerning the *phenomena* of nature. As far as concerns the offices of common life, the Sceptic acquieſces in appearances; being neceſſarily impelled to conform to them by his natural appetites and paſſions. Hence he liſtens to the calls of nature, conforms to eſtabliſhed cuſtoms, and practiſes uſeful arts [b].

The manner in which a Sceptic arrives at an undiſturbed ſtate of mind is entirely caſual. At his entrance upon the ſtudy of philo-

[a] Sexti Empirici Pyrrhoniæ Hypotypoſes (Ed. Lipſ. 1718) l. i. c. 4. § 8, 9. c. v. § 12. c. xii. § 25. § 202. 232. l. iii. § 235. Adv. Eth. § 111. Pyrrh. c. vi. § 12.

[b] Sext. Em. Pyrrh. l. i. c. 6. § 12. c. 7. § 13. c. 8. § 16, 17. c. 11. § 22, 23, 24. Laert. l. ix. § 68. 105, 108. Euſeb. Pr. l. xiv. c. 18.

ſophy, he hopes to be able to diſtinguiſh true from falſe opinions, and thus to obtain tranquillity; but being held in ſuſpence by contrary reaſoning, he deſpairs of arriving at ſatisfaction, and concludes, that no certain judgment can be formed concerning good and evil. Hence he is accidentally taught, that there is no reaſon for eagerly purſuing any apparent good, or avoiding any apparent evil; and his mind, of courſe, ſettles into a ſtate of undiſturbed tranquillity. So Apelles, when in painting a horſe he had ſucceeded ſo ill in drawing the foam, that, in vexation, he threw the ſponge which he uſed for taking off colours at the picture, by this accidental action formed the repreſentation which he had ſo long in vain exerted his utmoſt ſkill to produce[a].

Ten diſtinct topics of argument were made uſe of in the ſchool of the Sceptics, with this precaution, that nothing could be poſitively aſſerted, concerning either the number, or the force of the arguments which may be urged in ſupport of the doctrine of uncertainty. 1. That on account of the variety which takes place in the organization of different animal bodies, it is probable that the ſame external object preſents different images to different animals; and man can have no reaſon for aſſerting, that his perceptions are more conformable to the real nature of things, than thoſe of inferior animals. 2. That even among men there is a great diverſity both of mind and body, which neceſſarily occaſions a great variety of opinions; every man judging according to his particular apprehenſion, whilſt no one is able to determine the real nature of things. 3. That the different ſenſes give different reports of the ſame thing; whence, bodies may have different properties from thoſe which the ſenſes lead us to ſuppoſe. 4. That the ſame thing appears differently, according to the different diſpoſitions, or circumſtances, of the perſon who perceives it; whence, it is impoſſible for any one man to pronounce, that his judgment concerning any object is agreeable to nature. 5. That things aſſume a different aſpect according to their diſtance, poſition, or place; and no reaſon can be aſſigned why one of theſe aſpects ſhould agree with the real object, rather than the reſt. 6. That no

[a] Sext. Emp. Pyr. l. i. c. 12. § 26, 27. c. 13. § 31.

object

object offers itſelf to the ſenſes, which is not ſo connected and mixed with others, that it cannot be diſtinctly ſeparated and examined. 7. That objects of ſenſe appear exceedingly different, when viewed in a compound, and in a decompoſed ſtate; and it is impoſſible to ſay, which appearance moſt truly expreſſes their real nature. 8. That every object being always viewed in its relation to others, it is impoſſible to determine what it is ſimply, in its own nature. 9. That our judgment is liable to uncertainty from the circumſtance of frequent or rare occurrence; that which happens every day, appearing to us in a very different light from that, in which the ſame thing would appear if it were new. 10. That mankind are continually led into different conceptions concerning the ſame thing, through the influence of cuſtom, law, fabulous tales, and eſtabliſhed opinions. On all theſe accounts, every human judgment is liable to uncertainty, and we can only ſay, concerning any thing, that it ſeems to be, not that it is what it ſeems [a].

Beſides theſe topics, the later Sceptics made uſe of ſome others. They maintained that every propoſition requires ſome prior propoſition to ſupport it, *in infinitum*, or ſuppoſes ſome axiom, which cannot be proved, and is therefore taken for granted without demonſtration, that is, may be denied; that in argument, the point aſſumed, and that which is to be proved, may often be alternately uſed in each others place, both being equally uncertain; and laſtly, that nothing can be underſtood, by itſelf, as appears from the endleſs diſputes of philoſophers concerning the nature of things; nor by means of ſomething elſe, whilſt itſelf remains unknown [b].

On theſe and other ſimilar grounds [c], the Sceptics not only refuſed their aſſent to propoſitions of every kind, but avoided as much as poſſible every form of ſpeech which expreſſes certainty. When they uſe the term *is*, or any equivalent mode of aſſertion, they confeſs, that the term *ſeems*, or ſome other expreſſion of doubt, ſhould be ſubſtituted in its ſtead. Every thing, according to them, being uncertain

[a] Sext. Emp. l. c. l. i. c. x. § 36—163. Laert. l. ix. § 79, &c. Aul. Gell. l. xi. c. 5.

[b] Sext. Emp. l. i. c. 15. § 164, &c. [c] C. 17. § 180.

and

and incomprehenſible, their language, in all caſes, was, "What you aſſert may be true, or it may not; I ſuſpend my judgment; I determine nothing." They admitted the exiſtence of appearances, but maintained, that nothing could be affirmed with certainty concerning the nature of things[a].

Concerning LOGIC, the Scepties deliberate as follows:

Man can have no certain criterion of truth, becauſe man, the being who judges, is unknown to himſelf; becauſe he has no faculties by which he can judge, beſides thoſe of ſenſe and intellect, of which the former are uncertain and contradictory in their reports, and the latter is doubtful of its own exiſtence and nature, and variable in its operations and concluſions; and becauſe the inſtrument which he makes uſe of in judging, namely, the perception produced in his mind by the impreſſion of external objects, or the phantaſy, is itſelf wholly incomprehenſible, being a certain affection or ſtate of the rational principle, whoſe nature is unknown, and which is eſſentially different from the external object by which it is produced. If the underſtanding judges from any ſuppoſed perception, it judges according to that perception, and not according to the external object; and it is impoſſible that the underſtanding ſhould determine, whether the perception produced by an external object be like the object itſelf. A further cauſe of logical uncertainty is, that, except in caſes where the ſenſes are immediately concerned, as when we infer the preſence of fire from ſmoke, we cannot reaſon from that which is manifeſt to that which is concealed[b].

Syllogiſms eſtabliſh univerſal from particular propoſitions by induction, and demonſtrate the truth of particular from univerſal propoſitions; a kind of circular reaſoning which can produce no ſatisfactory proof. All induction is defective, and may therefore omit particulars which would contradict the propoſitions intended to be eſtabliſhed[c].

[a] Sext. Emp. l. c. § 185. & c. 19, 20, 21, 22. Cic. in Lucull. c. 6. 18.

[b] Sext. Emp. l. c. l. i. c. 29, &c. l. ii. c. 4. § 18, &c. c. 5. § 37, &c. c. 6. § 48, &c. c. 7. § 70, &c. c. 10. § 97, &c. c. 11. § 104, &c. 113, &c. c. 12. § 134. c. 13. § 149, &c. Laert. l. ix. § 91. l. x. § 33.

[c] Sext. Emp. ib. l. ii. c. 14. § 193, &c. 204.

Definitions

Definitions cannot aſſiſt any one in his ſearch after truth; for if he is unacquainted with the nature of the thing to be defined, he cannot define it, and if he is acquainted with its nature, he accommodates the definition to his previous knowledge; nor are they neceſſary in inſtruction, for ſince he who firſt acquired the knowledge of any thing, gained it without the help of definitions, ſo he may certainly communicate it without their help. Definitions are alſo uſeleſs, ſince, before they can be applied, their accuracy muſt be maintained, which is an occaſion of endleſs diſpute[a]. Equally uſeleſs are diviſions into whole and part, or into genus, ſpecies, and accident. For example, genus and ſpecies are either merely nominal, or realities. If they are nominal only, they partake of the uncertainty of the mind which conceives them; if they are realities, ſpecies cannot be comprehended in *genera*, becauſe they would not then have a diſtinct ſubſiſtence; and if they are not ſo comprehended, the entire nature of genus and ſpecies is loſt[b]. The forms of logic for the refutation of ſophiſms are alſo uſeleſs; for though it be deſirable to refute ſophiſtical reaſoning, this muſt be done, not by the artificial arguments of ſyllogiſms, but by acquiring a probable knowledge of the nature of things, and oppoſing the evidence of the ſenſes, and appearances, to the quibbles of ſophiſtry.

As the Sceptic admits nothing certain in the inſtrumental part of philoſophy, or logic, he conceives that there may be equal room for doubt in all philoſophical diſquiſitions, concerning NATURE.

With reſpect to the DEITY, he aſks, ſince the Dogmatiſts are not determined whether God be corporeal or incorporeal; whether he be endued with a human form or not; whether he be in place or not; or if he be in place, whether he is in the world or beyond it; what can be certainly known concerning a being of whoſe form, ſubſiſtence, and place, we are ignorant? That an efficient cauſe exiſts, may be inferred with probability from the productions and diſſolutions which take place in nature; for how can theſe changes happen without a cauſe? On the other ſide it may be urged, that if any cauſe be admitted, ſome cauſe muſt be aſſigned for that cauſe, and

[a] Ib. c. 16. § 205. 211, 212. [b] Ib. c. 20. § 219, &c. 22. § 236.

ſo

ſo on *in infinitum*. Each opinion may be ſupported by probable arguments; whence the queſtion muſt remain doubtful[a].

Material Principles muſt alſo, according to the Sceptics, be pronounced incomprehenſible, as is ſufficiently manifeſt from the diſagreement among philoſophers concerning their nature; for this diſagreement ſhows, that there are no common axioms on this ſubject, in which all are agreed, and which need no proof. The idea of body is incomprehenſible; for it is ſaid to conſiſt of length, breadth, thickneſs, and a power of reſiſtance; but theſe properties conſidered in themſelves are nothing, and can only exiſt as qualities of body; and yet if theſe be taken away, the whole idea of body is deſtroyed. Bodies are ſaid to be compoſed of primary elements, but this muſt either be by contact, or by mixture. It cannot be by contact; for either the parts of body in contact muſt touch, or the whole; the whole cannot touch, for then they would no longer touch, but become coincident; nor can the parts touch, for each part is a whole with reſpect to its own parts; if therefore any parts of bodies touch, wholes would touch, which is abſurd. The formation of bodies by contact is therefore inconceivable. And their formation by mixture is equally ſo. For mixture muſt be of the entire ſubſtance of the primary elements, elſe the effect would be contiguity, and not mixture; but a ſmall portion of elementary matter cannot be mixed with a larger ſubſtance, without becoming equal in magnitude, which is abſurd. We can therefore form no conception of the compoſition of bodies from primary elements[b].

Upon the queſtion concerning motion, the Sceptics not being able to refute the arguments which have been urged againſt its exiſtence, nor to reject the phenomena by which its exiſtence becomes evident, ſuſpend their judgment. On ſimilar grounds, they heſitate concerning the poſſibility of increaſe or diminution, tranſpoſition or change of any kind; for ſince a whole, as diſtinct from all parts, is nothing, adding, taking away, or changing the poſition of parts,

[a] Ib. l. iii. c. 1. § 2—11. 17. 24. Adv. Phyſ. l. i. § 33. 49. Pyrrh. l. ii. c. 13.
[b] Ib. l. iii. c. 4. § 30, &c. c. 5. § 38, &c. c. 6. § 56, &c.

affects nothing. Again, that which is changed muſt be changed in ſome time either paſt, preſent, or future; but it cannot be changed in any time paſt or future, for nothing can either act or ſuffer in a time that does not exiſt; nor can it be changed in the preſent time; for the preſent inſtant is an indiviſible point of duration, in which nothing can be done[a]. Place, or the part of ſpace occupied by body, muſt be either of one dimenſion, or of all the three; if the former, it is not commenſurate with the body whoſe place it is; if the latter, body, which conſiſts of three dimenſions, is its own place, and the thing containing is the ſame with the thing contained; both theſe ſuppoſitions are abſurd; yet the *phenomena* ſeem to prove the exiſtence of place, therefore the Sceptic does not determine this, rather than that, to be true. Time is neither a corporeal nor incorporeal ſubſtance; but beſides this nothing can be conceived; therefore time ſeems to be nothing: on the contrary, experience ſeems to prove its exiſtence; therefore, the Sceptic determines nothing concerning it[b].

On the ſubject of MORALS, the Sceptic ſect ſuſpended their judgment concerning the ground of the diſtinction admitted by the Stoics, and other Dogmatiſts, between things in their nature good, evil, or indifferent. The arguments on which they inſiſt are ſuch as theſe:

The different opinions concerning good ſufficiently prove, that philoſophers are ignorant of its nature. Different men are differently affected by things which are called good, and therefore theſe things in themſelves cannot be good. Deſire itſelf is not good, elſe we ſhould be contented with it, and not endeavour to obtain its object; nor can the external object of deſire be good, becauſe it is external; there appears therefore to be nothing really good, and conſequently nothing really evil. Since different men judge and act differently concerning theſe things, ſome approving what others condemn, and ſome avoiding what others purſue, there can be nothing in nature really good, evil, or indifferent. Hence it follows that ethics can

[a] Ib. l. iii. c. 8. § 64. c. 9, 10. § 82, &c. c. 12. § 98, &c. c. 14. § 109, &c. c. 15. § 115, &c. [b] Ib. c. 16. § 125, &c. c. 17. § 136—144.

have

have no foundation in nature. The art of living well is not innate to man; for, if it were, all men would be virtuous: nor can it be taught, for that which is to be taught, is doubtful; no one is himſelf ſufficiently inſtructed to become a teacher; nor are there any means of demonſtration, or teſtimony, by which it can be taught; or if this art could be taught, it would only prove the occaſion of endleſs perturbation of mind, ariſing from the eager deſire and purſuit of things ſuppoſed to be good. Tranquillity is beſt obtained, by giving up all expectation of arriving at truth, and ſitting down in a ſtate of total indifference with reſpect to opinions*.

Beſides theſe, which are the chief grounds of Scepticiſm, as given by the hiſtorian and admirer of the ſect, Sextus Empiricus, there are others, neither leſs ſubtle, nor more ſatisfactory, than the idle quibbles of the Dialectic ſchools. Indeed nothing is more evident, than that the Sceptic ſect owed its exiſtence to the diſputatious ſpirit of the Dogmatiſts; and that the followers of Pyrrho were more deſirous to put an end to the frivolous conteſts of others, than to eſtabliſh even their own doctrine of incredulity. In order to accompliſh their end, they made no ſcruple to turn back upon their adverſaries their own weapons, by making uſe of ſpecious arguments, diſtinctions merely verbal, and other artifices of ſophiſtry. It would not be difficult to expoſe the fallacies of thoſe reaſonings, if they deſerve the name, by which the ancient Sceptics endeavoured to undermine the foundations of truth, and to overturn every ſcientific, moral, and religious principle. But the nature and extent of our hiſtorical undertaking, will not permit us to enter into this important field of argument. Referring our readers to thoſe able advocates of truth, which modern times have produced, we muſt therefore content ourſelves for the preſent with briefly remarking, that the Sceptics have advanced nothing upon the important queſtion reſpecting the Exiſtence and Providence of a Supreme Being, which may not, with the greateſt confidence, be referred to mere verbal quibbling, or to the acknowledged imperfection of the human

* Ib. l. iii. c. 1ſt. § 153, &c. c. 21. § 172, &c. c. 23. § 179, &c. c. 24. § 191. 195. 206. 235. c. 25—31. Conf. Laert. l. ix. § 61. 108.

intellect,

intellect, which, whilſt it embraces, on the clear and certain ground of final cauſes in nature, the doctrine of the exiſtence of a Deity, muſt always confeſs itſelf unequal to the full comprehenſion of his nature and operations. It muſt be added, that whilſt the Sceptics claſſed the queſtion concerning the exiſtence of the Deity among thoſe ſpeculations, upon which they thought it impoſſible to decide with certainty either in the affirmative or negative, they not only joined in the popular worſhip of the gods, but confeſſed that there appeared to be, in the human mind, a natural inſtinctive principle of religion. A conceſſion, which ſufficiently invalidates all their futile reaſonings on the ſide of Infidelity.

If the hiſtory of the Sceptic ſect be compared with that of the Academy, the two ſects will be found to be nearly allied. The chief points of difference between them were theſe[a]: the Academics laid it down as an axiom, that nothing can be known with certainty; the Pyrrhoniſts perceived the abſurdity of this poſition, and maintained that even this ought not to be poſitively aſſerted. The Academics admitted the real exiſtence of good and evil; the Pyrrhoniſts ſuſpended their judgment upon this point. The Academics, eſpecially the followers of Carneades, allowed different degrees of probability in opinion; but the Sceptics rejected all ſpeculative concluſions, drawn either from the teſtimony of the ſenſes, or from reaſoning; and contended, that we can have no ground for affirming or denying any propoſition, or embracing any one opinion rather than another. Carneades admitted, that by the impreſſions of external objects upon the ſenſes, we are neceſſarily inclined to one opinion more than another; Pyrrho, whilſt he acknowledged, that men are neceſſarily impelled to action by their feelings, denied, that they are capable of forming any judgment. In common life, the Academics followed probability; the Sceptics, law, cuſtom, and the natural impulſe of appetite. After all, theſe two ſects differed more in appearance, than in reality. Both invaded the ſtrong holds of truth; but the Academics did it covertly and with modeſty, whilſt the

[a] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. l. i. c. 33. Æneſid. apud. Phot. Cod. 213.

Sceptics aſſaulted them with open violence, as if they had forſworn all allegiance to reaſon.

Before we take our leave of this ſect, it may be of ſome importance briefly to remark the gradual progreſs of Scepticiſm through the ſeveral ſtages of the Greek philoſophy. The confeſſion of ignorance and uncertainty, which ſo frequently fell from the lips of Socrates, amounted to no more than a general acknowledgment of the imbecility of the human underſtanding. In this modeſt acknowledgment he was followed by Plato and others. But, as ſoon as the Greek philoſophers began to employ themſelves in conſtructing ſyſtems of philoſophy, they admitted a tenet which was favourable to incredulity; namely, that nature is perpetually fluctating, ſo that no ſenſible object remains, for any ſingle moment, perfectly the ſame. Pythagoras and Plato, Heraclitus, Democritus and Epicurus, who were among the moſt celebrated Dogmatiſts, embraced this tenet; but in order to provide ſome ſtable foundation for ſcience, the two former deviſed their world of intelligibles, denominated by Plato, Ideas, and by Pythagoras, Numbers; and the two latter introduced the doctrine of immutable Atoms. Theſe doctrines, which were rather hypothetical than demonſtrable, ſtill left ſufficient room for doubt and uncertainty. After this, the Eleatic and Megaric ſects, who admitted into their ſchools the moſt childiſh quibbles and abſurd cavilling, and the Sophiſts, who profeſſedly undertook either ſide in any queſtion, and diſputed ſolely for conqueſt, without regarding truth, afforded no ſmall advantage to the riſing cauſe of Scepticiſm. Pyrrho and others, who were more inclined to doubt than to dogmatiſe, when they ſaw by what frivolous arguments opinions were, in theſe ſchools, ſupported or confuted, were led to conclude, that the whole philoſophy of the Dogmatiſts reſted upon the ſame precarious ground. Hearing the leaders of different ſects traducing each others ſyſtems as falſe, puerile, abſurd, and hoſtile to the truth; and remarking, particularly, the violent contentions which aroſe among the followers of Ariſtotle, Zeno, and Epicurus; it was not without ſome appearance of reaſon, that they looked upon the whole maſs of Dogmatic philoſophy as an ill con-

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ſtructed edifice, raiſed upon the ſand, which muſt ſoon fall to the ground. Where the prejudice, which theſe circumſtances would create in favour of Scepticiſm, was aided by a natural feebleneſs of judgment, and inſtability of temper, it was no wonder if it produced univerſal uncertainty. That theſe were the natural infirmities of thoſe who diſtinguiſhed themſelves as leaders in the Sceptic ſect, is ſufficiently ſeen in the weak reaſonings, and puerile trifles, which are piled up in the memoirs of this ſect, ſo induſtriouſly collected by Sextus Empiricus. And, whatever may have been urged to the contrary by modern advocates for Scepticiſm, it cannot be reaſonably doubted, that the true cauſes of the continuance of this ſect, through every age, have been, that indolence which is inimical to every mental exertion; that kind of intellectual imbecility which, in various degrees, incapacitates men for diſcerning the true nature and condition of things; or, laſtly, that propenſity towards ſubtile refinement, which hinders the moſt vigorous mind in eſtimating different degrees of probability, and accurately diſtinguiſhing truth from error *.

* Videnda. Huet de la Foibleſſe, &c. Jonſ. Scr. H. Ph. l. ii. c. 3, 4. Fabr. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 674. 818. Bayle. Sexti Diſp. Anti-Scept. ap. Fab. Bib. Gr. v. xii. p. 617. Morhoff. Polyh. t. ii. l. i. c. 6. Fabr. Syl. Scr. de Ver. c. 23. § 4. Heuniſch. Diſſ. de Phil. Scept. Arnhem. de Sect. Pyrrh. Miſc. Lipſ. t. v. Obſ. cxi. p. 240. Le Vayer. Op. t. v. p. 213. Bierling. de Pyrrh. c. i. § 3. Stollii Hiſt. Mor. p. 198. Gaſſend de Vit. Epic. l. v. c. 3. Voſſ. de Sect. p. 110. Paſch. Introd. in Rem Lit. Mor. Vet. p. 717. Crouſaz Log. p. iii. c. 9. § 12. Budd. de Scepticiſmo Morali, § 2. Ann. Hiſt. Ph. p. 210. § 23. p. 238. Ploucquet de Epoch. Pyrrh. Tub. 1758.

We have now completed the FIRST PERIOD of the Hiſtory of Philoſophy, Barbaric and Grecian. The latter we have followed from its infancy, through every ſtage of its growth, till it was tranſferred to Rome; and, as far as the numerous difficulties and obſcu-

rities, which, after every effort to clear them away, ſtill hang over the ſubject, would permit, we have delineated the peculiar features of the ſeveral ſects, and given a ſummary of their reſpective ſyſtems. It only remains, that we conclude this part of our work with remarking, in a few words, the fate of the Grecian philoſophy in countries foreign to Greece, where it was diſſeminated and profeſſed, excepting among the Romans, among whom the fortune it experienced through a long courſe of years is ſo intereſting as to require a particular diſcuſſion.

The Grecian philoſophy was at firſt confined, as we have ſeen, within the limits of Greece, and the neighbouring regions, except the Italic ſchool, inſtituted by Pythagoras in *Magna Græcia*. Several eminent philoſophers, it is true, travelled into Egypt; but it was chiefly in the infancy of philoſophy, and rather for the purpoſe of acquiring, than of communicating, knowledge. But after Egypt, and almoſt all Aſia, was brought under the Grecian yoke by the conqueſts of Alexander, the Grecian philoſophy paſſed, as might naturally be expected, from the conquerors to the nations whom they had ſubdued. Alexander himſelf, who had been early initiated into philoſophical ſtudies, and inſpired with reſpect for philoſophers by his maſter Ariſtotle, enlarged the boundaries of philoſophy[f], by carrying with him, wherever he went, a train of philoſophers, (among whom were Calliſthenes and Anaxarchus) whom he treated with great reſpect, and employed in conciliating the affections of the people to their conqueror. Notwithſtanding the reverence which the Orientaliſts unqueſtionably entertained for their antient doctrines, there can be little doubt that, when Alexander, in order to preſerve, by the arts of peace, that extenſive empire, which he had obtained by the force of arms, endeavoured to incorporate the cuſtoms of the Greeks with thoſe of the Perſian, Indian, and other Eaſtern nations, the opinions as well as the manners of this feeble and obſequious race would, in a great meaſure, be accommodated to thoſe of their conquerors. This influence of the Grecian upon the

[f] Plutarch. de Fort. Alex. t. ii. p. 346. t. v. p. 450. Ammon. in Vit. Ariſt.

Oriental

Oriental philoſophy continued long after the time of Alexander, and was one principal occaſion of the confuſion of opinions which we ſhall find in the ſubſequent hiſtory of the Alexandrian and Chriſtian ſchools.

It was in Alexandria chiefly, that the Grecian philoſophy was ingrafted upon the ſtock of antient Oriental wiſdom. The Egyptian method of teaching by allegory was peculiarly favourable to ſuch an union. We have already ſeen, that the philoſophy and religion of the Egyptians early underwent a material change of this kind, when Cambyſes, in conquering this country, introduced the doctrine and theology of the Perſians. Under the government of the Greeks, there were ſimilar innovations; the prieſts of Egypt endeavouring, as well as they were able, to form a coalition between the antient religion of their country and the doctrine and philoſophy of their conquerors.

Alexander, when he built the city of Alexandria, with a determination to make it the ſeat of his empire, and peopled it with emigrants from various countries, opened a new mart of philoſophy, which emulated the fame of Athens itſelf. A general indulgence was granted to the promiſcuous crowd aſſembled in this riſing city, whether Egyptians, Grecians, Jews, or others, to profeſs their reſpective ſyſtems of philoſophy and religion without moleſtation. The conſequence was, that Egypt was ſoon filled with religious and philoſophical ſectaries of every kind; and particularly, that almoſt every Grecian ſect found an advocate and profeſſor in Alexandria *.

The family of the Ptolemies, who, after Alexander, obtained the government of Egypt, from motives of policy encouraged this new eſtabliſhment. Ptolemy Lagus, who had obtained the crown of Egypt by uſurpation, was particularly careful to ſecure the intereſt of the Greeks in his favour; and, with this view, invited people from every part of Greece to ſettle in Egypt, and removed the

* Plut. l. c. Juſtin. l. 38. c. 9. Athen. l. iv. p. 184. Porph. Vit. Plot. c. 16. Arrian. l. iii. Q. Curt. l. iv. c. 8. Strabo, l. xvii. Amm. Marcell. l. xxii. c. 6. Joſeph. contr. Ap. l. ii. De Bell. J. l. ii. c. 36.

ſchools of Athens to Alexandria. This enlightened prince ſpared no expence to raiſe the literary, as well as the civil, military, and commercial credit of his country. In order to provide, in Alexandria, a permanent reſidence for learning and philoſophy, he laid the foundation of a library, which, after his time, became exceedingly famous; granted philoſophers of every claſs immunity from public offices; and encouraged ſcience and literature by royal munificence. Demetrius Phalereus, who was eminent in every kind of learning, eſpecially in philoſophy, aſſiſted the liberal deſigns of the prince, by his judicious advice and active ſervices. Ptolemy Philadelphus adopted, with great ardour, the liberal views of his predeceſſor, and afforded ſtill further aid to philoſophy, by enriching the Alexandrian library with a vaſt collection of books in every branch of learning, and by inſtituting a college of learned men, who, that they might have leiſure to proſecute their ſtudies, were maintained at the public expence[a].

Under the patronage, firſt, of the Egyptian princes, and afterwards of the Roman emperors, Alexandria long continued to enjoy great celebrity as the ſeat of learning, and to ſend forth eminent philoſophers of every ſect to diſtant countries. It remained a ſchool of learning, as well as a commercial emporium, till it was taken, and plundered of its literary treaſures, by the Saracens.

Philoſophy, during this period, ſuffered a grievous corruption, from the attempt which was made by philoſophers of different ſects and countries, Grecian, Egyptian, and Oriental, who were aſſembled in Alexandria, to frame, from their different tenets, one general ſyſtem of opinions. The reſpect which had long been univerſally paid to the ſchools of Greece, and the honours with which they were now adorned by the Egyptian princes, induced other wiſe men, and even the Egyptian prieſts and philoſophers themſelves, to ſubmit to this innovation. Hence aroſe an heterogeneous maſs of opinions, of which we ſhall afterwards take more particular

[a] Diod. Sic. l. xviii. Pauſan. in Att. Phot. Cod. 92. Ælian, l. iii. c. 17. Clem. Alex. Stro. l. i. p. 341. Philoſtr. Vit. Soph. l. i. c. 22. Laert. l. viii. c. 46. A. Gell. l. iv. c. 2.

notice

notice under the name of the Eclectic philoſophy, and which we ſhall find to have been the foundation of endleſs confuſion, error, and abſurdity, not only in the Alexandrian ſchool, but among Jews and Chriſtians; producing among the former that ſpurious kind of philoſophy, which they called their Cabbala, and, among the latter, innumerable corruptions of the Chriſtian Faith.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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TO THE

FIRST VOLUME.

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

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